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Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective
Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior

Second Edition

Edited by

Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo,

Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Michael T. Snarr



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
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
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To Ellie, Quinn, Joshua, Megan, Madison, Ty, Isaiah, and Elise

World Map, Country Cases



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The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective

Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Ryan K. Beasley

Recent and far-reaching changes in the world present a challenge to leaders who make foreign policy, as well as to those who study foreign policy. Consider the changes in global politics that have occurred in the past few decades. The world has transformed from one in which the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were the primary players in an international drama dominated by military tensions, to something very different. European countries have moved toward greater political and economic integration, and new powers have emerged in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. We have also seen new transnational challenges arise, such as climate change and terrorism.

New means of interdependence have also emerged—from the Internet to satellite communications technology to global financial networks. These changes reflect broad pressures for globalization and economic liberalization. As a result more economies are opening up and becoming connected across country borders. Pressures for democratization are also sweeping the world, as witnessed by the revolutions of the “Arab Spring” of 2011. New groups inside countries are demanding a voice in governance or are competing with governments for representation. Outside of countries, organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and Amnesty International argue that a state’s internal affairs and human rights records are legitimate concerns of the international community. These and other events in recent years have significantly transformed international relations and domestic politics.

Although some countries and leaders today are facing an identity crisis, actions of the sovereign state remain critical to shaping global politics. They can define the level of a country’s engagement with the world, economic liberalization and trade, as well as war or peace with other countries. *Thus, this book adopts as its focus states’ foreign policies in the context of contemporary internal and external developments.*

Studying Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective

It is precisely because states are experiencing challenges and transformations both internally and externally that the analysis of foreign policy is important. Foreign policy analysis as a distinct area of inquiry connects the study of international

relations (the way states relate to each other in international politics) with the study of domestic politics (the functioning of governments and the relationships among individuals, groups, and governments). Most theories of international relations are primarily concerned with state behavior, but some include discussions of foreign policy. Theories of domestic politics, found in the study of U.S. politics and in the study of comparative politics, share this attention to internal factors. These theories tend to explain the functioning of the state or political system and the domestic policies that are chosen and rarely comment on the effects of internal politics on a state's foreign policies.

Thus, the study of foreign policy serves as a bridge by analyzing the impact of both external and internal politics on states' relations with each other. Leaders cannot forge effective foreign policies without being aware of these connections; students cannot effectively evaluate foreign policy choices without recognizing these linkages.

Defining Foreign Policy

The first step in a comparative investigation of foreign policy is to define what we mean by foreign policy. This also raises issues concerning how foreign policy is studied and how it may be changing. We begin with the first term: "foreign." We typically make the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy. "Foreign" is meant to apply to policy toward the world outside states' territorial borders, and "domestic" is meant to apply to policy made for the internal political system. Going to war with another country, signing an international trade agreement, or aiding a rebel insurgency in another country are examples of foreign policy. Taxes, education standards, and civil rights are examples of domestic policy.

In the recent past, this distinction between foreign and domestic policy was easier to make, but contemporary politics and globalization have blurred the line between what is *foreign* and what is *domestic*. For example, the revolutionary uprising in Libya that threatened the rule of authoritarian leader Moammar Gadhafi in early 2011 began as a domestic issue. Antigovernment protestors launched a rebellion in the eastern part of Libya, and Gadhafi's forces responded with a military crackdown. However, as reports of vicious attacks against the rebels and civilians circulated throughout the media, social networks, and blogs, western governments re-framed the civil war as a humanitarian crisis demanding international response. The United Nations Security Council voted to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a few Arab states launched airstrikes to protect civilians. By mid-2011, countries like the United States and Germany were engaged in delivery of humanitarian supplies, while Italy and France deployed military advisors to assist the rebels in the civil war. What began as a domestic uprising quickly became a foreign policy issue for Libya and many other countries in the world.

Another example of this blurring between foreign and domestic issues can be found in comparative public policy, a subject area that may seem less dramatic

than war, but potentially can be equally, or more dangerous to public health. Government safety standards for food are typically aimed at the citizens of a country, but they also shape the amount and type of foods exporting countries produce. When the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an alert regarding Melamine—a chemical used in the manufacturing of food items like dairy products and even baby formula—Chinese exports to the United States were adversely affected. So, when countries make domestic policies that have the effect of changing the interactions between states, the line defining international and domestic policy making is unclear. Today's economic interdependence means more policies have consequences inside and outside state borders.

This does not mean that there is no longer a difference between foreign and domestic policy, and a distinction can be made based on the intended target of the policy. If the primary target lies outside the country's borders, it is considered foreign policy, even if it has secondary consequences for politics inside the country. Similarly, if the primary target is inside the country, it is considered domestic policy, even if it affects others outside the country's borders. If the intention of new economic policy is to alter the trade balance with another country by placing restrictions on imports, we consider that foreign policy. Many policies, of course, have multiple targets. Ensuring clean air for a country's domestic population and limited imports from foreign automobile competitors might be equally important in the design of the environmental policy, for example. In such cases, a single policy can be both foreign and domestic. It should be clear from our discussion that the targets of foreign policy are not limited to other countries. Foreign policy may be targeted at specific individuals such as a particular leader, nonstate actors such as international organizations, human rights groups working across borders, multinational corporations, terrorist groups, other states, the international environment, or the global economy.

Another difficulty in distinguishing foreign from domestic policy concerns the status of territorial borders. Many states' borders are in dispute. Part of a country, like the Catalan region of Spain, may be attempting to establish its independence but has only partial control in running its own affairs. Meanwhile, the rest of the country is engaged in suppression of its attempt at secession and independence. In this case, is Spain's policy toward a group seeking self-determination foreign or domestic policy? In some ways, it depends on your point of view. If you are part of the group claiming independence, as are the citizens of the region of Catalan (some 15% of Spain's population), you see the country acting across a border that you have defined and thus it is foreign policy. If you are the leader of the government of Spain, you deny this independence and see the situation as strictly an internal, domestic affair.

For such cases, we tend to rely on the judgment of the international community to distinguish foreign policy from domestic policy. If most other countries have recognized the breakaway region as independent, the relations between it and the country are perceived as foreign policy. Although in some cases it is clear what the judgment of the international community is, in others it is not. The issue

of how much a country actually controls its borders is of extreme importance in states that are so weak internally that rival factions control different parts of the territory. Such “failed” countries, or countries that are sovereign only in international legal terms, have become part of the twenty-first century international landscape and raise further questions regarding the distinction between foreign and domestic policy.¹

Now that we have defined foreign, let us further clarify the term “policy.” This is a broad term, representing a whole range of activities and/or subjects. It can include specific decisions to sign a treaty on climate change, for example, and general guidelines to support initiatives to address global warming. Policy can include observable behaviors by countries, such as the Australian commitment of troops to Afghanistan, or verbal pronouncements that do not necessarily lead to follow-up action, such as Turkey’s condemnation of Israeli foreign policy toward the Palestinians. As you can see, foreign policy is not limited to military or security policy. It also includes such areas as foreign economic policy, international environmental policy, and human rights policy.

Who makes policy? The answer to this question is also an important part of the definition of “foreign policy.” Policies are typically thought of as the product of governments, and thus governments are the “actors.” Other players whose actions are intended to influence targets outside a country’s borders may also be foreign policy actors. For example, businesses may market their products in other countries. Multinational corporations are businesses that are owned by interests in various countries or divide their production across country borders. International organizations, such as the United Nations, act across borders. By traveling to foreign countries, you may be supporting their economies and interacting with foreign nationals. Although these actions are certainly “foreign,” and are an increasingly significant part of international politics, we rarely consider them “policy.” Instead, the term “policy” is typically reserved for the actions of governments, government institutions, and government officials. Hereafter, when we refer to “countries” or “states” in a discussion of foreign policy, we are referring to the governments or their officials that are acting in their name.

Comparing Foreign Policies

This book focuses on analysis, or explanation of foreign policy. To begin such an inquiry, one must ask why a state makes certain decisions in foreign affairs and how the foreign policy may have developed from these decisions. We then use this information to look for understandable patterns—across time, space, and issues—in order to formulate or test explanations of foreign policy. In other words, we assume that at least some of the same reasons behind Catherine the Great’s Russian foreign policy in the eighteenth century might influence Dimitry Medvedev’s Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first century; some of the same motivations for India’s border conflict with China can perhaps be found in Argentina’s decision to start a war with Great Britain; and some of the same

factors affecting France’s nuclear policy are useful for understanding French foreign policy toward Senegal and Mauritania.

In the search for regular and identifiable patterns, the field of foreign policy analysis rejects the view that every event is completely unique. Finding patterns is important to reach the end goal of a general understanding and an increased capability for prediction. In other words, we seek to explain the factors that influence not just a specific policy, but state behavior generally because general knowledge can be used to anticipate future action. If we know the factors that shape decisions for war, we are better able to predict, control, and possibly even prevent future international conflicts.

This is not to say that we assume all states’ foreign policies can be explained in exactly the same way. In order to discover similarities and differences across foreign policies, we use the “comparative method.” The comparative method involves selecting what to examine (in this instance, states and their foreign policies) and determining patterns. It is “comparative” because it involves comparing two or more states or, in some cases, one state at different time periods to determine similarities and differences.

Selecting the countries to compare is a very important step in the comparative method. The countries selected are shown in Table 1–1, along with some demographic, political, and economic characteristics that give a bird’s-eye view of their similarities and differences. The table includes the United States for a convenient comparison, though the case is not included in this book.

The countries chosen for this volume are some of the central players on the global and regional stages today. In order to evaluate the different theories scholars have used to explain states’ foreign policies, we used two primary criteria to select countries to examine. First, we included countries that have some factors or characteristics in common with other countries in order to facilitate comparison. For example, we have several economically strong countries (Great Britain, China, and Germany) and several developing countries (Venezuela, Brazil, India, and Iran). We can also compare the foreign policies of states in the same region dealing with some of the same issues (such as the policies of Great Britain versus Germany toward the European Union).

Second, we selected countries that are diverse on some dimensions in order to generate contrasts and to see how different theoretical perspectives fare in different settings. For example, some theories emphasize democracy and nondemocracy as being important determinants of how a state conducts itself internationally. Thus, we have included several democracies (such as Britain, India, Israel, and South Africa) and some nondemocracies (such as China and Venezuela). We have also chosen states with large militaries (such as China and Russia) and states with smaller militaries (such as Venezuela and Nigeria). These choices allow for comment, albeit in a limited way, on observed differences in foreign policy between democracies and nondemocracies and between military giants and military dwarfs. Had only democracies been chosen, we would not be able to say much about how well theories of foreign policy explain the behavior of nondemocracies.

Table 1-1 Characteristics of Countries²

Country	Population (millions)	GNI (US\$, billions)	GNI Per Capita (US\$)	Military Spending (US\$, millions)	Armed Forces	Human Development Index ^b	Government Type	Freedom Status
Great Britain ^a	62	2,218	41,370	57,424	201,000	0.849	Parliamentary	Free (1.0)
France	63	2,671	42,620	61,285	357,000	0.872	Semi-presidential	Free (1.0)
Germany	82	3,377	42,450	46,848	246,000	0.885	Parliamentary	Free (1.0)
Russia	141	1,192	9,340	52,586	720,000	0.719	Mixed	Not Free (5.5)
China	1,331	5,029	3,650	114,300	2,070,000	0.663	Authoritarian	Not Free (6.5)
Japan	127	5,228	38,080	51,420	255,000	0.884	Parliamentary	Free (1.5)
India	1,155	1,369	1,220	34,816	1,190,000	0.519	Parliamentary	Free (2.5)
Iran	73	NA	4,530	7,044 [2008]	450,000	0.702	Authoritarian/Theocratic	Not Free (6.0)
Turkey	75	607	8,720	15,634	501,000	0.679	Parliamentary	Partly Free (3.0)
Nigeria	155	163	1,190	1,724	80,000	0.423	Transitional	Partly Free (4.5)
South Africa	49	279	5,760	3,735	55,000	0.597	Parliamentary	Free (2.0)
Brazil	194	1,562	8,070	28,096	265,000	0.699	Presidential	Free (2.0)
Venezuela	28	323	10,090	3,106	85,000	0.696	Authoritarian	Partly Free (4.0)
United States	307	14,011	43,360	687,105	1,380,000	0.902	Presidential	Free (1.0)

Sources: Population, GNI, and GNI per capita: 2009 figures, World Bank, *Countries and Economies* database, <http://data.worldbank.org/country> (accessed May 17, 2011); Military Spending: 2010 figures, Stockholm International Peace Institute, *SIPRI Military Expenditure* database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (May 17, 2011); Armed Forces: 1995-2005 figures, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 2005* (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 2005); <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/tis/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm> (May 17, 2011); Human Development Index: 2010 figures, United Nations Development Programme, *Country Profiles and International Human Development Indicators* database, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/> (May 17, 2011); Freedom Status: 2009 rankings, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=475&year=2009> © 2011 Freedom House, 2011 (May 17, 2011).

^aHuman development index based on life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and tertiary enrollment; gross primary, secondary, and purchasing power parity in U.S. dollars.

^bData for the United Kingdom are presented for Great Britain.

Analyzing Foreign Policies

The analysis of foreign policy begins with theories that identify different factors—various forces that influence a state's foreign policy. Most analysts recognize that any explanation of foreign policy typically involves multiple factors. As you will see, there is no shortage of theories on what factors influence foreign policy. These multiple factors can be grouped into two broad categories of explanations: those dealing with factors outside the state, and those dealing with factors inside the state. The first category points to the international environment as the explanation for countries' foreign policy. In other words, factors external to the state—how the international system is organized, the characteristics of contemporary international relations, and the actions of others—can lead the state to react in certain ways. The second category points to factors internal to the state. In other words, characteristics of the domestic political system—citizens and groups within that system, the government organizations, and the individual leaders—serve as the source of a state's foreign policy. As previously noted, the study of foreign policy uniquely bridges the study of international relations and domestic politics by considering how both internal and external factors influence state behavior. We turn now to a discussion of these categories and the variety of theories associated with each.

External Factors

All states, regardless of their type of political system, their history, or their culture, reside within an international system that limits choices they can make. The worldwide distribution of economic wealth and military power and the actions of other powerful states, multinational corporations, and international and transnational organizations often mean that states cannot pursue their preferred option in foreign policy. Scholars of foreign policy have long recognized that to understand how states behave toward each other, it is important to understand the influence of these systemic factors and the external actors and conditions outside the control of policy-makers. In fact, for a long time, many argued that states' foreign policies were solely a product of the international system—merely a reaction to external conditions and other actors. This is the expectation derived from theories of international relations such as realism and variants of liberalism and constructivism. Thus, foreign policy analysts often use perspectives on the international system to infer the actions states are likely to take in their foreign policies.

Anarchy and Power in the International System: Realism

The lack of an overarching government in the international system is one of the most important external conditions that affects foreign policy. Realist theory proposes that anarchy is the characteristic of the international environment that makes international politics so dramatically different from domestic politics. In domestic political systems, political actors (such as groups and individuals) can

cooperate because there are rules governing behavior and a government to enforce those rules. In the international political system, however, conflict is more likely because the absence of an overall system of law and enforcement means that each political actor (almost 200 states in 2012) must look out for itself.³ In addition, realists argue that power is a relative concept. In a condition of anarchy, any gain in power by one state represents an inherent threat to its neighbors. Realists prescribe policies that maximize state interests in an effort to seek relative gains and preserve balances of power.⁴

What is the effect of anarchy on foreign policy? Without the protection of an international legal system or global police force, states must look out for their own interests. The result is distrust, competition, and conflict among states. The driving force behind foreign policies then becomes the constant need to acquire and safeguard one's security and power. For most realists, the key components of power are military in nature, because ultimately it is the goal of every state to survive and to protect its territorial integrity (if not its citizens as well). Factors that contribute to military strength include the size and sophistication of military forces, economic wealth to purchase military strength, and good leadership. Geopolitical factors, such as natural defenses and abundant resources, have also long figured into the calculation of military strength. If a state does not have much power, it must enter into an alliance with states that are more powerful and can protect it. Thus, alliances and powerful allies also become additional external conditions that can constrain states.

The realist perspective leads to several expectations about foreign policy based on the power capabilities of a state and the potential threats to it.⁵ The foreign policies of states that are quite powerful militarily, such as China and Russia, focus on preserving their power by maintaining a high profile in world affairs and balancing against other powerful states. Policies aimed at demonstrating military capabilities and securing spheres of influence are most important. If there is only one other major power in the international system, such as was true during the Cold War, competition for allies and possible conflict with the other power likely dominates the foreign policy agenda.

For states with some capabilities but who are not global powers, such as Brazil and Great Britain, foreign policy often depends on the distribution of power in the international system (another systemic characteristic that realism sees as important). In a bipolar system, a middle power faces strong pressures to become a compliant alliance partner of one of the major powers and ultimately give up autonomy in its foreign policy for the sake of security. During the Cold War, Germany and Japan were arguably so dependent on their alliance with the United States that their potential influence as middle powers in the international system was largely constrained. Middle powers may instead try to play one major power off against another (as India and France attempted to do at times during the Cold War), but this can be a risky business.⁶

In a multipolar system, realists argue, middle powers often have the most autonomy and regional influence because there is greater choice in alliance partners

when the major powers are competing. Middle powers often worry, however, that the great powers will cooperate and rule the international system like an "oligarchy," ignoring the interests of the middle and smaller states. In terms of military capabilities, the current international system might be hegemonic, with the United States as the lone superpower. This presents new opportunities for middle powers. Although they are no match for the hegemonic state and must often follow its lead in areas of interest to the hegemon, a middle power may assert its influence regionally. Indeed, we are currently witnessing a resurgence of regional powers around the globe with states like Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa, playing new, more independent roles in their regions. As hegemony in the international system declines, contenders may adopt foreign policies that challenge the dominance of the hegemon. For example, some may interpret Chinese foreign policy today as focused on rivaling the United States as a world leader.⁷

States with fewer military capabilities at the beginning of their existence (such as South Korea, East Timor, or Belarus) are the most constrained. According to realism, they have little opportunity to forge an independent foreign policy, for they must satisfy their protector. For example in the 1950s, geographic vulnerability and regional threats impacted South Korea's relationship with the United States and necessitated the buildup of South Korea's defense forces. In the 2000s, East Timor sought support from Australia and other western powers in the face of threats from the government of Indonesia.

All states, according to the realist perspective, must be vigilant and react to potential threats, regardless of their military capability and their place in the international system. They constantly seek to attain a balance with the power of others. For instance, Russia and China must be wary of attempts by the United States to dominate the international system. France must be concerned about Germany's influence in the European monetary union. The Iranian government may be pursuing nuclear weapons, in part to increase its security against western threats. India must carefully watch and react to Pakistan's military capabilities, including its nuclear capability. And finally, Ukraine might seek support from western European countries in an effort to maintain a balance against its powerful neighbor, Russia.

Although realism captures an important aspect of states' foreign policies—the primacy of security interests and the drive for power among all states—it is often criticized for its excessive focus on military conflict at the expense of economic cooperation. Military capability supposedly gives a state influence in international politics, for example the influence to deter others from attacking and the influence to protect its allies. But economic power, not just economic wealth to purchase military capability, can also give a state influence in international politics. Even if a state does not use its wealth to build a strong military, it may be able to influence others through the use of economic sanctions or promises of an economically rewarding relationship. In other words, it may be able to "buy" its influence. Indeed, because of changes in the international system, economic power may be more significant in contemporary international relations. Military

force, for example, is often ineffective at solving some problems (such as trade imbalances and global environmental threats) and may be more costly to a state than economic sanctions. Such problems are arguably more important in an era of increasing interdependence and globalization.⁸

Interdependence in the International System: Liberalism

Liberal theories of international relations focus on the distribution of economic wealth as a primary characteristic that affects states' foreign policies. Liberalism sees the world as markedly different from what it was fifty years ago. With the increase in global trade and financial relationships and the technological advances that have facilitated this increase, states have become more interdependent.⁹ One variant, neoliberal institutionalism, contends that states cooperate because of expected mutual benefits, and they are likely to form multilateral regimes to increase information certainty, lower transaction costs, and foster mutual gains.¹⁰ For example, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) represents the core of the nonproliferation regime, a set of nested agreements and institutions that collectively help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Neofunctionalism is another theory which argues that trade is the most important spark for regional integration. Governments agree to pool sovereignty to manage technical issues created by expanding economic transactions, but integration quickly acquires a life of its own due to the dynamics of functional spillover (i.e., integration in one sector increases pressure to integrate in other areas).¹¹ As flows of intraregional trade and investment increase, players may advocate creation of supranational institutions that allow them to reduce the uncertainty and the transaction costs, and to reap the benefits of advantages in an integrated economic system.¹²

How is foreign policy affected by interdependence? According to liberalism, states find cooperation rather than conflict more in line with their interests. Arms control agreements, trade agreements, and cultural exchanges are examples of cooperation that can benefit states. Cooperating with other states, and building international institutions to facilitate that cooperation, allows states to further their goals of economic wealth. Indeed, economic liberalism argues that all states will be better off if they cooperate in a worldwide division of labor, with each state specializing in what it is relatively better at producing.¹³ Japan, for example, decided long ago that it was not possible to try to produce all that it needed to consume. Its experience in World War II of trying to control its access to resources through conflict was not successful in the end. Instead, it came to see participation in regional and global trade networks as a more efficient way to generate wealth in the 1950s and beyond.

An increase in interdependence can have a downside. The more numerous the connections are between states, the greater the opportunities for conflicts of interests. For example, Japan and western European states are highly dependent on

Middle East oil, and their economic interests have often diverged with Middle Eastern states' political and military interests. When states fail to resolve these differences through cooperation and compromise, states may resort to force to ensure access to resources on which they are dependent. This logic partly explains events in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and suggests a different interpretation of tensions between India and Pakistan over water resources originating in Kashmir today. More generally, when states become intertwined in one area, they often become sensitive to state behavior in other areas.

Interdependence also means states can be fairly constrained in their foreign policy. Because the fortunes of one state are connected to the fortunes of others, when one state harms another, it does so at its own peril. Going to war in an effort to gain power may make sense militarily, but states in an interdependent world harm themselves by destroying potential trading partners and markets in which to sell their goods. After World War II, France and Germany deliberately chose the path of interdependence and constraint and transformed a centuries-old relationship of distrust and rivalry into one of economic cooperation. Thus, liberalism views economic interdependence as the key characteristic of the international environment that states must consider when they make foreign policy.

Some states are more dependent than others. Richer states, such as China and Saudi Arabia, are very much affected by the actions of other states, but they can afford to sacrifice part of their economic wealth in order to pursue other goals. Their wealth and the centrality of their state in the world economy give them a choice in trading partners, and they do not have to rely on others for economic assistance. Poor states that are less engaged in the global economy, such as Bulgaria or Chad, enjoy no such luxury and are highly constrained in their foreign policy. Their very economic existence depends on their relationships with other states, as well as with nonstate actors such as multinational corporations and international financial organizations. Thus, they are often forced to comply with the foreign policy wishes of their benefactors. Furthermore, some suggest that the leaders of poor states often act in collusion with the rich states that exploit the poor states' cheap labor and abundant raw materials.¹⁴

As noted above, because there is no overarching authority to ensure cooperation, states may support international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization as forums for coordinating states' interests. What may be sacrificed in the short term, from that support, liberals believe is offset by the long-term benefits of stability, efficiency, and greater wealth.¹⁵ However, with international cooperation in the form of international organizations and with the rise of multinational corporations as the engines of globalization, states have no choice but to deal with these nonstate actors and sometimes compete with them for influence in international politics. At times, states even compete with nonstate actors for control over their own domestic politics.

Current globalization and liberalization pressures complicate the effects of interdependence in the early twenty-first century. Globalization connects more economies in worldwide financial and trading markets, but it has not done so

evenly. Indeed, the gap between rich and poor states is widening, according to some measures. Poor states have little ability to resist pressures to open up their markets, even when they disagree with the liberal philosophy and risk political retribution when the gap between rich and poor becomes greater within their economies. Some states, such as China, have changed their past positions and embraced some elements of the liberal economic philosophy.

One response to current globalization is regional economic integration. Both rich and poor states are engaging in agreements and dialogues to establish greater interdependence at the regional level. The European Union (EU) is the most successful example of regional integration, particularly with the establishment in 1999 of a common currency, the *Euro*. There have been other recent attempts at regional integration in response, in part, to globalization. This is particularly true for states in Latin America and southern Africa that are trying to replicate the benefits of regional cooperation seen in the EU. If these attempts are successful, states in southern Africa and Latin America may find they are constrained by the new international organizations that they build—much as British, French, and German states are sometimes constrained by the political and economic structures of the EU. Thus, regional integration provides another layer of external factors that may affect states' foreign policies.

International Norms and Legitimacy: Constructivism

A constructivist perspective sees the international system as composed of the social interactions of states and shared understandings in a global society. The international system includes more than objective forces of power, interests, and organization. For constructivism, anarchy and interests are not objectively determined. Instead, they are constituted by the actions of agents, such as states, and the meanings or ideas that agents attach to them. Given the breadth of this approach in the first decade after the Cold War, constructivism quickly emerged as a leading contender to rationalism in international relations theory.¹⁶

Constructivists view norms of appropriate behavior as socially constructed international structures that constrain states' foreign policies.¹⁷ Norms represent shared expectations about appropriate behavior that derive from a combination of beliefs, standards of behavior, international conventions, and decision-making procedures. For example, a norm evolved in the past two centuries to reframe the international slave trade as repugnant and immoral, and some scholars suggest that there is a new norm prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons today. Norms are characterized as both regulative and constitutive in that they shape national interests and identity.¹⁸ States often avoid violating norms, but when they do, other actors may sanction them or shame them.¹⁹ For some of the same reasons, states tend to avoid foreign policies that are not seen as legitimate by the international community. International laws may codify what counts as legitimate. Although states do not always comply with international laws, the system does carry some kind of moral, normative authority that states support.²⁰

In sum, external factors focus on aspects of the international system that push or pull states toward certain foreign policy choices. Realism proposes that states motivated by self-interests seek military power and create alliances while weak states submit to more powerful actors. Liberalism suggests that an interdependent international system results in more cooperation, more support for organizations that help coordinate activities, and the submission of economically weak states to the forces of the international marketplace. Constructivist perspectives point to socially-created meanings that develop into international norms that serve to guide actors' behaviors. Proponents of each of these perspectives agree that foreign policies are a result of states' rank, status, and links to other actors in the international system.

Internal Factors

Theories that focus on internal sources of foreign policy offer a rather different perspective and set of expectations. In contrast to the externally based theories, those who point to sources internal to the state expect differences across states' foreign policies, despite similar international circumstances. For these analysts, the great diversity of political systems, cultures, and leaders are the factors that point states in different directions, even though they are facing the same external forces. Furthermore, externally based theories often assume the policies states make are in response to their interests and the demands of the international system. Their response is "rational," or the most optimal decision given those interests and demands. Domestically oriented explanations, in contrast, argue that states sometimes make decisions that do not necessarily benefit them in international politics. These theories explain such "deviations from rationality" by pointing to the need of leaders to satisfy both domestic political goals and foreign policy interests or by examining the imperfect nature of the decision-making process. Finally, those who focus on external sources of foreign policy tend to examine states as if they were "unitary actors" whose politicians and citizens put aside any differences they may have and act with one voice for the sake of national security. Conversely, those who point to domestic sources of foreign policy highlight the many different voices and conflicts over foreign policy. These many voices reside at several levels of actors and institutions within countries—the public, societal groups, government organizations, and leaders.

The Public: Opinion, Identity, and Culture

For purposes of this study, public opinion is defined as the attitudes citizens have about particular foreign policy issues. The public may agree on an issue or may be deeply divided. For example, the public may be for or against their state intervening militarily in another country or signing a particular trade agreement. Scholars continue to debate the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, even in highly democratized states in which policy supposedly reflects "the will of the people."

Based on numerous findings in research, the conventional wisdom is that the public simply does not influence foreign policy. The average person tends to know little and care little about his or her country's foreign affairs. Even if the public were knowledgeable about foreign policy issues, it is not clear that leaders would follow public opinion. They may instead try to lead the public to opinions that are in line with their preferences or ignore their opinion altogether.²¹ Many times, evidence suggests that leaders who do ignore the public are not held accountable at the polls because elections typically revolve around domestic rather than foreign policy concerns. The media also play a role in the relationship between the public and the state, as they, too, may influence public opinion on foreign policy.²²

However, the question of public opinion and foreign policy may be more complicated than this conventional wisdom implies.²³ Some evidence suggests that there is more congruence than skeptics assume between changes in public opinion and changes in foreign policy.²⁴ In many specific cases of foreign policy decisions, we know leaders were quite sensitive to public reactions. Furthermore, although the public may not formulate specific stable opinions about foreign policy, it often expresses rather enduring "core values" or opinion "moods."²⁵ These refer to underlying beliefs—such as isolationism, anticommunism, nonappeasement, neutrality, and anti-imperialism—the public holds and uses to judge foreign policy. In Germany and Japan, the public has come to value multilateralism and antimilitarism. In post-Cold War Russia and in contemporary India, core values support the maintenance of a "great power" identity. Indeed, a country's identity—how it sees itself in relations to others—and its conception of its role in the world can be powerful ideas that are shared by members of the public and that set boundaries within which leaders must remain or risk public opposition.²⁶ As with public opinion on a specific policy, identity and role may be constructed by elites and used to support particular foreign policy positions.²⁷

Thus far, most research on public opinion as a source of foreign policy has focused on democracies in which there are institutionalized channels for the public to hold leaders accountable for their decisions. The public is often assumed not to have any influence on the foreign policies of more authoritarian political systems. The views of society, however, may be just as important in these types of systems, although in an indirect fashion.²⁸ As in democracies, core values held by the public may work to set boundaries. Indeed, authoritarian systems may be built on the foundation of such foreign policy orientations, such as self-determination and defense in North Korea, and anti-imperialism in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Iran. Thus, despite the fact that nondemocracies may not be "of the people, by the people, and for the people," the people may still constrain the government in its foreign policy decisions.

Core values and national identities are connected to a society's political culture—the values, norms, and traditions that are widely shared by its people and are relatively enduring over time. These enduring cultural features may also set parameters for foreign policy.²⁹ A country's culture may value individualism, collectivism, pragmatism, or moralism, and these culturally based values may affect

foreign policy. Cultures that place a premium on morality over practicality may be more likely to pass moral judgment over the internal affairs and foreign policy behaviors of others.³⁰ Culture also affects the way foreign policy is determined. Cultures where consensual decision making is the norm, for example, may take longer to make policy, because the process of consultation with many people may be just as important as the final decision.³¹ Despite the general recognition that cultural particularities do affect foreign policy, it is often difficult to assess the impact of culture.

Societal Groups: Links and Opposition

Leaders may be more likely to pay attention to, and react to, the opinions of specific, organized societal groups than to the society at large, as they play the role of linking society to the state or of opposing and competing with the state. Interest groups articulate a particular societal sector's position and mobilize that sector to pressure and persuade the government. Interest groups come in a variety of forms. They may be based on a single issue, on ethnic identification, on religious affiliation, or on economics. For example, nongovernmental organizations focused on human rights are becoming increasingly visible in countries as different as the United States and Egypt.

Economic interest groups can be an especially important societal source of foreign policy because they help to generate wealth, and economic welfare has become one of the primary functions of the modern state. Economic groups often have an interest in foreign relations as they seek to promote their foreign business adventures abroad or to protect markets from competitors at home.³² Business groups in Japan have often been considered partners with the bureaucracy on foreign, economic, policy making; and a wide range of business, labor, financial, and trade groups quite actively attempt to influence foreign policy in Ireland.

An interest group's influence on foreign policy often depends on the particular issue, how organized the group is, and the relationship between the interest group and the government. Interest groups face an uphill struggle in attempting to influence a government that disagrees with their position. The government typically has greater resources to bring to bear on the issue and more control of the information that flows to the public. Depending on the political system, the government also has more diffuse political support from the public. Globalization and liberalization trends have certainly increased the number of economic groups that have an interest in their state's foreign policies, as can be seen in contemporary Nigeria. Such trends have also arguably strengthened the capability of these groups to influence foreign policy.

Political parties, although often part of the government, also play the role of linking societal opinion to political leadership.³³ In many ways, political parties function much like interest groups. In some countries, such as Iran, only one party exists or dominates the political system and that party's ideology can be important in setting the boundaries for debate over foreign policy decisions and in providing

rhetoric for leader's speeches. In such cases, parties become less important than factions, which often develop within political parties. Factions are also important in political systems in which one party holds a majority in parliament and rules alone. In these countries too, factions may disagree over the direction of the country's foreign policy, as have the pro- versus anti-European integration factions in the British Conservative Party.³⁴ Party factions may seek to outmaneuver each other or they may be forced to compromise for the sake of party unity. Even if there is a consensus within the party, foreign policy might get captured by the intraparty fighting as factions compete with one another for party leadership. These internal dynamics of political parties can be seen in countries as different as China, Turkey, and Canada.

Factions are also important in more fragmented multiparty political systems, but in such countries the competition between parties becomes significant as well. In vying for the public's support, parties may attempt to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other, thus polarizing the debate over foreign policy, or they may rush to the center of the political spectrum to capture the moderates, who often decide elections.³⁵ In some multiparty systems, such as India and Germany, the political scene is so fragmented that parties must enter into coalitions and share power to make policy. In such cases, each foreign policy decision can be a struggle between coalition partners, who must get along to keep the coalition together.³⁶

A country's military is, of course, part of the government, but in many countries military leadership competes with civilian leadership for control over policy. At times, the military can be a powerful source of opposition to a government's foreign policy goals, especially if those goals concern national security issues or imply a cut in the military's resources. At other times, military groups might push leaders in expansionist directions to further self-interested goals of organizational growth and prestige.³⁷ Since a military that is not subordinate to civilian leaders controls the primary means of coercion, policy-makers may be very sensitive to this opposition. If they are not, they risk a military coup.

Government Organization: Democracies and Bureaucracies

How a government is organized may also affect foreign policy. Two characteristics are particularly important: democratization and bureaucratization. The foreign policy process is quite different for democracies—decision-making authority tends to be diffused across democratic institutions, and thus more actors are involved. In contrast, authoritarian leaders often make decisions by themselves. Democratic leaders are also directly accountable to political parties and the public and thus must build a consensus for foreign policy. Authoritarian leaders do not face these constraints and may enjoy considerable latitude in choosing their own policies.

Liberal theory argues that because of these differences in government organization, democracies will behave more peacefully than will authoritarian systems.³⁸ Even if a leader is inclined to war, they will have difficulty building political

support among a larger set of actors and mobilizing them for conflict. These leaders are accountable to a public that is often more concerned with economic than military issues. Furthermore, democratic institutions are built on and create a political culture that is likely to emphasize the value of peaceful resolution. In a democracy, citizens learn that conflicts of interest can be resolved nonviolently—for example, through elections, peaceful means of influence, or in the courts. They transfer that value to their relations with other states.

Despite these expectations, the proposition that democracies are generally more peaceful in their foreign policy is not supported by most evidence. Democracies and authoritarian governments, it seems, are both likely to be involved in and initiate conflict. For example, democratic constraints did not prevent British involvement in Iraq, French military interventions in Africa, India's conflicts with China and Pakistan, and Israel's participation in numerous Middle East conflicts. Democracies, however, rarely fight other democracies. Scholars continue to work on the answer to this puzzle, but many return to the ideas that democratic cultural values and institutional constraints make democratic foreign policy different, even if only when dealing with other democracies.

The differences between the making of foreign policy in democratic and authoritarian governments may be exaggerated.³⁹ First, actual decision-making authority may not be as diffuse, or constrained, in democracies as sometimes supposed. As noted earlier, citizens in a democracy are often not well informed, and their influence over foreign policy is debatable. Furthermore, foreign policy decisions, unlike most domestic policy decisions, are often highly centralized at the top of the government's hierarchy, as they typically are, for example, in France, Palau, and Poland.

Second, it is not always the case that authoritarian leaders act without constraint. These leaders often face considerable opposition from society, interest groups, party factions, and their own militaries and may consult frequently with these groups before making foreign policy decisions. Although citizens in authoritarian systems cannot vote their leaders out of office, they do have other means of holding leaders accountable, including forming or pledging allegiance to non-governmental groups who oppose the authoritarian leader, backing a coup and change of government, assassinating a leader, and starting a revolution. Indeed, simply being voted out of office may pale in comparison.

Authoritarian regimes that are fairly new, face tremendous internal opposition, or are otherwise weak in their control of the country need to pay special attention to public reaction to foreign policy. Countries such as India, Iraq, and Spain have serious economic, religious, and ethnic internal divisions that can detract from the legitimacy of the state. Leaders of such governments may use foreign policy to build national identity, demonstrate strong leadership, or divert attention away from internal problems.⁴⁰ Finally in some authoritarian systems, no single leader controls foreign policy; decisions are made collectively, as in modern-day Iran. Since there are considerable differences in the organization of authoritarian governments and democratic governments, it may be better to

think of government organization in regard to how centralized the decision-making authority is, and how strong the government is, in relation to societal opposition.⁴¹

A second feature of government organization that affects foreign policy concerns the bureaucracy, which is charged with gathering information, developing proposals, offering advice, implementing policy, and, at times, making foreign policy decisions. Because of the complexities involved in dealing with the many issues of international politics, governments organize themselves bureaucratically, assigning responsibility for different areas or jurisdictions of policy to separate agencies or departments. Separate agencies, for example, are responsible for diplomatic relations, for trade ties, and for different parts of the military.

Although such bureaucratic organization is necessary to deal with a complex world, it can create problems for foreign policy.⁴² The different departments, for example, may come into conflict over what foreign policy should be adopted, partly because departments tend to develop their own sense of identity or organizational mission. Bureaucratic conflict is a common problem, for example, in the process of making foreign policy in the United States and Japan. The conflict in viewpoints may create inconsistent foreign policy if departments are acting on their own rather than in coordination. It may also result in compromises that are not necessarily in the best interests of the state. Critics argue that the U.S. occupation of post-war Iraq was so chaotic in part due to bureaucratic struggles for control over policies there.

These types of problems that stem from bureaucratic organization in a government are less likely under certain conditions. Although most states have some sort of bureaucracy, in some, a single leader or a single unifying force (such as one political party) can impose a decision on a reluctant or conflicted bureaucracy. On some issues, moreover, all agencies may share an overriding value that guides foreign policy, making inconsistencies and conflict less likely. Finally, in crisis situations, the top leadership often takes over, minimizing (but not always eliminating) the effects of bureaucratic politics.

Leaders: Personalities and Beliefs

At the top of government sits a leader, or leaders, who have the authority to make foreign policy. Characteristics of leaders are generally more important when they have significant latitude in shaping policy and the situation is ambiguous, uncertain, or complex. Under these conditions, which occur frequently in foreign policy making, a leader's personality and beliefs may shape what the state does.⁴³

Leaders' decisions may be shaped by their own personal history. Their childhood or early political experiences, for example, may have taught them that certain values and ways of handling problems are important.⁴⁴ The revolutionary tendencies of the Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung, for example, might be traced back to when he was a child. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was profoundly influenced by her upbringing in the former East Germany. Manmohan Singh is India's

first Sikh prime minister, and holds a PhD. in political economy from Oxford University. His values and professional training have influenced his government's emphasis on economic development and trade policy. Since every leader's personal history is unique, one might expect each individual to draw on a particular set of beliefs, values, and experiences in coping with foreign policy issues.

Despite their individual differences, all humans prefer to be consistent in their beliefs, and studies show we often ignore or distort information that contradicts what we already believe. This is especially likely when we have strongly held stereotypes or "images" of other countries. Leaders who see another country as their enemy, for example, will often selectively attend to or perceive information about that country in a way that confirms their original belief. For this reason, images are extremely resistant to change, even if the "enemy" is making cooperative gestures.⁴⁵ U.S. President George W. Bush's image of Saddam Hussein, for example, was significant in his decisions about going to war with Iraq in 2003.

Leaders can also be categorized into types of personalities. Some leaders may be motivated by a need to dominate others and may thus be more conflictual in foreign policy; others may be more concerned with being accepted, and may therefore be more cooperative. Some leaders are more nationalistic, are more distrustful, and believe that the world is a place of conflict that can only be solved through the use of force, whereas others see themselves and their state as part of the world community that can be trusted and believe that problems are best solved multilaterally.⁴⁶

Leaders' decision-making style and how they manage information and the people around them can also be important. Some leaders, like Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, choose to be quite active in foreign policy making, whereas others, like Brazil's Itamar Franco, tended to delegate the authority to make foreign policy decisions. Some leaders are "crusaders" who come to office with a foreign policy goal. They tend not to compromise on their vision and are less open to advice. Others are interested in keeping power or bridging conflicts. They tend to be sensitive to advice and are reluctant to make decisions without consultation and consensus.⁴⁷ Historically, India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for example, tended to be an advocate for her own positions, whereas her father, Nehru, preferred to build a consensus among those around him.

Conclusion

As noted earlier, we have chosen a variety of countries in which to examine the links between international and domestic politics and the various propositions presented above. The following chapters afford a look at these various theories, which expect states' foreign policies to differ according to their level of economic development, dependence, and military power. We gain insight by comparing Germany with Nigeria, Russia with Venezuela, and China with Turkey. We also assess other theories that point to countries that are very similar in their placement

in the international security and economic system (such as Great Britain and France), but that choose different paths in their foreign policies, possibly because of internal factors. These countries also include a variety of different political systems, cultures, core values, historical experiences, societal opposition, degrees of centralization of political authority, and levels of bureaucratization, and they are led by leaders with their own beliefs and styles.

In addition, the countries represented in the chapters that follow provide an excellent opportunity to examine some of the recent changes in domestic and international politics and the effects these changes might have on foreign policy. Many of these states (such as Germany and Japan) were constrained by the Cold War international system. An examination of contemporary foreign policy allows us to assess how such states are coping with the post-Cold War world and its new security structures. Also of interest is how states, especially poorer states, are coping with globalization and pressures for liberalization, which may not be new but have intensified in the last decade. In internal matters, many of the states in this book have experienced changes in leadership over the past few years; several states have seen wholesale changes in their governing structures; others are facing significant pressures for reform. We examine how changes in domestic politics have influenced foreign policy in these states.

As you read the following chapters, we invite you to learn about the contemporary politics (both domestic and global) of central actors in the world today. We also encourage you to apply the theories discussed in this chapter to understand each country's foreign policy and to think critically about these theories as you compare the countries' experiences. As you go along, consider the questions presented below. In addition, try to assess which theories or group of factors are being emphasized as important for understanding the country's foreign policy. Each chapter presents a brief historical review of the country's foreign policy, an analysis of the most important external and internal factors in the country's foreign policy, and a discussion of contemporary foreign policy issues. In the book's final chapter, we return to a discussion of thinking comparatively and analytically about contemporary foreign policies.

Questions to Consider When Analyzing Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective

- Has the foreign policy behavior of many countries changed in the past two decades? What theories best explain different measures of change in countries' foreign policies?
- Which theories of international constraints on state behavior are most important, and for which countries? Overall, how do these perspectives help to account for the foreign policy behavior of countries in comparative perspective?
- How are states coping with globalization and the pressures for liberalization in contemporary international relations? Are there fundamental differences in how states deal with these challenges?

- How do constructivists explain state foreign policy behaviors? How important is political identity in shaping decisions about foreign affairs?
- Which internal influences on state behavior are most important and for which countries? Overall, how do these perspectives help to account for the foreign policy behavior of various countries?
- Can external and internal factors be linked to better understand foreign policy in the twenty-first century? What type of conceptual framework would capture the interaction of these levels?
- What are the benefits of studying foreign policy in comparative perspective? What are the limitations?

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CHAPTER 2

British Foreign Policy: Continuity and Transformation

Brian White

This chapter marks the beginning of our analysis of foreign policy behavior in thirteen different countries. Brian White describes the continuity of British foreign policy after World War II, within the context of Winston Churchill's global, Atlantic, and European "circles" of activity. Even as these circles remained constant arenas for British foreign policy, this chapter illustrates the incredible complexity of challenges Britain faced with changes in the world. Most notably, Europeanization has blurred the distinction between what is domestic and what is foreign and has significantly altered how foreign policy is made. Today, Britain continues to wrestle with its orientation toward and identity in Europe and with its role in the promotion of international ethics and interventions.

Britain may be compared with a number of different countries examined in this volume. First, Britain's reluctance to participate fully in the European Union differs from the pro-European Union policies of France (Chapter 3) and Germany (Chapter 4). This reluctance stems in part from British identity. The effects of identity as a core value of the general public can also be seen in the foreign policy of India (Chapter 8) and Turkey (Chapter 9). The importance of alliances, particularly the "special relationship" between the United States and Britain, parallels the strong relationship that Japan (Chapter 7) also has with the United States. Finally, the influence of Prime Minister Blair's beliefs and decision-making style on British foreign policy in the Iraq war is similar to the impact of leaders seen in the foreign policies of Iran (Chapter 10) and Brazil (Chapter 13).