GERMANY AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: 'TOTAL WAR', THE 'CULTURE OF RESTRAINT', AND THE QUEST FOR NORMALITY

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Abstract
For most of the past century, Germany's attitudes toward and practices of war have deviated from that of other Western countries. After the conduct of war had been pushed to new extremes during the Third Reich, after World War II, Germans turned into zealous proponents of anti-militarism. Since the late 1980s, the discrepancy between Germany and its Western partners has been shrinking, though, as Germany has shown growing readiness to contribute to international military operations. In this article, we will examine these changes, paying particular attention to the interplay of public attitudes, political discourse, and concrete foreign policy behaviour. Many observers maintain that the development of Germany's foreign policy behavior on this issue has largely been a response to both (mostly international) structural incentives and (mostly domestic) structural constraints. In contrast, others view it as driven by a deliberate strategy of re-militarization adopted by a small group of decision-makers. We argue that neither the structure- nor the actor-centered perspective are sufficient alone to understand the development of the German position on the use of military force. Thus, we will assume a third perspective, stressing the co-constitutive effects of public and elite discourse, public attitudes and foreign policy behaviour. We substantiate our argument by examining the interplay of these three factors since the 1980s, paying special attention to the two most important conflicts of the 1990s, the Gulf War and the Kosovo War.
Introduction

For most of the past century, Germany's attitudes toward and practices of war have been special in two ways as compared to other 'Western' or 'developed' countries. First, in the German case the changes that took place during the last century were probably more dramatic than in the case of similar societies (or similarly positioned states). Second, the development in Germany often seemed to contravene the trends prevalent in such other societies. The so-called Bonn Republic appeared to be almost as much of an extreme in comparison to other Western countries as was the Third Reich. Where Hitler and his associates pushed war to new extremes in both theory and practice, post-war West Germans were, for the most part, willing recipients or even zealous proponents of the anti-militarist re-education favoured by the Western allies. Where Goebbels was declaring 'total war' to the world, West German 'Genscherists' were declaring 'total peace', as one German journalist put it at the time of unification. Most observers could probably agree that both the Third Reich and the second German Republic were special in their attitudes toward war compared to other countries and societies during the same era. Whatever 'normal' may have meant in terms of defining Western attitudes during both periods, Germany was diverging from this norm more than most. Since the late 1980s, however, this discrepancy in attitudes toward war and the actual practice of war between Germany and similar Western countries has been shrinking, with the pace of convergence accelerating since the mid-1990s. While Germans were still almost totally absent from the scene of military action during the Gulf War of 1990/91, they found themselves center stage only nine years later in NATO's war in Kosovo.

In this article, we will examine these changes, paying particular attention to public attitudes and political discourse as well as to concrete foreign policy behaviour. In order to understand the German case, it is necessary to study the developments in these three dimensions and their interplay, which we view as a process of socialization taking place within a changing international environment. In fact, this interplay can be presented in very different ways. In section 2, we will discuss three different perspectives in this regard. Most observers concentrate on the impact that international structural factors (i.e. Germany's international environment) as well as domestic structural factors
(such as Germany's anti-militarist political culture, which can be witnessed in discourse and public attitudes) have on German participation in military interventions. These observers argue that Germany has remained exceptional in its behaviour, as domestic structural factors have prevented profound policy changes. In contrast to this structure-centered perspective, other observers have identified an ongoing re-militarization in German foreign policy. According to this actor-centered position, political decision-makers have repeatedly pushed the limits for German participation in military interventions. Here, it is concrete political action that impacts on domestic structural factors such as public attitudes. Assuming a third perspective, we will position ourselves in the middle, stressing the co-constitutive effects of public and elite discourse, public attitudes and foreign policy behaviour. While the changes we observe have often been initiated deliberately, inspired by 'normalizing' ambitions of German decision makers, decision makers are fully free neither from Germany's international environment nor from the expectations advanced and the limits set by German society.

In subsequent sections, we will try to substantiate our argument by examining the development of public attitudes, foreign policy discourse, and government action. Given the constraints of space we will not be able to examine these processes in detail. However, in sketching the broad outlines of developments since the late 1980s (including a more detailed analysis of Germany's policy vis-à-vis the two most important conflicts of the 1990s, the Gulf War and the Kosovo War) we hope to show how domestic and international structural factors as well as the strategic ambitions of foreign policy decisionmakers have produced the far-reaching changes in German attitudes and behaviour towards the use of force which we can observe today.

German Participation in Military Interventions: Three Perspectives

**The 'Culture of Restraint', or: the Constraining Effects of Social Structures**

Among the substantial number of scholars who have studied Germany's position on the use of
military force, one view is most prominent: It holds that in light of the disastrous consequences of German militarism during the Nazi period, a stable anti-militarist political culture has evolved in Germany. This culture, also known as the 'culture of restraint', is seen as responsible for Germany's exceptionalism on the use of force ever since the founding of the Federal Republic, and as bound to inhibit Germany's future 'normalization' in this regard. This position is pronounced most clearly by proponents of culturalist approaches to the study of German foreign policy. According to them, the formulation of a country's foreign policy is profoundly shaped by its political culture. The culturalists concede that such political culture may change in the light of dramatic political events. The transformation of German militarism into the post-World-War-II 'culture of antimilitarism' of the Federal Republic provides a good example for this argument. Yet, in general, political culture is perceived as very stable. Consequently, from this perspective, the German 'culture of restraint', that has evolved after Germany's loss of World War II and the breakdown of the Third Reich, still has an enormous impact on Germany's readiness to take part in military interventions. Public attitudes and the political discourse in Germany on the participation in military interventions reflect Germany's political culture and shape the room for manoeuvre for political decision makers. Thus, culturalists would draw arrows from political culture to public opinion and political discourse, and from there to foreign policy behaviour, paying little attention to the reverse effects German foreign policy behaviour may have on discourse and public opinion, and, finally, on the 'culture of restraint'.

A similar position has been developed by Hans Maull, who argues that Germany has adopted the role of a civilian power. Similar to the culturalists, Maull views Germany's self-identification as a civilian power as an outgrowth of lessons learned after World War II. While the role of a civilian power is basically an attribute of an actor rather than a component of a certain structure surrounding that actor (like political culture is), Maull in fact treats it as a stable and quasi-structural condition of Germany's foreign policy behaviour.

The consequence of this perspective on the development of the German position is that there is comparatively little change to be identified for the last decade as well as expected for the future.
Germany's domestic social structures slow down or even prevent substantial changes of the German position. Thus, the undeniable change of German policy from remaining absent in the Gulf War to fully participating in the Kosovo War is to be seen as a reluctant adaptation to a changing international environment, and there is little prospect (or: danger) of Germany fully giving up its reservations about the use of force in the foreseeable future.

'Salami Tactics', or: the Socializing Effects of Political Action

In contrast to this view, other observers have portrayed the development in quite a different way. Stressing that, within a decade, German decision makers have almost completely turned around Germany's policy with regard to the use of military force, these authors view this policy change as a central element of a remilitarization of German foreign policy. They view the evolving German readiness to participate in military interventions not as a reluctant adaptation to a changing environment, but as the result of a deliberate strategy of German decision makers who wanted the use of force to become an accepted means of German foreign policy all from the beginning. Yet, such a redirection of foreign policy could not be accomplished at once, but only stepwise. The German public had to get accustomed to Bundeswehr soldiers 'out of area'. Likewise, the idea of Germans taking part in military interventions had to gain acceptance in public and elite political discourse. Consequently, German decision makers expanded the scope of Germany's contributions to out-of-area operations stepwise, utilizing what can be called 'salami tactics'. Slice after slice, so to speak, the political discourse has been reshaped and limits for legitimate German use of force set by public opinion have been removed. From this perspective, international crises and the pressure of Germany's Western partners are less to be seen as causes of German policy changes but more as welcome opportunities for the proponents of re-militarization to legitimize their course. According to this argument, within a decade the parameters in Germany concerning the political use of military force have changed dramatically, and these changes were intended from early on. In the wake of the Gulf War, German participation in hostilities would have been unacceptable for the German public, but only eight years later, decision makers could count on broad public support for Germany's participation in the Kosovo War.
This view implies that public opinion and political discourse to a great extent follow concrete political action. While the culturalists stress the restraining effect of public sentiments on foreign policy, proponents of the re-militarization thesis would draw an arrow in the opposite direction. According to them, anti-militarist public sentiments in Germany may have had a restraining effect of German policy, but German policy makers have managed to dominate the political discourse and to push public opinion in their desired direction.

**Gradual Change and the Quest for Normality, or: The Co-Constitutive Effects of Agency and Structure**

While the *structuralists* emphasize the inhibiting effects of German political culture characterized mainly by a 'culture of restraint', and while the *actionalists* emphasize the intentionality of a German political elite bent on getting rid of former restrictions on the use of the Bundeswehr, our third (and preferred) *interactionist* perspective emphasizes the co-constituting effects of structure and agency. In the abstract our model presupposes that both structural factors (such as the distribution of power in the international system, international law, domestic political system, decision-making structures or political culture) as well as actor-related (or 'actional') factors (such as intentionality, decision-making and decision-implementation) exercise causal power. Structure and agency shape and (re-) produce each other through complex processes, the causal paths of which are not easily identified. For example, we argue that German attitudes towards the use of force as well as the respective policy changes which have taken place between the 1980s (Iran-Iraq War) and 1999 (Kosovo War) are far-reaching indeed. Yet we would neither argue that this reflects malicious designs of a trigger-happy foreign policy elite determined to implement a course of 're-militarization' (or 'normalization') in German foreign policy along traditionalist great power lines, nor would we argue that Germany (and its elites) had been 'forced by events', by systemic forces or the pressures of the allies to shed previous restrictions. Rather our argument is that structural factors as well as actional factors shape each other. Consequently, in order to adequately understand the development of the German position on the use of military force, these processes of agency-structure interplay need to be taken into
In this article we primarily focus on three factors: foreign policy discourse, public opinion and governmental decisions and action. Obviously, the latter clearly falls on the agency side of the structure-agency dichotomy. Foreign policy discourse has both structural and actional features: it is structural in the sense that meaning generated through discourse has deep roots in social life, encompassing (relatively) stable basic concepts such as 'sovereignty', 'foreign policy' and 'military force' as well as combinations of these concepts in judgements which reflect (more or less) adequately on relatively durable political realities. It also comprises, however, aspects of agency: Discourse always reflects on the action-guiding beliefs of individual and/or collective actors which, in their ability to invent and express old as well as new ideas, are behaving both routinely as well as creatively. Public opinion, finally, sheds light on the beliefs held among the German population. Thus, we use it here as an indicator of cognitive-normative structures German decision makers are confronted with. In consequence we interpret the evolution of the German position as a process of socialization: The (constructions of) foreign policy problems to be tackled by Germany (i.e. relevant individual as well as collective actors in Germany, such as foreign policy decision makers but also foreign policy experts participating in and shaping foreign policy discourse as well as public opinion more broadly) and its partners has to be seen against the menu of problems perceived and presented by other international actors – if only because Germany has always been (and continues to be) closely integrated in an intricate web of international institutions.

By implication this position leads us to expect significant change along the lines of those observers who interpret Germany's increasing readiness to use force either as a process of 'normalization' or 'abnormalization'. In the terminology of the normalization-sympathizers, Germany is in the process of 'coming of age'; becoming more 'self-confident' and assertive; feeling less inhibited ('befangen') by its pre-Second World War legacy. In the eyes of the abnormalization-critics, in contrast, Germany is again 'militarising' its foreign policy, thereby returning to the dubious past of 'Machtpolitik' and a 'security policy of re-confrontation'. We agree with the advocates as well as the critics of 'normalization' as to the significance of the dramatic departures from old foreign policy
practices. However, in contrast to both we prefer a more detached social science vocabulary in (primarily) describing and explaining (rather than politically evaluating) these changes.

Germany and the Use of Military Force: Trends in Government Behaviour, Political Discourse, and Public Opinion

It can be argued that nowhere has change in German foreign policy been more profound in the last decade than with respect to the willingness to take part in multilateral military operations. Table 1 summarizes the development of German contributions to international military operations during the 1990s.

Table 1 about here

The change in German foreign policy behaviour becomes even more visible in a graphical illustration. Figure 1 below shows that, in the 1990s, the scope of Germany contributions has gradually but in the end substantially grown during this decade. 'Scope' in this sense has both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension, as German military contributions have become larger and, at the same time, the operations Germany is ready to take part in have become more 'militarized' and thus more dangerous.

Figure 1 about here

While this development has been a gradual process, a few events can be identified that were crucial in driving this process. Thus, in this section, we will examine German behaviour as well as discourse and public opinion in the 1980s, during the Gulf War, the UN operation in Somalia, the decision of the German Constitutional Court in 1994, the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the Kosovo War. We will pay special attention to the Gulf War and the Kosovo War, as the former was crucial in initiating the developments which are the focus of our analysis whereas the latter marks its culmination point, at least for the time being.
The German Position before Unification

The foreign policy discourse in the old Bonn Republic was shaped largely by the legacy of German militarism and the notion of a 'special (German) path' ('Sonderweg'). Multilateralism (never again going it alone), European integration (with an emphasis on regaining recognition, trust and economic wealth) and anti-militarism ('culture of restraint'; 'civilian power') were accordingly the defining concepts in Germany's foreign policy vocabulary during the time of the Bonn Republic. Within this discursive setting, the political use of force, even in concert with the allies, was not perceived to be an acceptable instrument of German foreign policy. Of course, in the 1980s, when the scope of UN peace-keeping was still limited and the problem of 'out-of-area' operations was rarely discussed in NATO, the question of deploying troops abroad only attracted limited attention in West Germany anyway. In 1982, the Federal Security Council stressed that, in accordance with a broad 'security-political consensus' in Germany, the Basic Law prohibited any deployments of Bundeswehr troops out of area. Of course, legal experts differed on whether this was indeed the proper interpretation of the Basic Law, but it was widely shared among the political parties, if not least for political reasons.

Yet, only a few years later, in 1987, some participants in the decision-making process started to question this consensus. In their effort to secure the passage of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, U.S. forces engaged in a number of skirmishes with Iran. In July 1987, the U.S. called upon its European allies, West Germany among them, to provide military assistance in this conflict. The U.S. administration asked the German government to send several ships to the Persian Gulf for the purposes of military protection of tankers as well as for mine sweeping. In the end, the Germans, pointing to their constitutional restrictions, limited their support to sending a few ships to the Mediterranean (i.e. remaining within NATO territory). Still, there were first signs that the consensus on out-of-area operations was beginning to crumble among the West German foreign policy elite. In the process leading to the rejection of the U.S. request, the German Ministry of Defense took a position that deviated from the decision of 1982. It maintained that the deployment
of Bundeswehr forces was constitutional to protect German merchant ships on the high seas as well as for clearing mines in international shipping lanes. It also unsuccessfully proposed to base further decisions of the Federal Government on this interpretation, in order to enlarge the room for manoeuvre for the Bundeswehr. While this position was not taken up by the Federal Government in 1987, we can still see that the beginnings of what later turned into the 'out-of-area debate' date back to the time before German unification.

**Germany in the Gulf War**

A much bigger challenge to the German insistence on military restraint came with the Gulf War of 1990/91. Iraq's invasion in Kuwait occurred at a time when the German foreign policy establishment was preoccupied with wrapping up the 'Two-plus-Four' negotiations leading to German unification. During that time, the political rhetoric was filled with 'Genscherist' terminology: united Germany carried significantly more 'European' and 'global responsibility', and the conduct of a 'policy of the good example' ('Politik des guten Beispiels') or, alternatively, a 'policy of responsibility' ('Verantwortungspolitik') were imperative under the new condition. Multilateralism and European integration continued to be the guiding concepts and the repeated emphasis on Germany's responsibility for building 'a new culture of international co-existence' made clear that 'responsibility' was the code word for sticking with the anti-militarist 'culture of restraint' of the old Bonn Republic.

The course of the Gulf crisis, culminating in the war in January and February 1991, put many assumptions and positions that characterized this German discourse under immense pressure. Already in August, the U.S. administration had asked the Kohl government whether Germany could send troops to the Gulf. CDU representatives within the government briefly considered responding positively, but eventually the government decided that it would be unwise to make such a departure from long-established foreign policy practice without broad domestic support and at a time, when the Two-plus-Four Treaty, requiring Soviet approval, had not yet been ratified. Like three years earlier, the government stressed that the German constitution would not allow for a deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers to the Gulf. The difference was that this time, several politicians, notably from
Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats, portrayed this 'constitutional limitation as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a fundamental constraint to be dealt with on its own terms' by stressing that, after the Federal Election in December 1990, Germany should amend its Basic Law to allow for certain deployments of German soldiers abroad. According to public opinion polls taken during that time, the German people were rather skeptical about such prospects. Table 2 shows that vast majorities in both East and West opposed such a change of the Basic Law.

The overwhelming majority of Germans both among the elites as well as the broader public at this point still shared the view that only political means were justified to resolve international conflicts. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt best expressed these sentiments when he implored the Kohl government in November 1990 to stick to diplomatic means and economic sanctions 'in order to reach, in every conceivable way, a political solution' to the conflict in the Gulf. Germany 'must not lag behind anybody in its efforts for peace', Brandt said, because war, in his view, was 'the ultima irratio of politics'.

Meanwhile, Germany supported its allies with substantial financial contributions totaling some DM 18 billion. In December 1990, the Turkish government filed a request for assistance by its NATO allies against a possible Iraqi attack. As a result NATO's Defence Planning Committee decided in early January to send the Allied Mobile Force's air component to bases in south-eastern Turkey. Given the fact that a NATO ally was calling for help and since this rapid reaction unit was highly integrated and included some 200 Bundeswehr soldiers and 18 German fighter jets (aside of similar Belgian and Italian contingents) the German government would have had a very hard time to justify not participating. On the first day of the new year the German government decided to send the Bundeswehr to Turkey in order to 'deter aggression', as the government spokesman said. However, the opposition parties as well as some senior representatives of the governing coalition were arguing that an Iraqi attack on Turkey would not automatically lead to German assistance to Turkey under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty because, as some critics argued, allied air strikes from Turkish
soil under the mandate of the UN Security Council would in effect amount to \textit{offensive}, not \textit{defensive} operations. If Iraq were to retaliate, as one might expect, this could not be taken to trigger assistance obligations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.\textsuperscript{26} Whereas this eventuality never materialized, the 'war automatism' (Genscher\textsuperscript{27}) could not be stopped. Germany stood by largely paralyzed by what it was seeing and pondering what 'greater responsibility' might mean in the future. As the subsequent years showed, this experience had a lasting effect in that it initiated the 'normalizing' nation to the sobering realities of a new world order which contrasted sharply with Hans-Dietrich Genscher's hopes for 'a new culture of international co-existence' and which also seemed to run counter to the expectations raised by the rhetoric of a 'policy of the good example'.

\textit{The Out-of-Area Debate and German Military Deployments in the Early 1990s}

Against the background of the increasing pressures from Germany's allies to shoulder 'more responsibility' the German foreign policy debate during the early 1990s was marked by a polarized debate among those charging that the Kohl government was pursuing a course of 'militarization' on the one hand and those calling for a process of 'normalization' by shouldering the same burdens as the Western allies on the other. This debate was instrumental in re-defining the boundaries for a legitimate German use of military force. Yet, it did not only set limits for government behaviour, but it was also heavily influenced by government behaviour itself. This happened mainly in two ways.\textsuperscript{28}

First, the government kept arguing for a constitutional amendment, and it took a leading role in re-shaping the political discourse on German participation in out-of-area operations. Many representatives of the CDU/CSU held that an amendment of the Basic Law was not necessary, as it would already legitimize German participation in multilateral out-of-area operations covered by international law. Still, they supported the call for a change of the Basic Law, since partisan consensus was lacking and the coalition partner, the Free Democrats, thought that an amendment was necessary to clarify the issue. More important than the mere call for a constitutional amendment was the fact that proponents of German participation in out-of-area operations managed to introduce a new meaning of the term 'responsibility' (\textit{Verantwortung}) to the political discourse. Representatives
of the Kohl government repeatedly argued that unified Germany was expected by its partners to 'take over more responsibility' by contributing to international military operations. The word was no longer used to refer to a 'politics of responsibility' (Verantwortungspolitik) that stood in contrast to old-style 'power politics' (Machtpolitik). Instead, it was now used to indicate that responsible German foreign policy would be in contrast to the old Federal Republic's alleged privilege of standing by and leaving dangerous missions to its allies. In the end, the rhetoric of responsibility, which in itself conveyed the impression of continuity, was utilized to pave the way for significant change.

But apart from such rhetorical efforts to gather support for a change in the role of the Bundeswehr, the Federal government also followed a second path: It reached policy decisions to engage German troops abroad that stretched the legal limitations further and further. Although all these deployments have to be seen as low-scale deployments, there was a clear rise in the scope of the German contributions: from medical troops to the UN peace-keeping operation UNAMIC in Cambodia in 1991/92 through naval monitoring forces for WEU's 'Operation Sharp Guard' that was monitoring the embargo against the FRY in the Adriatic from 1992 to 1996 to the dispatch of supply and transport units of the Bundeswehr to Somalia in 1993/94 as part of UNOSOM II (cf. table 1 above).

We can see that, during these years, both the German foreign policy behaviour and the concomitant political discourse were in flux, but this is also true for public opinion. As table 3 shows, by spring 1992, the number of supporters of German participation in UN-led military operations had already grown significantly. There was still a considerable part of the German public that opposed such UN deployments, but according to the Allensbach opinion poll, at least in West Germany the number of supporters had surpassed that of the opponents.

The development of foreign policy behaviour, foreign policy discourse, and public opinion in the early 1990s substantiates our main argument. This development can only be understood if the interplay of structural and agency factors is taken into account. The structuralists are correct in that
the Federal Government was confronted with growing demands by its allies resulting from the structural changes after the end of the Cold War on the one hand and with existing domestic constraints created by an established anti-militarist political culture on the other. Thus, the government certainly responded to structural incentives and constraints. This, however, is only one aspect of the foreign policy behaviour, since the government also had a strong impact at least on the domestic constraints. The efforts to re-frame the political discourse and the practice of accustoming the German public to out-of-area deployments of the Bundeswehr played a key role in bringing about the gradual change of these domestic constraints.

As the proponents of a stronger participation in military operations increasingly dominated the political discourse, as public opinion was becoming more sympathetic with such participation, and as the scope of the actual deployments of Bundeswehr troops grew, the controversy was still unsettled. Yet, after another controversial engagement the German political parties finally did what they have often done when unable to politically resolve a political dispute: they called up the Federal Constitutional Court to reach an authoritative decision. Around the same time when the first non-medical Bundeswehr soldiers were sent 'out of area' to participate in UNOSOM II in Somalia, NATO for the first time took on a military task from the UN. On 12 April 1993, it agreed to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the course of the next year, NATO deployed its airborne early-warning unit AWACS to the Mediterranean; in February 1994, NATO fighter jets shot down four Serbian fighters after repeated Serbian intrusions into the no-fly zone; and in April 1994, NATO planes even attacked Serbian ground forces in order to stop the onslaught on the UN-protected area of Gorazde. In Germany, these NATO operations led to a heated debate on whether and to what extent Bundeswehr soldiers should and could participate. While Germany was not ready to take part in NATO's air strikes, German air force personnel did participate in the surveillance and monitoring operations of AWACS, as they made up about one third of this integrated multinational unit. Government officials stressed that AWACS would not be involved in NATO air strikes. Still, the decision was preceded by disputes not only between government and opposition, but also between CDU/CSU on the one side and the FDP on the other. Most leading Free Democrats, such
as Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel himself politically approved of the AWACS deployment but thought it was not covered by the Basic Law. The FDP pressured their larger coalition partner to work for a constitutional amendment, which would have required the support of the SPD in order to reach the needed two-thirds majority. When it became clear that no agreement could be found between CDU/CSU and SPD, the FDP took a rather unusual step: in April 1993, it gave its consent to the decision in favour of the German participation in the AWACS deployment, but at the same time joined the SPD and the Greens in filing suit to the Constitutional Court against this decision. So, eventually the Constitutional Court was called upon to decide whether such deployments were in accordance with the Basic Law. On 12 July 1994, it decided the issue in the affirmative: The Bundeswehr may take part in an out-of-area operation if the Bundestag gives its authorization and if this operation is conducted within the framework of a system of collective security. Also, the Constitutional Court supported the contention that NATO can be seen as such a system of collective security. This ruling immediately put an end to the contentious debate, since all its participants now accepted the constitutional basis for German out-of-area deployments as indicated by the Constitutional Court.

**German Troops in the Balkans: Participation in IFOR and SFOR**

After the 1994 decision of the Court and against the background of the deteriorating situation in the Balkans new coalitions were forming. In the domestic context of Germany Srebrenica served as a catalyst to align traditionalist, pro-Western normalizers along the lines of allied demands on the one hand and increasing numbers of more left-leaning internationalists who were having ever more difficulties rejecting the analogies between the cruelties on Balkans and Germany's historical legacy of Auschwitz. This provided the basis for another important step toward greater readiness to take part in military interventions. In the light of Srebrenica, it was now widely accepted in the German political elite that the legacy of German history should not only be to call for 'No more wars!' ("Nie wieder Krieg!") but also for 'No more Auschwitz!' ("Nie wieder Auschwitz!"). This already became visible after a request by NATO in February 1995. At that time the NATO allies were considering to send a large NATO force to the Balkans to secure the retreat of the unsuccessful UNPROFOR.
Like other NATO members, Germany was requested to firmly indicate which troops it would provide for such an operation. Two weeks later, Bonn actually responded positively to that request, declaring its readiness to contribute a contingent of 1,800 soldiers. Eventually, such an operation never materialized, but Germany was soon confronted with another - and still bigger - challenge.

In December 1995, the Balkans Contact Group, with strong U.S. leadership, managed to broker the Dayton Peace Accord. The German government had already indicated in October that it would contribute several thousand Bundeswehr soldiers, mainly from logistics and transport units, to the NATO-led force that was to police the agreement. When the Dayton Accord was signed, the Bundestag authorized the German participation in IFOR with a broad majority, as most deputies of the SPD and almost half of those of the Green Party voted with the government. Of course, the 3,000 German troops mainly provided medical and logistical assistance to those of France and other partner states, and they were stationed in Croatia, outside of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Yet, this was a major step. The next step was taken when SFOR took over the functions of IFOR in 1996. The fears of many in Germany that the German public would soon be confronted with casualties and that the presence of German soldiers in the Balkans would do more to aggravate rather than to solve the conflicts in the region had not come true. So, there was hardly any opposition now against another removal of limitations to a German deployment: Germany's SFOR contingent included combat forces, and the Bundeswehr troops were regularly stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Germany's full participation in SFOR demonstrated that the country had gone a long way since its military absence from the Gulf War coalition six years earlier. This was not only indicated by the mere fact of the German contribution to SFOR, but also by the fact that there was no controversial discussion about this contribution, with a large majority of the Bundestag faction of the SPD and even a majority of the Green faction supporting it.

**Using Force without UN authorization: German Participation in the Kosovo War**

Germany's participation in NATO's Kosovo war was the culmination point in this realignment. The
stunning result – unimaginable for most Germans only 5 years ago – was that this has been widely accepted both among foreign policy elites as well as the public more broadly. Perhaps most stunning was that this development took place under a government formed by the two German parties with the highest internationalist as well as 'anti-militarist' credentials. For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic German, soldiers were deployed to deliberately use force in a military operation with an at least questionable legal basis.

One of the central questions of the debate surrounding the German government's decision has been ever since to what extent the new government was forced to this particular course of action by decisions taken prior to the assumption of power in October 1998. According to the line of argument advanced by Schröder and Fischer, they were left with almost no choice by the Clinton administration. Yet other reports from the second half of 1998 claim that not much pressure had to be applied to secure approval for a strategy of escalation. According to the minutes of a meeting between Schröder and Clinton which took place during the German election campaign, Clinton had told Schröder that his administration thought that NATO had to prepare for military action in case diplomacy would fail. In this conversation in early August 1998 Schröder affirmed that he would support such a course if he were elected chancellor adding, however, that it would be desirable to secure a UN mandate. According to the minutes, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright rejected this condition outright because the UN was deemed incapable. Both Schröder and Fischer expressed an even harder line publicly prior to their first meeting after their election victory with President Clinton on 9 October 1998. To be sure, given the presumed need for the red-green coalition government to prove its alliance loyalty, Schröder and Fischer had little choice. Yet, during the months leading up to the start of the air campaign against Serbia in March 1999 there are few indications that the key figures among German foreign policy decisionmakers had actually pushed an alternative course of action. Rather, in public statements as well as preparations for war (such as the mobilization of troops for deployment in Macedonia in early February) the Schröder government tried to convey an image of determination to both Belgrad and its own allies. During a prominent transatlantic conference in February 1999 Schröder himself was at pains to emphasize 'in all clarity' that Germany would 'remain a reliable partner'. Moreover in contrast to past attitudes according to
which Germany's historical legacy 'prohibited any deployment of German troops out of area' the Chancellor emphasized that Germany's 'historical responsibility' made it 'imperative' to 'prevent mass-murder with all the necessary means'. In his view Germany had 'come of age' as a full member of NATO, now being ready 'without any reservations ('ohne jedes Wenn und Aber') , to assume responsibility as a 'normal ally'.

None of this was meant to imply that Germany was keen on going to war against Milosevic, as some analyses imply. But the responses of German decisionmakers after the failure of final diplomatic efforts at Rambouillet were remarkable indeed, especially in comparison to the paralysis in the final days prior to the escalation of the Gulf War in early January 1991. The similarities in the failure of diplomacy in both cases were striking. Yet whereas the conservative Kohl government appeared to be helplessly clinching to a 'political solution' even in the face of a diplomatic stalemate, the left-leaning Schröder government appeared to be surprisingly resigned and determined to carry out the plans for military escalation it had jointly developed with its allies in spite of the fact that internal ministerial analyses were providing for a very differentiating picture as to the situation on the ground in Kosovo itself. After the war had started on 24 March 1999, the key figures of the German government were constantly referring to unacceptable Serbian 'terror against the majority of the Albanian population', describing the overarching goal of the 'use of military means' to be 'a halt to continuing serious and systematic violations of human rights as well as the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe'. However, according to internal documents from the Foreign Ministry analysing the situation on the ground in Kosovo immediately prior to the war, this was not the kind of picture which German intelligence was providing. According to an intelligence assessment dated 19 March 1999 the truce was violated not only by Serbian troops but by the UCK as well. Moreover reports from the Kosovo showed that in contrast to 1998 Serbia could not be charged with systematic expulsions. Rather available evidence showed that both Albanians and Serbians were 'equally' affected by the war.

It comes as little surprise that this dramatic change in German policy over the course of a decade has also left its imprint on public opinion as well as on the political discourse. In a poll taken by Forsa
during the Kosovo War, a majority of the interviewees both agreed that Germany's participation properly reflects its role in world politics and maintained that this participation should be continued even if German soldiers die in combat, as table 4 shows.

[Table 4 about here]

Thus, in the German political discourse, 'taking over responsibility' today largely means playing the same role militarily as the big Western partners. 'Normalization' has progressed to such an extent that it is no longer necessary to call for it. The current debate about the restructuring of the German armed forces is focusing on whether or not to give up yet another one of the celebrated institutions of the Bonn Republic, the conscription of 'citizens in uniform'. Apart from a small circle of experts, few are interested in the implications of increasing Germany's contribution to European or allied intervention (or 'rapid reaction') forces, and the German public tends to support both the establishment of such forces and German participation in them, as recent polls conducted by EMNID indicate.

[Tables 5 and 6 about here]

There is little discussion on what such a European intervention force could or should be used for. Germans seem to view this project with a mixture of neglect and support that sharply contrasts with the anti-militarist attitudes that were so dominant a decade ago. So this is yet another sign of Germany's new normality as a European great power which is making rapid progress in shrinking the differences to Britain and France.

Conclusion

We can see that both the structuralist and the actionalist perspective is correct to some degree but that both are incomplete on their own. Beginning with the Gulf War, the German government was
certainly confronted with both new international demands to provide military contributions to international conflict management endeavours and societal skepticism about embracing such a new role. But the German policy makers did not just respond to a changing structure of the international system and to conflicting international and societal expectations, as the structuralist would maintain. They also managed to shape the public discourse in Germany and to establish new facts by slowly raising the scope of German military deployments, repeatedly moving beyond the established domestic consensus. Only by observing the continuous interaction of structural and actional factors can this change in German foreign policy be adequately understood.

The changes in Germany's readiness to participate in military interventions have been more than a mere adaptation to a changing international environment, as suggested by the culturalists and the proponents of the civilian-power thesis. In the last decade, Germany has changed significantly by giving up most of its exceptionalism concerning the use of military force. Yet, by doing so, Germany has also contributed to a change of the view on military interventions predominant in the societies of Western Europe (as witnessed by the plan to establish a European intervention force of 60,000 men).

Some may view it as a sign of maturation that Germany is finally joining ranks with other western states in terms of its attitudes towards and practices of war. German world views during the last decade certainly have been shaped and changed by the reappearance of war on the European horizon – although this is a very different kind of war in comparison to what Germans in East and West had been preparing for previously. Our emphasis on the re-socialization effects should, however, not be interpreted in the sense that Germany is shedding all its 'civilian' traditions. What we are saying however, is that the German self-image of being a 'civilian power' different from other more 'traditional' western powers is misleading. What is more, this 'civilian' inclinations may lead to military interventions which more 'hard nosed' calculations of 'national interests' would refuse. It is in this sense also that Germany's change may make an ambivalent contribution to the transformation of war.
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**Table 1: German Participation in Military Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict/Military Operation</th>
<th>Scope of German Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf 1987 Escort of Kuweit ships; U.S. skirmishes with Iran; minesweeping</td>
<td>Logistical support only; German ships to Mediterranean, but not to Gulf region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia 1989 Peace-keeping operation (UNTAG)</td>
<td>Contribution to international police force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War 1990/91</td>
<td>Financial and logistical support only; Dispatch of 200 soldiers and 18 fighter jets to Turkey as part of a NATO contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia 1991-92 Peace-keeping operation (UNAMIC)</td>
<td>Medical troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adriatic 1992-96 Monitoring of embargo against FRY (Operation Sharp Guard)</td>
<td>Naval forces ('no combat operation')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia 1993-94 (UNOSOM II)</td>
<td>Supply and transport units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina 1993-95 (UNPROFOR)</td>
<td>Logistical support only (airlifts to Sarajevo etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina 1993-95 monitoring of no-fly zone; NATO air strikes against FRY</td>
<td>Air-force personnel as part of AWACS unit; No participation in NATO air strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia, since 1994 (UNOMIG)</td>
<td>10 German medical officers and military observers as part of UN-peace-keeping force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina 1995-96 (IFOR)</td>
<td>Some 3,000 non-combat ground troops, stationed in Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina since 1996 (SFOR)</td>
<td>Some 3,000 ground troops (including combat troops), stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1998 U.S. led air raids</td>
<td>Offer to grant U.S. the use of military bases in Germany; no participation in attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo/FRY since 1998 (KVM; air strikes; KFOR)</td>
<td>Participation in unarmed OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission; Participation in NATO air strikes (no UN Security Council mandate); Contribution to KFOR with some 8,000 ground troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Public Opinion on Change of Basic Law to Allow for German Troops in UN Operations (October 1990, Februar 1991)

Question: 'Chancellor Kohl demanded to change the Basic Law after the parliamentary elections in order to allow for deployment of German troops for UN-activities. Do you agree?' (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October 1990</th>
<th>February 1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old Länder</td>
<td>New Länder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I disagree</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Public Opinion on Participation in UN Missions (March 1992)

Question: 'Two people are talking about whether Germany should participate in UN-peacekeeping forces. Which opinion would you agree with?' (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>观点</th>
<th>Old Länder</th>
<th>New Länder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Germany has to finally participate in UN-peacekeeping troops, the so called blue helmets. We cannot shirk our responsibilities and leave it to others to lose their heads.’</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Considering our history we should not take part in UN-peacekeeping troops. We should use our economic and political influence rather than soldiers.’</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Public Opinion on German Participation in Kosovo War (March 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Do you believe that participation in the air strikes corresponds with unified Germany's role in world politics?'</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Is Bundeswehr participation to be continued if German soldiers should die in combat?'</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Forsa poll on behalf of the magazine *Der Stern*, no. 14, 31 March 1999, p.52.
Table 5: Public Opinion on the Establishment of a European Intervention Force (1999, 2000)\textsuperscript{51}

Question: ‘Do you support or oppose the planning of the establishment of a rapid military intervention force (something like a EURO-Army) by the European Union?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November 1999</th>
<th>March 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to oppose</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Public Opinion on German Participation in a European Intervention Force (2000)\textsuperscript{52}

Question: 'Should Germany participate in such a European intervention force?'

(only interviewees who answered the previous question affirmatively)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>March 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, without restrictions, including soldiers</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but on case-by-case basis</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but only with financial contributions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, under no circumstances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Development of Germany's Participation in Military Operations

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference 'La guerre entre le local et le global: sociétés, États, systèmes', at the Centre d'Etudes et de la Recherche Internationales (CERI), Paris, 29 and 30 May 2000. A slightly different version of this article will also appear in French in a volume documenting the proceedings of this conference. We are grateful to Pierre Hassner and Roland Marchal, the editors of this volume, for granting publication in German Politics.


9. We are fully aware, of course, that this decision is not without problems, since the concept of political culture cannot be fully grasped by merely analysing public opinion polls. However, our decision should be seen as a pragmatic decision resulting from the limits of space allotted here.

10. 'Normalizers' as well as 'abnormalizers' fundamentally disagree on how to judge the observed processes of change in Germany's attitudes toward war. However, in contrast to the structuralists they tend to agree that Germany has come a rather long way in very short period of time. In general, the advocates of 'normalisation' welcome that Germany has 'finally' become 'once again a normal country' taking over 'normal responsibility' as 'our Western allies had already requested during the Gulf War'; see Ruppert Scholz, 'Deutschland auf dem Weg zur internationalen Normalität', in *Der Mittler-Brief*, No. 1/1994, p. 5 (in the late 1980s Scholz, a member of the CDU, had been serving as German Defense Minister). The critics say that Germany is 'again' becoming as 'abnormal' as other great powers – 'normality' here being defined as corresponding to a stringent normative standard; see Mutz 1994, op.cit., p. 221.


18. This position was expressed in an internal paper that was published three years later: Cf. Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 'Rechtliche Bewertung der Einsatzmöglichkeiten der Streitkräfte. Nicht-öffentliches Papier aus dem Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Herbst '87', reprinted in: Militärpolitik Dokumentation 13/78-79 (1990), pp. 72-74.


26. For a sample of statements along these lines from representatives of the opposition as well as the governing coalition parties see Claus Gennrich, 'Bonn will durch Entsendung von Alpha-Jets den Irak abschrecken', in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 January 1991, p. 2; 'Keine Mehrheit für Bundeswehr-Einsatz', in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 January 1991, p. 2. Joschka Fischer who at that time was heading the Greens in the state parliament of Hessen, criticized that the deployment of German troops to the front marked a 'qualitative change' in post-World War II history. For the first time German soldiers were called to 'war service' ('Kriegsdienst') rather than mere 'military service' ('Militärdienst'). In a prophetic tone he added: 'And I fear that this is only the beginning of a new development.' See 'Kaum ist die Einheit da, schickt man deutsche Soldaten
31


28. For a similar argument, see Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, op.cit., pp. 122-123.

29. The following passage from a speech of Defense Minister Volker Rühe is but one example: 'Unified Germany is endowed with a greater international responsibility. I am deeply convinced that the Bundeswehr must be given the means to make its contribution, within systems of collective security, to the stabilization and reconstruction of peace and security in Europe but also beyond. Unified Germany has no interest to remain different from its friends and partners in this respect', Volker Rühe, 'Sinn und Auftrag der Bundeswehr im vereinbten Deutschland, in: Bulletin no. 37 (7 April 1992), p. 346 (our translation). For similar statements, see the speeches by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, 'Die Rolle Deutschlands in der Weltpolitik', in: Bulletin no. 18 (3 March 1993), p. 141, and by Volker Rühe, 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik vor neuen Aufgaben', in: Bulletin no. 83 (8 October 1993), p. 948.

30. For a good description of the positions taken by the political parties in this controversy, see Lothar Gutjahr, German Foreign and Defense Policy after Unification, London: Pinter 1994.

31. This no-fly zone had been established by the UN Security Council on 9 October 1992 (S/RES 781).


33. Germany also did not participate in UNPROFOR, the UN peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For a good discussion of the background of the Bosnian conflict, see Marie-Janine Calic, Krieg und Frieden in Bosnien-Herzegowina, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1996.


40. Cf. John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, op. cit., pp. 215-216, and Alice Holmes Cooper, 'When Just Causes Conflict with Accepted Means: The German Peace Movement and Military Intervention in Bosnia', in:
German Politics and Society 15/3 (Fall 1997), pp. 99-118.


42. 'Deutsche Teilnahme an der Bosnien-Folgemission', op. cit.

43. See the history of German decision-making based on extensive interviews with government officials, Gunter Hofmann, 'Wie Deutschland in den Krieg geriet', in: Die Zeit, 12 May 1999, p. 18.


49. 'Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur Lage im Kosovo', 24 March 1999, in: Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, March 1999, p. 41. In his statement Schröder was at pains to emphasize that 'we are not conducting a war'. Instead, he said, 'we are called upon to enforce a peaceful resolution (of the conflict) in Kosovo with military means'.


52. EMNID, op.cit.