Lamed Power: Germany and European Integration

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As Germany’s influence grows, so will its capacity to upset people. Mr. Kohl and his foreign minister, Mr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, have steered an admirably smooth course to unity by making lots of promises, at least some of which they will not be able to keep. German voters were told that the bill for unity could be paid without an increase in their taxes. The Russians were offered cash and eternal friendship. The Poles were assured (after some unseemly hesitation) that their western border was secure. Germany’s EC partners were promised complete Euro-commitment. Americans were promised continuing loyalty to NATO. The words ‘either’ and ‘or’ are not in the Kohl-Genscher vocabulary; they offer a Pangalossian best of all possible worlds. This is understandable, given that Germany sits in the middle of Europe and wants to keep its neighbours on both sides happy. It is also unrealistic. Trade-offs and hard choices cannot be ducked. ... [In the future] [w]here interests conflict, the Germans will put their own interests first.

The Economist

Introduction: grasping Germany’s ‘de-Europeanization’

The starting point of this project was a hunch. Observing Germany’s foreign policy at the end of the 1990s in general and its European/EU policy in particular, and contrasting this with the available academic literature, we thought that we were witnessing complex, subtle and potentially far-reaching processes of change which were not sufficiently well captured by available approaches. Well into the second half of the
1990s the overwhelming majority of observers seemed to agree that there were ‘virtually no traces of Germany’s return to realist “normalcy”’ (Katzenstein, 1997a, p. 9). Yet in the second half of the 1990s, so we thought, some ominous signs appeared to be surfacing which did not fit as easily within established (mainly ‘liberal’) frames. Germany’s ‘capacity to upset people’ had indeed grown, and so had its willingness to bid goodbye to ‘sowohl-als-auch-Politik’ – that is, the practice of offering what The Economist had called ‘a Pangalossian best of all possible worlds’ to anybody in 1990. While it was far from clear whether the ‘more assertive’ approach already visible in the final years of the Kohl government (for example, concerning asylum policy or the stability pact) indeed signalled the beginning of a slow recourse to ‘Realist “normalcy”’, it certainly was irritating enough to warrant taking a closer look at the generation and development of Germany’s EU policy in particularly prominent fields. This sense of irritation even grew with the election of Gerhard Schröder in the autumn of 1998 and his very outspoken declarations of putting an end to what he called Kohl’s ‘checkbook diplomacy’ in the EU and his claim to assert Germany’s interests ‘self-confidently’ – one of the new code words in Germany’s rediscovery of Realpolitik-practices.

In social science parlance, our hunch related to a subtle process of change resulting from the interaction of the policies of a significant actor, on the one hand and equally powerful governance structures in Europe, on the other. In other words, what we were interested in looked ‘big, slow-moving, and … invisible’ – to use the title of a recent article by Paul Pierson on ‘slow-moving causal processes’ and ‘slow-moving outcomes’ in the study of macrosocial processes. Both our prior theoretical work and our acquaintance with German foreign policy and European integration seemed to warrant a closer look at this interaction even though the potentially relevant causal processes (that is, processual causal effects stemming from both German policy and European governance structures in a temporal sequence, therefore calling for an interactionist framework), on the one hand, and the relevant outcomes (that is, hypothesized change in German policy and identity), on the other, were very slow-moving indeed. As a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of research carried out alongside ours seemed to suggest that there was no ‘movement’ at all as far as the outcome was concerned. As a major recent study on Germany and European integration put it:

Despite new pressures and strains from the international, European, and domestic arenas, the emphasis has been on the continuity of a pro-European élite consensus, a ‘permissive’ public consensus and a
basic accommodation between EU and German institutions and policies. The dominant image is of a peaceful co-existence and co-evolution between two levels (or three, if one includes the Länder); and of pragmatic and incremental change in the definition and projection of national interests in a context of continuity in macro-political strategy towards European integration. The basic congruence between German and EU interests, institutions, and policies does not appear in doubt. ... Germany’s relationship with the EU has taken on a ‘path-dependent’ character, confined within a fairly narrow and predictable range of responses to events and developments and, above all, manifesting continuity. (Dyson and Goetz, 2003b, pp. 4–5, emphases added)\(^7\)

Against this background it seemed to be a pretty risky venture (if not a waste of time) to pursue the hunch about a more far-reaching change in Germany’s European policy in more detail. Yet it seemed to be worth the effort since – as Paul Pierson rightly stresses with an analogy to the natural sciences – the crux with a lot of political science research is that it focuses too much on the equivalent of a tornado in the natural sciences while neglecting more subtle phenomena with longer time horizons. Political science, Pierson writes, has been preoccupied far too long with tornado-like occurrences – quickly unfolding causal processes leading to equally rapid outcomes. In contrast, the political science equivalents of an earthquake (long-term causal process, quick outcome), a meteorite hitting the earth (quick/slow) or global warming (slow/slow) have received much less attention (Pierson, 2003, pp. 178–9; cf. Table 4.1).

From the very beginning, our project had to confront obstacles similar to research on global warming. In our eyes there seemed to be some irritating evidence for incremental yet potentially far-reaching (‘structural’) change in Germany’s European policy as well as its foreign policy identity.

### Table 4.1 Time horizons of different causal accounts

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<th>Time horizon of cause</th>
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<th>Long</th>
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<tr>
<td>Short</td>
<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tornado</td>
<td>Meteorite hit</td>
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<td>Long</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
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<td>Earthquake</td>
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*Source: Pierson (2003, p. 179).*
However, neither effects nor causes were easy to pin down. Moreover, given that much of the standard methodological guidance in the discipline focuses on the micro-level of decisions, there were no quick and easy fixes for connecting (‘short’) political decisions with (‘long’ processes of) identity change. Also, there were (and continue to be) powerful voices claiming that nothing had changed at all and that one must not be misled to take symptoms (several hot summers in a row) for causes (long-term climate change).

This lead to a rather precarious situation: since we are still in the midst of a longer-term process of change our more far reaching claims are likely to be met with suspicion. As a matter of fact, in terms of our analogy with research on global warming this book comes out in the early phase of a debate about some possible deeper change in Germany’s European policy. For political science scholarship, this ‘history of the present’-type research is particularly precarious. We believe, however, that it is worth the risk – both because the analytical approach we have chosen may be useful in other contexts as well and because the preliminary findings (as far as Germany’s European policy and foreign policy identity are concerned) are important politically for Germany as well as for Europe.

In this concluding chapter I will summarize the main results of the project. I claim that Germany is in the midst of a process of far reaching change which is best captured by the formula de-Europeanization by default. I will spell out in more detail what ‘de-Europeanization’ stands for, how it came about and what it may mean for the future of Germany’s foreign and European policy. In a nutshell, the chapter argues that the foundation of Germany’s Europeanized identity turns out to be much more fragile than suggested in the literature. Distinguishing broadly between ‘Realist’ and (liberal) ‘Europeanist’ assessments initially, it shows that neither of these two perspectives fully captures the dynamic interplay between Germany’s European policy, on the one hand, and the prevailing (and changing) European governance structures, on the other, since they essentially offer two variants of inevitability. Whereas Europeanists tend to depict Germany’s Europeanization as a one-way street towards ever closer union and a corresponding consolidation of Germany’s Europeanized identity, Realists in contrast think that a return of Realpolitik practices is equally inevitable given Germany’s triple increase in power, security and freedom of action. This chapter argues that neither is convincing by showing what value-added our interactionist framework provides. In particular it argues that what we do observe at the micro-level is a
mixture of decisions which – even though they may be both driven by a shallow Europeanized predisposition on the part of German decision-makers and constrained by the institutional environment of the EU – combine to produce changing policies, a changing identity and even changing institutions at the macro-level which were either unexpected or not accounted for in terms of their underlying causal mechanisms. When push came to shove, that is, when a choice had to be made between narrowly defined ‘national interests’, on the one hand, and state-transcending ‘European interests’, on the other, ‘Europeanist’ instincts seldom prevailed over ‘nationalist’ instincts among German decision-makers. This became increasingly obvious as the 1990s progressed. Thus whereas Germany may have appeared to be a ‘tamed power’ against the background of its policies from the 1950s through the first half of the 1990s (cf. Katzenstein, 1997a) it now appears to be more fittingly described as a ‘lamed power’ instead.

Two variants of inevitability: Europeanists and Realists

‘No single relationship has been more critical to the success of European integration than that between Germany and the EU’ (Dyson and Goetz, 2003b, p. 4). Change in this relationship, therefore, will inevitably reverberate far beyond it. However, if one examines the literature against the background of a very rough ‘continuity–change’ dichotomy, continuity seems to be ever present. Roughly speaking two schools can be distinguished, the ‘Europeanization’ school (here simply called the ‘Europeanists’\(^8\)) and the ‘Realists’. The first has clearly been dominating the discussion with an array of articles and books basically taking the description of continuity in German foreign policy as unproblematic and focusing instead on explaining why united Germany (sometimes called the ‘Berlin Republic’ in contrast to the ‘old’ Federal or ‘Bonn’ Republic) was bound to continue following the overall foreign policy path of multilateralism and integration pursued so successfully until 1990. This school relied heavily on liberal, institutionalist or constructivist reasoning (or some combination thereof), which individually or collectively implied that the old ‘German problem’ had finally been ‘enduringly transformed’ (Banchoff, 1999b).\(^9\) The rise of ‘German Euro-patriotism’ clearly seemed to signal a ‘comprehensive transformation of (its) post-World War II nation state identity’ (Risse, 2001, p. 209). In this sense ‘the “Europeanization” of Germany’ could be seen ‘as both an objective and an achievement of Bonn’s European policy’ (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996, p. 12). Moreover, the ‘unstopppable expansion of West German
authors, norms and political practice’ in the course of German
unification was taken as solid reassurance that the new Germany would
remain ‘thoroughly federal republican [“durch und durch bundesrepub-
likanisch”] and not “made in united Germany”’ (Katzenstein, 1991,
p. 70). ‘Civilian power’ seemed to be the most appropriate concept to char-
acterize Germany’s overall international role conception. In a ‘supreme
element of irony’ Germany and Japan, the two ‘late modernizers’ and
key culprits of World War II seemed to have turned ‘into prototypes of a
promising future’ (Maull 1990/91, p. 93). In the European context this
‘remarkably internationalized state identity’ had propelled Germany into
‘an ardent champion of a Europeanisation process through which it seeks
to promote German state interests’ (Katzenstein, 1997a, p. 5). As Thomas
Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin put it: ‘To be a “good German”
means nowadays to be a “good European” and to wholeheartedly support
more than anything else this Europeanized identity was seen to be the
result of a ‘historically important shift in the institutionalization of
power in Germany and Europe’. This process of institutionalization had
taken ‘the hard edges off power relations’ – and it had changed the very
identity of Germany. Rather than ‘merely constraining’ German prefer-
ences, German membership in the EU had gained such an importance
that it now ‘constituted’ Germany as an actor (Katzenstein, 1997a,
pp. 2–3). ‘[T]he European option, which in the 1950s had been a clear
instrumental calculation of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the business
elite, became for Chancellor Kohl, Adenauer’s “grandson”, and the
German business elite of the 1980s an unquestioned assumption of policy’
(Katzenstein, 1997a, p. 14, emphases added). This comprehensive trans-
formation of Germany’s post-World War II nation-state identity even
remained stable after German unification in 1990 when ‘a broad range
of foreign policy opportunities emerged, creating a situation in which
the German elites could have redefined their national interests. But
Germany did not reconsider its fundamental foreign policy orientations.’
Rather it even ‘accelerated … its support for further progress in
European integration’ (Risse, 2001, pp. 208–9).

One effect of this far-reaching Europeanization of the German state
was that it was seen to render ‘the search for the national, as opposed to
the European, interest a fruitless task’ (Goetz, 1996, p. 40). This was not
to imply that German policy reflected idealist motives. The point,
rather, was that Germany’s Europeanization served Germany’s interests
because the institutional setting was moulded in such a way as to meet
German interests (cf. Bulmer, 1997; Risse, 2001, pp. 201–3). Thus the
overall thrust of the Europeanization argument was that both the ideational frame (that is, Germany's Europeanized state identity and the internationalized European state identities) and the institutional dynamics of the setting ('Germany in Europe' rather than 'Germany and Europe') were feeding on each other in positive 'feedback' loops. Since political elites had thoroughly internalized this new identity it had taken on a certain 'stickiness' which made it 'likely to be challenged only in times of perceived severe crises' (Risse, 2001, p. 203). Thus, in a self-propelling setting such as this one, it was difficult to imagine how gradual change could turn into a direction more in line with dire Realist predictions, that is, predictions about a 're-hardening' of the softened edges of Germany’s Europeanized identity.

In principle, Realists had no problem in imagining such a future. For them the charge from critics that Realist analyses had ‘failed to derive any concrete strategies from Realist maxims that promise new solutions to some of Germany’s foreign policy dilemmas’ (Katzenstein, 1997a, p. 9) was largely beside the point since they did not see it as their primary task to provide ‘new solutions’. Rather the task in their self-description was to analyse international politics and foreign policy (to use a standard Realist phrase) ‘as it really is’, that is, based on the much more pessimistic transhistorical understanding according to which the lust for power and prestige and/or the pressures from the anarchic system provided ‘objective’ causes driving state policy in international politics (cf. Mearsheimer, 1990, 2001). Indeed, this set of assumptions shows up in most Realist analyses of Germany’s EU–European policy in the 1990s. Whereas there are only few publications in comparison to the Europeanization school the message is clear: Germany’s EU–European policy was bound to become more self-centred because the increased freedom of action, systemic pressures (that is, the new challenges in Eastern Europe) and domestic realignments ‘forced’ the country to readjust its policy and break with ‘the German vision’ of self-binding in a multilateral and supranational framework (Hampton, 1992, pp. 321–2). Realists such as Hans-Peter Schwarz did concede that ‘Germany is located in an environment of equally efficient and productive neighbours that would not allow it to dominate economically, even if it wanted to’. Moreover, all EU member states were seen to be ‘highly interdependent economically’. The resulting consequence, Schwarz wrote,

is as simple to recognize as it is fundamental: Germany is, of course, the most powerful, and, therefore, also potentially the most influential European country; at the same time, it can only prosper as long as it takes its place in this system of interdependence as a partner.
Attempts at unilateral domination or the formation of a block of states with Germany at its center would provoke counter-coalitions and would destroy the system of interdependence. (Schwarz, 1994a, p. 78, emphasis added)

Having said that, Schwarz did expect (and indeed favour) a shift in Germany’s European policy in line with its geopolitically defined role as Europe’s ‘central power’. This role made it ‘imperative to stabilize the regions from Gdansk to Budapest and Bratislava at any cost, or at least at almost any cost’ (Schwarz, 1994a, p. 115; see also Baring, 1995, pp. 17–20). The means to realize this objective was seen to be the widening of the European Union ‘with all its consequences’ (Schwarz, 1994b, p. 786). Among those consequences, the slowing down of the process of EU ‘deepening’ was actually seen as desirable because it was considered counterproductive from a ‘national interest’ vantage point anyway. This is not to say that Realists such as Schwarz thought that Germany should opt for a maximization of autonomy.10 However, Schwarz was convinced that ‘German foreign policy, including Germany’s European policy, will in the future for objective reasons become more selfish, more calculated and cost-conscious, less flexible and primarily fixed on a rather narrowly defined national interest’ (Schwarz, 1994a, p. 92, emphasis added).

To sum up in a somewhat stylized fashion, we may say that much of the scholarly debate confronts us with two variants of inevitability: Europeanists mostly depict Germany’s Europeanization (at least implicitly) as a one-way street towards ever closer union and a corresponding consolidation of Germany’s Europeanized identity;11 Realists, in contrast, think that a return of Realpolitik practices is equally inevitable given Germany’s triple increase in power, security and freedom of action. Whereas their ‘history-repeats-itself’ one-way street does not imply a reassertion of German hegemony over Europe, it certainly culminates in ever loser union and an assertion of power on the part of Germany in a manner which emphasizes narrowly defined ‘national interests’ at the expense of (and possible detriment to) established institutional structures at the EU level. Where Europeanists (at least implicitly) see a ‘Europeanized Germany’ moving forward progressively, Realists expect ‘history’ to reassert its power grip.

De-Europeanization by default: an interactionist synthesis

In contrast to both Europeanists and Realists, our research shows a picture which doesn’t fit either view. Metaphorically speaking, it provides
powerful arguments why it is important to organize theory-informed inquiry into intra-European foreign policy as two-way traffic: whereas the EU and its member states may be ‘moving forward’ in the Europeanist sense in some respects, European ‘powers’ may at the same time also be ‘moving backwards’ in others, as Realists expect. Our case studies clearly show that European institutions (as a key element of EU governance structures) are indeed crucial in accounting for state policy as well as state identity. This is what Europeanists assert and Realists basically dispute. However, Europeanists are reaching too far ahead in disregarding the potential reassertion of Realpolitik dynamics (and a concomitant backslide of a Europeanized state identity) within even highly institutionalized settings such as the EU. Despite the fact that liberal and constructivist theorizing among Europeanists explicitly espouses a dynamic conception of change, their emphasis on institutional effects tends to overemphasize the resilience (or ‘stickiness’) of policy orientations as well as accompanying identities. Here it seems that general Realist intuitions about the dynamics of power politics are at least worth keeping in mind even though they may not be sufficiently specified to either provide for a fitting conceptual frame for analysing what we may call ‘power politics under supranationalism’ or offer theoretically sound causal pathways as to how these dynamics work, for instance, under conditions of tamed anarchy.

Our two case studies render an interactionist synthesis (or Hegelian Aufheben) of Europeanist and Realist theorizing at least plausible. While we have examined only two sections of German-European interaction in depth, a cursory look over other fields seems to support our main findings. Rather than observing a self-reinforcing feedback loop between a Europeanized Germany, on the one hand, and an ever-stronger grip of the EU’s institutional network over member states’ identity and policy, on the other, as Europeanists expect we were detecting accumulating signs of a potentially far-reaching de-Europeanization of Germany’s Europeanized identity. This process was sometimes accompanied by an increase in institutional tensions in the EU. However, the underlying process of change leading to this turnaround is hardly captured by Realism either. Nowhere did we discover evidence that the switch from Europeanization to de-Europeanization was the result of a well-thought-out strategic calculation based on some new grand design in Germany’s European outlook in line with Realist expectations. Nor did we find causal connections between sequences of policy decisions which can be construed as ‘objectively forcing’ German decision-makers into a singular course of action, that is, leaving no reasonable choice whatsoever.
Rather, as we will discuss in more detail below, what may look as a result which is largely compatible with Realist expectations at first sight turns out to be a much more complex causal process than Realist theorizing suggests when examined more closely. Moreover, the underlying causal processes which brought about the observed changes are not only of little interest to Realists but actually differ in significant respects from what Realists assume.13

What do we mean by ‘Europeanization’ and ‘de-Europeanization’? In our understanding, Europeanization stands for a set of beliefs (or ‘rules for action’) which aims for solutions at the level of EU governance structures. De-Europeanization, in contrast, denotes a similar set of beliefs which emphasizes more narrowly defined ‘national’ interests and consequently aims for solutions at the level of the nation state. Due to our research focus, this usage contrasts with much of the literature. However, as has been noted before, there has always been ‘considerable conceptual contestation’ with regard to the concept of ‘Europeanization’ (Vink, 2002, p. 37) and no agreement what a shared definition might look like.14 For our concept of Europeanization/de-Europeanization three aspects need to be emphasized. First, Europeanization and de-Europeanization refer to the transformation of a set of beliefs which (in one way or another) always materialize at the level of (German) state action.15 Whether we examine (a) single decisions, (b) substantively connected multiple decisions (policies) or (c) identities, we are always confronted with certain manifestations of these sets of beliefs at a particular point in time. Second, individually both Europeanization and de-Europeanization are inherently teleological concepts. However, this is not to imply that concrete historical processes are equally construed in teleological terms. Nevertheless present and future action is also path-dependent. They are an expression of a set of beliefs which relies crucially on experience. Since actors (whether individually or collectively) generally aim for coherence as far as their beliefs are concerned there is a certain likelihood that patterns of action may show up over some time. In other words, change is always possible in principle, but this is not to say that it is also a permanent feature of action. Thus, if we are observing a process of de-Europeanization at the level of German policy and identity, we are indeed postulating a set of beliefs (and a pattern of action) with a certain durability (or ‘structure’-like quality). However, this always includes the possibility of reversibility. Third, in much of the academic literature Europeanization is usually defined either in terms of the process dimension at the European level or in terms of the effects which European governance structures cause at the state level (see discussion above).
Our concept of (de-) Europeanization, in contrast, centres on a set of beliefs on the part of an actor which materializes at (and can be described in terms of) three interrelated levels of observation (decisions, policies and identities) and which may be caused at the European as well as the national level.

The central claim of our research is that since the mid-1990s German policy towards and interaction with EU governance structures has shifted from an integrationist (or ‘Europeanist’) orientation – that is, an orientation which supported or even initiated the strengthening of supranational governance structures – to an orientation which emphasizes more narrowly defined ‘national’ interests and consequently favours governance structures with increasing voice opportunities for member states. This is what we want to convey with Germany’s policy shift from ‘vanguard’ to ‘laggard’. De-Europeanization thus denotes a process of change which is most significantly marked by changing German decisions and policies as well as a change in Germany’s Europeanized identity in such a way that state interests are accorded precedence over (state-transcending) ‘European’ interests. The reference to the three levels of decisions, policies and identity is significant here because if we look closely at the series of loosely connected decisions in the fields of our two in-depth case studies (asylum and defence) at the micro-level, these decisions acquire meaning in terms of our de-Europeanization thesis only if we weave them into a larger metanarrative at the macro-level. What we do observe at the micro-level is a mixture of decisions which – even though they may be both driven by a shallow Europeanized predisposition on the part of German decision-makers and constrained by the institutional environment of the EU – combine to produce changing policies, a changing identity and even changing institutions (although this latter phenomenon figures less prominently in our cases) at the macro-level which were either unexpected or not accounted for in terms of their underlying causal mechanisms.

The key here is that several interrelated factors interacting at the micro-level combine over time to produce outcomes at the macro-level which appear to have been largely unintended, at least initially. Change, thus, is incremental and difficult to pin down in strictly causal terms for at least two reasons. First, both causal process and outcome are slow moving, that is, ‘a little more of (slow-moving) x produces a little more of (slow-moving) y’ (Pierson, 2003, p. 192). Second, our explanation takes the form of an argument which causally connects an action (or a set of actions), on the one hand, and an outcome (or a set of outcomes), on the other, which may be quite distant from each other in temporal
terms. Moreover, given the longer time horizon and the interactionist process lying at the core of our project, there will likely be feedback effects with some variables figuring as ‘outcome’ in one particular perspective while figuring as ‘cause’ in another. For instance, de-Europeanization figures as an outcome at the macro-level (of identity change) but also as a cause at the micro-level (of decision). ‘Change’ (if only incremental) rather than ‘continuity’ could be ascertained only by considering this constant back-and-forth between German action (within an existing framework of European governance structures), on the one hand, and the causal impact of (changing) European structures of governance on subsequent German action, on the other, within a longer time horizon.

So how exactly do our case studies support this de-Europeanization claim? The ‘puzzle’ here is how we can account for Germany switching from a vanguard of European integration (say, in the 1980s and early 1990s) to a laggard today. How did it come about that one of the most thoroughly ‘Europeanized’ member states (re-)discovered practices and beliefs which favour intergovernmentalist EU governance structures with increasing voice opportunities for its member states in general and its most populous (or most ‘powerful’) members in particular? The brief and simplified answer is that this outcome is not the result of some grand design. Quite the opposite is the case: after unification the whole mindset of German decision-makers was poised exactly in the opposite direction. There is no evidence whatsoever to support the view that German decision-makers were disingenuous when they promised wholeheartedly to work for ‘a European Germany rather than a German Europe’ in 1990. However, specific sets of circumstances at particular points in time along the trajectory of German-European interaction have led to decisions (as well as consequences) which have accumulated over time to produce results which contradicted Germany’s traditional integrationist policy orientation. In some instances (such as the Amsterdam decision to block QMV in refugee and asylum policy) the outcome itself seemed to have come as a surprise to the Germans themselves. Yet the effects of this change (both internally as well as internationally) turned out to be far less malign than implicitly assumed in traditional pleas that Germany must not stray from the path of ever-closer European integration. Even though Germany’s partners may initially have been annoyed, they finally accepted the results – not least because this type of behaviour was considered ‘normal’ by European standards anyway. Moreover, domestically political actors were even likely to score points by framing the outcome in terms of securing German ‘national’ interests vis-à-vis ‘Brussels’. The overall result was an enlargement of the

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space of legitimate or appropriate forms of action in Germany’s EU policies, that is, the legitimation of practices which turned into new habits (or routines). The decisions on refuge and asylum policy in the aftermaths of Amsterdam and the policy positions taken by the German government are cases in point. Thus, creative action under conditions of ‘crisis’ decision-making at the micro-level has initiated (often unintentionally) new practices which eventually cumulated to new policy orientations and even identity change at the macro-level. A note of caution is called for here: this is obviously a very rough and highly simplifying version of an argument which is spelled out in more detail and with more differentiation in the case studies. However, it seems to fit with some recurring patterns which we observed in our two cases and which appear to be operable well beyond the issue areas examined in more detail here.

If one examines all the major initiatives and decisions taken by the German government in asylum and defense since the mid-1980s – that is, if we focus, for a moment, at the micro-level of decisions – five different types can be distinguished. First, there were initiatives which were purposefully and creatively designed to push ahead with an ever more integrated Europe. This is where entrepreneurial action seemed to be possible and where the German government also invested energy, prestige and skill in realizing innovative potential. Cases in point are the Franco-German agreement which eventually led to the Schengen Treaty, or the double-hatting initiative by the German government during the German EU Presidency in the first half of 1999.

Second, there are initiatives which represent reflexive ‘Europeanized’ reactions to perceived problems. These are cases where it seemed ‘natural’ to proceed along the same proven paths of integration which the Federal Republic had pursued so successfully ever since the 1950s. This pattern is most obvious in the early 1990s. For instance, the German government almost instinctively supported further integration in the fields of refuge and asylum as well as defense in the run-up to the IGCs at both Maastricht and Amsterdam. The same holds for the broad support for a change of the German Grundgesetz in the early 1990s which allowed for a greater say in European affairs by the Länder. Germany’s going along with France and Britain with the Saint Malo initiative also falls into this category.

Third, there are, however, also instances where seemingly integrationist solutions in accordance with Germany’s long-cherished Europeanized identity also served instrumental political ends with regard to domestic politics. This is observable, for instance, in the support given by Germany
to the creation of the third pillar at Maastricht whereby Germany successfully transferred the asylum and refugee problem to the European level, necessitating a change of the Grundgesetz in order to meet European requirements. There is also some evidence that progress on closer defense cooperation after the Franco-British initiative of Saint Malo was seen as means by some German decision-makers to proceed more rapidly with a restructuring of the Bundeswehr that would enable it to conduct military interventions alongside Germany’s militarily more advanced allies, such as France and Britain, while at the same time also providing for continued reassurance about US involvement in European security affairs.

Fourth, there are also decisions which where neither motivated by outright integrationist nor ‘intergovernmentalist’ ambitions but which, due to a particular constellation of political forces and interests, turned out to have a far-reaching (partly ‘de-Europeanizing’) effect: the decision to block QMV in refugee and asylum policy at the Amsterdam summit and the pressures on conscription as a result of previous pro-integrationist initiatives in defence are cases in point.

Fifth, and finally, there are also decisions which provide an undisguised view of Germany’s changing identity, that is, pro-intergovernmentalist decisions which are (more or less openly) justified in terms of ‘national interests’ and which would have been unthinkable 15 years ago. In the aftermath of the Amsterdam summit this is very obvious with regard to an accelerating retreat by the German government from positions favouring QMV solutions, but it is also starting to show in the field of defence, where a ‘shift of focus from institutional and symbolic questions to the issue of capabilities’ (Chapter 3, this volume, p. XXX) has sharpened the sense that Germany faces some tough choices on defence spending as well as force planning while also fostering a more narrowly circumscribed definition of decisions which Germany is willing to submit to QMV (as in the case of Fischer’s tabled amendment in the context of European Convention where he argued for unanimous decision-making in specifying the agency’s statute).

In what sense do these observations at the decision-making level add up to descriptions at a higher level of aggregation where we may discern changing patterns? Obviously, the more we focus on the fine-grained detail of decision-making processes the more we are confronted with contingencies which seem to obviate any form of generalization. However, the analysis of decision-making (agency) is not only important in actually tracing the policy-making effects of identity. It is also necessary in developing a clearer sense as to the potential of agency to actually shape an environment (and thereby, more or less consciously,
also recreate identity). In our cases this is visible with regard to German agency vis-à-vis institutional reform in the EU. We found a few instances (though mostly in the 1980s and early 1990s) where institutional change at the European level and in line with the predictions made by Europeanists could be clearly traced to German agency. More surprisingly, though, we found even more instances (and increasingly so since the mid-1990s) where German agency was responsible for institutional solutions which ran counter to Europeanist predictions. This is most obvious with regard to the decisions reached at the Amsterdam summit with regard to asylum, but it is increasingly also observable in defence, where powerful domestic interests are usually less significant in influencing government policy.

Thus, whereas it is certainly too early to argue that Germany’s Europeanized identity of the 1980s has been replaced by a de-Europeanized identity in 2005, there are certainly powerful (and mounting) indicators that we are observing an accelerating process of de-Europeanization. It is here that patterned action comes into focus.17 Three observations stand out in this context. First, and least surprisingly, it is mainly domestic issues that drive de-Europeanization. Well into the 1990s the beliefs and/or instincts among federal agencies and leading politicians in the executive branch pointed them towards pro-integrationist initiatives. However, for reasons which were seldom openly and directly related to Germany’s traditional Europeanist orientation, other domestic actors were pursuing objectives which conflicted with this tradition. This was the case with regard to the Länder in Amsterdam and it was also the case with regard to powerful domestic voices opposing the abolition of conscription. In most of these cases the outcome was that German policy stayed on a ‘Europeanization-by-default’ course of action at best. However, with time passing it was more likely to switch to instrumental (‘national interest’) positions expressed most prominently in terms of an insistence on unanimous decision-making rules.

This leads to a second, less obvious, observation regarding the robustness of Germany’s Europeanized identity. In our cases the foundation of this Europeanized identity appeared to be much more fragile than usually suggested in the literature. When push came to shove, that is, when a choice had to be made between narrowly defined ‘national interests’, on the one hand, and state-transcending ‘European interests’, on the other, ‘Europeanists’ seldom prevailed over ‘nationalists’ – and increasingly less so as the 1990s progressed.18 This is not to say that some individual decision-makers or coalitions were not pushing hard for traditional Europeanist solutions. Helmut Kohl, for instance, did try
to prevail with his preferred solution in the context of the Amsterdam summit until he realized that Länder opposition could not be overcome. However, as the 1990s moved into the twenty-first century, Germany as a collective actor increasingly arrived at ‘nationalist’ decisions. Yet in contrast to what Realists expected none of these decisions were part and parcel of some grand de-Europeanization (or re-nationalization) design. Rather, policy turned out to be more ‘nationalist’ because competing domestic interests often framed in ‘national interest’ terms prevailed over Europeanist objectives by default.

Third, the distinction between EU policies arrived at ‘by design’ or ‘by default’ points to the significance of both agency and structure in (re-) patterning Germany’s EU policies and identity. In the former, agency prevails, whereas structure(s) – here also encompassing other actors as part of the European governance environment of Germany – prevails in the latter. This is not to say that these structures ‘forced’ Germany into a de-Europeanizing mode of action. Yet it does imply that Germany as a collective actor did not (for whatever reason) muster sufficient resolve, energy and skill to see to it that Europeanist solutions were reached against powerful forces outside as well as inside Germany.

Fourth, this distinction between ‘by design’ and ‘by default’ is also useful at the level of outcomes, that is, regarding (a) institutional (or structural) transformation at the EU level, (b) change in policies more broadly defined, and (c) transformation of Germany’s identity. As a matter of fact, we believe that one of the most interesting findings of our cases has to do with the complex relationship between action (be it ‘by design’ or ‘by default’), on the one hand, and its interactionist effects on European governance structures, German foreign policy more broadly or German identity, on the other. Simply put, if one were to compare Germany’s credible, thoroughly Europeanist ambitions and commitments from 1990 (‘Wir wollen kein deutsches Europa, sondern ein europäisches Deutschland’) with Germany’s significantly de-Europeanized EU policies and identity today, one certainly has to wonder how this stunning transformation has come about. Our case studies offer two answers. The first relates to the observation that Germany as Europe’s ‘tamed power’ has increasingly become lamed. This becomes obvious, as pointed out in the previous paragraph, when one examines the Europeanist enthusiasm and initiative of earlier decades with the 1990s. During this last decade in particular, the German government often seemed disoriented as to what to do when faced with a problem which had before instinctively been approached with a Europeanized (and Europeanizing) mindset. In contrast Germany now seemed to lack the
necessary resolve, energy and skill to see to it that Europeanist solutions are reached. The second answer is equally important and, again, less obvious. One of our key findings is that one must not underestimate the dimension of unintended consequences, that is, effects which resulted from a confluence of actors, policies and structures which were not necessarily or obviously related to one another but which became inextricably linked over time to produce de-Europeanization effects both as far as Germany’s EU policies and its Europeanized identity were concerned.

Conclusions and outlook

Germany’s role in European integration has shifted from vanguard to laggard. While the origins of both asylum and immigration policy as well as security and defence policy at the European level can be traced back to initiatives that were supported by or even originated in Germany, further institutionalization has been obstructed. While in the field of asylum and refugee policy the Amsterdam ‘summit’ marks a clear turning point in Germany’s position, the transformation of German policies on European security and defence proceeded rather as an incremental decrease in material support, aggravating substantive progress in the policy field. In both cases, however, processes of transformation cannot be reduced to situational changes in position. Moreover, in both cases changes were largely independent of the change in government in 1998 which in itself marked a major break in Germany’s post-war history due to the fact that a Conservative coalition was replaced for the first time by a coalition of two self-consciously ‘left’ parties traditionally emphasizing an ‘internationalist’ foreign policy orientation. It didn’t come as much of a surprise, therefore, that in security and defence policy the ‘Red–Green’ coalition government continued to support further integration and actively re-embedded the Saint Malo initiative into the framework of European governance at the Cologne summit in 1999. In asylum and refugee policy, in contrast, a major policy change had already taken place at the Amsterdam ‘summit’ in 1997. Contrary to the findings of policy research that has emphasized political learning in the context of changes of government (cf. Sabatier, 1993) the transformation from vanguard to laggard in the policy fields under investigation unfolded continuously, without significant interruptions in 1998.

It is the routinized pattern by means of which Germany used to prefer ‘European solutions’ – thus negating conflicts of interest between the intertwined levels of policy-making that is subject to change – that seems to give way to a gradually more instrumentalist attitude vis-à-vis
the politics of integration. Hence, it seems warranted to interpret policy developments in both cases under investigation as strong indicators for a change in German identity, a transformation of the routinized self-perception rather than a mere shift in behaviour. This argument is strengthened by even a brief look into other areas of Germany’s EU policies. Obviously the theoretical framework underlying our project rather narrowly circumscribes the limits of generalizing conclusions. However, the three key variables guiding the selection of our two cases (malleability of European governance structures; a significant influence of intergovernmental decision-making which facilitates German influence; and a special interest on the part of Germany in the issue area in question) can easily be applied to other areas as well. The EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Eastern enlargement of the Union – just to mention two examples – are cases in point.

From the early 1990s on Germany had been one of the champions of Eastern enlargement. In coming out in strong support for both ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’, the Kohl government had to appease the French who feared that Germany would turn its back on its traditional Western orientation. As one observer put it, German unification and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact had thrown the country back into its traditional position in the middle of Europe (‘europäische Mittellage’), yet it didn’t want to (and was expected not to try to) return to Germany’s traditional ‘Mitteleuropa-Politik’ as well (Link, 2002, p. 610). So Eastern enlargement became the touchstone of Germany’s continuing commitment to its integrationist orientation – and without any doubt Germany has largely lived up to meet these expectations. Nevertheless, as the actual date of accession of the first round of Eastern enlargement approached in 2004, the German government became much more circumspect in defending more narrowly defined ‘national interests’. Moreover, the public mood has shifted markedly during the past few years from cautious support to outright rejection of further enlargement (see Table 4.2).

In response to these developments, two of the major parties, CDU and CSU, have stated publicly that they will try to prevent full membership for Turkey. Moreover, they have recently come to emphasize ‘strict adherence’ to EU accession criteria as a prerequisite for finalizing the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania (CDU/CSU, 2005, p. 36; Merkel, 2005, p. 17080A). Thus, as in the two cases examined in detail in our project, EU-enlargement began as a project with Germany out front as one of its initiators and key proponents. Today, however, Germany (together with Austria) is leading the laggard camp of those member states least enthusiastic about admitting more states.
EMU may perhaps be an even more fitting example. When the Stability and Growth Pact accompanying EMU was created in 1995/96 to provide for monetary stability, the German government was isolated among its partners in calling for as little political discretion as possible in imposing automatic sanctions against those surpassing established limits. Due to a very broad coalition of states opposing automatic sanctions, however, Germany’s Finance Minister, Theo Waigel, could not realize his more far-reaching objectives (Heipertz and Verdun, 2005). Still, the Stability and Growth Pact was approved with a set of rather detailed and strict rules (Singer, 2005). Up until this day constructivists interpret the creation of EMU as a major expression of Germany’s Europeanized identity. Yet only five years later it was Germany itself which not only refused to comply by these rules but actually led the move to ‘suspend’ them. When the German budget deficit for 2001 approached the 3 per cent threshold set out in the Stability Pact, the European Commission proposed to the Ecofin Council in early 2002 ‘to give Germany an early warning’. The German government could only avert being officially reprimanded by publicly committing itself to take ambitious consolidation measures. Yet in subsequent months the promises made never materialized. Moreover, when the Commission finally initiated formal steps to allow for Germany to be officially sanctioned for not abiding by the Pact Germany and France pushed the Ecofin Council in November 2003 to

### Table 4.2 Support and rejection of further enlargement of the EU in German public opinion (%)

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*Source: Eurobarometer (EB).*
‘suspend’ the excessive deficit procedure initiated by the Commission. From a legal point of view this amounted to an open breach of the Pact as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in the summer of 2004 in annulling Ecofin’s conclusions in its essential elements. However, more importantly from our perspective, this case clearly showed that Germany utterly failed an easy test of the action-guiding power of its Europeanized identity: Germany only had to abide by what it had put in place itself and what the majority of experts interpreted (in line with the ECJ) as a clear-cut set of rules. However, it did not do so. Rather, driven by domestic political concerns, the government chose to pursue narrowly defined national interests.

Implications for theory

There is obviously a pattern well beyond the cases examined in detail in the main part of the book. However, it is important to emphasize that Germany’s transmogrified identity has not been the result of strategic planning, or an unfolding grand strategy. Nor did it amount to an unavoidable adaptation to structural shifts at the systemic level. Before we turn to a brief discussion of some implications of these developments for Germany’s future European policy, we will offer some conclusions for theory.

As we have demonstrated, the processes of transformation in Germany’s identity were produced by the complex interplay between German policy and European structures of governance. Hence, in contrast to the ‘individualist and calculative conception of action’ (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 965) underlying most operationalizations of the Agency–Structure Problem (ASP), our analytical framework has shed light on the indirect effects of (inter)action. Specifically, we could observe three kinds of indirect effects. First, reflexive actors are capable of steering the process in order to achieve specific outcomes. The constitutional changes that significantly curtailed Germany’s liberal rights on asylum, for instance, were legitimized in public with references to legal obligations at the European level (cf. Wolf, 2000). Second, as we have pointed out above, the interactionist framework allows us to trace both the emergence and the political effects of unintended consequences. Being capable of grasping these diverse forms of indirect consequences of action, the operationalization of the ASP as an interplay between German policy and European structures of governance in the context of an interactionist framework has thus allowed us to take seriously the proposition that both structural and agentic determinism need to be avoided in order to grasp processes of
transformation. As Peter Katzenstein put it right before the upheavals of 1989/1990, history is often written in terms of a sequence of irregular big bangs. ... To date we have no social science equivalent to chaos theory, no concepts or models that help us to discriminate between incremental and discontinuous changes. Incremental change or large-scale change thus can be interpreted only after the fact. But once our hunch tells us that we are living in a period of relative normalcy or great turbulence, something that we must judge ourselves, then we can make contingent generalizations about systems, actors, rules, and interactions. (Katzenstein, 1989, p. 296)

In Katzenstein’s distinction between ‘relative normalcy’, on the one hand, and ‘great turbulence’, on the other, the kind of change we observed seems to fall exactly in between. There were few ‘big bangs’ – as there were, for instance, in the field of Germany’s security policy more broadly. The Amsterdam summit came closest to being a ‘big bang’ event in this sense. Not many observers, however, even noticed this one. Yet there was a lot of incremental change which – in Paul Pierson’s typology – resembled a slow-moving causal process with a long time horizon on both the causal and the outcome side. In this sense the thesis about Germany’s de-Europeanization is analogous to Pierson’s causal process of ‘global warming’.

Our case studies have also shown how important it is to relate the micro-level of decisions and policies to the macro-level of identity (re)production over an extended period of time in order to come to grips with the significance of evolutionary change. The reference to the three levels of decisions, policies and identity is significant here because if we look closely at the series of loosely connected decisions in the fields of defence and asylum at the micro-level, these decisions acquire meaning only if we weave them into a larger metanarrative at the macro-level which relates policy and identity, on the one hand, and rules and resources, on the other. What we do observe at the micro-level is a mixture of decisions which – even though they may be both driven by a shallow Europeanized predisposition on the part of German decision-makers and constrained by the institutional environment of the EU – combine to produce changing policies, a changing identity and even changing institutions (although this latter phenomenon figures less prominently in our cases) at the macro-level which were either unexpected or not accounted for in terms of their underlying causal mechanisms.
Applicable to any cases of dense institutionalization beyond the nation state, our interactionist framework thus provides an alternative to predominant operationalizations in the wake of the ‘constructivist turn’ in International Relations. Ironically, a debate that has been triggered by abstract reflections on an ontological paradoxon, that is, agent–structure co-constitution, has yielded hardly any methodological answers as to how this paradoxon could be translated into empirical research. One critic even observed that quite the opposite can be observed: ‘Unable to shake the positivist orthodoxy because it never really understood it, the discipline simply poured the newly emerging patterns of thought into the old framework’ (Wight, 2002, p. 40). What appears to be problematic with many attempts to operationalize the ASP is not only its presumed bias toward progressive norms (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, pp. 403–4), that is, a predominance of ‘liberal constructivisms’ that ought to be remedied by ‘realist constructivisms’ (cf. Barkin, 2003). The more fundamental problem is that methodologically, constructivist approaches in IR tend to entail a preference for either liberal or realist predictions instead of conceiving of specific agency–structure interplays as open processes that might yield either realist or liberal outcomes – or neither. Avoiding theoretically predetermined answers to empirical questions our interactionist framework forbears from stipulating specific predictions as to how the interplay between German policy and European structures of governance will play out. Hence, we have not proposed a causal model of European integration, but have suggested an analytical framework that is generally applicable in any instance of institutionalization in order to grasp the intertwined effects of international institutions on national foreign policy, on the one hand, and foreign policy initiatives on international institutionalization (or regional integration), on the other.

Implications for the future of Germany’s European policy

German foreign policy and European governance are inextricably intertwined. However, developments in the EU as well as in Germany during the past few years have changed the dynamics of this interplay. Most importantly, the new dynamics are likely to accelerate the de-Europeanization trends examined above for the foreseeable future. Three dimensions stand out. First, EU enlargement has further increased anxieties about the viability of the socioeconomic system which Germans had come to appreciate over the preceding decades. A particularly negative impact was feared with regard to unemployment and the possibility of illegal immigration. The overall effect of this rise in anxieties has been not
only that a strong majority of Germans is opposed to further enlargement but also that trust in the EU in general has fallen to historical low points. In a poll from early 2005, 51 per cent of Germans expressed little or no trust in the EU. Only 38 per cent had some trust or a lot of trust (in comparison, 47 per cent of Germans expressed some trust or a lot of trust in the United Nations).\(^{27}\) According to the same poll, Germans also saw the influence of their country shrinking within the EU. Whereas 61 per cent still believed in the spring of 2005 that German influence was ‘big’ (52 per cent) or ‘very big’ (9 per cent), these figures were well below those in the last year of Helmut Kohl’s chancellorship when 76 per cent (60 per cent; 16 per cent) thought so. As a consequence, it is hardly surprising that only 33 per cent of Germans think that moving ahead with European integration (‘taking care that more decisions are taken at the European level’) should rank among the most important objectives of German foreign policy (Noelle, 2005). Among a total of 17 possible objectives listed, this one was ranked as least important.\(^{28}\) Importantly, the supporters of the CDU, the CSU and the FDP – that is, the three parties with traditionally strong pro-European credentials which had formed the parliamentary opposition between 1998 and 2005 – almost consistently expressed more Eurosceptic views than supporters of the other main parties.

Second, these shifting attitudes among the German public increasingly resonate in political discourse. Long before the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands had the major political parties stopped calling for a federal Europe. Foreign Minister Fischer’s Humboldt speech from May 2000 in which he still called for a ‘fully sovereign European Federation’ built on ‘self-confident nation states’ (Fischer, 2000) was the last integrationist grand design offered by a prominent German politician. Yet even Fischer himself has markedly switched in subsequent years to a position which openly repudiated ‘core’ designs and now emphasized instead that Europe needed to position itself ‘strategically’ vis-à-vis (and together with) the US to meet global challenges (Fischer, 2004). Not only did Germany silently bid goodbye to federalist ambitions, but most parties also started to openly advocate redirecting resources to the national level. This position was clearly articulated among all the major parties with regard to Germany’s share in financing the EU budget. When the European Commission called for a budgetary limit of 1.24 per cent of gross national income for the period between 2007 and 2013, the German government insisted that this limit must not cross a 1.0 per cent threshold (for Germany, the difference between these two figures would have amounted to (60 billion over the six-year
Moreover, in its election platform for the 2005 federal elections, the CDU and the CSU propagated as a general rule that ‘competencies had to be transferred back’ to the national level (CDU/CSU, 2005, pp. 35–6). Thus, the de-Europeanization trend we observed in our cases as a rather inconspicuous development now manifests itself clearly and openly at many different levels – that is, in polling data, political discourse and political decisions.

Third, these changing dynamics at the level of German state are magnified by changes in the structure of European governance itself. EU enlargement has not only made it more difficult for any individual country to shape EU politics, it has also altered the dynamics of coalition-building in the EU. Although Germany and France continued to coordinate their European policies during the past few years as closely as any time during recent memory (their joint ‘axis’ in the run-up to the Iraq war obviously being the most important indicator), their relative weight has clearly been reduced. This has certainly added to the mounting scepticism within Germany about the future course of European integration. Moreover, the failed referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005 and the subsequent failure of the Brussels summit in June have created a ‘serious crisis’ (G. Schröder) not only within the EU but also one for Germany’s European policy. The fact that the Chancellor was willing to compromise on his tough negotiation line on the future EU budget at the June summit in order to secure a deal was interpreted in Germany as a relapse into the kind of ‘checkbook diplomacy’ which Schröder himself had castigated in his early years in power. This crisis is worsened still by the failure of the constitutional treaty because it leaves Germany in a much weaker position structurally compared with the new institutional structures which the treaty would have created. With the decision-making rules of the Treaty of Nice remaining in force in the newly enlarged Union, Germany is in a much more difficult position to form blocking minority coalitions.

All this adds up to a situation which is quite conducive to an acceleration of the de-Europeanization trend we identified in our research. The political implications of these changes will become very concrete when the EU finalizes the new rules for the EU budget after 2007. It will come into sharper relief still when EU member states draw the conclusions from the current institutional crisis. Institutional designs which revive conceptions of a European ‘core’ (as in the mid-1990s) are not likely to figure prominently. Rather, for the foreseeable future, German governments are more likely to advocate institutional solutions which
strengthen the intergovernmental side at the expense of supranational solutions. In this sense the old Europeanized German eagle is certainly descending. Whether it is crashing (as some people interpret the painting on the cover of this book) or whether it is actually rising (as could be argued, given the fact that the artist, Georg Baselitz, often depicts his objects upside-down in order to turn the world on its head) remains to be seen. In any case, it will be a different Germany in a different Europe.

Notes

1 I am grateful to Rainer Baumann, Monika Bösche, Benjamin Herborth and Wolfgang Wagner for comments on earlier versions of this chapter and to Frank Sauer, Sonja Schirmbeck and Christian Weber for research assistance.


3 For early articulations of a similar hunch, see Bulmer and Paterson (1996) and Hyde-Price and Jeffery (2001). Already in 1996, Bulmer and Paterson were sketching an ‘emergent leader’ scenario along the lines of the introductory quote from The Economist which anticipated the old Federal Republic ‘being overtaken by a more purposeful articulation of national preferences’. Their first (‘gentle giant’) scenario was similar to Katzenstein’s envisaging ‘an influential state somewhat reluctant to assert its strength’ (Katzenstein, 1997a, p. 10). In my own work I found Katzenstein’s interpretation (and Bulmer and Paterson’s ‘gentle giant’ scenario) most convincing myself until about 1997/98 (see Hellmann, 1996, 1997a). In subsequent years, however, I became increasingly irritated about changes in German policy, more recently characterizing these changes as a process of ‘Realpolitik resocialization’ (see Hellmann, 2004; the gradual shift in my assessment can be traced via Hellmann, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000, 2001a, 2001b and 2002). For a critique of my view, see the debate in WeltTrends, No. 43, 2004; No. 47, 2005.

4 The concept of ‘sowohl-als-auch-Politik’ is a fitting invention mostly of British observers of German foreign policy. Beside the article from The Economist cited in note 1, this practice has been sharpened later on in other analyses in The Economist and by Timothy Garton Ash. The concept implied that Germany always wanted to ‘have it all ways’ by seeking cover in multilateral or supranational environments, ‘using the diversity of its interests to avoid hard choices’ (‘Germany and its Interests: Hearing Secret Harmonies’, The Economist, 20 November 1993, p. 23; see also Garton Ash, 1994, p. 78. For a more detailed discussion of ‘sowohl-als-auch-Politik’, see also Hellmann, 1997b, pp. 29–31).

Pierson (2003, p. 189). Pierson defines ‘slow-moving outcomes’ as ‘processes where meaningful change in the dependent variable occurs only over the long run’.

Later on, Dyson and Goetz (2003b, p. 7) add a more cautious note, however, arguing that it is also ‘possible to see Germany’s relationship with the EU as more finely and precariously balanced and congruence as more contingent and fortuitous’ (‘congruence’ here refers to a ‘a basic “goodness of fit” between Germany and the EU’, ibid.). ‘In such a perspective, domestic actors have more discretion in exercising their – institutionally circumscribed – power, domestic structures offer actors opportunities to pursue change in European policy, European integration has unintended and unanticipated consequences, public opinion on Europe is dynamic rather than locked into a “permissive consensus” and, most importantly, institutional change at both European and domestic levels challenges congruence’ (ibid.). This is certainly a valid way to frame alternative approaches to the study of Germany and Europe. If one accepts it, our project focuses on the ‘contingent’ aspects of the relationship.

This use of the term ‘Europeanization’ as a label for a school of thought on German foreign policy needs to be distinguished from the concept of ‘Europeanization’ as it is used to characterize a certain strand of literature or scholarly debate in European studies. The latter is discussed in more detail below.

For another exception, see Hyde-Price and Jeffery (2001). They take Europeanization seriously as a political process, but at the same time argue (from a constructivist perspective) that Germany may be changing fundamentally. They see Germany’s political elites engaged in a project of re-imagining Germany as a ‘normal’ country with potentially far-reaching implications for the future direction of the European integration process as a whole.

On the distinction between ‘autonomy maximization’ and ‘influence maximization’ as two overall foreign policy strategies in the Realist tradition, see Baumann et al. (1999).

Given the liberal roots of the Europeanization literature, one obviously finds several references in the literature which basically grants that analyses in this tradition are based on a ‘dynamic conception of historical change’ which allows for institutional developments in response to domestic as well as international changes (cf. Katzenstein, 1997a, p. 14). However, in sketching Germany’s ‘tamed power’, Katzenstein’s theoretical argument does not engage a scenario in which German power could once again be ‘untamed’. The same holds for Thomas Risse’s work on Germany’s Europeanization. His evolutionary model of Europeanized nation-state identity construction in principle allows for a process of de-Europeanization if the ‘resonance’ within German society for alternative identity constructions increases and if material interests coincide with such a reorientation (Risse, 2001, pp. 200–3). Yet in his model it would take ‘severe crises’ (rather than mere gradual change accumulating as a result of a series of minor political decisions) to launch a process of de-Europeanization. Moreover, by around 2000 he saw
no empirical evidence whatsoever to expect any such a change (for a more recent argument emphasizing continuity see also Risse, 2004). As the theoretical work among historical sociologists (especially sociologists of time) has shown, there is a tendency among institutionalist work towards ‘models of change suggesting a single developmental path defined by displacement of the old by the new’. These models are often based on the assumption of irreversible trajectories of development. Yet in a variety of ways, research on questions such as capitalist development has shown that this is a highly problematic assumption (cf. Aminzade, 1992, pp. 464–5).

12 Hegel’s concept ‘Aufheben’ is often used to integrate three functions of scholarly progression: (1) to preserve what is valuable in our pool of knowledge, (2) to abandon what no longer seems appropriate, and thereby (3) to elevate the tradition to a new, and presumably more appropriate, level of sophistication. In and of itself, the term ‘Aufheben’ can be used in all three senses.

13 Obviously, this version of realism following Hans-Peter Schwarz has little in common with Waltzian realism. Waltz, however, is of less relevance to us both because he has little to say about domestic processes in general and Germany’s role in Europe in particular. For the indeterminacy of his predictions to Germany’s future role, see Waltz (1993, pp. 50, 54, 62–7, 69–70).

14 It has become commonplace in academic debate to lament the lack of a shared understanding of what Europeanization stands for (cf. Eising, 2003; Mair, 2004, pp. 337–8). Johan Olson (2002, pp. 926–43) has identified five types of usage: (1) Europeanization as a reference for the territorial reach of the EU, that is, Europeanization resulting from the expansion of the European Union; (2) Europeanization as a process of institution-building at the European level; (3) Europeanization as penetration of national systems of governance from the European level; (4) Europeanization as exportation of political organization and governance structures typical for Europe; (5) Europeanization as a political unification project. An excellent and very broad-ranging survey of Europeanization in the German context is provided by Dyson and Goetz (2003a, 2003b); see also Anderson (2003). Earlier useful discussions include Kohler-Koch (2000), Risse et al. (2001) and Tonra (2001).

15 It is important to keep the pragmatist notion of belief in mind, that is, beliefs are rules for action; cf. Chapter 1, this volume.

16 In the early 1990s, such a scenario has been discussed mainly under the heading of a ‘re-nationalization’ of Germany’s integrationist orientation in foreign policy well beyond the EU (for a summary, see Hellmann, 1997b). And indeed, at first sight it seems that much of what we are observing can be classified under this label. However, there are at least two significant differences between de-Europenization and re-nationalization: re-nationalization generally connotes intentionality – which is precisely what is not figuring prominently in our cases (at least, not yet). Second, and more importantly, re-nationalization usually suggests a return to some status quo ante. Again, in our interpretation of Germany’s European policy (and its foreign policy more generally) this would not be an appropriate interpretation. Our claim is that the incremental change we are observing will yield new beliefs and practices which may reveal similarities with older beliefs and practices (such as those conveyed by the term ‘re-nationalization’). However, we also believe that we will only be able to fully appreciate these changes in conceptual terms if
we allow for novelty to outweigh familiarity. At the same time it still seems
difficult to suggest a novel concept which goes beyond the mere reverse of
‘Europeanization’ since the direction is not clear-cut after all. ‘De-
Europeanization’ only denotes what we are moving away from. In this sense
it is a less than perfect concept. In the medium term, ‘Realpolitik
resocialization’ along ‘modern power politics’ (cf. Hellmann, 2004) lines may (or may
not) turn out to be a more fitting description in ‘positive’ terms. However,
the authors of this book as a whole are not yet ready to subscribe to it at this
point in time.

17 Patterns, of course, are verbal constructions intended to generate meaning.
They do not ‘exist out there’, but result from observation and causal attribution.
Whether some claim about patterns is convincing or not is a matter of
debate in which theoretical arguments and empirical observation have to be
connected.

18 ‘Europeanists’ and ‘nationalists’ are here being used as a shorthand for ‘state-
transcending European interest advocates’ and ‘state-fixated national interest
advocates’, respectively.

19 This section draws on the concluding section of Hellmann et al. (2005) which
summarizes the main findings of this project in article form. Wolfgang
Wagner, Monika Bösche, Rainer Baumann and especially Benjamin Herborth
have been contributing to this section.

20 As Thomas Risse put it (Risse, 2002, p. 13, emphasis in original): policy-makers
‘framed the issue in terms of roughly the following equation: Support for the
Euro = support for European integration = “good Europeanness” = good
Germanness = overcoming the German militarist and nationalist past’. In other
words, they ‘managed to frame the euro question in terms of the specific
post-World War II German nation-state identity’, thereby forcing opponents
of a single currency ‘to frame their position in interest- rather than identity-
based terms and to make sure that they could not be regarded as “bad
Germans”, i.e., proponents of German nationalism’. See also Risse (2006).

21 Commission assesses the German Stability Programme Update (2001–05),
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/164&format=HTML
-aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.

22 ‘2546. Tagung des Rates Wirtschaft und Finanzen am 25. November 2003 in
Brüssel’, No. 14492/03: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/
de/ecofin/78222.pdf, p. 21.

23 Judgment of the European Court of Justice, 13 July 2004, Case C-27/04:
http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&
alldocs=alldocs&docid=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docj0&
numaff=C-27%2F04&datefe=&datefs=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=
&resmax=100; see also Dutzler and Hable (2005, pp. 8–12).

24 A case in point is the break in the German government’s policy vis-à-vis the
US during the Iraq crisis in 2002/03.

25 It also carries some of the same liabilities when it comes to making the fund-
damental claim stick, as we have already pointed out earlier. As in the case of
‘global warming’, our claim that there is some powerful evidence for far-
reaching (‘structural’) change in Germany’s European policy as well as its
foreign policy identity is equally vulnerable to charges that we were not
distinguishing carefully enough between symptoms (several hot summers in a row) and causes (long-term climate change). Only time will allow to further test the validity of the claim.

26 According to a survey by Fondazione Nord Est/Demos Poll in April 2004, 64 per cent of Germans felt that unemployment in Germany would be negatively affected by enlargement (11 per cent thought that it would have a positive effect). Also, 60 per cent thought that enlargement would have a negative effect on illegal immigration (with 16 per cent expecting positive effects); see ‘Enlargement and European Integration – Citizens, attitudes and expectations’, April 2004: http://www.gms-gmbh.com/admincenter/links/documents/20040607112929_Report%20(english).pdf.

27 Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, ‘Die außenpolitischen Prioritäten aus Sicht der Bevölkerung’, May 2005 (IfD 7070). This poll was conducted for the German government and is not available to the broader public. The figures also show that trust in the EU is even lower among supporters of the Christian Democratic parties and the liberal FDP.

28 In comparison, the following objectives were ranked higher: 83 per cent of Germans supported ‘good relations with European neighbours’ as one of the most important foreign policy objectives; 66 per cent opted for ‘getting other countries to observe human rights’; 60 per cent for ‘participating in fighting crime and terrorism’; 53 per cent for ‘good relations with the US’ as well as ‘a common European foreign policy’; 52 per cent for ‘asserting German interests in Europe’ and 36 per cent for ‘increasing German influence around the world’.

29 Bundesministerium der Finanzen, ‘Stand der Beratungen zur Finanziellen Vorausschau der Europäischen Union’ (April 2005): http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/lang_de/DE/Aktuelles/Monatsbericht_des_BMF/2005/04/Stand_der_Beratungen_zur_Finanziellen_Vorausschau_der_Europäischen_Union.PDF. For background, see also Afhüppe et al. (2005) and the debate between chancellor Schröder (2005) and opposition leader Angela Merkel (2005) in the German Bundestag preceding the summit meeting in Brussels in June.


31 See CDU/CSU-Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, ‘Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik’, Pressemitteilung, 1 September 1994 (also known as the ‘Schäuble-Lamers paper’).


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