1. Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security

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It is always risky to pronounce a verdict of death on ideas, even after an extended period of apparent lifelessness, but I predict that we have seen the last of the "sociologists" in political science. . . . What has happened is that others too have penetrated the characteristically sloppy logic and flabby prose to discover the deeper problems of circularity and vacuousness inherent in the approach.

-- Brian Barry

This is a book written by scholars of international relations rummaging in the "graveyard" of sociological studies. Since research and teaching is an eminently social process, it is perhaps understandable that changing political circumstances and intellectual fashions reopen controversies that appeared to some to have been already settled. This process can lead, in the best of circumstances, to what we might call intellectual progress: the diminishing of sloppy logic, flabby prose, circularity in reasoning, and vacuousness of insight.

Put briefly, this book makes problematic the state interests that predominant explanations of national security often take for granted. For example, in the absence of geostrategic or economic stakes, why do the interests of some powerful states in the 1990s, but not in the 1930s or the 1890s, make them intervene militarily to protect the lives and welfare of citizens other than their own? Why did the Soviet Union consider it to be in its interest to withdraw from Eastern Europe in the late stages of the Cold War, while it had rejected such suggestions many times before? Answers to such questions are nonobvious and important. State interests do not exist to be "discovered" by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction. "Defining," not "defending," the national interest is what this book seeks to understand.

In the context of a bipolar, ideological struggle, the Cold War made relatively unproblematic some of the cultural factors affecting national security. Theories that abstracted from these factors offered important insights. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Issues dealing with norms, identities, and culture are becoming more salient. An institutional perspective permits us to investigate more closely the context, both domestic and international, in which states and other actors exercise power.

This book offers a sociological perspective on the politics of national security. It argues that security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors. This does not mean that power, conventionally understood as material capabilities, is unimportant for an analysis of national security. States and other political actors undoubtedly seek material power to defend their security. But what other
kinds of power and security do states seek and for which purposes? Do the meanings that states and other political actors attach to power and security help us explain their behavior? Answers to such questions, this book argues, raise issues of both theory and evidence.

Our point of departure is influenced greatly by the inability of all theories of international relations, both mainstream and critical, to help us explain fully what John Mueller aptly calls a quiet cataclysm: the dramatic changes in world politics since the mid-1980s, which have profoundly affected the environment for the national security of states. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, and its successor states, organized in the Commonwealth of Independent States, are in the process of creating a new regional international system while at the same time attempting to effect transitions from authoritarian socialism to democratic capitalism. The international positions of the United States and Japan have changed greatly as international competitiveness and financial power shifted away from the United States in the 1980s and away from Japan in the 1990s. China is undergoing a fundamental transformation in its economic structure and in its links to the international system. And the European Union (EU) appears to have been perhaps an overambitious attempt to accelerate the pace of European integration in the face of German unification. In South Africa, the Middle East, Central America, and Western Europe, long-standing violent conflicts that only a few years ago appeared to be simply unsolvable are now finding negotiated settlements. And in Europe, Central Asia, the Islamic world, and Africa, new conflicts are breaking out.

The main analytical perspectives on international relations, neorealism and neoliberalism, share with all their critics their inability to foreshadow, let alone foresee, these momentous international changes. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, international relations specialists, whatever their theoretical orientation, are uncertain about how to interpret the consequences of change. Disagreement is widespread on what are the most important questions, let alone what might constitute plausible answers to these questions. Are we living in a unipolar, a bipolar, or a multipolar world? Is the world increasingly divided into zones of peace among prosperous states at the center and zones of war between poor states on the periphery? Is the risk of war rapidly increasing in Asia while it remains negligible in Western Europe or is the reverse closer to the mark? Is the main cause of war on the periphery the excessive strength or the deplorable weakness of states? Is ideological conflict between states in the international system diminishing or increasing?

Without thinking specifically about the Cold War and national security, some sociologists wrote in the 1970s and 1980s about large-scale processes of change in and possible transformation of the global system. They privileged factors that appear to be relevant to our understanding of some of the changes that we are now observing. Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, argued that the dynamism inherent in the world capitalist economy would seek increasing integration of the socialist bloc. And John Meyer articulated a model of global sociopolitical organization that embeds states. This has opened up productive lines of research that undermine the plausibility of making a sharp distinction between international anarchy and world government as the only analytical alternatives for thinking about international relations. Taken together, Wallerstein's and Meyer's analyses recognize the importance of combining an analysis of power and wealth with issues of state sovereignty and cultural elements in the international society of states.

The uncertainties that mark international relations scholarship make this the right time to cast about for analytical perspectives that differ on key points from established theories, thus inviting us to take a fresh
look at the world we live in. This volume concentrates on two underattended determinants of national security policy: the cultural-institutional context of policy on the one hand and the constructed identity of states, governments, and other political actors on the other. We explore these determinants from the theoretical perspective of sociological institutionalism, with its focus on the character of the state's environment and on the contested nature of political identities. The primary purpose of this book is to establish these causal factors, and the theoretical orientations from which they derive, as relevant for the analysis of national security.

The empirical essays in this volume illustrate how social factors shape different aspects of national security policy, at times in ways that contradict the expectations derived from other theoretical orientations. This book does not offer a theory of national security. To insist on such a theory now would be premature for an approach that is in the early stages of developing a theoretically coherent, empirically oriented research program. And it would be immodest in the midst of a wide-ranging discussion of economic and sociological approaches in the social sciences. Instead, this book seeks to redress the extreme imbalance between structural and rationalist styles of analysis and sociological perspectives on questions of national security.

The authors in this volume adhere to the sociological use of such concepts as norms, identity, and culture as summary labels to characterize the social factors that they are analyzing. These factors result from social processes, purposeful political action, and differences in power capabilities.

The authors use the concept of norm to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such instances norms have "regulative" effects that specify standards of proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both.

For example, Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman in essay 3 argue that advanced weapon systems are one measure signifying that a state is modern. Governments thus spend their precious funds to buy such weapon systems even if they have only a marginal effect on national security. Analogously, large battleships at the beginning of the twentieth century and a secure second-strike capability at century's end confer world- or superpower status on states. Similarly, in essay 5, Martha Finnemore argues that global models of statehood have important effects on policies of military intervention. Relatedly, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald show in essay 4 that a taboo delegitimizing the use of chemical and nuclear weapons has, to different degrees, constrained the self-help behavior of states.

The essays refer to identity as a shorthand label for varying constructions of nation- and statehood. The process of construction typically is explicitly political and pits conflicting actors against each other. In invoking the concept of identity the authors depict varying national ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose. And they refer as well to variations across countries in the statehood that is enacted domestically and projected internationally.

For example, Thomas Berger traces in essay 9 the transformation of Germany's and Japan's collective purpose from war to commerce. Thomas Risse-Kappen, in essay 10, argues that the collective identity of democratic states has been central to the creation of a transatlantic security community, marked by what
Karl Deutsch called "dependable expectations of peaceful change." And Michael Barnett shows in essay 11 that changing and contested notions of Arab national identity help to define security threats and shape the dynamics of alliance formation.

Finally, the authors in this volume invoke the term culture as a broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law. Culture refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald (in essay 4) and Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman (in essay 3), respectively, exemplify these two usages of the term. Furthermore, Elizabeth Kier (essay 6), Alastair Johnston (essay 7), and Thomas Berger (essay 9) invoke specific cultural arguments about France, China, Germany and Japan, and, at times, about some of the political and military organizations within these countries.

The definitions of these concepts share an emphasis on what is collective rather than subjective. Sociological approaches to the analysis of national security sometimes seem nebulous in their specification of the factors that affect the behavior of states or other political actors. We can easily conjure up the image of a column of 50,000 tanks stretching from Cleveland to Seattle that tells us something about the size of the Soviet military at the end of the Cold War. It is harder to fathom what force caused Governor Michael Dukakis, the Democratic candidate for president in 1988, to dress up in military fatigues and ride around on a tank--looking foolish in the process--to demonstrate his toughness on the issue of national defense. Collectively shared expectations of the American public about the military toughness of presidential candidates are what made the governor behave the way he did. Collective expectations can have strong causal effects. Such expectations deserve close scrutiny, this book argues, for a better understanding of national security policy.

This essay points to some analytical gaps left by the predominant perspectives. The next essay proposes an approach for filling those gaps. The empirical essays that follow seek to show that perspectives that neglect social factors foreclose important avenues for empirical research and theoretical insight that are relevant for explaining specific aspects of national security.

Why Traditional National Security Issues?

The end of the Cold War has put new national security issues beside the long-standing fear of a nuclear war between the two superpowers and their preparations for large-scale conventional wars: ethnic conflicts leading to civil wars that expose civilian populations to large-scale state violence; an increasing relevance of economic competitiveness and, relatedly, of the "spin-on" of civilian high technology for possible military use; increasing numbers of migrants and refugees testing the political capacities of states; threats of environmental degradation affecting national well-being; and perceived increases in the relevance of issues of cultural identity in international politics, including human rights and religion.

The 1970s and 1980s had already witnessed some evidence of this trend. It divided American realist academics and political practitioners on the one hand and reformers staffing the Brandt, Palme, and Brundtland Commissions and European peace researchers on the other. In the case of Japan, whose power was increasing sharply in the 1980s, opinion also was divided. Did Japan's strategy of "comprehensive security" represent merely a politically convenient ruse to counter American pressure for
greater defense expenditures? Or was it a genuine political innovation that reflected the political experiences of Japan since 1945?

In a prescient article published in the early 1980s Richard Ullman made a general case for broadening the concept of security. Ullman viewed national security as more than a goal with different trade-off values in different situations. He insisted that national security is threatened by the consequences of events that quickly degrade the quality of life of state and nonstate actors alike, thus narrowing significantly the future range of political choice. But at the height of the second Cold War in the early 1980s, security specialists did not consider seriously the arguments of European peace researchers. Japanese national security policy was not an important topic. And the political climate in the early 1980s was not favorable to Ullman’s argument.

With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the political and intellectual climate has changed. In distinguishing between traditional, narrow definitions and recent, broad conceptions of security studies, Stephen Walt, Edward Kolodziej, and Barry Buzan, among others, have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security, as well as about the scope of analytical approaches and empirical domains appropriate to security studies. The narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use and control of military force by states. This contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic, social, and environmental security threats that affect not only states but also groups and individuals, as well as other nonstate actors.

Since different analytical perspectives suggest different definitions of national security, such disagreements are probably unavoidable. Those interested in the state and in traditional issues of national security tend to favor established realist and liberal approaches developed during the last decades. A new generation of scholars built on these approaches in reinvigorating the field of security studies as an intellectually challenging field of academic scholarship during the 1980s. In contrast, those interested in unconventional, broader definitions of national security—such as economic competitiveness, human rights, or human welfare—as affecting not only states but also nonstate actors tend to favor alternative analytical perspectives.

What scholars and policy makers consider to be national security issues is not fixed but varies over time. At the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, pronatalist policies were widely believed to strengthen national power and security. In the interwar period the focus on eugenics illustrated a partial shift from the quantity to the quality of population as an important measure of national power and security. And after 1945 there was a dramatic discontinuity as national elites no longer viewed population control policies as sources of national security but as sources of national well-being. To take a second example, in the case of plutonium, the very recent past has witnessed an analogous process of issue transformation. Once considered to be only a security issue, plutonium has now become an environmental issue as well. The domain of national security issues thus is variable. In the nineteenth century, the concept covered economic and social dimensions of political life that, for a variety of reasons, were no longer considered relevant when national security acquired a narrower military definition in the first half of the twentieth century, especially during the Cold War. The intellectual move to broaden the concept thus returns the field of national security studies to its own past.

This book is self-conscious in bringing together two fields of study usually kept apart. Its theoretical
stance highlights the social determinants of national security policy, but it adopts a traditional, narrow
definition of security studies. It does so despite the fact that the argument for a broadening of the field
has substantial intellectual merit and is reflected in the changing agenda of United States foreign policy
as well as in the curricula of many schools of foreign affairs.  

Why, then, does this book focus on traditional issues of national security? The main reason is a healthy
respect for the sociology of knowledge. Intellectual challenges are often disregarded because they do not
meet reigning paradigms on their preferred ground. It might have been easier to point to the limitations of
existing theories of national security by investigating some of the "new" security issues. But in all
likelihood that exercise would have been pointless. Such a challenge would be dismissed as skirting the
hard task of addressing the tough political issues in traditional security studies. This book deals with
what most scholars of national security would consider to be hard cases. It chooses political topics and
empirical domains that favor well-established perspectives in the field of national security. If the style of
analysis and the illustrative case material can establish plausibility here, it should be relatively easy to
apply this book's analytical perspective to broader conceptions of security that are not restricted to
military issues or to the state.

Existing Analytical Perspectives

Like other subfields in international relations, security studies is influenced by the major theoretical
debates in international relations. Structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as the two
dominant paradigms agree on the central importance of international anarchy for the analysis of
international politics. Even though neoliberalism to date has had little direct influence on national
security studies, indirectly, through this shared assumption, it has helped consolidate the orienting
Hobbesian framework that motivates most studies of national security.

In addition, neorealism and neoliberalism share other areas of agreement on basic theoretical
issues. Neorealist and neoliberal perspectives focus on how structures affect the instrumental
rationality of actors. Neorealists emphasize that the competitive pressure of an anarchic international
system is a constant in history; it determines important types of state behavior such as balancing. In an
interdependent world, neoliberals insist, international institutions provide an alternative structural context
in which states can define their interests and coordinate conflicting policies. But the assumption of
unified state actors and a focus on an anarchical, systemic context of states are common to both.

Kenneth Waltz's formulation of a neorealist theory has had a profound influence on the field of security
studies. Waltz's theory is explicitly structural. It argues that the international state system molds states
and defines the possibilities for cooperation and conflict. According to Waltz, the international state
system has three distinctive characteristics. It is decentralized; the most important actors--states--are
unitary and functionally undifferentiated; and differences in the distribution of the capabilities of the
most important states distinguish bipolar from multipolar state systems. Waltz is careful to specify only a
restricted domain in security affairs as relevant for neorealist theory. But within that domain
developments in international politics are driven by the balancing of differences in capabilities in the
international system.

Robert Keohane has been very influential in shaping the analytical perspective of neoliberal
institutionalism on questions of political economy and international relations. According to Keohane, international politics after hegemony does not necessarily collapse into the unmitigated power politics that realists infer from conditions of international anarchy. Instead the international order that hegemons have created through institutions can continue to ameliorate the problem of international anarchy. These institutions facilitate monitoring, enhance political transparency, reduce uncertainty, and increase policy-relevant information. The institutional infrastructure of a post-hegemonic system thus can facilitate the coordination of conflicting policies by lowering the transaction costs associated with cooperation. Neoliberals insist that conflict inheres in the international system. But that condition is not immutable. Under some political conditions, international conflict can be ameliorated through collective management.

Structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share a similar, underlying analytical framework, susceptible to the same weakness. Kenneth Waltz privileges systemic effects on national policy and sidesteps the motivations that inform policy. He argues that "neorealism contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit level explanations of traditional realism. . . . The range of expected outcomes is inferred from the assumed motivation of the units and the structure of the system in which they act." Since causes operate at different levels and interact with one another, explanations operating at either level alone are bound to be misleading. Robert Keohane concurs when he writes that "institutional theory takes states' conceptions of their interests as exogenous: unexplained within the terms of the theory. . . . Nor does realism predict interests. This weakness of systemic theory, of both types, denies us a clear test of their relative predictive power." The consequences of this shortcoming for both neorealism and neoliberalism are in Keohane's view far-reaching. "Without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate. . . . Our weak current theories do not take us very far in understanding the behavior of the United States and European powers at the end of the Cold War. . . . More research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system."

Both neorealism and neoliberalism thus express a widely accepted, though problematic, social science paradigm suggesting a three-step analysis. First, there is the specification of a set of constraints. Then comes the stipulation of a set of actors who are assumed to have certain kinds of interests. Finally, the behavior of the actors is observed, and that behavior is related to the constraining conditions in which these actors, with their assumed interests, find themselves. This perspective highlights the instrumental rationality of actors and focuses on decisions and choice.

Variants of realist and liberal perspectives do acknowledge the importance of social facts. However, in adopting economic styles of analysis, they often misunderstand concepts such as prestige and reputation, which they view as "force effects rather than as social attributions."

Robert Gilpin is one of the most important and insightful realists. He has developed a compelling argument about war and change. While he appreciates the importance of sociological insights for understanding the context of rational behavior, his book argues in an economic mode. Yet a core assumption of Gilpin's basic model embodies an unanalyzed concept of identity, the distinction between revisionist and status quo powers. And Gilpin's analysis of the international system explicitly
incorporates recognition by others, or prestige. For Gilpin this is a functional equivalent to the concept of authority in domestic politics and has functional and moral grounding. Gilpin asserts, but does not demonstrate, that "ultimately" prestige rests on military or economic power. But he writes that "prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency in international relations." Analogously, Robert Keohane is a leading neoliberal scholar favoring an economic mode of analysis. He writes that "much of my own work has deliberately adopted Realist assumptions of egoism, as well as rationality, in order to demonstrate that there are possibilities for cooperation even on Realist premises." In thinking about egoism and empathy, Keohane poses the central question of "how people and organizations define self-interest." The answer lies in the issue of identity, in variations in the degree of expansiveness and restrictiveness, with which people and organizations relate to one another. To what extent does the "self" incorporate relevant aspects of the "other" in its calculations of gains and losses? The answer to this question takes Keohane away from considerations of more or less myopic calculations of interest to "deeper" questions of values. Keohane concludes that "since the notion of self-interest is so elastic, we have to examine what this premise means, rather than simply taking it for granted." Such relational thinking falls squarely in the sociological rather than the economic mode of analysis.

Similarly, a theory of historical change popular among realists and rationalists mimics a sociological institutional perspective. Stephen Krasner, for example, gives an account of sovereignty that relies heavily on the concept of punctuated equilibrium and historical path-dependence. In this view, the social determinants that this volume analyzes are acknowledged to exist, but they are banished to a remote past or to a distant future. The big bangs in history contrast sharply with the slight tremors of the present. The social determinants that are thus admitted to exist during epochal shifts, this book claims, exist throughout history, be it heroic or mundane.

Finally, in a bold neorealist analysis of European politics after the Cold War, John Mearsheimer invokes the importance of social factors. Mearsheimer makes a case for a carefully managed process of nuclear proliferation to help stabilize an emerging war-prone, multipolar European system no longer held in check by the Soviet threat from the East and, possibly, the American night-watchman state from the West. Nuclear powers can reduce the dangers of proliferation by helping to "socialize emerging nuclear societies to understand the nature of the forces they are acquiring. Proliferation managed in this manner can help bolster peace." Similarly, Kenneth Waltz has conceded in one of his more recent writings that "systems populated by units of different sorts in some ways perform differently, even though they share the same organizing principle. More needs to be said about the status and role of units in neorealist theory."

This book relaxes the two core assumptions that mark, to different degrees, both neorealism and neoliberalism. First, what happens if, in contrast to neorealism, we conceive of the environment of states not just in terms of the physical capabilities of states? Neoliberalism has already effected this move with its focus on institutions. But its efficiency-oriented view of the role of institutions in political life is open to reinterpretation if we also relax a second assumption. What happens if, contrasting with neoliberalism, we do not focus our attention solely on the effects that institutional constraints have on interests? This perspective neglects the crucial fact that institutions can constitute, to varying degrees, the
identities of actors and thus shape their interests. Relaxing core assumptions of the two central perspectives in international relations theory, this book argues, is useful for two reasons. It may help us discern new aspects of national security. Alternatively, it may help in accounting for anomalies in existing analyses of national security.

**Cultural-Institutional Context and Political Identity**

The end of the Cold War and the issues of international politics that are emerging as central make this a propitious time for rethinking established analytical approaches to national security. This book focuses on the effects that culture and identity have on national security. The prevailing theories deliberately slight these effects. For realists, culture and identity are, at best, derivative of the distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power. For rationalists, actors deploy culture and identity strategically, like any other resource, simply to further their own self-interests.

For example, the process of German unification within multilateral frameworks illustrates well the shortcomings of realist analysis. The Bush administration did not seek to exploit the weakness of the Soviet Union through an aggressive foreign policy. It remained instead committed to the institutional innovation of multilateralism that it had brought to Europe at the end of World War II. The Soviet Union was willing to accept multilateral institutions to solve its national security problems. Germany eschewed neutralism in favor of continued membership in the Western Alliance and a deepening of the process of European integration. After a brief moment of uncertainty in December 1989 and January 1990, France, in contrast to Britain, decided in favor of European integration as the most appropriate way of dealing with the consequences of German unity. Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, nato's Cooperation Council, reinforced subsequently by the Partnership for Peace, became a forum for the discussion of security issues between the West and all Central and Eastern European states as well as all successor states of the Soviet Union except Georgia. None of these choices was automatic. None is irreversible. But the logic of balancing in a world of relative capabilities did not dictate political action in the halls of government in 1989-1990. Realism does not offer a compelling explanation of the end of the Cold War.

While neoliberalism helps us understand the importance of institutions at the end of the Cold War, it is of less use in making intelligible the central features of international politics after the Cold War. During the Cold War, it may have been reasonable to take for granted state identities, at least on the central issues of national security along the central front that divided East from West. Definitions of identity that distinguish between self and other imply definitions of threat and interest that have strong effects on national security policies. Furthermore, such definitions of identity are rarely captured adequately with the language of symbolic resources sought by self-interested actors. For most of the major states, identity has become a subject of considerable political controversy. How these controversies are resolved--for
example, in the United States, in the member states of the European Union, in Russia and the members of
the Commonwealth of Independent States, in China and in many parts of the Third World--will be of
great consequence for international security in the years ahead. In sum, recent changes in world politics
remind us that other approaches, here a perspective emphasizing social factors, are useful in sharpening
our thinking on issues that neorealism and neoliberalism slight.

**Social Determinant 1: Cultural-Institutional Context**

In sharp contrast to the realist view of the international system as a Hobbesian state of nature,
neoliberalism offers a theory of the cultural-institutional context of state action. It defines regimes as
particular combinations of principles, norms, rules, and procedures. Power shapes international
regimes. Often these regimes emerge when a hegemonic state, such as the United States after 1945,
Attempts to mold the international order to suit its interests and purposes. But international regimes do
not simply mirror power relationships. With the passing of time they acquire their own dynamic.
Regimes reduce transaction costs and thus enhance the potential for coordinating conflicting state
policies. Regimes present states with political constraints and opportunities that can substantially affect
how governments calculate their interests.

While the analysis of economic regimes has become a focus of scholarly attention, American scholars
have made relatively few attempts to apply this analytical perspective to issues of national security. In
the original volume on international regimes, Robert Jervis, for example, was very tentative in his
assessment of whether security regimes have existed since 1945. And in a subsequent essay he reached
cautious conclusions about the possibility of relatively high levels of cooperation between states
confronting a security dilemma in international politics. Other scholars have given greater weight to
cultural-institutional factors in their analyses of security regimes and the security cooperation between
the United States and the Soviet Union. In the most recent synthetic and authoritative restatement of
this line of research, Volker Rittberger has gone furthest in incorporating a prescriptive element as a
defining characteristic of a regime.

In an important article, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie have noted that these lines of
argument subscribe to a view that is too behavioralist. The dominant, neoliberal application of regime
theory captures only what in a statistical sense is "normal" about norms. But norms reflect also the
premises of action. While above a certain threshold behavioral violations invalidate norms, occasional
violations do not. Critics of neoliberal institutionalism have made this their central point. These critics
insist that social change engenders a process of self-reflection and political actions that are shaped by
collectively held norms.

Although their criticism has not been answered to date, these observers have failed to produce the
empirical research necessary to shake the rationalist and behavioral assumptions of neoliberal
theory. But this is beginning to change. For example, in the area of arms control Emanuel Adler has
relied on a sociological perspective to show how the arms control community in the United States
institutionalized its influence in government and how it subsequently diffused and institutionalized its
views in international agreements. And several scholars have investigated with interesting results the
effects of the culture of military organizations.
Self-reflection does not occur in isolation; it is communicated to others. In the process of communication norms can emerge in a variety of ways: spontaneously evolving, as social practice; consciously promoted, as political strategies to further specific interests; deliberately negotiated, as a mechanism for conflict management; or as a combination, mixing these three types. State interests and strategies thus are shaped by a never-ending political process that generates publicly understood standards for action.69

The behavioral compliance of actors with norms thus is only one part of the story, and that part must be linked to another aspect, the justifications proffered.70 This line of reasoning is a departure from neoliberal theory, but it would be a great mistake to overemphasize this difference. The most widely accepted definition of what constitutes a regime refers specifically to implicit norms.71 This definition thus grants scholars a wide measure of latitude in the type of evidence that they collect and in the methods of analysis that they rely on. Since a large amount of the scholarship on international regimes relies on qualitative case histories, the shift in analysis is not very great, so long as analysis adheres to the conventions of an empirically oriented social science.

**Social Determinant 2: Collective Identity**

International regimes are social institutions that mitigate conflict in a decentralized international society of states. But a rationalist theory of regimes factors out of its analysis the actor identities that often are consequential for the definition of actor interests. Cultural-institutional contexts do not merely constrain actors by changing the incentives that shape their behavior. They do not simply regulate behavior. They also help to constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to regulate.

International and domestic environments shape state identities.72 With the end of the Cold War, issues of collective identity have become centrally important, probably more so than the reduction in political uncertainties that inhibit agreements. For example, the shape and speed of the European integration process and the question of how that Europe will relate to the outside world is of critical political importance and has given rise to xenophobia and a new wave of nationalism. Analogous political developments are occurring in Eastern Europe, in the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in many Third World countries, and in the United States. And in Asia the intensification of efforts to create new forms of multilateralism designed to facilitate policy coordination is closely linked to contested definitions of Asian identity.

With few exceptions, neorealism also remains silent on the issue of identity--for two reasons. First, it stresses the ecological dynamics that self-selection and functional imperatives have for states. Second, neorealism seeks to distance itself from traditional realism, which did pay attention, implausibly, to human nature73 and, plausibly, to issues of national identity. Since neorealists view states as undifferentiated and unitary actors, they sidestep consideration of issues concerning the character of the state and the construction of state identities.74

The international and domestic societies in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways. The state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors.75 On this point the contrast between a sociological perspective on the one hand and neoliberalism and neorealism on the other is substantial. History is more
than a progressive search for efficient institutions that regulate property rights. And history cannot be reduced to a perpetual recurrence of sameness, conflict, and balancing. History is a process of change that leaves an imprint on state identity. In a broad historical perspective the eventual success of the national state in Western Europe should not blind us to the wide array of institutional experimentation, both domestic and international, that preceded it. Influenced by a long history of universal empires, regional kingdoms, and subcontinental empires, Asian states also differ greatly from the conventional image of unified, rational states. The historical evidence compels us to relinquish the notion of states with unproblematic identities.

The identities of states emerge from their interactions with different social environments, both domestic and international. Despite differences in theoretical formulation, the analysis of nationalism offers an important example. Ernest Gellner stresses the importance of the instrumental logic of nationalism; Benedict Anderson emphasizes that national identities are socially constructed; and Ernst Haas combines both perspectives in his discussion of nationalism as an instrumental social construction. All insist that the national identities of states are crucial for understanding politics and that they cannot be stipulated deductively. They must be investigated empirically in concrete historical settings.

The international society of states also shapes varying state identities by virtue of recognizing their legitimacy and admitting them to international organizations whose membership is often restricted only to states. Governments crave the diplomatic recognition by members of the international society of states because it bestows upon them the legitimacy they may need to secure their existence. In Africa and elsewhere, for example, sovereignty constitutes and legitimates states that are extremely weak in terms of material power. Statehood thus depends partly on position in the international society of states.

The analysis of transnational relations and of world systems offers analytical perspectives that also elucidate the relations between states and their social environments. Often the social environments that affect state identity link international and domestic environments in a way that defies the reification of distinct domestic and international spheres of politics. After 1945, for example, the institutionalization of the welfare state created a system of "embedded liberalism" based on the compromise between advocates of domestic welfare capitalism and proponents of a liberal international order. In her research on European guestworkers Yasemin Soysal has demonstrated one of the consequences of embedded liberalism for changing notions of citizenship in Western Europe. In contrast to past practice, European nation-states have become responsible for the welfare of all persons, not just citizens, living within their borders. Traditionally defined on the basis of nationality, individual rights in Western Europe are now codified into notions of universal personhood rather than nationality. This is a novel and important change in the matrix of factors affecting the international relations of Europe.

This book analyzes the effect of political identities. It views states as social actors. It analyzes political identities in specific historical contexts. And it traces the effects that changing identities have on political interests and thus on national security policies.

Neorealist and neoliberal theories adhere to relatively sparse views of the international system. Neorealism assumes that the international system has virtually no normative content. The international system constrains national security policies directly without affecting conceptions of state interest. Neoliberalism takes as given actor identities and views ideas and beliefs as intervening variables between
assumed interests and behavioral outcomes. In this view states operate in environments that create constraints and opportunities.

These analytical perspectives overlook the degree to which social environments and actors penetrate one another. The domestic and international environments of states have effects; they are the arenas in which actors contest norms and through political and social processes construct and reconstruct identities. The cultural-institutional context and the degree to which identities are constructed both vary. In some situations neorealist and neoliberal assumptions may be warranted. But these perspectives often overlook important political effects that condition international politics and thus affect issues of national security.

This book makes two analytical moves simultaneously. It stipulates a more social view of the environment in which states and other political actors operate. And it insists that political identities are to significant degrees constructed within that environment. It thus departs from materialist notions and the rationalist view of identities as exogenously given. That is, this book seeks to incorporate into the analysis of national security both the cultural-institutional context of the political environment and the political construction of identity. The empirical studies illustrate how both factors help to shape the definition of interests and thus have demonstrable effects on national security policies.

Why Bother?

Neorealism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of national security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook. Furthermore, neorealism holds forth the promise of a tight, deductive theory as the ultimate prize of theorizing about national security. Kenneth Waltz himself, however, has been very circumspect in his theoretical claims. He argues that his theory, formulated at the level of the international system, seeks to explain only the recurrence of the balancing behavior of states in history.

Neorealism is too general and underspecified to tell us anything about the direction of balancing, let alone about the content of the national security policies of states. Therefore, particular studies of national security, typically, adapt some features of Waltz's theory and, in addition, import more or less loosely clustered groups of variables from other fields (such as organization theory, comparative politics, or political psychology) and graft them onto the orienting framework that neorealism provides. The theoretical contribution of these studies lies in the formulation and testing of, at best, loosely linked hypotheses. The politically substantive and most interesting scholarship in the field is historical in nature and offers little hope of moving to a deductive style of "theory" anytime soon.

This book puts at center stage analytical concepts that the existing literature on national security acknowledges only obliquely. Some studies seek to explain aspects of national security with reference to social facts. But they tend to do so in a manner that subordinates the causal force of social facts to a materialist or rationalist view of the world. In this view, for example, identities and norms either are derivative of material capabilities or are deployed by autonomous actors for instrumental reasons. Based on the assumption that rationality is a natural rather than a constructed concept, these books view ideologies largely in the service of rational calculations.

The "myths of empires," for example, that Jack Snyder analyzes in accounting for the conditions under which great powers overexpand result from different patterns of domestic politics. While Snyder acknowledges that international factors also play a role, he argues that specific domestic coalitions
develop aggressive strategic perspectives that serve particular political interests. Elites manipulate mass publics through propaganda. In this view imperial ideologies are rationalizations for parochial interests, products that entrepreneurs sell in political markets. As Snyder writes, his theory of domestic politics roots its analysis "securely in a rational-choice framework. . . . It is more accurate to say that statesmen and societies actively shape the lessons of the past in ways they find convenient than it is to say that they are shaped by them." Snyder acknowledges in passing that the "blowback" of propaganda, the blurring of the line between "fact and fiction . . . sincere beliefs and tactical argument," entraps political leaders not only in their own confusions but in the political context that they helped create. But since this aside cuts against Snyder's rationalist interpretation of ideology, it remains one underdeveloped page in a long theoretical essay. Sociologists and cultural historians are likely to demur by insisting that "blowback is big."

Stephen Walt's theory of balance of threat shows a similar theoretical inclination. As is true of Snyder's work, Walt's threat theory is not a minor modification of neorealism but a substantial departure from it. While Walt continues to subscribe to realism as an orienting framework, his emphasis on threat perception moves away from the systemic level and shifts analysis from material capabilities to ideational factors. Walt views ideology as a variable that competes with others for explanatory power. But balance-of-threat theorizing poses an obvious question about the importance of ideology in the threat perceptions of states. If one views ideology as a system of meaning that affects the definition of threat, then Walt's conclusions may warrant further investigation, for the cost calculations that states make when they weigh ideological solidarity against security concerns are not exogenous to their ideological affinities.

James March and Johan Olsen, among others, have elaborated this view in an often neglected chapter of their much-cited book. Ideologies, norms, and identities do not simply serve instrumental purposes. March and Olsen argue that obligatory action contrasts with consequential action. Behavior is shaped not only by goals, alternatives, and rules of maximization or satisficing central to rationalist models of politics. Behavior is shaped also by roles and norms that define standards of appropriateness. Improvisation and strategic behavior are embedded in a social environment that constitutes the identity of the actors and their interests and that shapes the norms that also help to define their interests. "Political processes are as much concerned with managing interpretations and creating visions as they are with clarifying decisions. . . . We are led to a perspective that challenges the first premise of many theories of politics, the premise that life is organized around choice. Rather, we might observe that life is not only, or primarily, choice but also interpretation." Applied to questions of national security, the work of Elizabeth Kier on strategic culture offers a compelling application of that general perspective. In a landmark study, Barry Posen, for example, developed sophisticated arguments that link the preference of military organizations for offensive doctrines to the functional needs of military organizations--specifically their wish to control resources, to be autonomous from civilian interference, and to enhance the social prestige of military officers. Kier has reexamined existing explanations of the choice of offensive and defensive military doctrines by military leaders, investigated fully the historical evidence, carefully evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of alternative explanations, and come to an unambiguous conclusion: military organizations do not have an inherent preference for offensive doctrines. One cannot deduce the interests of the military from either the functional needs of the military or the international balance of power. Instead, the political preferences for offensive or
defensive doctrines of different branches of the military reflect organizational interests. And these must be understood within the context of specific organizational cultures, which are themselves nested in broader political-military cultures distinctive of the politics of different states.

A perspective that emphasizes obligatory action does not have to deny consequential action and the importance of the instrumental political use of norms and identities. For example, moral entrepreneurs who manipulate ideas, John Mueller and Ethan Nadelmann argue in different projects, have had important effects on how elites and mass publics view the institution of war and a variety of state policies combating acts such as piracy, slavery, counterfeiting of national currencies, hijacking of aircraft, trafficking in women and children for purposes of prostitution, and trading in drugs. As these examples make clear, empirical research on national security needs to evaluate the competing claims of both obligatory and consequentialist perspectives.

This book makes its main analytical move at the level of an orienting framework that privileges social factors. Contrasting analytical claims are best articulated in the form of specific hypotheses that are applied in particular empirical domains. This is the strategy that the empirical essays in this volume follow. It is on the ground of evidence that we have the best chance of intellectually engaging contrasting analytical perspectives that differ on questions of ontology, epistemology, and methodology.

For particular research questions in specific situations it may be sensible to conceive of states as actors with unproblematic identities that balance and bandwagon or conduct their political business in institutions that lower transaction costs. But for many research questions and in many situations we must capture additional factors to explain problematic aspects of national security policies.

The effort to test sociological, culture-based explanations against economic, interest-based explanations centers on identifying and describing problems overlooked by existing scholarship and specifying the social factors, here state identity and the cultural-institutional context, that shape conceptions of actor interest and behavior. Some essays in this book view the context of states and governments as more permeated by social facts than is typical of most scholarship on national security. Other essays focus on the problematic nature of the identity of states and governments. While the individual essays privilege one or the other aspect in their empirical research, the book as a whole makes both moves simultaneously. In this view the crucial question is not to establish whether interests prevail over identities and norms or whether identities and norms prevail over interests. What matters is how identities and norms influence the ways in which actors define their interests in the first place.

Essay 2 explicates more fully the theoretical approach, with its dual focus on cultural-institutional context and identity. It compares that approach to others in the analysis of international and domestic politics; it makes some basic conceptual distinctions; finally, drawing on the individual case studies as well as other literature, it reviews the effects of culture and identity on interests and national security policy.

Part 1 focuses on the cultural-institutional context in which states and governments define their interests and act. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman analyze in essay 3 the effects that norms of military prowess have on some of the weapons procurement policies of states. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, in essay 4, analyze the historical evolution in norms of the non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons. In essay 5 Martha Finnemore examines the effects of changing norms on patterns of military intervention. She shows how shifts in understandings about the reasons to intervene and the means of intervening have
changed the modalities of national security policies. In essay 6 Elizabeth Kier analyzes the effects of the organizational culture of the French military on the evolution of offensive and defensive military doctrine. Finally, in essay 7 Alastair Johnston argues that China's national security policy in the Maoist period resulted from a "hard" strategic culture of parabellum, a quintessentially constructed worldview, rather than from the condition of international anarchy. What unites these essays and sets them apart from related inquiries is their detailed attention to the effects of the cultural-institutional context on national security policies.

Part 2 analyzes how constructed, collective identities of political actors, such as states or governments, affect their interests and policies. In essay 8 Robert Herman traces the political process by which cosmopolitan reformers in the Soviet Union articulated and put into practice newly invented or rediscovered notions of a "Western" Soviet Union, thus helping to end the Cold War. Thomas Berger, in essay 9, deals with Germany and Japan as two instances in which collective identities have been deeply transformed by the effects of World War II in a political process marked by political contestation and historical contingency. In essay 10, Thomas Risse-Kappen examines the changing identities that help define changing security communities among liberal democracies in the North Atlantic area. And Michael Barnett, in essay 11, examines the effects of contested and changing identities on security policy, both in an Arab nation increasingly divided and between the United States and Israel.

The essays in parts 1 and 2 span domestic and international levels of analysis as well as national, regional, and global political contexts. They engage the present as well as the past. They deal with Western and non-Western states operating at different levels of development. But this diversity in empirical application conceals a unity of theoretical purpose. All these essays specify a political outcome or set of outcomes that is central to students of national security. And all of them either derive a plausible set of expectations from existing theories that do not address their question or offer a plausible explanation derived from existing analytical perspectives that they test against a preferred culture- or identity-based explanation.

The two essays in part 3 conclude the volume. In essay 12, Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro deal with the origins and consequences of norms and identities. Their analysis connects this book back to a set of intellectual concerns that distinguish a number of current approaches. In the interest of mapping directions for future work, they seek also to impose greater specification of variables and causal patterns. And they point to gaps and oversights in this book's approach and findings. Finally, essay 13 considers some recent realist and liberal writings that are trying to grapple with the issues of culture and identity raised in this book; it summarizes the approach, hypotheses, and main findings of the empirical essays and explores further some of the issues raised in them; it points to a broader research agenda for national security studies; and it concludes with a discussion of the implications of this book's perspective for the role of the United States in a changing world.

This book argues that we should not take for granted what needs to be explained: the sources and content of national security interests that states and governments pursue. A focus on political identity and the cultural-institutional context, this book claims, offers a promising avenue for elucidating the changing contours of national security policy.
Workshops at the University of Minnesota and Stanford University in 1994; and Emanuel Adler, Thomas Christensen, James Goldgeier, Peter Haas, Gunther Hellmann, Ronald Jepperson, Mary F. Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Jonathan Kirshner, Atul Kohli, Charles Kupchan, John Odell, Judith Reppy, Shibley Telhami, Stephen Walt, Alexander Wendt, and two anonymous readers for Columbia University Press.

Note 1: Although, properly speaking, I am referring to state security, I am adhering to the conventional usage in the field of national security studies. Back.


Note 8: John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in Albert Bergesen,

**Note 9:** This is a major difference between the inspiration motivating this book and Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, eds., *Reconstructing Realpolitik* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). Back.


**Note 11:** I argue below that this is no particular liability for the approach chosen for the book; no such theory exists in the field of national security studies. Back.

**Note 12:** One of the main difficulties in making the sociological approach of this book attractive for scholars of national security lies in the intuitive equation of the concept of norm with morality. The book focuses primarily on the analysis of regulatory norms (defining standards of appropriate behavior) and constitutive norms (defining actor identities). It touches less directly on evaluative norms (stressing questions of morality) or practical norms (focusing on commonly accepted notions of "best solutions"). See also various essays in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1993). Back.


**Note 14:** This distinction between the cognitive and evaluative effects of norms is also made by scholars working from within a cognitive paradigm. See, for example, Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System*, p. 235 (Boulder: Westview, 1980). Back.


Note 23: Proponents on either side of the debate agree that much would be lost, and little gained, if broader security studies were compressed into the well-developed, narrower focus of strategic studies; Walt, "Renaissance of Security Studies," p. 213; Buzan, "The Case for a Comprehensive Definition," pp.
Note 24: Why these are the lines of division is not entirely clear. It is possible that nonstate actors and issues that touch less directly on the balance of material capabilities lend themselves perhaps more easily to the sociological perspectives that this book proffers. Back.

Note 25: I would like to thank John Meyer for drawing my attention to this analytical point and these examples. Back.


Note 27: Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview, 1989), p. 6, for example, writes that the "causal impact of international institutions on state policy is not as strong as that of states on international institutions." But in contrast to realist thought, this version of liberalism focuses on deception rather than violence as the most important consequence of international anarchy. Back.

Note 28: Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 313-44; Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics 46, no. 2 (January 1994): 209-34; Michael Zürn, "We Can Do Much Better! Aber muss es auf amerikanisch sein? Zum Vergleich der Disziplin 'Internationale Beziehungen' in den USA und in Deutschland," Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 1, no. 1 (June 1994): 98-109. Grouping different theoretical formulations under these two broad headings is a simplification. Each theory has a major and a minor variant. Neorealists have sought to systematize the insights of traditional realists. And neoliberals distinguish themselves from traditional liberals. Although not unimportant, these differences pale compared with the combined impact that the two main variants, neorealism and neoliberalism, have had on international relations scholarship since the early 1980s. Hence I discuss them here. The first part of the concluding essay examines briefly some attempts of reformulating realist and liberal perspectives to address the issues that this book raises. For some important differences between realism and liberalism, see also Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, pp. 1-20, and the discussion in Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 1-17. Back.


Note 30: This book's approach differs from Waltz's along all three dimensions. First, the international society of states is distinguished by both organizational decentralization and elements of a shared culture. Second, states are not unitary and functionally differentiated. Third, the distribution of capabilities and the number of poles may be less important than some of the effects of the society of states. An additional important difference lies in the fact that the recurrent balancing behavior of states that interests Waltz is of little concern to any of the authors writing in this volume. Some of them are interested in the direction of the balance, others in a variety of aspects of national security policy. A set of essays in two special


**Note 34:** Ibid., p. 42. Back.


**Note 36:** Ibid., pp. 294-95. Back.


**Note 40:** Ibid., pp. 10-11. Randall Schweller's interesting paper on neorealism illustrates the same point; see Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996) (in press). "Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the avoidance of relative-gains losses, are the prime movers of neorealist theory" (ibid., p. 36 of manuscript). Back.


**Note 42:** Ibid., pp. 30-31. Back.


**Note 44:** Ibid., p. 228. Back.

**Note 45:** Ibid., p. 236. Back.
Note 46: Keohane writes further: "A complete analysis of regimes would have to show how international regimes could change as a result not of shifts in the allegedly objective interests of states, or in the power distributions and institutional conditions facing governments, but of changes in how people think about their interests, including the possibility that they may be interested in the welfare of others, both from empathy and from principle" (ibid.). In the early 1980s Keohane suggested that a different, sociological line of argument about regimes would be possible, whereby norms would be "internalized" by actors as part of their utility functions; see Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, p. 154 n. 27 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). But his subsequent work has continued to draw almost exclusively on economic imagery and has followed a rationalist path. See also Robert O. Keohane, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint," in Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, eds., Gender and International Relations, pp. 41-50 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). This paper clearly recognizes feminism's sociological orientation toward the articulation of an "institutional vision of international relations" (p. 44) and calls for an "alliance between two complementary critiques of neorealism," neoliberal institutionalism and feminism (p. 47). Back.


Note 48: I am indebted to John Meyer for drawing my attention to this point. Back.


Note 51: One should note here that neoliberalism and institutional economics have been notably unsuccessful in measuring transaction costs, an opaque concept at best that is central to an understanding of how institutions work. Back.


Note 56: This is a simplifying assumption, not an empirical claim. State identities are always politically reproduced and contested. Furthermore, context makes a difference. The Cold War may have had a large effect on state identities in Europe. But this does not mean that it necessarily did so, for example, in the Third World. Back.


Note 59: Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, pp. 58-79. Although these are two widely cited papers, it should be noted that Jervis was not writing from an unambiguous, neoliberal perspective. His analysis neglects cultural-institutional factors and rests largely on changes in the payoffs of different policies as well as on institutional features that increase transparency and warning time. Back.


Note 63: This leads to an important set of analytical distinctions that could be further clarified, relying on Goldstein and Keohane's taxonomy of three types of beliefs; see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, pp. 8-11 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). "World views" and "principled beliefs" are publicly held and have behavioral implications; they are "intersubjective." "Causal beliefs" can be held privately and do not necessarily make claims on behavior; they are "cognitive." Back.


Back.


Note 88: Walt is very explicit in arguing that balancing in inter-Arab relations is atypical. While states typically "seek to counter threats by adding the power of another state to their own . . . in the Arab world the most important source of power has been the ability to manipulate one's own image and the image of one's rivals in the minds of other Arab elites" (ibid., p. 149). Back.

Note 89: In a second book, Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), Walt extends this analytical move from international threat perceptions to domestic threat perceptions. He argues that revolutions affect threat perceptions through miscalculation, hostility, perception of offensive power, and uncertainty--that is, through four different psychological mechanisms. Back.

Disziplin 'Internationale Beziehungen' in Deutschland" Zeitschrift fŸr Internationale Beziehungen 1, no. 1 (June 1994): 82-83. Taken on Walt's terms, his analysis of ideology also fails to convince at times. He appears to be bent on arguing the case against the importance of ideology, especially for the superpowers, either by imposing excessively rigid definitional criteria or by coding decisions of cases that are not compelling. For example, as noted in Douglas J. MacDonald's review in Journal of Politics 51, no. 3 (August 1989): 795-98, Walt's restrictive definitional criteria of left-wing ideological adherence (p. 186) preclude coding the support of "united front" movements by the Soviet Union as alliances based on ideological considerations. And the ideologically close relations between the United States and Israel are simply argued away by referring to Israel as a "welfare-state theocracy" that has little ideological affinity with the United States (p. 200). Maybe so. But as Michael Barnett argues in this book, U.S.-Israeli relations became much more problematic in the late 1980s when some segments of the American public began to doubt that Israel was still behaving like an essentially like-minded parliamentary democracy.  


Note 92: Kier, Imagining War. Back.


The Culture of National Security