Pragmatism and International Relations

Edited By Gunther Hellmann
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University

Beliefs as Rules for Action:
Pragmatism as a Theory of Thought and Action

Gunther Hellmann
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University

When Stanley Hoffmann characterized International Relations (IR) as an “American Social Science,” the America he referred to mainly stood for two things: a world power in search of a broader intellectual grounding of its newfound role in world politics and a country with many huge political science departments highly receptive to the wave of mostly European immigrants “all concerned with transcending empiricism” (Hoffmann [1977] 1987:9). However, it was not the America of pragmatism, that is, that tradition of thought which is widely regarded as the most genuinely American philosophical tradition in the first place (Joas 1992:7–15, 96–113). Rather, it was an America associated with the “exact sciences” and the epistemological foundations derived from logical empiricism on the one hand, and political realism on the other—both of which were, at their very core, as “European” as can be. Ever since the often dualistic “isms” debates of the discipline (idealism versus realism, rationalism versus constructivism, etc.) have largely been void of any reference to the quintessential American “ism.” Only recently has there been a rising interest in pragmatism.

While this is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the possible causes of the resurgent interest in pragmatism, a pointer at two connected factors may be allowed. The first relates to the disturbances in international politics in the aftermaths of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1989/1990 and the terrorist attacks on the twin towers in September 2001. The second has to do with an increasing appreciation in IR of an internal perspective on such real world developments—that is, a perspective which tries to understand how individual and collective actors make sense of such occurrences. Such a turn to an internal (or reconstructive) perspective—as opposed to an external (or explanatory) perspective has accompanied, among others, the rise of “constructivism” and “postmodernism” in general and the refinement of a diverse set of “discursive” approaches in particular. This confluence of real world developments and disciplinary shifts provided an extremely fertile soil for the rediscovery of the much older tradition of pragmatism. This is due to the fact that pragmatism promises to steer a clear course between the Scylla of eternal repetition without any
sensorium for novelty (positivism) and the Charybdis of aloof criticism without a sufficiently strong grounding in everyday real-life problems (postmodernism).

Pragmatism’s attractiveness stems, at least in part, from its anti-‘‘istic’’ disposition. In contrast to other “paradigms” or “research programs” in IR, it does not lend itself as easily to paradigmatic treatment (cf. Lapid 1989). Richard Bernstein suggested that pragmatism ought to be thought of as a tradition in the sense of a “narrative of an argument” which is “only recovered by an argumentative retelling of that narrative which will itself be in conflict with other argumentative retellings.” In this view, the history of pragmatism has not only been a conflict of narratives “but a forteriori, a conflict of metanarratives” (Bernstein 1995:54). Thus, whereas many Realists, Liberals, or Constructivists are keen on building research programs, most pragmatists abstain from such endeavors (and the paradigmatic battles that necessarily accompany fights over the true core), not least because most of them sympathize with Richard Rorty’s plea for “liberal irony.” As “liberal ironists” accept the contingency of language, they are also accepting the impossibility of reaching any such things as a “final vocabulary” (Rorty 1989:73–95). As this forum shows, the very diverse recourse to different pragmatist themes that social philosophers such as Richard Bernstein, Jürgen Habermas (1999:7–64), Hilary Putnam (1987, 1995), Richard Rorty (1982, 1998), and Nicholas Rescher (1995) note with regard to philosophical debates, also shows up in the reception of pragmatism in IR.1

In the spirit of this diversity in recovering the pragmatist tradition, one way to claim a distinctive accent is to present pragmatism as a coherent theory of thought and action (Hellmann 2009). “Theory” is synonymous here with “doctrine” or “axiom”—a belief held to be true, or, more pragmatically still, a tool to think about thought and action which is held to enable us to cope better. The core of this theory is the primacy of practice—“perhaps the central” principle of the pragmatist tradition (Putnam 1995:52; emphasis in original). According to this principle, the inevitability of individual as well as collective action is to be thought of as the necessary starting point of any theorizing about thought and action. Most social action is habitualized. As William James put it, our beliefs live “on a credit system.” They “pass,’ so long as nothing challenges them” (James [1907] 1995:80). Yet as we cannot flee from interacting with our environment and as the world keeps interfering with our beliefs, we have to readjust. In such “problematic situations,” a (very practical) form of “inquiry” helps us to find appropriate new ways of coping with the respective problems at hand. Experience (that is, past thoughts and actions of ourselves as well as others), expectation (that is, intentions as to desired future states of the world we act in as well as predictions as to likely future states), and creative intelligence merge in producing a new belief (Dewey [1938] 1991:41–47, 105–122, 248–251; see also Jackson in this forum). The shorthand which many pragmatists have used to express this interplay is that beliefs are rules for action (Peirce [1878] 1997:33; James [1907] 1995:18).

This very condensed version of the core of pragmatism has far-reaching consequences. The view that a belief is a habit of action implies, among other things, that all anyone can have (and needs to have) is his or her own point of view. As a matter of fact this “insistence on the agent point of view” is just another way of expressing the primacy of practice and the “epistemology” that follows from it: “If we find that we must take a certain point of view, use a certain conceptual system,’ when we are engaged in practical activity, in the widest sense of ‘practical activity,’ then we must not simultaneously advance the claim that it is

---

1See in addition to the contributions of this forum, Puchala 1995; Kratochwil 2007; Katzenstein and Sil 2008; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009. See also the plea by Adler and Pouliot 2008 for a “practice turn” which picks up many themes of pragmatism as well.
not really ‘the way things are in themselves’” (Putnam 1987:70) From Dewey onwards, pragmatists have rejected the “spectator theory of knowledge” which Putnam alludes to here—that is, the view that our beliefs do (or can) somehow “correspond” to some reality “out there.” No doubt: we have to cope with reality, but to do so successfully, our beliefs do not have to “correspond” to it. For pragmatists, beliefs are not to be thought of as “a kind of picture made out of mind-stuff” which represents reality. Rather they are “tools for handling reality” (Rorty 1991:118). Most importantly our beliefs are tools which depend in a fundamental way on language. Thus, Dewey properly called language “the tool of tools” (Dewey [1925] 1981:134) directly following on Charles Sanders Peirce, the very first exponent of what later became to be known as the “linguistic turn” (Rorty [1967] 1992). For pragmatists, Peirce’s famous line about man being thought (my language is the sum total of myself; for a man is the thought; Peirce [1868] 2000:67) had in many ways foreshadowed an obvious solution to a philosophical debate which had dominated for centuries (and continues to do so in some quarters even now). Rather than positioning themselves on either side in the debate on “realism” versus “antirealism” pragmatists reject the very distinction as it relies misleadingly on an understanding of truth as accurate representation. Yet as Donald Davidson convincingly argued “beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing. It is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking there are representations that engenders intimations of relativism” (Davidson [1998] 2002:46). The radical conclusion after having gotten rid (with Quine and Davidson) of all three “dogmas of empiricism,” then, is that language is a tool for coping with the world rather than for representing reality or for finding truth. Moreover, as is the case with any kind of tool, languages are “made rather than found” (Rorty 1989:7). Just as the craftsperson may have to adapt his or her tools in dealing with new types of tasks so human beings in general are always dependent on coming up with new descriptions for new situations to cope adequately. Yet neither these descriptions nor the vocabularies on which they are based are “out there.” Rather, descriptions are the result of the intelligent use of words and vocabularies which have been invented and adapted in a gradual process of collective habituation. As Markus Kornprobst argues in this forum, the use of analogies or metaphors is a particularly good illustration of this point.

In this sense, methods provide the central tools for science (which Dewey defined as “the perfected outcome of learning”). Two points are worth emphasizing in this context. First, as Dewey put it, “never is method something outside of the material.” Rather, good scholarship (as “methodized” inquiry) is characterized by making intelligent connections between subject matter and method. As there is always a danger of methods becoming “mechanized and rigid, mastering an agent instead of being powers at command for his own ends,” the scholar has to strike a proper balance between proven techniques based on prior experience with similar problems on the one hand and innovation based on the novelty (or “problematicness”) of the problem at hand on the other. “Cases are like, not identical.” Therefore, existing methods, “however authorized they may be, have to be adapted to the exigencies of particular cases” (all quotes from Dewey [1916] 2008; see also Sil in this forum).

Second, the central role attached to methods as tools for problem-solving also has implications with regard to two other key concepts usually addressed as a sort of trinity in elaborating one’s position vis-à-vis science and scholarship, that is, ontology and epistemology. Pragmatism, in essence, dispenses with both. The “question of ontology”—that is, the question of “what exists” (Wendt 1999:22)—which scientific realists, among others, consider to be of central importance, does not arise for pragmatists simply because an “as if” assumption usually suffices to deal with those aspects of reality (for example, an “international
system’ or a ‘state’), which we cannot observe directly. Consequently, an ‘ontological grounding’ of science is only worrisome if one had reason to worry about ‘the really real’ (Rorty 1991:52). Pragmatists see none. The state is experienced as ‘real’ when I pay taxes or refuse to go to war for it. Thus, establishing intersubjective understandings as to how to deal successfully with reality is all that is needed. This is another way of describing what pragmatists view as ‘knowledge’: The quality of a certain description of reality (in terms of specific conceptual distinctions and choices of vocabularies) will show in its consequences when we act upon it. Knowledge in this sense is, as Wittgenstein has argued, ‘in the end based on acknowledgement’ (Wittgenstein 1975:§378).

The ‘question of epistemology’ similarly dissolves as the answer to it is the same one which pragmatists give to the question of action: you settle for a belief (as a rule for action) through inquiry. Thinking and acting are two sides of the same coin. The question of how people think would become a problem only if there were a problem with the way people think. But, as Louis Menand has pointedly put it, ‘pragmatists don’t believe there is a problem with the way people think. They believe there is a problem with the way people think they think’—that is, they believe that alternative ‘epistemologies’ which separate thought and action are mistaken as they create misleading conceptual puzzles. In dissolving the question of epistemology in the context of a unified theory of thought and action pragmatism therefore ‘unhitches’ human beings from ‘a useless structure of bad abstractions about thought’ (Menand 1997:xi).

In this reading of pragmatism, what remains is the question of methodology—as a question about methods. As the contributions of Friedrichs, Jackson, Rytövuori-Apunen, and Sil in this forum show, there is room for debate even among pragmatists as to what it may mean to focus on methods/methodology rather than ontology and epistemology. Peircians are more inclined than Jamesians or Rortyans to accept the notion that there is a difference between everyday problem-solving and scientific problem-solving. ‘Abduction,’ for instance, Peirce’s invention of a method of reasoning which rejects the dichotomous distinction between induction versus deduction and relies instead crucially on a processual merger of creativity, experimentation, testing and adaptation is conceptualized differently by Friedrichs and Rytövuori-Apunen. Yet both agree at least implicitly that abductive reasoning provides for a distinctive (scientific) methodology. I am more inclined to side with Rorty on this issue who argues that ‘abduction’ names something that everybody does all the time.” Rather than drawing a strong distinction between science and non-science, Rorty argues, ‘what enables scientists to solve problems is what Kuhn called ‘initiation into a disciplinary matrix,’ rather than the application of ‘standards of rationality’” (Rorty 2005:138). Yet, this is merely one of those multiple ways of recovering what is indeed a very rich tradition promising novel answers to contemporary questions, American or non-American.

Abstractive Observation as the Key to the 
“Primacy of Practice”

HELENA RYTÖVUORI-APUNEN

University of Tampere

In the field of IR, one sign of “science” is that the prevailing modes of reasoning are deductive and inductive, which are two variations of the scientific syllogism. The systemic approach, in particular, by which researchers for half a century have pursued intellectual control of a worldwide domain, has emphasized
this binary logic of reasoning. The presentation of propositions, either deductively as theoretical ideas or inductively as probability hypotheses, has dominated the concept of research. If we want to deepen our disciplinary self-understanding, the implications must be seen in a frame broader than methodology. In an earlier article (Rytövuori-Apunen 2005), I have argued that the disciplinary deep structure, which explains tradition in IR, can be adequately described by what Stephen Toulmin (1990) calls a theory-centered comportment to knowing, and that this approach also shows in the more recent approaches, which have abandoned the idea of theory testing. Thus, the binary logic of inference is an epistemic feature, which is part of a wider modernist frame of knowing. The main part of critical IR, too, follows this tradition and shows the primacy of theory over practice (of structure over process and of language over speech). ²

My next step is to argue that pragmatism presents a profound critique of the theory-centered mainstream. It reconnects the de-contextualized (theory-centered) knowledge with life-practices. The point I would like to make is that C. S. Peirce’s abduction offers a logic by which to realize this critical interpretation. It is not possible if abduction is considered in terms of the binary logic. Thus, my interpretation parts from Friedrichs, who interprets abduction as the concept which represents reasoning “at an intermediate level” between deduction and induction (see pp. 645–648 in this forum). While his contribution deals with the question of developing an epistemic convention—more specifically with the rules of acceptance of a hypothesis—I concentrate on the examination of the ground of proposing a hypothesis or an idea. I offer my interpretation as a way to understand the “primacy of practice.”

We may start by saying that abduction is a logic to analyze and interpret the context of inventions and initial propositions. But “context” is not to be understood in the finalist sense of restoration of something given. Abduction is a mode of inference which makes questioning about reasoning possible from a practical point of view. Basic to the inference is a triadic logic of signification, which operates with three categories, which Peirce calls firstness, secondness, and thirdness. For Peirce, logic was something much more comprehensive than the formal logic, which the modernist concept of knowing prioritizes. Presuming that our field—IRs or IS—is aimed at producing propositions about reality (rather than studying mere ideas and intellectual conceptions), the application relevant for us focuses on observation. It leads us to Peirce’s sentimental realism. In this connection, the three categories refer to the iconic, indexical, and symbolic dimensions of sign relations (Peirce 1986; CP (2), bk. 2, chs. 2 and 3, PM 1992). They compose a logic to question how the irritation of doubt concerning some given reality-claims arises from experience. Experience is understood as a totality and interpreted in the three dimensions. It includes professional knowledge and other life-practices.

I will try to illustrate the three categories in ways relevant in IR. A predominantly iconic reality is about character and qualitative possibility. An example is the argument, according to which staying outside some singular event—say, a military operation—is to stay outside an entire community (“democratic states,” “the west,” etc.). The event (the operation as a series of events) is an iconic sign of the community when the community is argued to “exist” in or by it. By contrast, indexical signs exist independently of interpretation. A bullet-size hole in a skull indicates that the person has been shot, but the hole is there independently of any interpretation. The indexical dimension of the sign presupposes epistemic realism, but it does not propose any determinate external reality. It denotes the “force” by which

²Examples range from poststructuralist approaches (Ashley) to the uses of speech act theory as a taxonomic framework (Onuf) and explanations of the emergence of “spaces of meaning” (Laidi). Also constructivism in IR (Wendt) soon took a theory-centered turn. More in Rytövuori-Apunen (2005).
actual reality, unlike mere quality and nominalist convention, resists our will and has effects which we cannot modify by modifying linguistic practices. Military records may register killed “enemy combatants,” but the convention (linguistic and professional) is violated if “being armed” is not a proposition, which can be reasoned with “indexical” evidence. Such reasoning is much more complicated, if the enemy is, say, a “poppy grower.” (For one thing, labor and ownership need not coincide.) These are pressing questions, because the “first-hand” information of events, which media, too, relies on, is in most cases received through communications networks. This means that idea and convention (including linguistic and professional codes) weigh heavily in the process of significiation. The door is left open for interpretations in which any body may appear as a (primarily iconic) sign of military success and power, for example.

The third category, the symbolic sign, is based on conventional agreement and, by contrast to the iconic sign, has a real reference. A flag is a symbol of a political entity, and the word (flag) is a symbol of a piece of cloth. The UN or NATO flag on a vehicle in a conflict area suggests that the international community symbolized by the respective organization is “real” on the ground. According to Peirce’s pragmatist (a term he coined in criticism of Dewey’s instrumentalist concept) conditions of truth, the reality-claim is justified, if it is causally related (through mental causation or implied consequences) to some potential regularity of action, which can form a habit. In place of the vehicle with the flag, we can think of agents and policies as the things which are (what they are) in the regularities of their operations or habits. Man, the state, and war (and objects of nature, too) exist to us in the effects that they might conceivably bear on our acting, the experiences we expect and the conduct we recommend. The (anticipatory) regularity of these practical bearings, in its law-likeness, is the pragma which, in interpretation, gives unity to instances of social praxis.

On the basis of the above, it is clear that instrumentalist approaches, which concentrate on social problem-solving, cut off “experience” in the pragmatist sense. Such instrumentalism has not had much influence in the IR mainstream. We can rather find clues about a more comprehensive approach to experience. The classical realists (Morgenthau, Aron) may have had the unity of praxis in mind when they dealt with the practices denoted by the “soldier” and the “diplomat,” and the agenda focused on “practices” has greatly expanded since then. For the field threatened by dispersion through explosion of its research agenda, the pragmaticist logic of interpretation provides means to open up new and sufficiently broad avenues of disciplinary communication. In the epistemic-ontological sense, the three categories correspond to phenomenological, deictic (the dimension of “proof”), and discursive grounds of interpretation. That is, the logic brings together existential, objectivist, and community-based knowing and offers us a means to analyze the relative weight of each in our disciplinary practices. As the triadic logic combines mimesis (creative imagination) and proved experience, it provides a means to solve the problem of the epistemic void, in which the rejection of empiricist practices in critical IR has left the field. I have in mind the epistemic idealism, which applications of the linguistic “turn” have nourished when semantic structures have been taken for what words do in social practices. Peirce’s epistemic realism requires that propositions about reality must be examined (at least thought) in their relations of accommodation with the facts the effects of which are not malleable by what we think and speak of them. This is what is usually
meant by the primacy of practice in the sense of Peirce. The main disciplinary context, in which this discussion has been carried out, is analytic philosophy. In this connection, the focus on practice relates to the question of how verification differs from the empiricist concept. While this discussion merits recognition, it remains philosophically specific for the purposes of IR. I would like to emphasize that the considerations about a pragmatist “turn” in IR give an opportunity to reflect on the possible applications of Peirce’s inquiry in a more comprehensive sense of its triadic logic.

In relation to the discipline’s theory-centered mainstream, the logic of abduction helps us examine how the launch of an inference with law-like associations is prepared in abstractive observation before it gets on its orbit of deductive and inductive inference in the binary logic of scientific explanation. In the context of reasoning (argumentative discourse), this means asking how the irritation of doubt, which arises from dissatisfaction with previous ways of knowing, appears in the existential, habitual, and conventional mode of questioning, and which of the modes is primary. In the knowledge practices of IR, the conventional mode is predominant. It is even embodied in the conception of the discipline as competing frameworks. The “inter-paradigm” debate is a paradigmatic example. Standard textbooks introduce IR as a set of schools, and “epistemic community” is one more notion about the field as competing conventions. The problematic thing is that reliance on convention means that truth claims must be ultimately justified in a nominalist manner. The reality of IR is framed with concepts which express disciplinary conventions (power and interdependence, anarchy and hierarchy, neoliberal institutionalist and structural realist frameworks, and so on). Empiricist methodologies examine the empirical support of theories and conceptual frameworks, but they do not question the nominalist practices as such.

The problem with the predominance of convention, which leaves to the side individual (authentic) experience and the pragmaticist test of reality, is that it results in privileged domains of knowledge and alienation from the concerns of our immediate life-experience. Abduction deals with this problem by recognizing individual sensation in knowing. It argues that nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing definitions, that is, by restricting the intellectual operation to the deductive and inductive modes of inference, because in these cases the possible knowledge is already included in the premises. Framing reality with the conventional concepts of IR theory represents such a definitional approach, which can violate authentic experience. For example, from the point of view of Finnish habitual experience, it is of little relevance to argue, following Adler (2008), that practices of cooperative security, such as those of post-Cold War NATO (note the clue about abstraction), are linked to the spread of self-restraint subjectivity through the mechanisms of cognitive evolution. In Finland, the habitual modes of solving problems of security already emphasize practices of self-restraint. This situation has its background in the existential experience of living next to a much larger power, that is, Russia. While “habitual” denotes the regularities of individual life experiences (such as the experience of World War II), “existential” means that the neighborhood of Russia is part of the Finnish self-constitution. That is, it is effective through historical memory and imagination also in those interpretations in which Russia is not actual and present in the indexical sense of some concrete “traces” of action. Today, like during the decades which preceded and followed World War I, the political discourse in Finland frequently presents the country as the cultural and political outpost of the “west” against evil things from the “east” (authoritarian government, criminality, etc.). Apunen (2008) and Kangas (2007) elucidate the habitual and existential grounds of Finnish foreign policies by examining how the Finnish and Russian political characters appear in relations of mutual constitution in the Finnish discourse during historical periods of transition.
The effects (meaning) of “living next to” can be examined also by focusing on the social rules and law-like practices, which are operative in society and hence have their own conventional basis to question the policy schemes and theoretical interpretations, which may be handed down to them. The efforts to establish environmental cooperation on the communal levels in the Baltic Sea area during the ideological polarization of the Cold War provide an illustration (Rytövuori-Apunen 1980). Similar situations appear when sanction policies imposed upon communities on two sides of a border frustrate regular interaction. The conflict, as it is presented on the macro level of relations between political entities, may not be recognized on the micro levels in the same way. Finnish discussion on foreign and security policies provides further illustration of the critical interpretation I have in mind. As an EU member state, Finland participates in the common European policies, and these—although much in spe—have replaced the previous mechanisms of the bilateral relationship with the eastern neighbor. Conventional macro level arguments such as those saying that multilateral cooperation is beneficial for “the small state” are frequent in the discussion. The logic of abduction can guide the interpretation to critically assess such generalized knowledge and to recognize macro phenomena (what in the IR discourse goes together with the “small state,” for example) in micro-level observations concerning the distinct characteristics of our belonging to a state (more in Rytövuori-Apunen 2008). The logic of abduction, which unfolds and examines sensation (irritation of doubt) in the three different dimensions of the modes of questioning (experience), can substantively broaden our disciplinary discussions and save us from becoming prisoners of privileged professional bodies of knowledge. A final remark about the logic of interpretation. It does not tune us towards types of problems in the same way as social theory. My arguments about IR are thus meant to show what questioning about reasoning against a pragmatic horizon can mean in practice.

From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice
Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship

JÖRG FRIEDRICHS
University of Oxford

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower is strangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much more hazardous to contemplate the way how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the first place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business.

As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretense and pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in generating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes to presenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingenious conjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the much more prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theories, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses.
In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealizations, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. These are discussed and enhanced by Rytövuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, I present various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmatic research strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction are important but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).

Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is as old as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many years ago that he coveted “a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressure for the latter even as the findings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the former, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on each other.” This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he was still touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientific requisites, such as independent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his statement at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name.7

While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientific methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragmatism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical research unencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I concerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodological awareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.

Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspecified fundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in a positivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer, however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological nonchalance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsik sees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane, Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Barry Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial exception of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or her scholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in their research, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodological position. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above.

Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links a commonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commitment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008). The

---

7Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is “guilty” of lapses into pragmatism, for example when he states that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the important difference that they are guided in their quest for finding regularities not so much by the stomach but rather by empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62).
idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thus to enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are translated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recomposed in novel ways. This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulating parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will be enabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. In addition to themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. The ascription is probably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these scholars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these scholars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.

My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically as self-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions. The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as social scientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for some reason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we do not know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. We therefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applying concepts from existing fields of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or simply inferring propositions from facts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction).

Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all a more conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learned to solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it is currently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able to achieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimate miracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from, and far more efficient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientific methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well to mimic this at least in some respects.

Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, and Martha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thoroughly specified its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developed abduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research on international police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossible to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way to advance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).

On a final note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimate epistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown to themselves, namely that they are ingeniously “sorting out” problematic situations. Scientific inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a research problem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communities of practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the...
fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-
cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful
knowledge are two sides of the same coin.

Simplifying Pragmatism:
From Social Theory to Problem-driven Eclecticism

RUDRA SIL
University of Pennsylvania

To date, the pragmatist turn appears to have had little or no effect on main-
stream IR scholarship, particularly in the United States where pragmatism first
took root (Bauer and Brighi 2008). One reason for this may be that the renais-
sance of pragmatism has come in the form of a confrontation with analytic phi-
losophy, which continues to provide (at least implicitly) the main foundation for
the major IR research traditions. Compared with other fields (for example, soci-
ology and linguistics), where debates among competing approaches to some
extent follow from those between pragmatist and analytic philosophy, debates in
American IR have taken place almost entirely within the domain of analytic phi-
losophy, with the result that the range of variation on issues concerning episte-
mology, methodology and research practice is significantly narrower than what
we find in other fields. Constructivism may be marginally more receptive to
aspects of pragmatist thought (for example, Gould and Onuf 2008; Haas and
Haas 2008), but most Constructivists in the United States remain “conventional”
(Checkel 2007) in the sense that their rejection of the ontologies underlying
realism and liberalism has not been accompanied by a fundamental challenge
to epistemological and methodological perspectives derived from analytic
philosophy.

Equally problematic is the fact that what pragmatists have to say rarely
seems intelligible, let alone relevant, to most mainstream IR scholars. For the
most part, pragmatists have been attempting to engage the IR field in the
same abstract language they use to formulate positions in opposition to
analytic philosophy. Moreover, pragmatists themselves have gotten caught up
in nuanced debates over such issues as the relationship between ontology and
epistemology, the relative significance of specific pragmatist tenets, and the
complicated history of pragmatism as an intellectual movement (Joas 1993;
Haack 2004; Bauer and Brighi 2008). Ironically, pragmatist discourse appears
either too abstract or too convoluted to be of any practical significance to IR
scholars coping with the challenges and requirements of research. Many IR
scholars will certainly recognize key elements of the pragmatist critique of
positivism, and some may even acknowledge the discrepancies pragmatists
note between standard models of cumulative knowledge and the actual history
of science (Kratochwil 2008). But, beyond this, much of what pragmatists have
to say simply seems too far removed from the immediate concerns of most IR
scholars.

What is needed to generate a more fluent and useful dialogue between prag-
matism and IR is a sustained effort to simplify tenets associated with the former
so that they are more intelligible to scholars trained in an environment in which
institutionalized research practices continue to reflect understandings of
“science,” “progress,” and “good research” formed on the basis of analytic
philosophy. As a modest contribution to this end, and at the risk of oversimplify-
ing some of the more nuanced and complicated formulations of pragmatist
inquiry, Peter Katzenstein and I (Katzenstein and Sil 2008) have sought to define and promote what we refer to as “analytic eclecticism” as a pragmatist alternative to scholarship embedded in existing research traditions.

Analytic eclecticism is a problem-driven approach featuring the extraction, adaptation, and integration (but not synthesis) of discrete concepts, mechanisms, logical principles, and interpretive moves normally embedded in emergent research traditions, each identified with distinct styles of research reflecting distinct combinations of ontological and epistemological principles. These research traditions certainly generate valuable insights, and the consensus they generate by fiat does enable scholars to build up initial stocks of knowledge and to efficiently communicate findings to one another. Moreover, the competition among multiple traditions serves to inspire progress within each tradition as scholars seek to defend their substantive theories against criticisms and challenges by refining their arguments and generating more sophisticated analyses. However, the boundaries between research traditions also serve to prevent more inclusive dialogue and more practical forms of collaboration. And, they leave us with concepts and arguments that seem incommensurable despite the interconnectedness of empirical observations and substantive arguments generated by research traditions.

Downplaying the metatheoretical incommensurability normally assumed to exist across research traditions, AE focuses on the empirical referents used to operationalize concepts in various theories and narratives to identify connections and complementarities across substantive arguments initially developed in separate theoretical frameworks. Scholarship embedded in a research tradition typically tends to address only those aspects of social reality that readily conform to the metatheoretical postulates and theoretical conventions associated with that tradition. In contrast, AE takes on the messiness of a given “real world” problem in all its complexity, seeking to take advantage of usable elements—concepts, logical principles, observations, and interpretations—drawn from separate research traditions but integrated in novel, recombinant analytic formulations designed to be responsive to particular problems. More specifically, AE explores how different types of mechanisms, some of which are effectively defined out of existence by the methodological requirements or foundational assumptions of particular research traditions, might interact with each other in the process of influencing outcomes of interest to both scholars and practitioners.

Importantly, AE requires engaging, not displacing, existing research traditions. Eclecticism that is inattentive to the scholarship produced by existing research traditions runs the risk of reinventing the wheel or producing analyses that appear to simply generate a “laundry list” of things that might matter. What keeps AE from devolving into a position in which “everything matters” is precisely the wager that research traditions are valuable for the purpose of establishing the importance of crucial factors that are most likely to matter in explaining important phenomena and tackling problems facing real world actors. The value-added of eclectic approaches stems from their attention to the task of understanding how the range of relevant factors deemed important by capable scholars working within research traditions combine to affect outcomes of interest to scholars and practitioners.

Contra Jörg Friedrichs (this forum), this is neither a case of “dependence on research traditions,” nor an effort to separate the many scholars assigned to the “laborious process of formulating parochial research traditions” from the cosmopolitan few seeking “to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages.” In fact, when it comes to the field of IR in the United States, there are already a multitude of forces in play—in the form of deeply institutionalized norms, procedures, and incentive systems—that reproduce and reinforce com-
mitments to (and competition among) existing research traditions. These com-
mitments certainly produce active discursive communities that employ their 
vocabularies, approaches and standards to generate valuable insights and to eval-
uate their own progress. But, this also gets in the way of more inclusive dialogue 
and more practical forms of collaboration, leaving us instead with seemingly 
incommensurable concepts and arguments in spite of the interconnectedness of 
the empirical referents invoked to operationalize them. AE offers a practical and 
necessary means to correct for this tendency and to open up new spaces where 
more creative experimentation and open-ended deliberation can take place.

Analytic eclecticism also refrains from discounting the epistemological signifi-
cance of the context within which problems are defined and decisions are negoti-
ated by the actors being studied (Flyvbjerg 2001:43). The elevation of context 
means that AE resists a priori postulates concerning the relative ontological or 
epistemological status of agents or structures, or of the material or ideational 
components of social life. Instead, AE points to a problem-driven approach that 
puts the burden on the investigator to demonstrate how and why the choices 
and actions of agents reflect, reproduce, or transform emergent patterns of 
social norms and structures. While this implies an epistemological agnosticism 
that makes AE unsuitable as a unifying paradigm, it also leaves open the possibil-
ity for exploring the variety of complex processes that cut across or connect mul-
tiple levels of analysis and multiple dimensions of social action within a given 
context (Sil 2000).

Elsewhere, Katzenstein and I (Katzenstein and Sil 2008) have reviewed a num-
ber of studies that exemplify for us what an eclectic approach to IR might look 
like in practice. Here, in the limited space available, I simply draw attention to a 
few of these studies without attempting to capture the complexity of their argu-
ments or the evidence they present. Robert Jervis (2005), in his study of foreign 
policy, seeks to offer a “synthetic interactive explanation” to explain the emer-
gence of a security community among the world’s most developed powers. Jervis 
deliberately reformulates and combines factors drawn from Realist, Liberal, and 
Constructivist research traditions, including: the pacifying effects of economic 
interdependence and joint membership in international institutions; the recog-
nition of the costs of war in an environment characterized by nuclear weapons and 
American power; and, in some cases, the emergence of shared core values 
among advanced powers that happen to be capitalist democracies. Similarly, Tim-
othy Sinclair (2005) employs an eclectic approach to understand the role of 
bond rating agencies in global finance. He does so by combining the rationalist 
emphasis on the role such agencies play in limiting uncertainty and risk for eco-
nomic actors with a deeper understanding of context-specific social processes 
and interpretive frameworks evident in the creation and dissemination of eco-
nomic knowledge. John Campbell’s (2005) conceptualization of institutionaliza-
tion in the era of globalization challenges conventional arguments that (wrongly) predicted a worldwide reduction in taxation levels in response to glo-
bal economic forces. Campbell employs the puzzling absence of tax reform in 
the United States to highlight the interactive effects generated by individual-level 
choices, regulatory mechanisms, as well as cognitive, evolutionary, and diffusion 
mechanisms in mediating the complex relationships between the global econ-
yomy and processes of national institutional change.

Although dealing with quite different problems, these studies share a commit-
ment to identify previously hidden or under-appreciated connections among a 
wider range of mechanisms than is typically considered within the boundaries 
of any one research tradition. One can certainly debate the accuracy or sophisti-
cation of specific interpretations or causal explanations offered in these and 
similarly eclectic studies. However, the eclectic styles adopted in the aforemen-
tioned studies are a necessary complement to the more regimented styles of
research prescribed by competing research traditions. At a minimum, such studies serve the purpose of opening up new avenues for productive dialogue by establishing empirical connections between theoretical vocabularies that are normally seen as incommensurable. Beyond that, they have the potential to uncover social processes and causal forces that might otherwise remain hidden from view.

What does any of this have to do with pragmatism? First, AE shares the pragmatist aversion to seemingly “interminable” metaphysical disputes (James 1997:94), which implies a rejection of conventions or procedures held to be the definitive basis for “progress” by adherents of particular research traditions. For AE, as for pragmatism, the “success” of knowledge claims has to do more with their practical consequences for “the active reorganization of the given environment” (Dewey 1920a:156). This also implies a “multiperspectival” view of theory (Bohman 2002) as something that is a composite of discrete elemental pieces each of which can be independently and creatively redeployed by both scholars and ordinary actors seeking to integrate “knowing” and “doing” in particular contexts (Dewey 1920b:121).

Second, our defense of AE relies heavily on the neo-pragmatist doctrine that “there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones—no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of language…” (Rorty 1982:165). AE shares the pragmatist anxiety about rigid structures of knowledge identified with closed communities and places a premium on more inclusive forms of deliberation among all potential interlocutors, including ordinary actors engaged in their own everyday forms of inquiry and persuasion (Joas 1993; see also Flyvbjerg 2001). By engaging multiple scholarly and nonscholarly traditions, AE is in a position to play a role in adjudicating existing truth claims in the wider society and thus advancing the cause of “rhetorical pragmatism” as outlined by Markus Kornprobst (this forum).

Finally, AE draws inspiration from a pragmatist understanding of agency, structure, and identity. This understanding is primarily informed by George Herbert Mead’s (1934) symbolic interactionism in which the self is constructed and reconstructed in continuous interaction with society. This view not only challenges reductionism but also points to a fluid, context-dependent approach to tracing the relationships between those mechanisms that emerge from actors’ interests and cognitive dispositions and those that emerge from collective beliefs, shared practices, and social relations in a given environment. For most problems that have a bearing on the real world, the search for relevant mechanisms and causal processes must necessarily contend with the dialectical interplay of agency and structure without having to assume the epistemological primacy of either (Sil 2000).

In sum, the value-added of AE depends on some rather basic notions distilled from pragmatist thought. AE, like pragmatism, bypasses excessively abstract ontologies and focuses instead on the practical consequences of knowledge claims for the experiences and problem-solving efforts of actors in the social world. AE, like pragmatism, eschews rigid boundaries between scholars and actors, encouraging inclusive forms of deliberation among all who show interest in aspects of a given problem. And AE, like pragmatism, wagers that most outcomes of interest to both scholars and practitioners require attention to the manner in which the material and ideal interests of actors are constituted in view of their cognitive dispositions, their collective beliefs, and their institutional and social environments. These notions may seem overly broad or simplistic to seasoned pragmatists, but the hope is that these simplifications can help to illuminate pathways through which pragmatism and the main IR research traditions can be brought into a more practically useful dialogue than has been the case to date. Once that
dialogue has been initiated, the complexities and tensions across various strands of pragmatism can be explored more meaningfully in relation to their implications for the study of IR.

**Doing What Comes Naturally Without Being Oblivious to It**

**Rhetorical Pragmatism and International Relations**

**Markus Kornprobst**

*Diplomatic Academy of Vienna*

More and more scholars in the field borrow from classical rhetoric to explain key dynamics of world politics. Following the seminal research on reasoning by Kratochwil (1989), authors have employed classical rhetoric to make sense of explananda ranging from decolonization (Crawford 2002) to the “Western Civilization” (Jackson 2006) and from citizenship rights (Krebs 2006) to the settlement of border disputes (Kornprobst 2008).

For many classical rhetoricians, however, there was more to rhetoric than explanation. Scholars such as Antiphon, Gorgias, Hippias, Isocrates and Protagoras (in Sprague 1972) defended an epistemological stance in which rhetoric was at the center of pragmatist inquiry aimed at *argumentatively generating intersubjective working truth*. This epistemological theme reappears in the works of Schiller (1929) and Fish (1989). Mailloux (1995:21) has recently baptized scholars converging on this theme as rhetorical pragmatists. Does this rhetorical pragmatism have any relevance for us doing IR today?

**Coming Naturally**

Rhetoric comes to IR scholars naturally. The discipline’s rhetorical dimensions are pervasive in scholarly practices across the field’s major divides, including the schism between positivists and postpositivists. As much as they clash about theories of knowledge, their *practices of doing and communicating research* share three important rhetorical dimensions. First, the *modes of reasoning*, being much broader and less rigorous than usually acknowledged, point towards rhetoric (Beer and Hariman 1996). Perhaps most notably, scholars across the great divide make use of the creative potential of language, especially figures of speech. This is more pronounced within postpositivist perspectives, but even positivist explanations abound with the creative play with words, such as the balance of power and the prisoners’ dilemma. Furthermore, modes of inference that seem stringently logical at first glance turn out to be rhetorical at closer scrutiny. The positivist *caveat*, for example, that the premises on which inferences are to be based are not true but merely “valuable” (Keohane 1988:379), point—in Aristotelian terms—to the rhetorical *enthymeme* rather than the logical syllogism. While the latter is applicable to the theoretical sciences such as mathematics, the former is a rhetorical mode of inference tailored to the uncertainties of the practical sciences such as politics (Aristotle 1975).

---

11The title “Doing What Comes Naturally” is borrowed from Fish (1989). I would like to thank the organizers of this forum, the reviewers, as well as the other contributors for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
Second, IR practices follow the dictum of the Philosophical Sophists that what counts as provisional truth is a matter of adjudication. Throughout the field, practices of knowledge generation revolve around making, exchanging, revising, and abandoning arguments while interacting with others. Most importantly, adjudication determines whether a work is published and what status it acquires once it is published. This is not to glorify adjudication. Academic adjudication processes can be at times quite unfair. Yet Rorty’s (1979:179) famous quote that working truth is “what our peers let us get away with saying” is quite an accurate description of scholarly practice. What counts as fruitful knowledge is, in practice, the product of persuading peers rather than self-evident objectivity.

Third, truth claims and critiques of truth claims are rhetorically disseminated beyond the confines of the field. Messages often overstretch truth claims. Positivists may concede limitations in their research when communicating with peers, but all too often sweep them underneath the carpet when disseminating their messages beyond academia. Postpositivists also overreach. This applies even to poststructuralists who tend to argue in a much less open-ended manner as their theories of knowledge demand, especially when addressing an audience outside of academia.

**Being Oblivious**

We are oblivious to the discipline’s rhetorical dimensions. As they come to us naturally, it seems unnatural to us to reflect upon them. This is a problem. All kinds of things can go wrong in a rhetorical discipline, especially if it focuses—as ours does in an extraordinarily unmitigated manner—on politics (Kornprobst 2009). Most importantly, there is always the risk that scholars harness the rhetorical dimensions to further their own perspective and dismiss other perspectives a priori. Minimizing the exchange with other perspectives or using it merely as a tool for demarcation, subcommunities grow overconfident in the mode of reasoning they privilege. Avoiding challenging comments, they stifle the adjudication process by recruiting its jurors from their own camp. IR, split into proliferating and increasingly inward-looking subcommunities (Hermann 1998), has its fair share of these problems. Yet this is not only a matter of concern for academic research. It is a matter of concern for politics as well. Eager to leave their mark on politics, many scholars intervene into the political process while brushing aside or entirely ignoring possible doubts about such an intervention raised by other perspectives. Such political practices are very much at odds with the uncertainties of our research findings—uncertainties that are fully acknowledged even by the supposedly most determined positivists (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:8–9).

**Rhetorical Pragmatism**

Rhetorical pragmatism helps us reflect on the uses of rhetoric that come naturally to us. Instead of remaining oblivious to the field’s pervasive rhetorical dimensions, it puts them under scrutiny, and provides the necessary epistemological qualifications as well as elaborations without which things can go seriously wrong in a rhetorical discipline. First, rhetorical pragmatism embraces a broad range of rhetorical modes of reasoning. This includes, inter alia, the abstract and comparative modes. The abstract mode revolves around Aristotle’s enthymeme. The comparative one involves using language that provokes our imagination to think of parallels between phenomena that are usually seen as entirely distinct. There are many variants of both modes. While both allow for—and even demand—a considerable measure of creativity on the part of the scholar, this is especially important for the comparative one. Language, such as figures of speech, captures our imagination. We should make use of this by employing
language creatively to defamiliarize ourselves with the taken-for-granted as well as by introducing and discussing novel understandings.

Second, skepticism and adjudication are at the core of rhetorical pragmatism. Scholarly skepticism against truth claims is what initiates and sustains scholarly debates. It prevents truth claims from assuming the status of orthodoxy. Skepticism, of course, does not mean to demolish every truth claim. It simply means to put them under critical scrutiny. Such a critical scrutiny may end up with the—always provisional—agreement that a truth claim amounts to a working truth. The mechanism for reaching such an agreement is adjudication. Yet not any kind of adjudication does the job. In order for knowledge claims to undergo a sufficiently demanding examination, the adjudicating peer group has to be heterogeneous. At a minimum, it has to be recruited from across those contending perspectives in the discipline that pertain to the research problem addressed by the piece to be adjudicated. Ideally, it transcends disciplinary boundaries. And even if truth is generated through such demanding multiperspectival checks and balances, we should remain alert that adjudication is not about settling a truth claim once and for all. It is always—this is the whole point about the metaphor of adjudication—provisional.

Third, there is nothing wrong with intervening into IR per se. Indeed, given the array of global problems, such scholarly interventions, in principle, are warranted. But not any kind of intervention will do. Rhetorical pragmatism pushes students of world politics towards understanding scholarly interventions into political discourses as scholarship writ large. This means first and foremost to critically discuss what is taken-for-granted. Out of these critical discussions, scholars can develop interventions into a constellation of taken-for-granted ideas. They can make innovative interventions that propose novel understandings of the world. They can also make reinforcing interventions that push an already established commonplace higher up the agenda. The benchmark for such interventions, however, is high. They have to survive an even broader discussion, involving multiple scholarly and nonscholarly perspectives. We have to discuss with our fellow scholars but we also have to discuss with decision makers, bureaucrats, activists, and the public at large. We have to stand in the midst of those who we study instead of pretending to stand apart or even above them. After all, the knowledge we produce may have very real repercussions for all of us (Flyvbjerg 2001). Such a broad adjudication makes for a rigorous system of rhetorical checks and balances that reasonably safeguards against the deeply troubling connection between insular scholarship and political malpractice. Even if a scholarly argument does not survive these rigorous rhetorical checks and balances, there is still a good chance for it to make a difference. It may contribute to raising doubts on what otherwise passes as unquestioned orthodoxy. Or it may play its role in shaping a broad discussion that converges on a provisional truth different but perhaps related to the originally proposed argument.

The Added Value of Rhetorical Pragmatism

Rhetorical pragmatism helps us channel the rhetorical dimensions of IR into fruitful directions. The added value is threefold: First, it broadens our understanding of theory-building, empirical methods, empirical research, and the relationships among them. The often taken-for-granted story of scholarly reasoning in our field—scholars deduce hypotheses from a set of premises and then test them by using a variant of the controlled experiment—is very incomplete. It tells us of a logical form of reasoning but remains quiet about the many other forms of reasoning without which we cannot arrive at assumptions, cannot make inferences based on these assumptions, cannot relate theory and empirics, and cannot relate empirics to theory—in short cannot make theoretical and empirical inferences. The range of
practices by which we make inferences is very broad. Rhetorical pragmatism, due to its emphasis on multiple modes of reasoning, helps us examine this range in all its breadth and depth, and encourages us to try out new modes of reasoning to arrive at novel understandings of the world we study.

Second, rhetorical pragmatism helps us uncover overlaps across different perspectives (such as rhetorical forms of reasoning) and develop dialogue out of these overlaps. If we continue to rehash the typical textbook divisions of IR, for example Rationalism versus Constructivism, by emphasizing again and again the same divergences, we blind ourselves of their convergences. Yet if we take these divisions for what they are, that is, the products of rhetorical reasoning, and if we treat them accordingly, that is, not shy away from scrutinizing and reframing them, we move away from an incommensurability assumption—deeply entrenched in our discipline—that is much more absolute than even Kuhn (1977:xi-xii) presented it. Instead, we are very likely to uncover overlaps across clusters of research that have previously been thought of as incommensurable. Out of these overlaps, and driven by the curiosity to learn something new about the world we study, we can develop dialogue (Gadamer 1972; Bakhtin 1986; Bernstein 1991). Such a dialogue across perspectives is of paramount importance. It is the precondition for meaningful adjudication. Uncovering overlaps and initiating dialogue can be performed by focusing on meta-theory, theory and methodology. It can also be carried out—and this may often be easier—by focusing on a shared empirical research puzzle.

Third, rhetorical pragmatism provides us with important clues for how to disseminate knowledge responsibly. The issue of knowledge dissemination is an important one because there is no hiding in the Ivory Tower. Scholarly discourses and political discourses do not stand apart. They crisscross in various ways. Most importantly, many of the commonplaces (for example, appeasement and the democratic peace), based on which political decision makers reason, are shaped by scholarly discourses. As there is no hiding in the Ivory Tower, we need to think hard about how to feed ideas into political discourses in responsible fashion. The currently widespread practice of acknowledging uncertainty in scholarly research on the one hand and pretending that such uncertainty is nonexistent when attempting to diffuse knowledge beyond academia on the other is highly dubious. Understanding scholarly interventions as scholarship writ large is a much more responsible alternative to it.

Conclusion

International Relations is a rhetorical discipline. Rhetoric constitutes key features of our reasoning, processes by which we evaluate knowledge, and mechanisms through which we disseminate knowledge. These rhetorical elements come so naturally to us that we are oblivious to them. The gist of my argument is that we should continue “to do what comes naturally” (Fish 1989). But we should stop being oblivious to it. Rhetorical pragmatism provides a very promising avenue for shaping the rhetorical dimensions of our discipline. It postulates a rhetoric that is far removed from the trickery and deception that the vernacular associates with the term. For a rhetorical pragmatist, rhetoric ought to be about seeking exposure to different arguments, approaching these arguments with an open mind, creatively composing one’s own arguments, and being constantly reminded of and challenged by the shortcomings of the arguments that we exchange with one another. Rhetoric thus understood is an important building block of an intellectually thriving and responsible discipline.
Situated Creativity, or, the Cash Value of a
Pragmatist Wager for IR

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson
American University

Unlike the other contributors to this Forum, I would like to follow Robert
Cox’s (1996:144) admonition that “[o]ntology lies at the beginning of any
inquiry” and suggest that where pragmatism holds its most profound implica-
tions for IR scholarship lies in its distinctive ontology. I refer here not to the sci-
centific ontologies, or specific accounts and characterizations of extant objects,
propounded by one or another pragmatist thinker; I refer rather to the philo-
sophical ontology (Patomäki and Wight 2000:215), or account of our “hook-up”
to the world (Shotter 1993a:77–79), shared by many if not most self-identified
pragmatists. This philosophical ontology affects not so much our specific choice
of techniques for data-collection and data-analysis as much as it affects the over-
all status of our knowledge claims—and therefore our self-understanding of what
it is that we do when we engage in IR scholarship.

The pragmatic philosophical ontology that I have in mind here consists of the
conjunction of two basic commitments or wagers about the relationship between
the mind and the world. The first is an orientation towards experience as the
basic stuff out of which knowledge and action—and ultimately, human society as
a whole—are produced. This emphasis is perhaps the most well-known hallmark
of pragmatist philosophy, as it signals a somewhat radical departure from the
Enlightenment project of referring everything to the ground of Reason; instead,
speculative formulations and ideas are referred back to experience, and to the
difference that they make for a person engaged in solving a particular problem
or surmounting a particular obstacle (Dewey 1910:109–110). John Dewey in par-
ticular was adamant that knowledge-production always had to remain oriented
towards and bounded by phenomena that could be in principle experienced, lest
human beings fall “into a paralyzing worship of super-empirical authority or into
an offensive ‘rationalization’ of things as they are” (Dewey 1920b:102).

This dispensing of the super-empirical does not mean restricting knowledge to
those things that we have already experienced; indeed, Dewey (1938:25–26)
emphasizes that part of the effect of a good and educative experience is to prepare
a person for richer further experiences. Referring knowledge to experience does
not mean confining what we know to what we ourselves have seen or felt or
heard—to do so would be to come dangerously close to what Bhaskar (1998:133)
calls the “epistemic fallacy,” the claim that our knowledge defines the limits of
what exists. Rather, limiting knowledge to experience means rejecting the notion
that it is possible to know anything about anything that we cannot, even in prin-
ciple, experience.Positing the existence of and generating knowledge about some-
thing that we cannot yet experience, perhaps because the specialized equipment
needed to perceive and measure it has yet to be constructed (Harre 1985:93–95),
poses no special problems for the pragmatist emphasis on experience; problems
are, however, posed when we start claiming to have knowledge of quarks, higher
dimensions, or social structures understood as deep generative potentialities
(Wendt 1987; Wendt and Duvall 2008). Unlike philosophical realists, who have no
problem with the reality of in-principle unobservables like these, philosophical
pragmatists instrumentalize claims about such theoretical entities, and remain
focused on the work that such claims do in practice—that is to say, what they help us explain in the phenomenal, experienced world.

Related to this emphasis on experience, but analytically distinct from it, is a second pragmatist wager: a mind-world monist refusal to consider the problem of knowledge-production as stemming from the Cartesian conception of a self-contained knowing Subject facing an unknown (and perhaps threatening) field of Objects which have to be somehow grasped by an operation of mind. Bridging the gap between the mind and the world formed the classical problem of epistemology. The perennial failure to resolve it, and to dispel the anxiety felt by a Cartesian subject unable to rest completely secure in her or his absolutely certain grasp on a mind-independent world, fueled centuries of philosophical speculation, eventually giving rise to the great metaphysical systems of Kant and Hegel and their followers—systems that still did not suffice to solve the initial problem and definitively prove that knowledge of an externally existing world was possible.

Much as it did for Heidegger and Wittgenstein, the rejection of the Cartesian conception as the appropriate starting point for the problem of knowledge formed a central plank of the pragmatist program: the Cartesian problem is not solved so much as dissolved, made to vanish through a reorientation of our conceptual equipment (Wittgenstein 1953:308–309). William James (1978:183), for example, denied the existence of a discrete entity called “consciousness” on the ground that “thoughts in the concrete are made out of the same stuff as things are,” while Dewey (1938:43) argued that concrete acts of knowing start off in an interaction situation characterized by “a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his [sic] environment” and drew the implication that it was senseless to try to separate either the knower or the known from those transactions. More recently Hans Joas (1997:133) has argued that the heart of pragmatism is its model of “situated creativity,” wherein actors work by “defining that which is as yet undefined, rather than simply making a different selection from a reservoir of situation components that are either already defined or have no need of definition.” Knower and known are not discrete entities, but are instead mutual participants in an ongoing creative process whereby situations arise, are transformed, and are replaced by new situations as they are met by actors who have acquired novel capacities for action as a result of their participation in previous situations.

It is important to note that this pragmatic model of action, although superficially similar to the “cognitive bricoleur” (Bhaskar 1989:78) frequently seen in critical realist accounts of social life, differs in one crucial respect. Realists and pragmatists both argue that action arises out of the capacities that actors possess in concrete situations, and that those capacities are conditions of possibility rather than categorical variable attributes that are systematically correlated with outcomes in the manner presumed by neopositivist statistical-comparative approaches to the study of social life (for example, King et al. 1994). But, where realists maintain that those capacities and conditions of possibility are real and therefore, in principle, knowable in the abstract by a scholarly analyst, pragmatists ground social capacities—much like goals and judgments and intentions (Joas 1997:157–162; see also Mills 1940)—in the creative action of concrete actors involved in concrete situations. It is therefore not the task of scholarly analysis to engage in efforts to “correct” the ways that actors make sense of their situations (Shotter 1999b, 88–90). The effort to do so presumes a split between the mind (of the actors) and the world (in which the actors find themselves) such that the scholar can grasp the world—which is of course also separate from the mind of the scholar—in a classically objective (Jackson 2008) manner, and use that grasp to criticize the actors’ conceptions from a solid basis of knowledge. The philosophical ontology of critical realism makes that kind of worldly intervention meaningful in a way that it is not meaningful for a pragmatist.
Instead, the knowledge produced by a pragmatist scholar has a different relationship to worldly action. The philosophical mind-world monism of a pragmatic stance ensures that scholarship is less about a presumptive effort to grasp an externally existing world, and more about a disciplined effort to envision what the world would look like if explained and understood according to some ideal-typically elaborated set of value-commitments. Ideal-type analytical models or depictions are rooted in a concrete situation rather than purporting to derive from some kind of objectively existing reality—but the situation in question is not the situation of the actors as much as the situation of the scholarly analyst (Weber 1999:170). Of course, the situation of the scholarly analyst is in no way completely divorced from the general situation of their present time, Dewey (1910:175). In refining conceptual equipment and using it to analyze empirical situations both contemporary and historical, scholars systematize the diffuse, tacit, value-laden intellectual heritage of their present situation, forging instruments like ‘the social network’ or ‘the process of legitimation’ that express a particular, contemporary sensibility about the world—in our case, about the social world of global politics. In so doing, the analyst both preserves something of value from that sensibility and liberates it for application elsewhere (Dewey 1920a:150). Responsible scholarship, for a pragmatist, is thus a form of critical tool-making (Shotter 1993a:203–207).

Producing knowledge about global politics, then, is necessarily an activity involving a culturally specific portrayal of a domain of social life, and thus an intervention into an ongoing set of conceptual and philosophical controversies about how we ought to comport ourselves in the world. But at its best, this is a social-scientific intervention and not merely a political intervention, in that it should be less of a polemic and more of a systematic demonstration of what one gets, empirically, if one apprehends the world with a given sensibility. As a result of the pragmatist philosophical orientation towards experience, no other demonstration would or should suffice to demonstrate the value of a given piece of conceptual equipment; the categories through which the world is analyzed cannot, by definition, derive their value from anything super-empirical or from any ethereal realm beyond experience. The orientation towards experience thus makes the production of knowledge in IR something distinct from propaganda, distinct from theology, and distinct from pure partisan advocacy.

Needless to say, pragmatist knowledge-production is also distinct from the kind of hypothesis-testing prized and advocated by contemporary neopositivists. The very procedure of hypothesis-testing presumes a mind-independent world to which a speculative hypothesis might be compared, and a notion of truth as the correspondence between a claim and a state of affairs in the world. But for pragmatists, the world is in important ways shaped by our ways of comporting ourselves; what we think we see depends, in profound ways, on which of the potentialities in a situation we creatively explore and which we leave aside. It is never a simple matter of positing a causal claim—democracies do not go to war with one another, for example, or economic development eliminates terrorism—and then expecting the world to weigh in to either validate or invalidate that claim. Instead, in the very identification of potential causal factors, we are creatively arranging the ambiguous material of the world in dialogue with the scholarly traditions within which we locate ourselves. The fact that we scholars are able to ignore this, and then speak and act as though our creative depictions of the world arose from the world itself, is an effect of our scholarly sense-making practices, and of the peculiar ways that we have talked ourselves into a particular vantage-point (Shotter 1993b:24–26).

One implication of this realization is that it is always appropriate to inquire into the ethical status of our empirical claims. We cannot hide behind the notion that we are simply representing reality in The One True Way That It Is (Rorty 2001), but instead we have to take responsibility for the ways in which we are depicting
the world to be. A particularly helpful way of taking responsibility for our depictions, I would argue, is to recognize the ideal-typical character of our conceptual instruments; such a recognition foregrounds the value-commitments embedded in our concepts, and also prevents us from making the category mistake of thinking that our values have been empirically validated (Weber 1999:191). Questions of the form “does X cause Y?”—neopositivist questions, like “does democracy cause peace?”—presume a world of stable relationships and general laws that is just out of sight and waiting to be discovered. Pragmatist questions, on the other hand, make no such presumption, and as such take a form more like “how is peace produced in this situation?” Ideal-typical accounts of democracy may figure into the explanation, but only as part of a specific causal configuration (Ragin 2008:112–114), and only with the caveat that “democracy” is something that we value—and maybe something that only we would see in the data.

A pragmatist turn in IR is a recipe for an “engaged pluralism” (Lapid 2003), as no partisan of a given sensibility can legitimately claim to have grasped the world “as it actually is in itself”—always a danger with dualist philosophical positions that claim the ability to grasp super-empirical truths. Pragmatism is also a recipe for a distinctive kind of indirect debate about value-commitments, as its methodology of social science shifts the focus away from values themselves and onto the potentially more commensurable terrain of empirical controversy—although a definitive resolution of any particular empirical question might provoke a renewed effort to forge an alternative piece of conceptual equipment just as easily as it might prompt actors to shift their value-commitments. Finally, pragmatism provides a distinctive way to think about the relationship between science and politics, as the pragmatist preservation of that divide is based not on some sort of essential disconnect between the two realms, but is based rather on the insight—that the temporary isolation of a given value-commitment from the ordinary flow of daily life might be the best chance of refining that value-commitment to allow it, and the actors who stand by it, to face the open-ended future.

References


Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1986) Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, translated by V.W. McGee. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.


Pragmatism and International Relations


