Foreign Policy Capacities and State Preferences on CFSP: Assessing the Rationalist Explanation of German, French and British CFSP Policies

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Abstract
While even small steps towards a common European foreign policy have received broad public and scholarly attention, this paper seeks to analyse member states’ behaviour and to explain the different German, French and British policies towards the European foreign policy regime. In contrast to a constructivist or postmodern perspective, rationalist and neorealist approaches seem to converge here – not because rationalism has been truncated, but because recent neorealist theorizing has moved away from a narrow focus on material capabilities and has incorporated institutions and perceptions as further explanatory variables.

I. Introduction

A transfer of foreign policy-making competences from the member states to the European Union would signify a large step towards a European federation. This may explain why even small steps towards a common European foreign policy have received broad public and scholarly attention. The extent to which foreign policy-making competences are transferred to the level of the European Union, the involvement of the Commission and the European Parliament (EP) as well as decision-making procedures and financing arrangements have all been negotiated by the member states. Whereas supranational actors play an important role in Community politics, member states remain the single most important actors in constitutional questions: At the intergovernmental conferences the Commission does not have the exclusive right of initiative it enjoys in Community politics. Member States can thus place their own initiatives on the agenda. For treaty reforms to come into force, every member state has to ratify the agreement according to its constitutional procedures. The European Parliament’s assent is not required. Any change of the European Union’s constitution including the provisions on foreign policy making thus requires the consent of all member states. It is therefore surprising that not much scholarly work has so far been dedicated to analyzing member states’ policies towards European Po-

1 I would like to thank Rainer Baumann, Henning Boekle, Roy Ginsberg, Peter Mayer, Andrew Moravcsik, Susanne Riegraf, Hans Seidenstücker and the participants of the ECPR Summer School on ‘EU External Capability and Influence in World Affairs’ for helpful comments.
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political Cooperation (EPC) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) respectively.\(^1\)

This paper\(^2\) seeks to fill this lacuna by trying to contribute to an explanation for the different German, French and British policies towards the European foreign policy regime. In this paper I will apply a rationalist framework to German, French and British CFSP policies. This privileged position of a rationalist – in contrast to a constructivist or postmodern – perspective can no longer be justified solely by reference to the dominant position of rationalist theorizing in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. From the point of view of ‘mainstream IR’, a constructivist approach may have become an even more obvious point of departure. However, a rationalist first cut is worthwhile because rationalism is best equipped to detect general patterns of state behavior. Whereas a constructivist focus on identities, cultures or historical legacies is best equipped to make us understand the specific background of state policies, a rationalist perspective helps us to trace state behavior back to general assumptions about the basic interest of states or the functions of institutions. A rationalist first thus cut seems appropriate to the extent that one is interested in placing given cases (such as member states’ CFSP policies) into a general pattern of state behavior. It should be noted, however, that a rationalist first cut privileges a rationalist explanation but does not guarantee its success. Quite the contrary, because rationalism assumes that state behavior can be traced back to general assumptions about preference formation and the like, its hypotheses are open to falsification. If rationalism cannot account for a given puzzle, a constructivist second cut seems necessary in order to find an explanation. In other words, whenever an instant of state policy cannot be explained by general assumptions about state behavior we have to ask what specific (or idiosyncratic) factor(s) may account for the behavior in question.

\(^1\) If no explicit reference is made to the time before 1993 when EPC was replaced by CFSP, ‘CFSP’ and ‘CFSP-policy’ refers to both CFSP and its predecessor EPC. Though CFSP covers both foreign and security policy and even envisions defense policy I will focus exclusively on traditional foreign policy, i.e. on the non-military (and non-economic) aspects of relations to third countries and international institutions.


\(^3\) This paper presents a part of my dissertation on “The Construction of a European Foreign Policy” that analyses why Germany, France and Great Britain have pursued different policies towards CFSP. In my dissertation a rationalist first cut which is outlined in this paper is followed by a constructivist second cut that aims at explaining those aspects of policy which rationalism cannot account for.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II gives a brief outline of the puzzle to be examined, i.e. German, French and British policies towards CFSP. Section III presents a general rationalist framework designed to explain states’ foreign policy towards international institutions. This framework comprises a theory of states’ fundamental preferences, a theory of co-operation, a theory of institutions and a theory of institutional choice. Finally, a theory of rationalist foreign policy translates the previous insights into specific behavioral predictions. Section IV demonstrates that a large part of the literature on CFSP draws heavily on the rationalist theories outlined in section III. Section V presents rationalist predictions for German, French and British CFSP policies that are derived from the general rationalist framework and supported by common assumptions made in the literature on CFSP. Finally, section VI evaluates the record of rationalism in explaining German, French, and British policies towards CFSP.

II. German, French and British Policies Towards CFSP

The Concept of CFSP Constitutional Policy

Member states’ CFSP policies comprise two dimensions, i.e. a policy within CFSP and a constitutional policy toward CFSP. It is this second, constitutional dimension that this study is concerned with. A member state’s policy within CFSP comprises its behavior inside the Council of the EU, where common positions and joint actions are discussed and decided upon, as well as, the degree of compliance with CFSP provisions. The constitutional dimension refers to a state’s behavior during intergovernmental negotiations about the regime’s constitution itself, i.e. about its principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. A state’s constitutional policy may be observed in particular during the negotiations on the Luxembourg report of 1970, on the Copenhagen report of 1973, on the London report of 1981, on the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration of 1983, on Title III of the Single European Act of 1986, on the provisions of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as part of the Treaty on European Union of 1992 and, finally, on the review of these provisions as part of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.

CFSP constitutional policy is particularly suited to examine a state’s fundamental approach to the regime, i.e. to what extent it wants to strengthen foreign policy co-operation. Of course, a state’s policy within CFSP may also point to that state’s general approach. However, the vagueness of many common positions makes it difficult to differentiate between compliant and non-compliant behavior and thus to determine the degree of member state compliance. Moreover, there is a general bias towards observing com-
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pliant behavior because common positions are agreed upon unanimously in
the first place. Finally, a state’s behavior in Council negotiations is difficult
to examine due to the secrecy of the meetings. Taken together, an examina-
tion of a member state’s constitutional CFSP policy is the best indicator for
that state’s general approach to CFSP.

Common Ground, Different Policies and Package Deals

In analyzing member states’ CFSP policies, one can emphasize enduring
differences as well as common change. From a bird’s-eye view, the policies
of all member states have changed in similar ways over the last thirty years
since all member states have endorsed the same institutional innovations.
Though the regime’s various constitutional documents from the Luxemburg
report to the Amsterdam Treaty may reflect compromises and package
deals, it is difficult to argue that no change in member state policies has oc-
curred. As will be shown in the next section, however, characteristic differ-
ences between member state policies have persisted during the entire pe-
riod. It is important to note that member states’ policies comprise features
of both continuity and change. Though I will focus on the differences be-
tween German, French and British policies, it should be kept in mind that
these differences have been accompanied by common changes that reflect
CFSP’s evolution.

German, French and British CFSP Policies

Germany’s CFSP Policy

At the 1969 summit in The Hague the German government welcomed
the French proposal on closer foreign policy co-operation of the members of
the European Community. When the regime was established a year later,
Chancellor Brandt agreed to its intergovernmental structure. In 1972, the
German government repeatedly suggested the establishment of a small, but
permanent, secretariat. However, no agreement was reached among the

litische Chronik, Bonn: Europa Union, p.220. While Brandt himself is said to have appro-
ached institutional questions in a rather pragmatic way, foreign minister Walter Scheel put a
stronger emphasis on supranationalism. In a speech in the Bundestag, Scheel regretted the
lack of supranational institutions for the time being (cf. Gaddum, Eckart 1994: Die deutsche
Europapolitik in den 80er Jahren: Interessen, Konflikte und Entscheidungen der Regierung
Kohl, Paderborn: Schöningh, p.196).

2 Müller-Roschach, Herbert, op. cit., p. 274f.; Simonian, Haig 1985: The Privileged Part-
UP, p.125f.; Ifestos, Panayiotis 1987: European Political Cooperation. Towards a Frame-
work of Supranational Diplomacy, Aldershot: Avebury, p.156f..
member states, since France insisted on having the secretariat located in Paris.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Germany for the first time took the initiative for advancing further political integration.\(^1\) Together with Italy, the German government presented a Draft European Act which referred to a European Union as the aim of the integration process. According to the draft, the European Council would take over a leadership role for both the Community and EPC. In order to further develop EPC, consultations would be intensified and the European Parliament’s resolutions would be taken into account more carefully.\(^2\) Furthermore, member states should take every possibility to facilitate decision-making and thus reach common positions faster. The Commission should be closely associated to the working of EPC. The European Council would be supported ‘by an ‘expandable secretariat’, whose function, according to Bonn, would have been to form a common security assessment, that is something akin to the National Security Council in the US’.\(^3\) In the following negotiations, however, Genscher’s proposal was watered down.\(^4\) Finally, the European Council in Stuttgart in 1983 adopted a Solemn Declaration instead of an Act as Germany intended. Genscher’s proposal to establish a permanent secretariat for EPC was not (yet) taken up. On EPC, the Solemn Declaration only mentioned its “necessary reinforcement”.\(^5\)

To the surprise of the other member states Germany and France jointly presented a ‘Draft Treaty on European Union’ at the Milan European Council in June 1985.\(^6\) The text comprised eleven articles all dedicated to the development of a common European foreign policy. The text emphasized the importance of the European Parliament’s participation in EPC and suggested a further development of the respective procedures. With regard to decision-making in the Council, unanimity was assumed.\(^7\) Article 10 mentioned a secretariat supporting the presidency. Together with a British Text, the Franco-German draft treaty served as a basis for the negotiations

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\(^2\) The European Parliament may also discuss EPC matters, it may pose oral or written questions may submit recommendations to the Council.

\(^3\) Tsakaloyannis, Panos, op.cit., p.57-58.


among the foreign ministers. Due to the rather limited reforms proposed in the two texts, the delegations had little difficulties in finding a consensus.\footnote{de Ruyt, Jean 1987: L’Acte Unique European. Commentaire, Brüssel: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, p.77} Only the decision on whether to incorporate the provisions on EPC into a single Act, as favored by Germany, was left to the final European Council in Luxembourg. There, the concept of a single Act emphasizing the close relationship between EPC and the Community won the day. The establishment of a permanent secretariat located in Brussels was the Single Act’s most important institutional innovation. However, the “German proposal to appoint a political personality as head of the secretariat was not picked up by the majority of the member states”.\footnote{Rummel, Reinhardt 1996: Germany’s role in the CFSP: ‘Normalität’ or ‘Sonderweg’?, in: Hill, Christopher (Ed.): The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London/New York: Routledge, 40-67, p.50}

In 1990, it was again a joint French/German initiative that placed EPC on the agenda of intergovernmental negotiations. In a joint letter to the President of the Council, Kohl and Mitterrand proposed to “initiate preparations for an intergovernmental conference on political union” with the particular objective to “define and implement a common foreign and security policy”.\footnote{Quoted from Laursen, Finn/Vanhoonacker, Sophie (Eds.) 1992: The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reform, New Policies, and International Identity of the European Community, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, p.276.} The joint letter itself was initiated by the German chancellor.\footnote{Tsakaloyannis, Panos, op.cit., p. 86.} In December 1990 a second joint letter further elaborated the Franco-German position: As regards decision-making, “decisions would in principle be adopted unanimously, with the understanding that abstaining should not hinder the adoption of decisions.” Furthermore, “when the Council would have to adopt concrete measures required by a given specific situation, it might be decided that the implementing arrangements for these measures may be adopted through majority decisions”.\footnote{Quoted from Laursen, Finn/Vanhoonacker, Sopjie, op.cit.,p. 314.} The fact that the European Parliament was not given much of a role in the Mitterrand-Kohl letter was perceived as a concession by the German side.\footnote{Hill, Christopher, op.cit., p.50.}

The question of whether the foreign policy regime should remain outside the Rome Treaty or should be transferred to the Community became one of the most controversial issues during the negotiations. The German delegation sided with those who criticized the Luxembourg Non-Paper of April 1991 for keeping CFSP separate from the Treaty establishing the EC. However, when only a few months later the Dutch presidency presented a
single treaty, that also comprised a title on CFSP, only Belgium supported this proposal.\footnote{Cf. Corbett, Richard 1993: The Treaty of Maastricht: From Conception to Ratification, Harlow: Longman.}

The extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) within CFSP became a German priority during the 1996/97 negotiations on CFSP. Though the German government itself was prepared to adopt qualified majority voting as a general rule,\footnote{According to Article 23 TEU “[d]ecisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions. When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union.”} the emphasis was placed on reaching a common position with France. Eventually, the Franco-German guidelines on CFSP, adopted in Freiburg in February 1996, enumerated several possibilities to make decision-making easier by including constructive abstention\footnote{Cf. Declaration of the federal government on current issues of European policy to the Bundestag, in: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung No. 51 of June, 26th, 1995 and Foreign Office, ‘German aims at the intergovernmental conference’ of March, 26th 1996.} which was adopted by the conference.

The German government agreed with the other member states that a body for analysis, forecasting and planning would enhance the Union’s capability to actively pursue a foreign policy and thus generally supported the respective proposals. According to Bonn, the unit should be controlled by the Secretary-General of the Council who in turn would be accountable to the member states.\footnote{Cf. Die Zeit of November, 12th 1998.} The German government was reluctant to support the establishment of a ‘Mr./Ms. CFSP’ as envisioned by France. When searching for a high representative to be appointed after the ratification of the Amsterdam treaty, foreign minister Kinkel preferred a person with a rather low profile.\footnote{Cf. Stark, Hans 1998: Deutsch-französische Positionen, Divergenzen und Kompromißformeln in der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, in: Weidenfeld, Werner (Ed.): Deutsche Europapolitik: Optionen wirksamer Interessenvertretung, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 142-151, p.146. Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, however, has interpreted the German objection to a Mr./Mrs. CFSP as a rejection of “proposals amounting to France’s leadership in Europe” because “a CFSP leader may have run against German interests, even if the position had not been filled by a French person, because he or she may have followed French ambitions and designs” (Le Gloannec, Anne-Marie 1998: Germany and Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: Embracing the ‘British’ Vision, in: Lankowski, Carl (Ed.): Break Out, Break}
tions on the financing of joint actions revealed a positive German attitude towards a strengthened role for the European Parliament. During the 1996/97 negotiations, Germany pushed to include operational expenditures in the Community budget and to treat them as non-obligatory expenditures. While the inclusion of CFSP expenditures in the Community budget mainly symbolized CFSP’s affiliation to the Community, their treatment as non-obligatory would have given the European Parliament the last word in determining their amount.

France’s CFSP Policy
It was France that took the initiative both to call for a conference of the heads of state or government and to suggest intergovernmental co-operation on foreign policy. France opposed any involvement of the supranational institutions and only granted the Commission the right to participate on the invitation of the member states. France suggested the establishment of an intergovernmental secretariat in Paris which was opposed by the other member states. For the rest of his term Pompidou did not take another initiative to change EPC.

The Presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981) brought about two institutional innovations which also impinged on EPC. During the 1974 French Presidency Giscard suggested direct elections to the European Parliament and the establishment of the European Council as a steering organ of the heads of state or government. In the following years, Giscard indeed used European Council meetings to propose common foreign policies.

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the same time, however, Giscard’s interest in EPC is said to have been limited.¹

At the beginning of his term as President, Mitterrand’s European policy was clearly focused on economic and social issues.¹ At the same time, the French government (with ex-Commissioner Claude Cheysson as foreign minister) accepted closer involvement of the Commission in EPC which became codified in the London report. At the beginning of Mitterrand’s Presidency, however, the modest reforms of the London report were “the most to which France was prepared to consent”.² The proposals advocated by Genscher and Colombo did not receive any support from Paris.

Three years later, in a speech at the European Parliament, Mitterrand suggested a new intergovernmental conference to negotiate further cooperation.³ With respect to EPC, Mitterrand suggested a permanent secretariat. As mentioned above, a Franco-German draft treaty was presented to the Milan European Council in 1985. Though the contents were primarily attributed to the French, Mitterrand distanced himself from the text after the other capitals had reacted rather reservedly.⁴

During the 1990/91 negotiations, CFSP was a top priority for France.⁵ Though France paid particular attention to security and defense, its position on foreign policy cooperation also changed significantly: Most importantly, France accepted the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP, especially for implementing measures.⁶ At the same time, however, France continued to emphasize the distance between CFSP and the Community. Thus, the French delegation opposed proposals to integrate EPC into the

² de La Serre, Francoise, France, p.22.
Community framework and supported the pillared structure of the TEU.\(^1\) France also opposed further involvement of the European Parliament and the Commission. However, France endorsed the (non-exclusive) right of initiative for the Commission.

In February 1996, *Le Figaro* published a government ‘memorandum on the French guidelines for the IGC 1996’. In this document, the French government first launched its idea to replace the Presidency by a High Representative who would be appointed for a term of several years and who would be supported by a strengthened Council secretariat. Several months later the French delegation officially submitted a more detailed proposal (CONF/3863/96). The proposal made clear that the High Representative would have little autonomy from the European Council, that would define his tasks and could dismiss him any time. Regarding a financing of CFSP, the text suggested that CFSP expenditure be obligatory and thus be excluded from the European Parliament’s budgetary competences.

**Great Britain’s CFSP Policy**

Even before becoming a full member of the EC in 1973, Great Britain was closely associated with EPC. In 1980, after the then EC-9 had failed to react quickly to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the British government presented an initiative suggesting a procedure for emergency consultation, the establishment of a small secretariat and a more overt political commitment to EPC from the member states.\(^2\) Except for the secretariat, these proposal became part of the London report.

Foreign policy co-operation was also a crucial point in the government paper “Europe – The Future”\(^3\) that was presented to the Fontainebleau European Council in 1984. A “common approach to external affairs” and “a coherent and persuasive West European voice” are mentioned as major goals. Furthermore, Europe should play “no less central a role” than the US. Moreover, the document states that cooperation should not just be a matter of making declarations in the face of increasingly complex challenges. The Ten have the weight and must show more political will to act together: concentrate their efforts where their leverage is greatest and their interests most directly touched e.g. in the Middle East and Africa; [...] The objective should be the progressive attainment of a common external policy.”\(^4\)

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1. Schild, Joachim, op.cit., p.86.
2. Iliestos, Panayiotis, op.cit.,p.284.
Only a year later, foreign minister Howe presented another paper that “had the form, although not the title, of a Treaty”.¹ That so-called Stresa paper² assumed unanimous decision-making. The European Parliament should merely be consulted. In one respect, the British proposal even tried to reverse current practice: the Commission was only to be invited to participate if the member states do not decide otherwise. A small secretariat was to be set up to support the Presidency.

During the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty the British government is said to have tried “to reduce the debate on CFSP to a discussion on limited adaptations to European Political Cooperation”.³ Britain was particularly “opposed to bringing EPC within the supranational Community framework”.⁴ The British delegation fiercely opposed any introduction of QMV into the foreign policy regime including for implementing measures.⁵ However, Britain suggested to fuse the foreign ministers’ meetings in the framework of EPC with their regular sessions as the EC Council and to integrate the EPC secretariat into the secretariat of the Council.

The British government presented its position on the intergovernmental conference of 1996/97 in a White Paper entitled ‘A Partnership of Nations’.⁶ On CFSP, the British government hardly compromised their initial positions during the negotiations, even after the new Labour government had taken office.⁷ As was made clear in the White Paper, Britain aimed at keeping CFSP intergovernmental. Unanimity was not regarded as hindering progress. The Political Committee consisting of the foreign ministries’ political directors was regarded as “the single most important element in the

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¹ Nutall, Simon, Single European Act, op.cit., p.205.
⁵ Cf. Forster, Anthony, op.cit., p.110f.
CFSP machinery”. Great Britain suggested to increase the frequency of its meetings in order to intensify common analysis. Moreover, the Political Committee should be entrusted with supervising the implementation of joint actions and the expenditure of Community funds. In order to cope with the growing workload, the secretariat should be strengthened and should assist the formulation of policy. For this task a new planning unit within the secretariat could be established consisting of five or six additional delegates from member states foreign ministries. Regarding a High Representative, Great Britain emphasizes his accountability to the Council. On the basis of unanimous agreement he could represent common policies to the public, conduct the political dialogue with third countries and supervise implementation. Though he would not be granted any formal right of initiative he could make suggestions to the Council.

Summary

During the entire period of foreign policy co-operation, Germany has advocated a strengthening of the regime. Germany never opposed proposals to strengthen the regime and has usually presented more far-reaching proposals than France and Great Britain. During the early stages of EPC, Germany particularly pushed for a permanent secretariat. In the 1990s, the introduction and extension of Qualified Majority Voting became a focus of German CFSP policy.

After first having been midwife to EPC, France took on a rather restrictive stance during various negotiations later on. In particular, French policy aimed at keeping the regime strictly intergovernmental. During the 1970s and 1980s French positions on the Commission’s involvement and the establishment of a permanent secretariat marked the lowest common denominator. In the 1990s, however, strengthening of CFSP received new priority. Most importantly, France accepted the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting. Moreover, France proposed a strengthening of the intergovernmental structure of CFSP by advocating a High Representative and a Unit for Planning and Analysis.

Until the mid-eighties, Britain supported (and initiated) a strengthening of foreign policy co-operation. The negotiations on the Single European Act, however, mark a turning point: Though Britain favored the establishment of a permanent secretariat, its proposals were more modest than those of France and, particularly, Germany. Since the 1990s Britain has been the most restrictive of the three member states under consideration, essentially opposing every move towards Qualified Majority Voting and a closer relationship to the Community. However, like France, Britain proposed a
strengthening of the intergovernmental structure with a particular emphasis on the Political Committee and the Council Secretariat.

III. A Rationalist Framework of Analysis

*Power and plenty as fundamental state preferences*

Almost every scholar in IR would agree to the notion that states are instrumentally rational actors, as long as nothing specific is said about the contents or sources of state preferences. Thus, it is not the concept of instrumental rationality, but of *substantial* rationality (i.e. about the contents and sources of state preferences) that makes rationalist theorizing distinct from other approaches such as constructivism. In a rationalist framework, states are assumed to share the same set of fundamental preferences. Though the exact composition remains contested within the rationalist camp, scholars agree that states generally adhere to ‘power’ and ‘plenty’ (or to be more precise: ‘security’ and ‘wealth’) as a set of fundamental preferences.

‘Security’ refers to “the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity”.¹ Because there is no legitimate monopoly on the use of force in the international system, every state is left to take care of its security itself. States are therefore inclined to preserve their autonomy and independence. At the same time, states try to influence their international environment, especially the behavior of other states in a way conducive to their security. Taken together, states’ fundamental interest in security translates into, on the one hand, an interest in preserving their autonomy, and, on the other hand, an interest in exerting influence.²

*Three Functions of International Institutions*

From a rationalist point of view, international institutions are regarded as *instruments* for the pursuit of state preferences. The establishment and maintenance of international institutions brings about costs, namely constraints on member states’ autonomy and freedom of action. Therefore, international institutions will only be established and upheld if the benefits they provide exceed the costs they impose. Various kinds of benefits have been

² For a more detailed discussion cf. Baumann, Rainer/Rittberger, Volker/Wagner, Wolfgang 1998: Power and Power Politics: Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory and Expectations about German Foreign Policy since Unification (Tübingen Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung 30a), Tübingen.
identified from a rationalist point of view. Again, their relative importance is contested within the rationalist camp. However, the various functions and benefits are not mutually exclusive and, at least regarding CFSP, do not result in conflicting incentives for state action. Thus, the functions of international institutions listed below can be seen as adding to each other.

First, functionalist regime theory has argued that international institutions help states to overcome collective action problems. International institutions reduce transaction costs and, by providing information, uncertainty. By establishing standards of appropriate behavior they help states to distinguish cooperative behavior from defection and thus make tit-for-tat strategies possible in the first place. By linking issues within a policy area international institutions help states to solve problems of distribution.

Neorealism has criticized functionalist regime theory for neglecting the power structure underlying international institutions. However, few neorealists regard international institutions as mere epiphenomena without any independent role. Most neorealists accept an independent, albeit limited, role for international institutions and consequently take them serious as an instrument of state policy. In contrast to functionalist regime theory, neorealism emphasizes that institutions may serve as instruments to exert power and influence. Whereas a hegemon may dominate an entire institution, less powerful states gain what Joseph Grieco has called voice-opportunities. Voice-opportunities are “institutional characteristics whereby the views of partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just expressed but reliably have a material impact on the operations of the collaborative arrangement”. Thus, a state may have a preference to establish and maintain international institutions because it augments its influence on the other member states.

Finally, scholars in a liberal tradition have emphasized that a commitment to international institutions can be seen as a strategy of governments to en-

hance their autonomy from domestic pressure. By transferring issues from the domestic to the international arena governments increase their leverage over domestic actors (such as Parliament and interest groups) in various ways. Governments gain privileged access to information and may thus manipulate the framing of the issues at stake. The influence of the parliamentary opposition is severely circumscribed because international agreements frequently do not demand ratification. What is more, even if ratification is required, the opposition can only reject the entire package, but cannot engage in bargaining on the details of an agreement. Finally, governments may take advantage of the intransparent decision-making process of many intergovernmental negotiations to diffuse responsibility. Assuming that governments strive to enhance their autonomy from both other states and societal actors, Klaus Dieter Wolf concludes that the self-binding of governments in international institutions may even bring about a net gain in autonomy.

**Institutional Choice**

Like the rationalist theory of institutions, the rationalist theory of institutional choice is functionalist, i.e. it "explains institutional choices in terms of the functions a given institution is expected to perform and the effects on policy outcomes it is expected to produce, subject to the uncertainty in any institutional design". Because compared to other international institutions, European integration has brought about an extraordinary variety of institutional forms, institutional choice theory has paid special attention to the institutional choices of EU member states. In EU constitutional politics, institutions may constrain the member states’ autonomy

"in two ways: pooling or delegation of authoritative decision-making. Sovereignty is *pooled* when governments agree to decide future matters by voting procedures other than unanimity. [...] Sovereignty is *delegated* when supranational actors are permitted to take certain autonomous decisions, without intervening interstate vote or unilateral veto."


2 Cf. Moravcsik, Andrew, Why the European Community, op.cit.

3 Wolf, Klaus Dieter, Neue Staatsräson, op.cit., p.63..


According to institutional choice theory, sovereignty is pooled because pooling provides a solution to the problem of incomplete contracting: Because no agreement can explicitly cover every detail of its implementation, ways must be found to make secondary decisions. Compared to unanimity, decisions by qualified majority are more efficient because fewer states are required to endorse a proposal. Observers of decision-making in the Council of the EU have pointed out that under qualified majority voting, only few votes are taken. Qualified majority voting accelerates the decision-making process, not because minorities are quickly outvoted, but because extreme positions are easier to isolate and participants holding extreme positions are pressured into a search for compromise. Moreover, under qualified majority voting, governments must give their delegations more differentiated instructions because without a right to veto, delegations must be prepared to engage in bargaining.

The delegation of decision-making authority can be regarded as a solution to incomplete contracting as well.\(^1\) On the basis of general guidelines that were agreed upon unanimously, secondary decisions can be taken by another actor. Mark Pollack has listed four functions that the delegation of sovereignty may fulfill.\(^2\) Delegation may increase the credibility of commitments. This function is particularly prominent whenever incentives to defect continue to exist as is the case in monetary policy.\(^3\) Furthermore, there are incentives to delegate the right to initiate proposals. Because initiatives are costly and may weaken a state’s position in the ensuing negotiations, states face incentives not to take the initiative themselves even if this strategy results in a failure to co-operate.\(^4\) Moreover, under qualified majority voting there are incentives to delegate a monopoly of initiative. Otherwise, outvoted states may try to reverse the decision by a new policy initiative. This may lead to an "endless series of proposals from disgruntled participants who had been in the minority in a previous vote\(^221\)."\(^5\) Thus, the European Commission’s monopoly of initiative for Common Market issues can be explained well by rationalist institutional choice theory. Finally, the delegation of sovereignty may serve to detect defection from agreements. Because the
member states face incentives not to blame other member states for (alleged) defection, the delegation of this function can be explained.

Though both pooling and delegating provide solutions to problems of incomplete contracting they differ in their effects on member states’ autonomy and influence. Delegation does not enhance a member state’s control over the other member states because decision-making power is then transferred to an independent body. Though the actual independence of a supranational actor has to be examined individually, the exercise of control over any supranational actor is generally seen as limited and costly. When sovereignty is pooled, however, it “is not transferred to a supranational body because the crucial decisionmaking role is taken by an interstate body”. Thus, when sovereignty is pooled, member states may obtain concessions from their partners, i.e. exert influence on them. Thus, the pooling of sovereignty actually brings about an increase in a member state’s influence.

A Rationalist Theory of Preference Formation: The Distribution of Costs and Benefits Among Member States

The rationalist theories outlined above are all functionalist in character, i.e. they explain outcomes (cooperation as well as the establishment and design of international institutions) by reference to the functions these outcomes provide. In order to explain member state policies, however, a rationalist approach must leave the level of the international system and pay attention to the specific ratio of costs and benefits for individual member states.

Interdependence brings about (positive or negative) policy externalities which impinge on states’ abilities to achieve policy goals unilaterally. However, the

“vulnerability of governments to negative externalities may vary greatly: some are able to sustain effective policies autonomously, others remain vulnerable to negative externalities from policies abroad”.  

1 Ibid.
States with effective unilateral policies have little to gain from international co-operation. Instead, they benefit from the current pattern of externalities and therefore face incentives not to change their behavior and to keep their freedom of action unrestrained by international agreements. By contrast, states able to achieve policy goals only by altering the pattern of externalities imposed by the policies of other states have a preference to establish co-operative agreements designed to change the pattern of externalities.¹

Though the basic argument, that a state’s preference is a function of its vulnerability, is said to hold true for the entire range of (foreign) policies, economic and non-economic issue areas differ as regards the process of preference formation. In economic issue areas, governments react to the demands and pressures of interests groups such as industrial associations. The preferences of these private actors in turn reflect the degree of their vulnerability to issue-specific interdependence. In non-economic issue areas, by contrast, few if any influential interest groups are involved in the policy-making process. As a consequence, the government enjoys greater agency slack to pursue general regulative objectives and can formulate its preferences in direct reaction to its vulnerability in an issue-area. For instance, differences in EU member states’ vulnerability to flows of migration best explain these member states’ preferences for or against a common European asylum and refugee policy.²

IV. CFSP Research in a Rationalist Framework

To a large extent, research on CFSP has been inspired by rationalist theorizing.³ Whereas only few scholars explicitly refer to them, many ob-

servers implicitly build upon rationalist theories. For instance, it is commonplace to regard CFSP as an instrument to promote member states’ interests.\textsuperscript{1} The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the various theories presented in the previous section resurface in the literature on CFSP.

*The functions of foreign policy co-operation*

Building on a rationalist theory of cooperation, foreign policy co-operation is regarded to be beneficial to the member states involved. Most importantly, CFSP is seen to increase member states’ influence on the world stage:

“A strong European role in the regional and international system is something like a ‘common good’ from which each member state profits if it produces results in the interest of every state of the EC/EU”.\textsuperscript{2}

Though every member state, particularly the larger ones, may influence the international environment on its own, the pooling of resources makes the collectivity of member states more influential than all individual foreign policies together.\textsuperscript{3} In a similar fashion, foreign policy co-operation is seen to further the pursuit of common policies already agreed on, particularly in the realm of foreign trade.

Furthermore, CFSP is seen to provide member states with institutionalized opportunities to influence the foreign policies of the other member

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Assessing the European Union’s External Capability and Influence

states. These opportunities arise from the member states’ “commitment to consult partners before adopting final positions or launching national initiatives on all important questions of foreign policy”. Though weaker member states are assumed to benefit most from the voice opportunities provided by the regime, major powers may also use them, especially to elicit support for specific initiatives.

Finally, CFSP is said to have an “alibi and legitimation function”. The regime may serve as a pretext for establishing or changing specific policies. Critics can be isolated with reference to an existing ‘European consensus’. Policy changes can be legitimized with reference to ‘European standards’. It should be noted that this alibi function “works as regards third countries but also internally vis-à-vis political forces and public opinion”.

Institutional Choice

A rationalist perspective on institutional choice can be found in the discussion on CFSP reform as well as in studies analyzing institutional differences between the Community’s first pillar and CFSP. Many institutional features of CFSP can be explained by the peculiarities of foreign policy cooperation, namely the need to react swiftly to a rapidly changing international environment. As a consequence, agreements such as common positions tend to be confined to general principles without spelling out any details. In other words, agreements on foreign policy are particularly incomplete.

The incomplete nature of foreign policy agreements can explain why the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting is frequently regarded as the most decisive step towards a more efficient CFSP. After all, QMV enables member states to take decisions faster. From a rationalist point of view, there are strong incentives to pool sovereignty in order to strengthen foreign policy co-operation. By contrast, there are fewer incentives to delegate

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2 This is the formula used in the London Report, quoted from Agence Europe Documents No. 1174 of October, 17th, 1981.
3 Regelsberger, Elfriede, op.cit., p.183 Cases in point include France’s use of EPC as regards her Middle East policy and Great Britain’s endeavor to elicit ‘European’ support for its policy in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe as well as during the war in the Falklands (cf. Gerbet, op.cit., p.156; Bulmer, Simon/Edwards, Geoffrey 1992: Foreign and Security Policy, in: Bulmer, Simon/George, Stephen/Scott, Andrew (Eds.): The United Kingdom and EC Membership Evaluated, London: Pinter, 145-160, p.150).
5 ibid. and de la Serre, Francoise, Ausmaß nationaler Anpassung, p. 246.
6 cf., e.g., Zielonka, Jan, op.cit, p.177ff., 202.
soverignty to the supranational community institutions. Because member states gain little from defection there are few incentives to delegate implementation. For the same reason, there is little demand to delegate the detection of defective behavior to either the Commission or the European Court of Justice. Moreover, the ECJ is ill-suited to interpret agreements authoritatively with the necessary rapidity. Because of the non-legislative nature of foreign policy and due to the need to react swiftly, it is difficult to grant the European Parliament competences similar to those it enjoys in the first pillar. However, it remains puzzling why the European Parliament has received any competences at all (e.g. on financing CFSP). The delegation of competences to the European Parliament is generally puzzling to a rationalist theory of institutional choice because it is difficult for member states to control and sanction an actor that draws direct legitimacy from the electorate.

Explaining Different Member State Policies: The Distribution of Costs and Benefits

The argument that member state policies reflect their degree of issue-specific vulnerability is particularly common in the literature on small states in CFSP. Because of limited resources and a high degree of dependence from larger countries (i.e. because of a high degree of vulnerability), small states are regarded as particularly interested in international co-operation. Since their autonomy is limited anyway, they tend to be more prepared to transfer sovereignty to international and supranational institutions than larger states. In a study on Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands in CFSP, Ben Tonra pointed out that small states gain a lot from the information made available through foreign policy co-operation: “Minor states usually lack significant intelligence or espionage capabilities and, as a general rule, have smaller diplomatic staffs from which to gather and analyze data.”

1 In terms of game theory, foreign policy co-operation has features of a co-ordination rather than a collaboration game: The major difficulty consists of finding a common position (a point on the Pareto frontier). Once a common position is agreed upon, member states cannot achieve international influence at the expense of the other member states.


more, particularly when holding the presidency, small states gain access to international actors they would not be granted otherwise.\footnote{Ibid., 184.}

Moravcsik has also suggested a close relationship between the viability of a state’s unilateral foreign policy capacity and its preference for or against foreign policy co-operation.\footnote{Moravcsik/Nicolaidis, op.cit., p.64.} As a consequence, both a liberal, issue-specific and a (neo-)realist, geopolitical theory of preference formation predict that “geopolitical concerns would dominate [...] positions [...] in those areas without clear and certain economic implications, such as [...] foreign policy cooperation”.\footnote{Moravcsik, Andrew, Choice for Europe, p.402.}

V. Explaining German, French and British CFSP Policies

In this section, I will apply the rationalist framework, as outlined in the previous sections, to German, French and British CFSP policies. In order to do so, the independent variable ‘capacity to conduct foreign policy unilaterally’ has to be further specified (IV.1). Next, the German, French and British capacities to conduct foreign policy unilaterally have to be determined (IV.2.). After having measured the independent variable, predictions on German, French and British CFSP policies can be formulated. In order to demonstrate that these predictions are not derived from a theoretical strawman, but reflect widely held beliefs about the factors determining these states’ CFSP policies, I will refer to existing research (IV.3.).

Specifying ‘capacity to conduct foreign policy unilaterally’

“A state’s capacity to act unilaterally by and large depends on its power position.\footnote{Cf. also Moravcsik/Nicolaidis, op.cit., p.64.} As demonstrated above, it is a truism that powerful member states have a larger capacity for an effective unilateral foreign policy than less powerful member states. However, not much is gained until one makes more specific statements as to how to determine a member state’s power position. Because states’ power positions are of paramount importance in neorealism I will take neorealist writings on determing power positions as a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., 184.
\item Moravcsik/Nicolaidis, op.cit., p.64.
\item Moravcsik, Andrew, Choice for Europe, p.402.
\item Cf. also Moravcsik/Nicolaidis, op.cit., p.64.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Actors and models

point of departure. Since this paper undertakes to explain member states’ policies in a rationalist – not necessarily neorealist – way, additional considerations on ‘institutional power’ and ‘soft power’ will be added.\(^1\) Vasquez, John A. 1997: The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition, in: American Political Science Review 91:4, 899-912 as well as the ensuing debates in ‘International Security’ and ‘American Political Science Review’). To the extent that neorealism is understood to include these variables, rationalism and neorealism generate similar predictions on matters of foreign policy and defense (cf. also Moravcsik, Andrew, op.cit., p.50).

From a neorealist perspective, a state’s power position is a function of two factors, namely the number of great powers in the international system (polarity) and its share in certain material resources. Together, they have a major impact on a state’s foreign policy behavior:

"The behavior of individual states, regardless of their domestic political characteristics, is constrained by their own capabilities and the distribution of power in the system as a whole (...). The external environment will inevitably pressure states to move toward congruity between commitments and capabilities"\(^3\)

**Polarity**

The polarity of the international system, i.e. the number of great powers, has a decisive impact on every state’s freedom of action. Neorealists distinguish between bipolar and non-bipolar systems.\(^4\) The polarity of the international system influences a state’s power position because the number of

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1. The respective paragraphs largely draw on Baumann, Rainer/Rittberger, Volker/Wagner, Wolfgang, op.cit.
2. It has been a contested issue whether institutions and perceptions can or should play a role in neorealist theorizing (cf. Legro, Jeffrey W./Moravcsik, Andrew 1999: Is Anybody still a Realist?, in: International Security 24:2, 5-55 and
4. With regard to non-bipolar systems, neorealists are mostly concerned with multipolar systems, but they have also identified unipolar international systems (cf. Layne, Christopher 1993: The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise, in: International Security 17, 5-51). In terms of war proneness, unipolarity is regarded as especially stable by neorealist proponents of hegemonic stability theory, such as Gilpin. However, most neorealists emphasize the extreme instability of unipolar systems in terms of durability; unipolarity is only seen as a transition stage on the path to a bipolar or multipolar system. For neorealists, therefore, the most important distinction is the ‘bipolarity/non-bipolarity’ dichotomy, where non-bipolarity generally signifies a multipolar system, and in exceptional cases a unipolar transitory system.
great powers determines the freedom for manoeuvre of all states in the international system and thus also how states can employ their capabilities. For most states, for example, increasing their own share in capabilities in the international system under conditions of bipolarity has fewer consequences than if they do so under non-bipolarity. In bipolarity, a state with a share in capabilities at its disposal that is significant but remains far behind those of the two leading powers, will have little prospect of itself becoming a pole in the system and thus of being able to independently safeguard its own survival. Its security will remain contingent on protection from one great power by the other. In a non-bipolar system, by contrast, this dependence is far less evident, and the state can act independently to a greater degree. When employing its capabilities it is not (or at least to a lesser degree) restricted by a protective great power. When a bipolar system falls apart, therefore, the power position of such a state improves even if its share in the capabilities available in the international system has not increased.

Capabilities

Next to the number of great powers in the international system, neorealism regards a state's share in certain capabilities as decisive for its power position. Capabilities are seen as highly fungible, meaning that power is a general potential which can be used in quite disparate areas of policy. Whether a capability contributes to a state's power depends on its utility in the extreme case of war which neorealism regards as a permanent background condition. Though the size of population and territory has lost the paramount importance it had in agricultural societies, they remain important. Whereas the size of territory may impact on the endowment with natural resources, the size of population impacts on the size of troops and workforce. Probably the most important capability is a state's economic strength, usually measured in GNP and export volume. A strong economy usually goes along with a high level of technology which may, last but not least, be used for military purposes. Moreover, a state's military capability largely depends on its military budget which in turn depends on a state's economy.

Institutional power

As outlined above, international institutions may be regarded as instruments to influence other states' policies. Thus, a state's membership or special position in international institutions may further add to its power position. Not to be admitted to exclusive international institutions such as the G7...
or the Bosnian Contact Group diminishes a state’s possibilities to exercise influence on international events.\textsuperscript{1} Institutional privileges such as a special veto right (e.g. in the UN Security Council) or a large number of votes (e.g. in the EU Council) or seats (e.g. in the European Parliament) further add to a state’s institutional power.

**Soft Power**

Realists and neorealists alike have referred to non-material resources such as “national morale” and the “quality of diplomacy” (Morgenthau) as well as “prestige” (Gilpin).\textsuperscript{2} The most elaborate work on this ‘second face of power’, however, can be found in Joseph Nye’s *Bound to Lead* (1990). In contrast to ‘command power’, ‘soft power’ (also termed ‘indirect power’) is based on the “attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express”.\textsuperscript{3} According to Nye, a state’s soft power is derived from its culture, its ideology and its institutions.\textsuperscript{4} Though soft power is more difficult to measure than ‘command power’, it seems clear that, for example, a state’s history may enhance or diminish the attractiveness of its ideas and, consequently, its policy initiatives.

**Summary**

The number of great powers in the international system, a state’s share in capabilities, the attractiveness of a state’s ideas and institutional resources all impact on a state’s power position.

**German, French and British Power Positions**

German unification and the end of the Cold War as a watershed

During the period under consideration at least two factors determining a state’s power position have changed dramatically: First, the end of the Cold War has left the United States as the only great (or super-) power. Second, German unification signifies an increase in German capabilities and drastically changes the distribution of capabilities within the European Union.

\textsuperscript{1} The exclusion from encompassing institutions such as the United Nations or (within Europe) the Council of Europe may even lead to (or express) a severe marginalization of a state.


\textsuperscript{3} Nye, Joseph, op.cit., p.31.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 32.
The end of the Cold War has put an end to forty years of bipolarity in the international system. Notwithstanding whether the international system of the early 1990s is described as a “unipolar moment”, as “unipolarity without hegemony” or as an emerging multipolar system, the room of manoeuvre has increased for all EU member states. With the collapse of the Soviet threat their dependence on the US for their security has declined. This in turn makes it more difficult for the US to use security guarantees as bargaining chips. Since the dominant East-West confrontation has withered away coalition building between states has become less determined by strategic calculations. However, Germany, France and the United Kingdom have benefitted from this new freedom of action to varying degrees.

Germany’s Power Position

Even before unification, Germany’s power position had steadily increased. Besides a growing economic capacity, institutional power resources have been important in this process. When EPC was established in 1970, the Federal Republic was not yet a member of the United Nations. Furthermore it lacked diplomatic relations with a range of countries in Eastern Europe and the Third World.

Notwithstanding this increase in capabilities and institutional power, Germany’s power position before unification remained severely limited. First of all, Germany lacked full sovereignty. The special rights and responsibilities of the Allied Powers (Alliierte Vorbehaltsrechte) limited Germany’s room for manoeuvre which always became apparent when German preferences did not concur with Allied interests. Furthermore, its position as a ‘front state’ and the special status and exposed position of Berlin made the ‘old’ FRG particularly vulnerable. Finally, vivid memories of Germany’s militarist and fascist past left the ‘old’ FRG with only little ‘soft power’. As a consequence, a unilateral foreign policy was “likely to lead to negative reac-

2 Layne, Christopher, op.cit.
4 Rummel, Reinhard/Wessels, Wolfgang, op.cit, p.39.
tions, thereby reducing the Federal Republic’s influence and room for manoeuvre”.¹

Unification and the end of the Cold War significantly increased Germany’s power position. With the 2+4 Treaty, Germany regained its full sovereignty. The end of the Cold War also meant an end to Germany’s exposed position.

It is difficult to assess whether the end of the Cold War and German unification rendered the legacy of Germany’s Nazi past less relevant and thus increased Germany’s soft power. On the one hand, the mere passage of time as well as a generation of politicians coming into power that has no first-hand experience of Nazi Germany, may result in these memories fade. On the other hand, unification and the symbolic move from Bonn to Berlin may revitalize traditional fears of a powerful Germany in the middle of Europe.²

The power positions of France and Britain

Because of their similarity, the power positions of France and Britain can be determined in a single move. Until German unification, both countries were endowed with capacities which made them the two most powerful West European states. The most important factor of these capacities was the French and British nuclear arsenal.

In both the French and the British case, institutional and soft power were further contributing to a power position topping that of any other West European state (including Germany). Because both states belonged to the winning coalition in World War II, they were endowed with preponderant soft power. Moreover, the permanent seat in the UN Security Council has been a very important institutional power resource. Other institutional power resources include the G7 and the Contact Group on Bosnia.

Though the end of the Cold War augmented both states’ freedom of action, their relative power positions declined as compared to Germany. Though France and Britain remained the only West European states endowed with nuclear weapons their importance had declined after the Cold War because they were unlikely to play an important role when dealing with the security agenda of the 1990s.

Rationalist Predictions

Germany

¹ Rummel, Reinhard/Wessels, Wolfgang, op.cit., p.40.
Because of its weak power position before unification Germany is expected to support foreign policy co-operation in the 1970s and 1980s. Because Germany’s power position significantly improved after unification and the end of the Cold War post-unification Germany is expected to lose its interest in strengthening foreign policy co-operation and to oppose respective proposals.

Many observers of Germany’s CFSP policy agree with these expectations. Pre-unification Germany is said to have benefitted particularly from its regime participation. Those commenting on Germany in EPC emphasized the importance of institutionalized voice-opportunities to Germany. German governments used EPC to elicit support for some of its policies, most importantly its Ostpolitik of the early 1970s. The German government used EPC to inform its partners about its bilateral contacts with Warsaw Pact states and thereby successfully demonstrated its trustworthiness. The alibi and legitimation function was also regarded to be “of specific importance for the FRG”. EPC was “a highly useful framework for diverting conflicting pressure away from Bonn and transferring it to an anonymous body where the respective blame can be put on the ‘group’ or on other partners”. EPC “enabled the FRG to take an open stand on critical issues affecting the international system which it would not have been able to do bilaterally”. This holds true as regards human rights policy towards Eastern Europe and, of course, as regards its Middle East policy where Germany “was hindered […] by the burden of Nazi atrocities against the Jews”. The Soviet Union could no longer accuse Germany bilaterally of revanchism and destabilization when Germany criticized human rights violations under a European umbrella. With regard to domestic opposition, critics could be described as isolated in Western Europe.

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1 Cf. Rummel, Reinhard, op.cit, p.40.
4 Ibid.
5 Schweitzer, Carl-Christoph, op.cit., p.122.
7 Schweitzer, Carl-Christoph, op.cit., p.114.
After unification, several observers have expected and/or perceived Germany to put greater emphasis on its unilateral freedom of action. For example, Anne-Marie Le Gloannec found that in the mid-1990s Germany changed “from a champion of federalism into an advocate of intergovernmentalism, from a Musternknaebe of Europe into a convert to British policies”. For the realm of foreign policy co-operation, Wolfgang Wessels finds that the federal government’s demand for a real common foreign and security policy “clearly diminished in the mid-1990s”.

France

Because of its then paramount power position in the European Union, France is expected to oppose a significant strengthening of foreign policy co-operation before the end of the Cold War. Because of its weakened power position after German unification, France is expected to increase its support for a strengthening of the EU’s foreign policy regime.

Again, the scholarly literature on France shares these expectations. France’s preference for foreign policy co-operation is regarded to depend on its (shifting) capacity for effective unilateral action. Many scholars concur that binding and controlling Germany has been a major incentive for foreign policy co-operation. Whenever Germany’s room for independent ac-

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2 Le Gloannec, op.cit., p.21.


4 Schild, Joachim, op.cit.

tion increased, so did the French preference for foreign policy co-operation. This is seen to hold true for Pompidou’s original initiative. By institutionalizing foreign policy co-operation, France wanted to counter a “loss in power status with respect to the FRG evidenced both by the monetary disturbances of 1969-70 and Willy Brandt’s autonomous Ostpolitik”.¹

Many scholars point to an increased French interest in foreign policy co-operation after the end of the Cold War which is assumed to be a “shock questioning established premises of French foreign, European, but also security policy”.¹

Great Britain

Similarly to France, Great Britain is expected to oppose a significant strengthening of foreign policy co-operation before the end of the Cold War because of its then paramount power position in the European Union. Because of its weakened power position after German unification, Great Britain is expected to increase its support for a strengthening of the EU’s foreign policy regime.

Again, this expectation can be found in the literature in British foreign policy. As for the beginning of EPC, Christopher Hill points to the large capacity for unilateral foreign policy but “as Ostpolitik and détente developed, while the United States remained enmeshed in Vietnam, the advantages for Britain of alignment with Western Europe in international relations seemed

¹Jopp, Mathias 1998: Nationale Interessen und europapolitische Grundverständnisse im Wandel – zur Einordnung und Interpretation der empirischen Ergebnisse, in: Jopp, Mathias/Maurer, Andreas/Schneider, Heinrich (Eds.): Europapolitische Grundverständnisse im Wandel. Analysen und Konsequenzen für die politische Bildung, Bonn: Europa Union, 149-192, p.165, my translation. A strengthening of CFSP in particular is regarded to bind Germany closer to Western Europe.² For example, France is seen to use a common European policy towards Eastern Europe to prevent German hegemony and a consequent disturbance of power in this region.³


³Sauder, Axel, op.cit, p.154.
clear”. As long as EPC leaves its member states free to act unilaterally, “the balance sheet points towards a gain deriving from British participation in EPC”. Because of the regime’s limited scope, “EPC imposed few costs upon the UK”. In a number of cases Great Britain is regarded as having successfully used EPC to mobilize support. In regions to which Great Britain had less intensive ties (e.g. Latin America) EPC is seen to enhance British influence. In the Near East, Britain benefitted from EPC ‘alibi and legitimation function’.

The unification of Germany elicited widespread scepticism in Britain. Britain is said to have perceived German unification as a threat both to its position in Europe and to its relationship with the US. Thus, observers concluded that Britain’s preference to tie in the unified Germany via European co-operation has intensified.

VI. Conclusion: Rationalism’s Explanatory Capacity

As section IV. made clear, both scholars and observers of CFSP have adopted rationalist arguments in order to explain the establishment, development and institutional design of foreign policy co-operation in Europe. Indeed, rationalist theories of co-operation and international institutions successfully account for the fact that EU member states have committed themselves to co-operate in the realm of foreign policy. Though the exact level of co-operation remains indeterminate, a rationalist approach is helpful in identifying the costs and benefits of foreign policy co-operation. Moreover, a rationalist theory of institutional choice can explain why Qualified Majority Voting has been fiercely debated and finally introduced, whereas the delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions has been rather limited.

However, the rationalist record in explaining the puzzle of this paper, namely specific member states’ policies towards CFSP is less impressive.

2 Bulmer, Simon/Edwards, Geoffrey, op.cit, p.150.
3 Bulmer/Edwards mention the policy towards Rhodesia and Zimbabwe (Ibid, p. 150). One may add the policy towards Argentina during the Falkland War.
4 This holds particularly true for the political elite.
As argued above, the end of the East-West-conflict and German unification are a turning point expected to change member states’ preferences on foreign policy co-operation. Whereas the rationalist framework can account for German, French and British policies until the end of the Cold War, it only explains France’s policy after unification but fails to account for Germany’s and Britain’s CFSP policies in the 1990s. As long as Europe’s foreign policy regime remained non-binding, unanimous and intergovernmental (i.e. until the negotiations on the Single European Act), German, French and British support for various reforms of EPC can be explained by the few constraints that these reforms have placed on the conduct of unilateral foreign policy. From the early to the late 1980s, German support for, as well as French and British opposition against, a strengthening of foreign policy co-operation is in line with these member states’ power positions and resulting capacities to pursue efficient unilateral foreign policies.

German unification and the end of the Cold War have changed the relative power positions of Germany, France and Great Britain who are thus expected to adjust their policies towards Europe’s foreign policy regime. However, only the French policy during the Maastricht and Amsterdam negotiations is in line with the rationalist expectation that France and Britain should display an increased preference for foreign policy co-operation. Contrary to a rationalist expectation, Britain continued to oppose a strengthening of CFSP, particularly the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting. Moreover, the continued German support for strengthened foreign policy co-operation contradicts the rationalist expectation that post-unification Germany would lose its interest in CFSP.

It is important to note that this failure of a rationalist approach cannot be blamed on a too narrow, essentially neorealist understanding of rationalism that ignores other rationalist theories of international co-operation and foreign policy. ‘Liberal’ theories emphasizing the influence of interests groups or public opinion on foreign policy cannot be integrated into an explanation of CFSP policies because neither organized domestic interests nor public opinion have much of an impact on CFSP constitutional policy-making. Rationalism and neorealism seem to converge, not because rationalism has been truncated, but because recent neorealist theorizing has moved away from a narrow focus on material capabilities and has incorporated institutions and perceptions as further explanatory variables.

German and British CFSP policies in the 1990s do not reflect the shift in the European power structure and the resulting changes in costs and benefits. In both cases, other factors such as political culture and identity, values and norms seem to be more important. In order to develop a complete ex-
planation of German, French and British CFSP policies a constructivist second cut would be necessary.