Wolfgang Wagner / Rainer Baumann / Gunther Hellmann

Agents, Structures, and German Foreign Policy after Unification.

From Metatheory to Empirical Enquiry

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Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to bridging the gap between Foreign Policy Analysis, specifically the study of German foreign policy and the study of the dynamic system of European governance. So far, the former usually focuses on how Germany reacts and adapts to a changing (European) environment, while neglecting the impact of German foreign policy on this environment. In contrast, the latter is concerned with changes in European governance, yet usually without attributing these changes to the actions of governments of EU member states such as Germany. As a consequence, the continuous and dynamic interplay of state action and the development of the state's environment has not been sufficiently recognized in empirical research. We suggest an interactionist approach to the study of German foreign policy which centers on the mutual constitution of German foreign policy on the one hand and European governance on the other. In outlining such an approach, we draw on two sources with a view to integrate them into a single model. The first is the debate on the agency-structure problem. This debate obviously has left its imprint on IR theorizing during the past decade. However, its implications have not been sufficiently spelled out for empirical research. The second source is the pragmatist epistemology and theory of action, which has received only little attention in IR so far. In two empirical illustrations we show how our interactionist model applies to the examination of the dynamic interplay between German foreign policy and European governance. These cases are (a) German policy with regard to the establishment of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and (b) the development of Germany's readiness to participate in multilateral military out-of-area operations. In the first case, we can especially witness the interplay of German foreign policy and European political structures, whereas the second case is a model case to study the reciprocal effects of foreign policy and domestic structures on each other.

Authors' address:
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
Institute for Comparative Politics and International Relations
Robert-Mayer-Straße 5, Fach 102
D-60054 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
++49-69-798-28488 (Baumann and Wagner)
++49-69-798-25191 / -22667 (Hellmann)
wolfgang.wagner@soz.uni-frankfurt.de
r.baumann@soz.uni-frankfurt.de
g.hellmann@soz.uni-frankfurt.de / gunther.hellmann@t-online.de
I. The Analysis of German Foreign Policy and the Study of European Governance: 
\textit{Wächst zusammen, was zusammen gehört?!}  

It is a commonplace that the development of European governance, particularly the course of European integration has been heavily influenced by the policies of successive German governments. It is equally accepted that Germany, its interests and its identity, have in turn been shaped by European governance and by the process of European integration in particular. However, both issues have traditionally been studied apart from each other, due to a division of labor between Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and the study of European governance and integration. As a result, each field of study has treated the other field’s matters only at the margins. Thus, students of European governance have only marginally been concerned with explaining member states’ policies. Most importantly, from our point of view, students of German foreign policy have treated changes in European governance as exogenous and, as a consequence, usually depict German policy as mere reaction and adaptation to these changes. This portrait of German foreign policy is clearly at odds with the truism mentioned above, namely that Germany has, to a considerable extent, pursued an active policy of shaping its European environment.

This paper attempts to contribute to bridging the gap between the study of German foreign policy and the study of the dynamic system of European governance. In particular, it outlines an interactionist approach to German foreign policy that puts the interplay between German policy and European governance at the center of analysis (section III). The approach draws on two sources, namely the debate on the Agency-Structure-Problem and a pragmatist theory of action. Section IV gives a first (and still sketchy) illustration of the model by studying Germany’s policy on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well as on participation in out-of-area missions. Before we outline our interactionist approach, section II presents a brief state of the art on Foreign Policy Analysis and the study of change in European governance.

II. The State of the Art on German Foreign Policy in Europe

1. Foreign Policy Analysis

The field of Foreign Policy Analysis has been influenced by the theoretical debates in International

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1 This paper is based on a research proposal submitted to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). Whereas the interactionist model outlined in this paper is illustrated by German policy on a European Security and Defense Policy and on military out-of-area missions, in the larger project Germany’s policy on a European Security and Defense Policy, on a European Asylum and Immigration Policy and on the Eastern enlargement of the European Union shall be analyzed. The authors would like to thank Chaya Arora, Helmut Breitmeier, Thomas Christiansen, Matthias Dembinski, Thomas Diez, Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Katzenstein, Susanne Riegraf, and Frank Schimmelfennig for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper.
Relations about the relative importance of different structural variables.\textsuperscript{2} The most important debates have been ‘systemic versus subsystemic approaches’ and ‘rationalism versus constructivism’. Whereas neorealists have emphasized the necessity to gear foreign policy to the anarchic structure of the international system and the distribution of power in it (cf. Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 1990), liberals have stressed the importance of domestic structures, e.g. the system of rule which has been said to impact on a state’s war proneness.\textsuperscript{3} It is important to note that both approaches share the assumption that foreign policy is a function of structures. Foreign policy change can only be conceived of as an adaptation to changing (international or domestic) structures.\textsuperscript{4}

Both neorealist and liberal theorizing has been criticized by constructivists for neglecting ‘ideational’ variables such as political culture, identity, norms and values (cf. Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995; Lapid/Kratochwil 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995; Ruggie 1998). Though constructivists have broadened the concept of structure to include common norms and culture, they have not abandoned the notion that state behavior is heavily influenced by structures, be they international or domestic (cf. Hudson 1997).\textsuperscript{5} For example, Martha Finnemore (1996a) demonstrates how the decisions of states to intervene militarily abroad are shaped by changing international norms ‘governing’ legitimate and appropriate behavior in that area. By contrast, Thomas Risse and his colleagues (Risse et al. 1999) argue that the differences in German, French and British policies on European Economic and Monetary Union are influenced by different national identities, i.e. relatively stable conceptions of Self and Other shared within a state.

At the same time, FPA as a field of study has been challenged, at least in Europe, by the Europeanization or Brusselization (Allen 1998: 42) of national foreign policies (White 1999; Manners/Whitman forthcoming). The more national foreign policies have become part of a European governance of foreign relations the more the distinction between ‘state actors’, on the one hand, and the structures and institutions around them, on the other, has been blurred. As a

\textsuperscript{2} Of course, the first wave of studies on foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, which is usually labeled Comparative Foreign Policy, often neglected the implications of such debates for the analysis of foreign policy, but FPA has become more open to adopt and utilize thoughts from IR theory (cf., for an overview, Neack/Hey/Haney 1995 and Hudson 1995).

\textsuperscript{3} Cf. Rummel 1995; 1999 for the proposition that democracies are inherently more peaceful; cf. Russett 1993 and Chan 1997 for the proposition that democracies do not fight each other.

\textsuperscript{4} The literature on the foreign policies of hegemons is an exception. Hegemons are considered powerful enough to shape international structures in the first place (cf. Gilpin 1981; Ruggie 1993). Germany, however, does not qualify as a hegemon (Kreile 1996).

\textsuperscript{5} Cf. Rosati/Hagan/Sampson 1994 The literature on (simple and complex) learning, which can be considered part of the constructivist school of thought, is equally concerned with actors adapting to changes in the environment (Nye 1987; Levy 1994).
consequence, many FPA tools have become inadequate since they have been based on that very distinction.

2. The Study of European Integration

The very object of European integration studies has been change, namely „the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger center“ (Haas 1968: 16). Yet, students of European integration have been quite hesitant to attribute any responsibility (or causal significance) for the dynamic of this process to state actors. As a general rule, the more change was conceived as possible, the less states were considered important actors. This holds true both for the debate between the two major schools of thought in integration studies, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, as well as for the discussions within the neofunctionalist camp.

In ‘The Uniting of Europe’ (1968), the first major outline of neofunctionalism, Ernst Haas presented a theory that was optimistic about the prospects of integration. Haas considered technical elites, industrial associations, trade unions, bureaucrats, and supranational institutions to be the agents of change because they were capable of grasping the necessity of integration in the face of an highly interdependent world. The concept of ‘spill-over’ was introduced to denote the automaticity of the integration process spreading from one sector to another.

Intergovernmentalists have criticized neofunctionalism for being over-optimistic about the prospects of integration. Stanley Hoffmann in the 1960s and Andrew Moravcsik in the 1990s have accused neofunctionalism of underestimating the importance of nation-states as the prime (non-)movers and of overestimating the potential of supranational and domestic actors to influence the course of integration (cf. Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1991; 1993; 1998). To be sure, intergovernmentalists have not denied that a significant transfer of competences to the European level has taken place. However, they have emphasized that states have been in control of this process. In other words, unintended consequences in this perspective were considered to be negligible. Moreover, in significant respects governments were seen to employ ‘integration’ as a calculated strategy to regain their capacity of control and to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis domestic actors (cf. Moravcsik 1994; Wolf 1999).

In the face of their intergovernmentalist critics and of de Gaulle’s impact on integration, neofunctionalists embarked on a process of revising the theory already in the 1960s. A major challenge was to take ‘dramatic political actors’ (Haas 1967) such as de Gaulle into account. However, to the extent that state strategies were taken more seriously neofunctionalism became more skeptical about the prospects, let alone the automaticity of integration.6

6 A good example is Schmitter (1971) who took ‘spill back’ and ‘encapsulation’ as serious as ‘spill-over’. As a
The new dynamic of European integration since the mid-1980s led to a renewed interest in neofunctionalist theorizing (cf. Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991; Sandholtz/Zysman 1989; Sandholtz 1993). Characteristically, attention again shifted away from states to supranational entrepreneurs such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice (cf. Burley/Mattli 1993) and to networks of experts (e.g. the Delors committee of central bankers, cf. Cameron 1995).

3. Studies on Post-Unification German (Foreign) Policy in Europe

Though the impact of German policy on European governance has been immense in the aftermath of the Cold War, it has hardly been studied by scholars of European integration but mainly by students of Foreign Policy Analysis. Here, Germany has been treated as a ‘test case’ in order to assess the impact of different variables on state behavior (cf., e.g., Rittberger forthcoming). Research has been dedicated to the question whether German policy has adapted to the imperatives of the international power structure, whether German policy has reflected the demands of domestic interests or whether German policy has been led by institutionalized expectations of appropriate behavior (on either the international/European or domestic level). These expectations were derived from competing schools of thought, most importantly neorealism and constructivism. Neorealism expected Germany to adapt to the transition from bipolarity to unipolarity (and ultimately to multipolarity) and the concomitant improvement of its power position by putting more emphasis on its unilateral freedom of action at the expense of multilateralism and integration (cf. Waltz 1993; Baumann/Rittberger/Wagner 1999). Empirical studies, however, have found little evidence supporting this expectation. By contrast, most observers have found continuity to be the dominant feature of Germany’s foreign policy after unification. According to them, Germany has continued to pursue a foreign policy characterized by multilateralism, non-military means and a culture of restraint.

Most of these studies have been based on constructivist theorizing in order to explain continuity in German foreign policy. Scholars have either pointed to the enduring embeddedness of Germany in international institutions (cf. Anderson/Goodman 1993; Katzenstein 1997) or to unchanged features of Germany’s political culture (cf. Duffield 1998; 1999; Berger 1998; Maull 2000). In both cases, foreign policy has been traced back to the impact of (international or domestic) structures. According to Thomas Berger (1998) and John Duffield (1998; 1999), an anti-militarist culture in German society has led the German government to forgo the establishment of an independent

consequence, he concluded that „the evolution of a national integration policy or regional institution [...] is quite likely to be erratic and may well demonstrate no cumulative trend at all“ (242).

Liberals who expect foreign policy to reflect the pattern of domestic interests and their institutional mediation (cf. Moravcsik 1997 and the literature on the democratic peace) have paid little attention to German foreign policy after unification (but see Bienen/Freund/Rittberger 1999 and Anderson 1999).
military capacity and to avoid out-of-area missions. Peter Katzenstein (1997), Thomas Banchoff (1999), Thomas Risse (1999) and Markus Jachtenfuchs (1999) have all pointed to a Europeanized German identity in order to explain Germany’s adherence to European integration. It is important to note that none of these authors conceives of ‘political culture’ or ‘national identity’ as a fixed concept. The possibility of change in ‘political culture’ and ‘national identity’, however, is mostly considered in the context of outside pressures (cf., e.g. Risse et al. 1999 for French European policy). Few attention has been paid to the active shaping of ‘political culture’ and ‘national identity’ by actors such as the German government or other governments.

4. Summary

The analysis of German policy in Europe has suffered from an artificial division of labor between FPA on the one hand and the study of European governance on the other. While research on European integration has paid little attention to the role of states in the shaping of European structures, studies on German foreign policy have usually depicted German foreign policy as a response to exogenous developments on the European (and wider international) level. Notwithstanding this division of labor, scholars usually acknowledge that German policy and European integration have had a tremendous impact upon each other. Thus, calls to bridge the gap between scholars analyzing the development of European integration on the one hand, and scholars studying German policy adaptation to changes in its European environment on the other, have not come as a surprise (cf. Medick-Krakau 1999: 4; Kohler-Koch 2000). The integration of two research traditions, however, is a challenging endeavor if it is meant to be more than a merger of lists of variables. In the following we will sketch an outline of an interactionist model which is supposed to provide for such an integration.

III. Towards an Interactionist Model

This paper and the underlying project aim to bring the study of German foreign policy and the analysis of European governance closer together. In doing so, however, the study of German policy remains our prime interest. Rather than adding a ‘German layer’ to the analysis of European governance, we introduce a ‘European layer’ to the examination of German policy. In this section, we will outline an interactionist model designed to guide the analysis of the dynamic interplay between an agent (such as Germany) and its environment (such as the system of European governance). Our interactionist approach draws on two major sources with a view to integrate them into a single model. The first source is the debate on the Agency-Structure-Problem that has been brought to the attention of IR theory by the work of Alexander Wendt and David Dessler in particular (III.1.). The far-reaching implications of this theoretical work for Foreign Policy Analysis has later been spelled out by Walter Carlsnaes (1992; 1993) in particular.8 The second source is the

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8 In fact, our endeavor has many similarities with Walter Carlsnaes’ morphogenetic model. Unfortunately,
pragmatist epistemology and theory of action which has received only little attention in IR so far (III.2.).

1. **The Agency-Structure-Problem as a Starting Point**

Because the debate on the Agency-Structure-Problem (ASP) has been dedicated to overcoming the dualism of agency-based theorizing, on the one hand, and structure-based theorizing on the other, it is an obvious point of departure for theorizing the dynamic interplay between agents and their surrounding.

1.1. **Three Dimensions of the Agency-Structure Problem**

The ASP has been presented, first of all, as a problem of (social) ontology. As an ontological problem, the ASP has been concerned with the nature of agents, structures and their relationship to each other (Wendt 1987: 339). What is at stake is to what extent agents and structures can be considered ontologically primitive units. Traditionally, (methodological) individualism and (methodological) structuralism have marked the extreme positions on that question. In contrast, the debate since the mid-1980s starts from the assumption that both extreme positions are untenable and that a mediating position is needed.

In addition to the ontological dimension of the problem, an epistemological and a methodological dimension can be distinguished. With regard to the former, it has been asked whether a positivist epistemology can still be appropriate once the mutual constitution of agents and structures has been accepted or whether an interpretivist approach is required (cf. Carlsnaes 1992; Friedman/ Starr 1997: 10; cf. also Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986). The methodological dimension has been concerned with the translation of co-constitution into specific research designs. Methodological aspects of the Agency-Structure-Problem have received the least attention so far. As a consequence, empirical research has rarely gone beyond paying lip-service to a ‘structurationist’ ontology (cf. also Checkel 1998: 340; for a recent exception, cf. Cerny 2000). In our view, this is a major shortcoming of the debate, since the merits of metatheory in the end depend on the additional empirical insights they

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10 According to Wendt, there are “two truisms about social life which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors.” (Wendt 1987: 337-338; cf. also Dessler 1989: 443).

11 This distinction has been made by Friedman/Starr 1997 and Wight (1999: 125). Wendt only mentions an ontological and an epistemological dimension (1987: 339).
make possible. A major aim of this paper and the underlying project is therefore to address the methodological issues of conceptualization and to assess an interactionist model by applying it to two instances of German foreign policy after unification.

1.2. Moderate-Structurationist Foreign Policy Analysis

The term ‘structurationist’ has been coined by Anthony Giddens to denote a mode of theorizing that takes neither agents nor structures as primitive units and focuses instead on the process of their mutual constitution. The notion that agents and structures are co-constitutive and therefore subject to change poses a serious challenge to any positivist methodology dedicated to the detection of regularities („laws“) between clearly defined and measurable variables (Carlsnaes 1992: 263). It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the Agency-Structure-Problem has inspired a wave of post-positivist theorizing that has replaced causal analyses with narratives (cf. Suganami 1999) or figurations (cf. Jackson/Nexon 1999).

It is important to note, however, that such a post-positivist structurationism becomes necessary only if both agents and structures are considered to be in a process of permanent change (Zangl/Zürn 1996: 344). In contrast, a moderate structurationism assumes that agents (or to be more precise: their interests and identities) as well as structures do not change permanently. Rather, for analytical purposes it is inevitable to conceive of them as if they are relatively fixed and stable during certain periods (cf. Carlsnaes 1992; Zangl 1999: 38-39). On the basis of temporarily stable attributes of agents and structures, the process of co-constitution can be sequentialized and thus kept open for causal analysis. Wendt and others have referred to this analytical device as ‘bracketing’, „that is,

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12 According to Wendt, „structuration theory should be evaluated on pragmatic grounds, on its ability to solve problems in existing substantive theories, to suggest new areas of theoretical and empirical inquiry, or to integrate different bodies of research.“ (Wendt 1987: 369)

13 Margret Archer has referred to such an approach as ‘morphogenesis’ (cf. Archer 1982). While we agree with the underlying thrust of her argument on the necessity to systematically examine the co-constitution of actors and structures as historical processes over time (see also Carlsnaes 1992: 258-260) - we prefer the term ‘moderate structurationism’ because, in our view, the term ‘morphogenesis’ overemphasizes the organisational and, most importantly, teleological nature of a system’s development. It is worth quoting at length both Wendt and Dessler who have envisioned such a ‘moderate structurationism’ open for causal analysis: According to Wendt, „neither agents nor [...] structures which constitute them should be treated always as given or primitive units; theories of international relations should be capable of providing explanatory leverage on both. This does not mean that a particular research endeavor cannot take some things as primitive: scientific research has to start somewhere. It does mean, however, that what is primitive in one research endeavor must be at least potentially problematic (or function as a ‘dependent variable’) in another - that scientists need theories of primitive units“ (Wendt 1987: 349). In a similar fashion, Dessler holds that „[n]ot every specific explanation, of course, need give a complete analysis of both agential powers and the conditions in which those powers are deployed. But the explanations must make room for such completion; or, more accurately, the conceptual scheme or framework underpinning specific explanations must recognize and make appropriate allowance for the workings of both agency and structure, even if each specific explanation does not exploit this allowance.” (1989: 443-444).
taking social structures and agents in turn as temporarily given in order to examine the explanatory effects of the other“ (Wendt 1987: 364-365).

**The Conceptualization of Agency**

In order to be bracketed, agents and structures have to be carefully conceptualized. In this regard, the conceptualization of ‘agency’ has received surprisingly little attention (Wight 1999: 126; Checkel 1998). Colin Wight convincingly argues that „a faculty or state of acting or exerting power“ (as he quotes Buzan/Jones/Little 1993: 103) does not suffice to conceptualize agency in the social world, because it does not discriminate agents from structures which may exert power as well. Wight emphasizes the importance of „accountability, intentionality and subjectivity“ (1999: 130). This, however, raises the question whether ‘agency’ should be reserved for human beings or may be extended to include corporate agency as well. Among others, Friedman and Starr have taken the ‘individualist’ position arguing that only human beings are in possession of „consciousness, power, and intentional choice“ (Friedman/Starr 1997: 32; cf. also Wight 1999: 127-128; Jaeger 1996: 319-320). Wendt, by contrast, holds that corporate actors also qualify as agents: „states are also purposive actors with a sense of Self - ‘states are people too’“ (1999: 194). In ‘Social Theory of International Politics’, Wendt has dedicated an entire chapter to the problem of corporate agency. He starts from the notion that corporate agency is actually a kind of structure that is instantiated and reproduced by individuals. Because corporate agents are unobservable, „the challenge for [scientific] realists is to show that state action is anything more than the sum of [...] individual governmental actions.“ (1999: 216). Wendt points out that we routinely explain individuals’ behavior „as the ‘behavior’ of corporate agents, and these explanations work in the sense that they enable us to make reliable predictions about individuals“ (ibid.). Moreover, Wendt argues, „we cannot make sense of the actions of governments apart from the structures of states that constitute them as meaningful“ (1999: 217).

As our empirical illustration below makes clear, it is indeed difficult not to refer to the actions of politicians, diplomats, or press spokespersons as the actions of governments or states. From the pragmatist point of view that we will introduce below, the question about the ontological status of corporate agency, i.e. whether corporate actors are ‘real’, does not appear to be essential anyway. Thus, while ‘bracketing’ the ontological question, we will attribute ‘agency’ to individual human beings as well as to corporate actors depending on the specific case to be analyzed. As a rule of thumb, states may be conceptualized as agents whenever changes in international governance are to

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14 From a scientific realist point of view, Wendt emphasizes that corporate actors, though unobservable, are nevertheless real. By contrast, Friedman/Starr hold „that the anthropomorphization of social aggregates can be a legitimate simplifying assumption“ (1997: 87). Consequently, Friedman/Starr suggest to keep aggregation to a minimum: „the conceptualization of agents as subjective, intentional, entities with the power to choose and influence social phenomena suggests, perhaps dictates, that the proper extension of the abstract conceptualization of agency is the individual international political elite“ (1997: 85).
be explained because it is useful to conceive of states as the constituent units of the international system. In contrast, whenever developments of domestic structures such as a society’s political culture are of interest, actors within the political system - the government as the most prominent one, but also courts, political parties, the media - are more appropriate conceptualizations of agency. If the processes within states are of interest, states are best understood as structures that are reproduced by various agents. These, in turn, however, may again be individuals or corporate actors such as political parties, governmental agencies, associations of civil society and the like.

**The Conceptualization of Structure**

From the perspective of empirical research, the re-conceptualization of structure has been the most striking consequence of the Agency-Structure-Debate. The Waltzian notion of a material structure constraining behavior has been the prime target of criticism. In Waltz’ theory, structure is reduced to the „unintended positioning, standing, or organization of units that emerges spontaneously from their interaction.“ (Dessler 1989: 449). What has been criticized as missing from Waltz’ concept of structure are the intended institutions, norms, and rules that may be reproduced as well as transformed by states. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the impact of rules cannot be limited to their regulative effects, i.e. to constraints and incentives that change the costs of various behavioral options and thereby regulate behavior. Instead, the constitutive effects of rules also have to be taken into account. That is to say that rules also inform actors about their identity and interests in the first place. They legitimize goals and act as ‘motives’ (Klotz 1995: 26).

Contributions to the Agency-Structure-Debate have relied upon different concepts of structures. The most popular concepts are Bhaskar’s notion of generative structures as sets of internal and external relations (cf. Wendt 1987: 346) and Giddens’ notion of structures as sets of rules and resources (cf. Giddens 1979: 64pp; Wendt 1991; Arts 2000). With a view to an empirical analysis of (German) foreign policy, Giddens’ conceptualization of structure as ‘rules and resources’ seems more appropriate to us because it well connects to existing research on the role of institutions and norms (rules), on the one hand, and on the role of power (resources), on the other (cf. also Arts 2000):

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15 With reference to the dominance of rational choice in International Relations and the concomitant exogenization of actors’ interests and identities, some authors hold that it has not been the concept of agency but the concept of structure which has been neglected (cf. Finnemore 1996b: 25; Christiansen 1998: 111).

16 The distinction between "regulative" and "constitutive" effects of rules goes back to Rawls (1955). Some scholars regard regulative and constitutive norms as different categories. In their view, constitutive norms do not generate any specific expectations of behavior because their function lies in the constitution of actors’ identities, not in the regulation of their behavior (e.g. Klotz 1995). Others hold that rules are rules though the relative importance of their regulative and constitutive dimension may vary.

17 In *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt has introduced a third concept of structure containing “three elements: material conditions, interests, and ideas” (1999: 139). However, the relationship of this concept to the other concepts mentioned above is unclear (cf. Wight 1999).
With regard to empirical research, Wendt’s distinction between micro- and macrostructures as two levels of structure within a social system is particularly helpful to systematize the debate on structure following Waltz’ *Theory of International Politics.* Except for the issue of collective knowledge as a non-material element of structure, Wendt’s concept of macrostructure is largely identical with Waltz’ concept of structure. Macrostructures refer to attributes and tendencies of a system as a whole. The elements of macrostructures can be found „at the level of the population of states, not on the level of individual or interacting states.“ (Wendt 1999: 151). Microstructures, by contrast, refer to the interactions between the units of a social system, e.g. states in a prisoners’ dilemma. Wendt correctly points out that the outcome of interactions in problematic social situations such as prisoners’ dilemma does not follow immediately from state actions and cannot be conceived without reference to structures as well.

With regard to empirical research, micro- and macrostructures are best understood as idealtypes on a continuum that differ in terms of their scope and - as a consequence - their malleability. By definition, macrostructures refer to the level of the population of states, i.e. to the international system as a whole. Microstructures, by contrast, refer to an ‘interaction complex among states’ (Wendt 1999: 147). Such an ‘interaction complex’ may comprise two states (e.g. Franco-German relations) as well as the members of an international institution (e.g. the EU). Though both levels of structure are reproduced by the actions of agents, they differ with respect to their malleability. Microstructures are seen to be very responsive to the actions of the states involved (Wendt mentions the transformation of prisoners’ dilemma into a chicken game caused by a change in a state’s preference ordering; cf. 1999: 149). By contrast, macrostructures „supervene“ individual actions, i.e. their existence depends on, but they are not reducible to particular actions of states. From a particular state’s point of view, macrostructures are therefore not changeable by its foreign policy actions though a critical mass of states and their policies may indeed lead to a transformation of a macrostructure as well.

The differentiation of micro- and macrolevels of structure is helpful in guiding empirical research

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18 Porpora has claimed the incompatibility between a concept of structure as a set of internal and external relationships and a concept of structure as a set of rules and resources (1989: 201-202). This claim, however, seems to rest on a reading of Giddens according to which rules are always at least tacitly acknowledged. Giddens, however, emphasizes the importance of ‘unacknowledged conditions of action’ in his theory of structuration (cf., for example, 1984: 8). Moreover, Porpora accuses Giddens to underestimate the material aspects of structure (including their unequal distribution). In our view, however, Giddens’ concept of ‘allocative resources’ (cf. Giddens 1984: 258pp), referring to those material capabilities that generate power, seems to capture this aspect well.

19 Wendt does not present them as idealtypes on a continuum but as qualitatively distinct structures. However, as with the constitutive and causal effects of norms, it can be argued that ‘structures are structures’ though they vary in their balance of reducability and supervenience to individual actions (cf. below).
such as on German foreign policy after unification. Because macrostructures (e.g. ‘anarchy’) have remained untouched even by the end of the Cold War (not to mention ‘minor’ events such as German unification or the Maastricht Treaty), they can be considered as a constant feature of the environment in which German foreign policy takes place. By contrast, microstructures are more likely to have changed in response to the end of the Cold War and the ensuing policies of states such as Germany. The interactions between microstructures and German policy constitutes a major focus of our analysis of Germany’s foreign policy. In empirical analyses, microstructures become largely synonymous with international institutions. As international institutions, microstructures may be further distinguished by the degree of their tightness, i.e. „whether or not material conditions (technology, communication, etc.) and/or socially and historically embedded practices strongly limit actors’ room for manoeuvre in a quasi-coercive manner (whether exogenously imposed or psychologically internalized)“ (Cerny 2000: 437). Whereas tight international institutions, e.g. the European governance of monetary policy, are more difficult to change, loose international institutions, e.g. the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, are more malleable.

**Bringing Domestic Structures Back in**

In the context of the ASP, the debate on an appropriate conceptualization of structure has almost exclusively been focused on structures of the international system. Though the relative importance of various domestic structures (such as regime type, political culture and the like) has traditionally been discussed in Foreign Policy Analysis (as discussed above), a structurationist perspective remains to be extended to the realm of second-image foreign policy analysis. Given the salience of political culture in research on German foreign policy, the reification of domestic structures, i.e. the inattention to agency in the analysis of their reproduction and change, must be regarded as a major shortcoming.

It is important to note a difference between domestic structures and their international counterparts that impacts on an interactionist analysis of foreign policy: There is a high degree of ‘likeness’ among the units of the international system, i.e. among the states. Due to the anarchic nature of the international system, the degree of functional differentiation among states is comparatively limited.20 By contrast, the degree of functional differentiation among the units of a domestic system is extremely high because the ordering principle within states is hierarchy, not anarchy. Within states, some actors (such as the government or the Constitutional Court) are endowed with powers that give them extraordinary leverage over the other units of the system. The ordering principle and

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20 It is a matter of dispute whether the anarchic structure of the international system ‘allows’ states to engage in functional differentiation. Whereas neorealists tend to emphasize that the international structure induces states to be ‘like units’, liberals tend to allow for a higher degree of functional differentiation. Notwithstanding these differences, there is little doubt that there is a huge difference between the degrees of functional differentiation on the level of the international system and on the level of the state.
the degree of functional differentiation among the units of a system impacts on the way in which the structures of a system are reproduced. Within states, single actors (such as the government) may become decisive in reproducing (or changing) structures whereas other actors only play minor roles.\textsuperscript{21} This is especially true in the realm of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{22} Consider, for example, a neutral state, i.e. a state that has been non-aligned and that has not been involved or taken sides in international conflicts on principle.\textsuperscript{23} The neutrality of the state has probably been institutionalized by respective constitutional provisions, court rulings and the like. Most importantly, however, ‘being neutral’ has become a part of that state’s identity and political culture, i.e. its citizens as well as corporate actors (e.g. political parties, schools) have continually reproduced the domestic structures that make that state neutral, e.g. by keeping that state’s collective memory alive, by educating students and diplomats about the merits of neutrality, or by commenting on the state’s policy from the perspective of ‘appropriate neutrality’. It seems obvious that the actions of the government are more influential in reproducing ‘neutrality’ than the actions of any other domestic actor. Of course, the government is highly constrained in its policies by a ‘culture of neutrality’. Still, the government enjoys considerable leverage which it may use to change the meaning of neutrality (i.e. domestic structure).

2. A Pragmatist Extension

In recent years, there has been an unexpected renaissance of the tradition of American pragmatism in Philosophy and Sociology, but also within Political Theory.\textsuperscript{24} In International Relations in general and Foreign Policy Analysis particular, however, this development has hardly left its imprint so far, apart from a few exceptions (Puchala 1995; Smith 1996: 23-25; Deibert 1997). This is astonishing, since pragmatism, being a philosophical tradition that treats epistemology and theory of action as a unity, offers important suggestions and unconventional solutions to problems and debates of IR. This concerns both the recent "success story" (Guzzini 2000: 147) of constructivism in IR and the agent-structure debate which has provided a basis for this success story. Thus, we will attempt to bring together two lines of theoretical research that are concerned with the same problems and yet have remained unconnected so far: the moderate-structurationist tackling of the agency-structure

\textsuperscript{21} In the realm of international relations such a situation can only be envisioned if a single state acquires attains the position of a hegemon.

\textsuperscript{22} In comparative politics, it is considered to be a feature of modern states that many policy areas are governed by networks, i.e. without a single most important actor.

\textsuperscript{23} The example of the neutral state has been introduced to the Agency-Structure Debate by Walter Carlsnaes (1992). Carlsnaes, however, has analyzed the co-constitutive relationship between the foreign policies of neutral states and the international regime the rules of which define ‘neutrality’ and appropriate behavior of neutral states in the first place.

problem on the one hand and pragmatist reasoning on problem-oriented creative action on the other. In combining insights from these two bodies of research, we intend to formulate an interactionist model of analysis which then can be applied in empirical analysis, for instance to cases of German foreign policy and European governance.

While the analysis of interaction processes has been brought back to the center of IR mainly by Wendt's (1987) reception of Giddens' structuration theory, it has traditionally been a main focus of pragmatism. The main difference between a moderate-structurationist and a pragmatist approach is that the latter emphasizes the central importance of the concept of action, defines it in an interactionist fashion in a stricter sense, and conceptualizes it as intelligent and creative action aimed at the solution of concrete problems. From the outset, the relation between an actor and its environment is taken as a relationship of social interaction. Actors only experience themselves as actors in concrete social situations. These could be either „determinate“ situations or „problematic“ situations. In Dewey's words, determinate (or routine) situations are perceived as "a closed (...) 'universe of experience'" (Dewey 1981 (1938b): 227). Here, actors can resort to habits, an internalized repertoire of action which is based on a rich experience with similar situations in the the past. In contrast, in problematic situations, actors cannot resort to such an internalized repertoire. These situations are perceived as problematic, as there are no given and apparent ways of dealing with the situation. The unreflected belief in "self-evident conditions and successful habits (...) and the concomitant routines of action will break down; the usual and automatic process of action" will be interrupted (Joas 1992b: 190; our transl.; cf. also Dewey 1981 (1983a): 512-513). Actors must search for a new belief that could enable them to find an appropriate new way of coping with the respective problem. In the words of Charles Sanders Peirce, it is „the irritation of doubt“ which provides the „immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief“:

„With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and what we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the

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25 Cf. Dewey 1945 (1917); Dewey 1929 (1925); Mead 1967 (1934); for the more recent reception and further development of these lines of arguing, cf., among others, Joas 1992a; Strauss 1994b, and Dewey 1999; for an assessment of Giddens' structuration theory from the perspective of the pragmatist tradition, cf. also Joas 1992b.

26 It is important to note that the "new" situation is to be seen as a "precognitive" state that will be transformed into a "problematic" one "in the very process of being subjected to inquiry". Dewey writes: "The indeterminate situation comes into existence from existential causes, just as does, say, the organic imbalance of hunger. There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they are the necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves they are precognitive. The first result of evocation of inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged, to be problematic" (Dewey 1981 (1938b): 229; emphases added). It is in this sense that a problematic situation is always composed of "objective" and "internal" factors, as Dewey stresses (Dewey 1981 (1938a): 518), on this point, cf. also Joas 1992b: 193-196 and 235-236.
sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for a mental effort. The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so“ (Peirce 1997(1877): 13-14, emphasis in the original)

It is in this situation of the „struggle to attain belief“ that the potential of creativity comes into play. In contrast to other theories of action which do not systematically take creativity into account pragmatists locate this potential of both individual and collective actors at the center of both their epistemology and their theory of action. In order to get beyond the phase of doubt actors must reconstruct a „disrupted continuum of action“. Their perception must "comprise new and different aspects of reality; the action must refer to different points of the world, or it must restructure itself. This reconstruction is a creative achievement of the actor. If the action can be reoriented by means of a changed perception, and if the actor can continue with this reoriented action, then something new has come into being: a new way of acting that could be stabilized and, in turn, itself become an unreflected routine. From a pragmatist perspective, all human action is characterized by the tension between unreflected routines and creative achievements. This also implies that pragmatists see creativity as an achievement within situations that call for a solution rather than as the unconstrained creation of new things without any constitutive background of unreflected routines." (all quotes Joas 1992b: 190; our transl.).

According to Joas, this understanding of situative and genuinely creative action is the real core of both pragmatism’s epistemology and its theory of action. It implies that it would be inappropriate to dissolve any action as a singular action from its larger context of action („Handlungszusammenhang“) and to describe it in the sense of a relation of ends and means that precedes this singular action and can at the same time be restrictively applied to it. From a pragmatist perspective, the formulation of ends does not take place before the action in a strictly temporal or causal sense. Instead, it is the result of a reflection within the situatively given context of interaction. This reflection is based upon "pre-reflexive impulses [„Strebungen und Gerichtetheiten“] which are always present in our action" (Joas 1992b: 232; our transl.). Even if the action rests on specific plans in the sense of preconceived schemes of action, the concrete course of action is "constructively created in each and every situation and open for continuous revision" (Joas 1992b: 237; our transl.). This in turn means that it is more appropriate to conceive of the formulation of ends and the choice of respective means as an interplay in a given problematic situation, rather than assuming that an actor's goals are fixed, while the choice of the means of action will only be oriented towards these ends. 27 Thus, the structure of any „problem“ to be solved

27 In this pragmatist theory of action, ends are usually "relatively indeterminate and will only be specified in the course of the decision on the means to be used. Reciprocity of ends and means thus implies an interplay between choice of means and specification of goals. The dimension of the means is not neutral vis-à-vis the dimension of the ends. By realizing that we possess certain means we detect ends we were not aware of before. Thus, means do not only specify ends, but they also broaden the scope of possible ends" (Joas 1992b: 227).
is complex in the sense that conglomerates of actors and bundles of motivations and beliefs come into play. In terms of the temporal context of our problem-solving action experience (i.e. past thoughts and actions of ourselves as well as others) is as important as expectation (i.e. intentions as to desired future states of the world as well as predictions as to likely future states). Quite often, it will become apparent that a solution of a concrete problem is the more intelligent, the more the actor (in the light of changing conditions) succeeds in formulating appropriate new and more complex goals that will provide "procedural means" in future contexts of action. In other words -- and to use the shortest and most common definition of pragmatism -- "beliefs are rules for action" all the way down, i.e. from epistemology to the theory of action.

In this sense, situation and interaction are inseparably linked (cf. also Dewey 1981 (1938a): 516-520; Joas 1992 b: 193-196, and Rorty 1993 (1987): 60-67). The recognition of creative action avoids the reduction of an interactionist analysis of any social action - be it conducted by individuals or by governments - to the search for structurally determined regularities. Due to the creativity of human action, pragmatists do not expect regularities in social interaction in a strict sense. Therefore, it cannot be regarded to be the goal of scientific research to detect such regularities. Yet, pragmatists concede that similarities or patterns can be discerned; after all, creative solution of problems would be inconceivable without a reference to the equally important category of experience as nets of well-tested beliefs. The positivist (and "scientific realist") goal of attaining theoretical generalization and the pragmatist goal of providing for interpretation based on experience differ significantly with regard to their theoretical status. In practical research, however, this difference will be less important.

28 Intentions refer to a future that we hope to shape as a result of our current thoughts and actions; predictions refer to the likelihood that our intentions will indeed turn out to shape the future. Cognitively we often tend to equate both, but at least "theoretically" we know that outcomes may differ from outputs and that there may be unintended consequences resulting from our interaction with others.


30 While our experience may be said to be nothing but "general knowledge", the pragmatist conception of experience is fundamentally different in epistemological terms from the positivist conception of "theoretical knowledge". As William James put it: "(O)ur fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time" (James 1995 (1907): 65, see also p. 86; for an excellent modern argument along these lines see Hawthorn 1995 (1991)). Experience in this pragmatist sense is based on a trial-and-error understanding of human thought and action as well as the belief that the past cannot be "replicated" in the future, as positivist theory assumes with its standard ceteris paribus clauses. Other things" never will be "equal", according to pragmatism. Yet they may be "similar". Thus, the pragmatist conception of experience may be said to operate with a ceteris similibus clause instead: other things being similar it cannot be wrong to rely on experience -- be it personal (as an individual recalls from personal memory) or collective (as a nation, for instance, remembers its history in books). Carlsnaes (1992: 263 and 267) also raises this point arguing that the epistemological implications of adequately solving the ASP will be "essentially subversive of the research programme underlying much of mainstream comparative foreign policy analysis" (263).
These pragmatist extensions of an interactionist approach to foreign policy analysis indicate that the empirical reconstruction of specific problematic situations as well as their "solution" (i.e. a new level of development of the co-constitution of agent and structure/environment) is crucial for rendering the „theoretical“ solution of the ASP relevant also to empirical analysis. Thus, the "co-constitutive" development or change of certain actors and certain structures on the basis of a certain horizon of possibilities can only be traced in empirical analysis (cf. Hawthorn 1995 (1991)).

3. **An Interactionist Frame of Analysis**

A moderate-structurationist and a pragmatist approach are not (as some underlying epistemological differences may suggest) mutually exclusive but complementary. Taken together, they provide a number of analytical devices (such as ‘bracketing’) and, most importantly, a set of questions guiding empirical research. Given our assumption that the process of mutual co-constitution has to be sequentialized, we obtain three sets of questions which we will address to the cases to be studied in detail. The first set refers to what we call the *initial situation* in which Germany finds itself (i.e. bracketing agency and focusing on Germany’s environment), the second relates to German foreign policy action (i.e. bracketing structure and concentrating on agency), and the last one examines the new situation in which Germany finds itself after having gone through this process of change (i.e. again bracketing agency and focusing on Germany’s environment).  

**The Initial Situation**

Of course, German foreign policy does not „start“ at point „t“. Any analysis of German policy must reflect the embeddedness of German policy in its international and domestic environment. In order to account for this embeddedness, we may ask

- how the international environment has been (and is) shaping Germany’s interests as well as its identity (the environment comprises international institutions, singular events as well as the expectations of other countries);
- what domestic actors demand of the German government (i.e. what the interests, perceived opportunities and strategies of influential domestic actors are);
- how decision-makers perceive the foreign policy agenda, particularly whether they perceive themselves to be confronted with a „routine“ situation or a „problematic“ situation;
- how decision-makers perceive their „menu of choice“, i.e. their room of manoeuver and their options.

**German Action**

Once again, Carlsnaes develops a similar, though not identical framework. His morphogenetical analysis rests on a set of intentional, dispositional and structural variables that are examined at different points in time (cf. Carlsnaes 1992: 254).
The second set of questions refers to the analysis of German foreign policy action. In order to thoroughly examine the goals and means\textsuperscript{32} of German foreign policy, we may ask
- which (long-term as well as short-term) interests Germany pursues, particularly what kind of reproduction and/or transformation of (international) structures it strives for. (In this regard, we may, for instance, distinguish between ‘self-binding’ and ‘self-assertion’; cf. Kohler-Koch 2000; Knodt 2000; whereas a ‘self-binding’ policy aims to strengthen international rules in order to ‘lock in’ particular policies, a ‘self assertive’ policy strives for an enhanced room of manoeuver in order to (re)gain freedom of choice;)
- what means and instruments Germany uses. We may examine whether Germany prefers a multilateral or rather unilateral approach and whether its policy entails some unexpected features (such as threats).

\textit{A Transformed Situation}

The third set of questions guides our analysis of changes in the environment in which German foreign policy is embedded. Most importantly, it draws our attention to the impact of German policy by asking
- what changes in the international and domestic environment have taken place;
- to what extent these changes may be traced back to German policy;
- to what extent these changes have been intended by German foreign policy decision-makers and to what extent they represent unintended consequences of German policy.\textsuperscript{33}

The changes in Germany’s environment can best be assessed by again asking the first set of questions because the analysis of the transformed situation completes a full circle and at the same time marks the beginning of the next circle. The next section will illustrate how this framework might be applied in empirical analysis.

\textbf{IV. Empirical Illustrations}

We will demonstrate the salience of our arguments by outlining two empirical cases of German foreign policy.\textsuperscript{34} These case show that both Germany itself and its environment have significantly

\textsuperscript{32} It should be emphasized once again that a pragmatist theory of action takes ‘goals’ and ‘means’ to be interrelated and mutually constitutive.

\textsuperscript{33} The distinction between intended and unintended consequences has been regarded as a crucial element in any structurationist analysis (cf. Giddens 1984: 5-14; Carlsnaes 1992: 261).

\textsuperscript{34} It must be stressed that these are not fully elaborated case studies but merely brief illustrations. Nevertheless, they show that an interactionist perspective, as formulated in this paper, may yield significant insights to the analysis of the foreign policy of a country like Germany.
(some would even say: dramatically) changed during the past decade. We argue that neither of these changes is understandable without considering the mutual effects of structural and actorial factors. An interactionist approach is particularly well suited for an analysis of Germany’s policy in Europe because, within the European Union, Germany is a powerful actor whose policies are likely to shape the structures of European governance. We will first look at German policy with regard to the establishment of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), before we will turn to the development of Germany's readiness to participate in multilateral military out-of-area operations. The first case illustrates the interplay of German foreign policy and structures of European governance, whereas the second is a model case to study the reciprocal effects of foreign policy action and domestic structures on each other.

1. Germany and a European Security and Defense Policy

The question of whether a European Security and Defense Policy was desirable and feasible has been discussed among the members of NATO, the WEU, and the EU for quite a while, although the term „European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)“ is rather new. Previously, the topic was debated under the heading of a „European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)“, of the strengthening of the European pillar of the Transatlantic Alliance, or of the relations between the EU and the WEU. Within NATO, the issue has been driven by two quite different desires: the U.S. desire to induce the Europeans to take up a greater part of the burden of common defense, and the European desire to get a greater say on questions of European security. While the U.S. (most of the time supported by European countries such as the UK and the Netherlands) has always demanded that any closer European cooperation on matters of security take place within the structures of NATO, France has been at the forefront of those calling for greater European independence of the U.S. (i.e. a U.S.-dominated NATO). Germany usually placed itself in the middle, trying to harmonize the positions of its two key partners. For instance, Germany was much in favor of the agreements reached at the NATO Summit in Berlin in 1996 to strengthen the role of the Europeans while keeping European security cooperation embedded in NATO. Yet, from the early 1990s on, Germany also supported France in pushing the idea of contemplating a common EU defense policy. French-German initiatives led to the inclusion of article J.4 into the Maastricht Treaty. This article stipulates that a common defense policy shall in the long run become part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and that the WEU would be considered an integral part of the development of the European Union. Also, Germany supported the strengthening of the operational role of the WEU. Germany's WEU Presidency of 1992 culminated in the signing of the Petersberg Declaration. This document declares, among others, member states' readiness to contribute troops to WEU-led military operations, ranging from humanitarian tasks to combat operations. Of course, it was clear to all participants that the WEU and its members states were lacking both organizational structures and the very military equipment to actually conduct any larger-scale military operation. Thus, even for operations that were ranking relatively low on the so-called Petersberg spectrum, the...
WEU had to rely on NATO structures. In the early 1990s, several WEU member states, especially Great Britain, opposed any role of the EU in matters of defense policy, so that no substantial progress on the issue of defense policy cooperation within the EU was possible. Therefore, the Petersberg Declaration as well as the inclusion of far-fetched goals in the Maastricht Treaty were seemingly of limited effect.

Several years later, though, significant steps towards a European intervention force were taken. At the end of 1998, Great Britain gave up many of its reservations. Together with France, it launched a new initiative for a European defense policy. When, soon thereafter, the European NATO members were marginalized in the decision-making processes during the Kosovo War, the project of an ESDP gained momentum. EU members agreed to establish an intervention force comprising 60,000 soldiers. This project will yield new scope for action for German foreign policy, as Germany will doubtlessly be one of the key contributors to these intervention forces, together with France and Great Britain. At the same time, Germany is also facing an increased pressure to make the Bundeswehr capable of contributing to such a force. As a result, conscription, a corner stone of German defense policy since the creation of the Bundeswehr in the 1950s, is likely to come under increased pressure, while the prospects of further cuts in the defense budget will probably shrink.

A conventional FPA account takes recent changes in the European governance of military policy as its point of departure and analyzes the German reaction and adaptation to this development. From this point of view, changes in the European governance of military policy are mainly attributed to the end of the Cold War (i.e. a change in the structure of the international system) and to the experiences of European diplomacy on the Balkans (i.e. functional spill-over). As far as agency is concerned, emphasis may be put on a new British policy and its impact on partners like Germany.

From an interactionist perspective, in contrast, it is crucial to examine both the structures facing Germany and Germany’s policy shaping these structures. In this regard, it will not suffice to start the inquiry with the (impact of the) British policy shift in 1998. The structures of European governance in security and defense had already been significantly affected in previous years - inter alia by German foreign policy. In studying the development of these structures we may bracket Germany’s policy shaping them while in turn bracketing ‘structure’ in order to scrutinize German policy. More specifically, we may focus on German policy on ESDP during the summits of the European Council of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Cologne, Helsinki and so on whereas we may bracket German policy and focus on an analysis of European governance between those summits, i.e. in the „valleys“ of the process of institutional reform. An interactionist analysis thus starts with Germany’s policy in the early 1990s, particularly during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty in 1990/91, when Germany, in a joint initiative with France, put the issue of a European defense policy (back) on the

35 The notion of summits and valleys in the process of European integration is taken from Christiansen/Jørgensen (1999).
agenda of the intergovernmental conference on Political Union. Various reasons may account for this policy (cf. Rummel 1996: 44; Sauder 1995: 172f.; Tams 1999: 89; Varwick 1998: 267): Germany wanted to deepen European integration (cf. also Jachtenfuchs 1999) in order to avoid a renationalization of policies in Europe and to reassure its European partners of the trustworthiness of a united Germany. Moreover, Germany was eager to increase its room for manoeuvre in security matters. In this regard, Europeanization of defense policies was also designed to enable Germany to participate in military out-of-area missions.

Given the change of government in October 1998 (at the time of the British-French St. Malo initiative) it is also interesting to examine how a much more left-of-center Schröder/Fischer government reacted to the demand for a European military contribution that goes back to the policy of its predecessor. The coalition agreement holds that the new government will continue its predecessor’s policy of treasuring transatlantic relations and of deepening European integration. More specifically, the government will support a communitarization of CFSP, a strengthening of the European Security and Defense Identity. Moreover, the EU’s capacities in the realm of conflict prevention should be strengthened. The desire to strengthen European integration (may be also to balance a more assertive stance on financial issues) has therefore contributed to the German support for a European defense policy (cf. also Maull 2000: 73; Brauner 2000) but it might also have done so to further „normalize“ its standing (and thereby increase its influence) among Europe’s major powers.

An interactionist perspective is also helpful in identifying the changing rules (and resources) in the structures of European governance. For example, in the early 1990s the ‘rules of integration’ changed insofar as defense became an appropriate topic of debate. From an interactionist point of view it is interesting to examine the extent to which the Schröder government has been confronted with the intended consequences of its predecessor’s policy and the extent to which the course of a European Defense Policy was unforeseen or even unintended by the Kohl government (e.g. it may be possible that the initial goal was not a European intervention force but the objective of accelerating the process of creating a common European identity by integrating the member states’ militaries. Given the importance of conscription and the budgetary constraints after unification,

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36 In a joint letter to the Presidency of the Council of December, 6, 1990, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand hold that „political Union should also include a true common security policy which would in turn lead to a common defence“ (quoted from Laursen/Vanhoonacker 1992: 314). The initiative to this letter seems to have come from Germany (Nuttall 2000: 125, referring to Attali 1995: 651).

37 The Franco-German proposal on Political Union of February 1991 argues that a common European defense system is desirable because without that system „the construction of European Union would remain incomplete“ (quoted from Laursen/Vanhoonacker 1992: 333).

38 According to Nuttall, part of the rationale of the Franco-German paper on European security policy was Germany’s sensitivity to the criticisms it received for not participating militarily in ‘Operation Desert Storm’ (2000: 147-148).
there are good reasons to question Germany’s interest in setting up an intervention force).

Finally an interactionist perspective highlights those ‘events’ in the international environment which cannot be considered elements of structures. For example, the war in Kosovo is frequently regarded to have been instrumental in fostering a European intervention force (cf., among others Maull 2000: 73; Dembinski 2000: 10). There is plenty of evidence that decision-makers in all European capitals, including Berlin, were almost traumatized by their being marginalized by the American allies. These developments have certainly affected the perception of the nature of the „problem“ to be confronted by the Europeans, thereby spurring some creative thinking in directions which were hitherto considered to be inappropriate. In any way, the events and decisions in the aftermaths of the Kosovo War clearly indicate that neither the original initiative to put defense back on the European agenda nor the Schröder government’s support for an European intervention force were inevitable.

2. Germany's Participation in Military Out-of-Area Operations

Germany's position on the establishment of an ESDP provides a good example for the interaction of German foreign policy and Germany's European environment. As the following case illustration on Germany’s participation in military „out-of-area“ operations will show, it is necessary to also include domestic structures in the analysis.

In the case of Germany's readiness to take part in multilateral military operations outside NATO territory, Germany has certainly been exposed to growing international demands for German contributions after the structural changes resulting from German unification and the end of the Cold War. The foreign policy of (West) Germany had long since centered around being a reliable ally of its Transatlantic and European partners, while Germany maintained a largely non-military self-conception. The position that the West German constitution, the Basic Law, would prohibit the use of the Bundeswehr for purposes other than individual and collective self-defense had been widely shared across the political spectrum. In the view of many experts and observers the end of the East-West conflict opened up new opportunities (and also necessities) for multilateral military crisis management. Germany's Western partners demanded that the Germans give up their reservations about the deployment of German soldiers abroad. Soon, the German government began to embark on changes which arguably have been more profound than in any other area of German foreign policy. While Germans were still almost totally absent from the scene of military action during the Gulf War of 1990/91, they found themselves center stage only nine years later in NATO's war in Kosovo. The decade in-between was marked by a gradual enlargement of the scope of German contributions to multilateral military operations: from medical troops to the UN peace-keeping operation UNAMIC in Cambodia in 1991/92 through naval forces for WEU's 'Operation Sharp Guard' that was monitoring the embargo against the FRY in the Adriatic from 1992 to 1996 to the dispatch of supply and transport units of the Bundeswehr to Somalia in 1993/94 as part of
UNOSOM II; and from there to the contribution of logistical troops to NATO's IFOR in Bosnia-Hercegovina and to a full-fledged participation in IFOR's successor operation SFOR.

It could be argued that this foreign policy change was in fact a response to such demands from Germany's international environment. Yet, it would be mistaken to confine an analysis of the development of Germany's readiness to participate in multilateral military operations to this aspect. In order to understand the development of the German position over the course of the last decade, it is necessary to pay special attention to German foreign policy action and its interplay with domestic structural factors such as political culture. Our interactionist model can be applied to such an analysis, too.

In fact, many observers have portrayed this development of German foreign policy mainly as a cautious adaptation to international demands for German contributions voiced after German unification and the end of the Cold War, while maintaining that domestic structures such as Germany's anti-militarist political culture have slowed down or impeded this adaptation (cf. Berger 1998; Duffield 1998; 1999; Maull 2000). In contrast to this mainly structure-centered perspective, others have viewed the change in German foreign policy in this issue-area as driven by a deliberate strategy of re-militarization adopted by a small group of decision-makers (cf. Mutz 1993; Berndt 1997). We argue that neither the structure-centered nor the actor-centered perspective are sufficient alone to understand the development of the German position on the use of military force. Instead, the complex interplay of German foreign policy with international and especially with domestic structural factors must be taken into account. The German government certainly did respond to a changing international environment and to growing demands by its partners. Also, it did have to pay attention to a well-established domestic scepticism concerning the use of the Bundeswehr abroad. At the same time, the government also shaped domestic structures itself, especially German political culture. This was done in two ways. First, the government had a significant impact on the domestic political discourse on out-of-area operations. It kept the issue high on the agenda while reframing key concepts in the discourse such as "responsibility". Previously, the term had mainly been used to stress that Germany must follow a politics of responsibility (Verantwortungspolitik) as opposed to old-style power politics (Machtpolitik), thus implicitly calling for a largely non-military German role in international politics. Now, government officials repeatedly stressed that unified Germany must „take over more responsibility“ in the sense of participating actively in military operations

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39 In her application of different constructivist theories to the study of German military involvement abroad, Maja Zehfuss (1999: 63-136) argues that Wendtian constructivism can capture this adaptation, conceptualizing it as a change in German identity (as opposed to a mere behavioral change). Yet, Zehfuss is very critical of this approach, not least for ignoring the "significance of different narratives of identity in the domestic discussions" (Zehfuss 1999: 94).

40 For a fuller explication of our arguments and a more detailed analysis of German foreign policy with regard to out-of-area operations, cf. Baumann/Hellmann forthcoming.
under the auspices of the UN, NATO, and even the WEU. Second, in addition to these rhetorical efforts the government also influenced the anti-militarist domestic political culture by the practice of gradually accustoming the German public to out-of-area deployments of the *Bundeswehr*.

For instance, during the Gulf War of 1990/91, the German government felt exposed to both domestic and international constraints. While the opposition of the German public to any German participation in military operations of the Gulf-War coalition was quite expected, the Kohl government also had to face demands by the U.S. and other allies to make more than just financial contributions. Yet, with reference to existing constitutional restrictions the government confined the German participation to financial and logistical support. In the following years, however, it actively worked to overcome the domestic reservations to German military involvement abroad. It kept working for an amendment of the Basic Law (which could only be achieved together with the then major opposition party, the Social Democrats, who mostly opposed such an amendment in the early 1990s). At the same time, as noted above, the government took several opportunities to engage the *Bundeswehr* in low-scale deployments. These deployments often went short of contributions which countries like France or Great Britain were willing to make (for instance, Germany did not participate in UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Hercegovina), but they always went beyond the established domestic consensus. German foreign policy in these instances was certainly constrained by domestic political culture, but it was also instrumental in pushing the limits set by this culture further and further. Thus, by 1995, when the German government, with the authorization of the Bundestag, decided to take part in IFOR and send German soldiers to the Balkans, it had gained tremendous scope for action; a couple of years earlier, such a deployment would have been unthinkable.41 This is not to say that domestic structural factors such as the often mentioned „culture of restraint“ were irrelevant. They have had a constraining effect on the government, so that Germany could only gradually embrace the participation in out-of-area missions. Moreover, we do agree with authors like Berger, Duffield and Maull that these domestic structures have also had a constitutive effect on the government in influencing their perception on what kind of foreign policy actor Germany is, should and could become. In this sense, the notion of the remilitarization-critics that Germany's gradually growing readiness to take part in out-of-area operations reflects malicious designs of a trigger-happy foreign policy elite is certainly a gross exaggeration that ignores such constitutive effects of (domestic) structure. What is crucial, however, is that political culture itself is malleable, so that political culture and foreign policy practice influence each other in turn. In this sense Germany’s growing readiness to take part in multilateral military operations is not only an excellent test case. What is more, it can only be properly understood when the dynamic interplay of domestic structures and German foreign policy is recognized.

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41 Of course, this increase in scope for action has been a double-edged sword: With growing capacity to deploy the Bundeswehr abroad, it has also become harder for Germany to fend off demands by Germany's partners, which may in turn again reduce the German scope for action.
On a final note, we would like to stress that we do not view this interplay as a deterministic process whose direction can easily be predicted beforehand. During the last decade, the practice of the government to slowly raise the scope of German contributions to multilateral military operations has helped to overcome domestic impediments which in turn has helped to further raise the scope of (future) contributions and so on. Yet, if one of those military engagements had resulted in a substantial number of German casualties, the effect could as easily have been a reverse one, as fears and reservations among the German public would have been aggravated in such a situation. Thus, interactionist processes such as the ones in the out-of-area case may display certain regularities but they are still essentially indeterminate. This should not come as a surprise, however, since these processes are more complex than the ones usually acknowledged by positivist scholarship in IR.

V. Conclusion

In the course of the 1990s, European governance and German foreign policy have both undergone significant, even dramatic changes. The European Union is continuing its course of expanding both its membership as well as the range of its tasks. It is also rethinking the underlying institutional structure. Germany, which has been standing aside at the time of the Gulf War in 1990/1991, is now fully and centrally involved in any military endavour undertaken by either NATO or the EU. Nine years after Germany’s abstention from military action in the Gulf the first German government since the 1920s exclusively formed by „internationalist“, „left“-leaning parties was joining Germany’s western partners as a „normal ally“ in a war which was conducted outside the jurisdiction of the alliance and without a UN mandate. Nothing better symbolized how much Germany (and Europe) had changed. Yet it is not only in the field of security policy that both the country and Europe have changed. In Germany’s policy towards European integration in general domestic discourse about „national“ interests has markedly shifted during the past decade (and particularly during the past three or four years) from a position strongly supporting supranationalism and inhibition („Befangenheit“) based on both Germany’s postwar enthusiasm for European integration and its pre-Second World War legacy of „Machtpolitik“ to a more self-centered, assertive and more „national“ position (cf. Hellmann 1996, 2000 and forthcoming). Some of the early repercussions of this „normalization“ shift have already been felt around Europe during the end game of the negotiations of the Amsterdam treaty. As one of the state secretaries of both Foreign Minister Kinkel and Fischer said in 1997, Germany’s European policy has become „more British“. None of this means that the „taming“ effects of German integration in Western institutions in general and in the EU in particular do no longer apply. Yet developments in Europe during the past decade have


43 Peter Hort, ‘Die deutsche Europa-Politik wird „britischer“’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 November 1997. It was State Secretary Friedrich von Ploetz offering this judgement.
shown, that historical processes are not a one-way street (of structures shaping agents). Rather the traffic flows two ways and it has been heavy indeed during the past ten years for all sides concerned.

The academic analysis of developments such as these has suffered from an artificial division of labor between Foreign Policy Analysis and the study of international/European governance. Despite the truism that the foreign policies of (major) states and the structures of European governance have been mutually constitutive of each other, either ‘government action’ or ‘European governance’ have been treated as exogenous. The aim of this paper has been to outline an approach that is capable to account for this truism, i.e. to provide us with the (descriptive ad analytical) tools to examine the dynamic interplay between (German) foreign policy and European governance, i.e. explaining how we got to where we are. This interactionist approach to German foreign policy draws on the Agency-Structure-Debate in International Relations and on a pragmatist theory of action. It helps to bridge the gap between FPA and the study of European governance, and it shows how insights from the theoretical (and to some extent meta-theoretical) debates on agency and structure can be utilized for empirical research.

The two empirical illustrations have demonstrated, so we hope, that the interactionist approach is capable of examining the dynamic interplay between German foreign policy and European governance. This in turn provides us with additional insights into the nature of post-unification German foreign policy. In particular, an interactionist account makes clear that Germany has not only reacted and adapted to changes in European and domestic structures but has also shaped these structures to a significant extent in the first place. Thus, in order to enhance their room for manoeuvre in the realm of security (and in order to meet the expectations of major allies), successive German governments have used elements of German political culture (e.g. multilateralism and ‘never again Auschwitz’) to legitimize an increasingly high profile on out-of-area missions. At the same time, however, German foreign policy has had consequences compelling decision-makers to accommodate to changes that have only partly been intended. For example, the most important motive to put a European defense policy on the agenda of the Maastricht negotiations was probably to transform the European Community into a federal European Union. Though the ensuing Europeanization of defense can thus be considered successful (and therefore intended), the intergovernmental character of the Common European Security and Defense Policy which is taking shape may be considered unintended. As part of the larger project we hope to show that German policies on the Eastern enlargement of the EU as well as on a common European policy on Asylum and Immigration followed similar patterns („loops“). We thus hope to contribute to a more thorough understanding of the underlying mechanisms which have shaped both Germany and Europe in ways which, for many observers, have been surprising indeed.
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