Defenders of duties of justice to compatriots sometimes criticize the aspirations of cosmopolitans to develop accounts of justice that are global in scope. The criticisms are many and varied, including in particular concerns about whether cosmopolitanism can allow for appropriate patriotic regard for fellow-citizens, whether cosmopolitanism can allow for the political self-determination of states, and whether cosmopolitanism can account for the basis of duties of justice absent the existence of political communities. These are important debates and their existence seems to me fully predictable for two main reasons. One is that the tradition of theorizing about justice within the state is long, rich, and sophisticated. It contains many important moral insights that ought not to be neglected. The other is that the global association, in contrast to the state, is merely emergent. Its institutions are many but they are comparatively weak and less comprehensive.

I take it that both the rich tradition of political philosophy and the state of the world lay a certain burden of proof—if one can use term *proof* in the context of political philosophy—on cosmopolitans to account for the revisions to the theory of justice that they believe are warranted. Of course any philosophical account of justice carries the burden of rationally defending itself and it may be that the greater burden for cosmopolitans is merely rhetorical, that which lies on any interlocutor who speaks after another. But I assume that the burden common to all is real enough in any case. And having cast my allegiance with the cause of cosmopolitanism, I shall try to do my bit to carry some of the weight for it. I’m going to avoid the onerous—and dialectically stupefying—task of trying to answer all of the many criticisms of cosmopolitanism made by those who defend robust duties to compatriots. Instead I shall set out an account of cosmopolitan duties that is consistent with significant duties to compatriots, duties—I believe—as robust as anyone should reasonably want to defend.

The argument that I shall present goes as follows: In the next section I shall give an account of duties of social justice as associative duties.
Following that I argue that there is a defeasible justificatory presumption that such duties are egalitarian. In the third section I argue that the global economic association is a distinct source of duties of justice and that the global economic association and the state generate distinct goods and powers, which are the basis of distinct conceptions of equality. Finally, I close by considering how cosmopolitanism of this sort can take into account the emergent character of the global economic association.²

1. The Associative Duties of Justice

I assume that there is a universalist foundation for basic moral duties. All persons are owed respect on the basis of their inherent dignity. Included in the class of persons are at least normally competent human beings of a certain age. I assume neither that respect is the only appropriate moral attitude or way of valuing that which we should value nor that entities that are respect-worthy are the only entities that we should value. I keep my assumptions limited then to claim that respect is an attitude owed to all persons and required by their inherent dignity. At least part of this dignity consists in the capacity of persons to be sources of practical reasons. Persons are capable of developing a plenitude of practical reasons based upon prudential, aesthetic, religious, and moral values. They seek to guide their lives by values that they more or less reflectively endorse and thereby to live with integrity and conviction. It is in virtue of the equal possession of this capacity that all persons have equal moral standing as against each of us. We respect persons insofar as we recognize this standing.³ This, I assume, is an important and universal basis of morality.

It does not follow from this universalist moral basis that duties of justice are owed to all persons, although there are cosmopolitan accounts that explicitly hold that thesis.⁴ Such accounts are not readily able to explain the limitations on duties of justice that are characteristic of claims that persons have special duties of justice to compatriots. Whereas Thomas Nagel assumes that the cosmopolitan is committed to the view that duties of justice are universalist, I agree with Nagel that duties of justice are membership dependent.⁵ We do not owe duties of justice to all persons, even though we owe duties of respect to all persons. The former we owe to persons who are co-members of institutions of certain kinds. Justice and injustice are properties of those institutions. Nagel may be correct about
memberships; but he errs in asserting that compatriot status is the only kind of co-membership that generates duties of social justice.

The inherent dignity of persons constrains morally appropriate institutional power. Institutions express respect for persons only if the institutions are such that persons whose lives are lived within the institutions could reasonably endorse them. Otherwise the institutions fail to respect the capacity of persons to be sources of practical reasons. I call this kind of respect justificatory respect.

The version of membership dependence that I affirm is based upon what I term the principle of associational justice. The idea is that duties of social justice exist between persons who have a moral duty of equal respect to one another if those persons are co-members in an association that is (1) relatively strong, (2) largely nonvoluntary, (3) constitutive of a significant part of the background rules for the various relationships of their public lives, and (4) governed by norms that can be subject to human control. With respect to strength, an association is strong to the extent that it is (a) enduring, (b) comprehensively governed by institutional norms, and (c) regularly affecting the highest order moral interests of the persons associated. With respect to nonvolitariness, an association is nonvoluntary to the extent that there is no reasonable alternative to participating in the association.

Employment of this principle requires judgment. There is no bright line that distinguishes associations from mere interactions and not all associations generate duties of justice. The reasons for this are twofold. First, not all associations generate effects with sufficient scope and force to structure a person’s membership in public life. Second, a person’s participation in an association is not always nonvoluntary to a sufficient degree. Consideration of this requires judgments with respect to the reasonableness of various alternatives to participation in the association.

One might challenge the principle of associational justice by pressing the question of why the four institutional requirements listed above generate duties of social justice, if such duties would not exist in the absence of these conditions? Compare the situation of persons in the following two distinct circumstances: In the first the four conditions unambiguously do not obtain; in the second they unambiguously do. Suppose that duties of social justice do not exist between persons in the first. Person A has no
claim on B for treatment of any kind by institutions that might, but do not, mediate their interactions. In the second situation there are such institutions which, ex hypothesi, affect the highest order interests of A and B in a manner that conditions their public lives, but which although changeable by social effort are escapable for each individual only at unreasonably high moral expense. Now imagine further that in the second situation from the beginning of their lives, through no choice of their own, the life prospects of A and B are dramatically different under these institutions, with B’s being profoundly inferior to A’s. The challenger doubts that duties of justice exist in the second situation if they do not exist in the first.

One kind of answer is unavailable to me in response. That is the claim that whenever there is inequality between persons that render the life prospects of one profoundly inferior to the life prospects of another, there is social injustice. A luck egalitarian might claim this but to do so seems inconsistent with membership dependence. Rather, I must assert that the institutional mediation in the second situation is relevant to the generation of duties of justice.

The argument invokes justificatory respect. In the first situation person B may not enlist the demands of justificatory respect concerning his circumstances. Suppose his condition is also relatively poor. He may not demand that person A provide him with reasons for why their common institutions permit such inequality because the inequality is not permitted by common institutions. The conditions of A and B are endogenous to their separate circumstances. B may appeal to A for help, and basic moral duties of humanity might require A to help. But this is a claim on A’s action, not a claim on social institutions. In contrast in the second situation justificatory respect requires that there be reasons for the inequality-permitting institutional structure, reasons that B could reasonably endorse. In the absence of such reasons the institutional order fails to respect B and the inequality that the order permits is unjust.

Although the skeptical challenge to membership dependence can be adequately answered, I don’t believe that there is a knock-down argument that refutes the view that duties of justice are owed to all persons. There are, however, several reasons in support of membership dependence that taken together are, I believe, compelling. The distinction between general moral duties and membership dependent duties of justice is a matter of moral terminology. There are different kinds of moral appraisal. We judge
actions and we judge institutions. The latter judgments concern justice. But there are also substantive considerations, the preponderance of which, I believe, support the membership-dependence account of duties of social justice. First, as I shall argue in due course, the membership-dependence account allows us to make sense of duties of justice both to compatriots and to co-members of the global economic association. Second, as I shall also argue, it allows cosmopolitans to be appropriately sensitive to the emergent character of the global economic association by recognizing that what justice requires might change as the strength of the association increases. Finally, membership dependence avoids certain intuitively implausible entailments of the view that duties of justice exist between all persons. For instance, in the example discussed above, suppose that in the first situation there was inequality between the life prospects of A and B, but they lived at such distance from one another—on other planets, if you will—that regular contact was exceedingly difficult and unusual. The claim that A has a duty of justice to B would require the construction of reliable institutions to remediate the inequality even though it is not one permitted by institutional rules. This, I submit, is implausible; and it is a virtue of an account of justice that it avoids such a conclusion.

2. The Egalitarian Presumption of Justificatory Respect

Certain kinds of institutional frameworks that generate duties of justice are what I call common good associations. Common good associations produce goods and powers to which no one has a preassociational moral claim. I argue that in such associations, justificatory respect establishes a presumption that the rules of the association should distribute the goods and powers of the association equally.

Rules that distribute the goods and powers of a common good association differentially will tend not to satisfy the requirement that the persons who are subject to them be able to reasonably endorse them. Such rules would be rejected if the baseline against which differential burdens are assessed were equality. Equality is the most plausible baseline for the distribution of goods and powers in a common good association because there are no preinstitutional moral claims on the goods and powers generated by the association. Principles that diverge from equality require justification. This is not to argue that there are no plausible justifications for inegalitarian rules, but that there is a presumption against such rules.
This is the justificatory presumption in favor of egalitarianism established by justificatory respect in the context of a common good association. To deny the justificatory presumption is to maintain that goods and powers to which no associate has a preassociational moral claim can be distributed in a manner that profoundly and unequally affects the life prospects of persons, but without a justification to the persons affected. If we did not owe a morally basic duty of respect to persons this could perhaps be the case, but it is implausible if we owe co-members the duty of justificatory respect.

The justificatory presumption in favor of egalitarianism is in principle defeasible. Equal respect for persons does not establish the principle that there could be no morally relevant reasons for diverging from equality. The question to consider is which principles diverging from equality could be reasonably endorsed by members of a common good association. Four seem to be the strongest candidates. (1) Some persons could deserve to have their interests treated less well because of something they have done to harm the interests of others; (2) some persons could voluntarily consent to lesser realization of their interests or to taking certain risks of this outcome; (3) there might be differences in morally relevant needs requiring more resources to satisfy; or (4) offering incentives that produce differential outcomes could benefit everyone in comparison to their condition under equality. The justificatory presumption in favor of egalitarianism does not rule out these four principles. But justificatory respect entails that each is justified only to the extent that it would be reasonable for persons in some common good association to endorse them. In listing these four principles here, I am assuming, but not arguing, that there are associational types in which one or more of each could pass such a test.

3. Egalitarian Ideals for the State and the Global Economy

Both the modern state and global economy are complex associations that involve distribution of economic goods and contain rules of governance. I abstract from this complexity to consider the more purely political aspects of the former and the more purely economic aspects of the latter. I don’t suppose that these aspects exist in isolation from each other or that the abstractions cut reality at the joints. The abstraction merely serves the purpose of focusing our attention on a set of institutions that have peculiar salience for claims of justice. But understanding this salience requires interpretation.
I consider first what the justificatory presumption of respect concerns in the political association of the state. There are various significant (for our purposes) aspects of the state political association. State institutions contain deliberative processes of rule establishment and enforcement to govern the common life of citizens. Many aspects of political co-membership require such rules: Protection from threats, both domestic and foreign; the education of children; the management of the commons; the assembly of persons on the basis of political and religious conviction; the regulation of the public speech of persons; the establishment and enforcement of procedures for attaining offices of leadership; and the manner in which all the rules that govern these and other aspects of life are to be changed. Rules such as these affect persons' highest order moral interests and structure their public lives. For most people the costs of emigration are such that they have no reasonable alternative to living in the state into which they are born. Abstracting from the role that the modern state plays in regulating the production and distribution of economic goods and services, the state contains a set of activities of approximately the sort described above, with perhaps some additions. In light of the principal of associational justice, I now claim that states are associations generating duties of justice among compatriots.

Political justice involves assigning the various powers and benefits of citizenship. Although pre-modern political views upheld the natural fitness of some to rule and enjoy the privileges and prerogatives of office, such views are now in discredit. There are no pre-associational entitlements that persons can plausibly invoke for a disproportional share of the powers and benefits of citizenship. The justificatory presumption in favor of equality favors an equal assignment of these powers and benefits, or equal standing under the rules of the sort mentioned in the previous paragraph. In other words, the presumption of equality promotes the political ideal of equal and inclusive citizenship. It would be reasonable for compatriots to endorse a strong presumption against rules that treat some persons as having a higher citizenship status than others. They would affirm rules requiring institutions to ensure equal democratic rights and to prevent discrimination.

In his discussion of distributive justice in *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls calls the conception that seeks to mitigate advantages that might be gained either from social or natural contingencies *democratic equality*. This ter-
morality is used for a conception comprised of a set of distributive principles, namely fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. But understanding the democratic character of this conception is illustrative of the content of democratic values more generally. The two distributive principles guide institution construction so as to minimize the influence on institutions of social and natural advantages. Likewise democratic citizenship is a conception of citizenship status that permits full membership for all regardless of family background or natural talents.8

The justificatory presumption of equality and the interpretation of the goods and powers of the political association support the democratic political ideal of equal and inclusive citizenship. This ideal can be employed as an interpretive guide for deriving the rules that govern political institutions. We reject rules that provide favored membership status on the basis of considerations such as family background or natural talents. A political association with institutions of equal and inclusive citizenship would ensure both the equal treatment of persons and the social bases for equal powers to influence the political process.9

Ensuring equal powers to influence the process of rule formation requires preventing the purchase of influence by the wealthy and the exercise of influence by control over information. Mechanisms for doing so include public financing of political campaigns and requirements of equitable media coverage of candidates.10 This, however, is not likely to be sufficient to secure the social bases for equal powers to influence the political process. Persons who are deterred from fully exercising their rights of participation because they are impoverished or overworked have not been guaranteed the social bases of equal powers to influence.11 Hence, even a purely political association generates duties of distributive justice among compatriots.12 Citizens must be assured access to sufficient necessary resources such as education, news, income, housing, food, primary healthcare, and leisure to function effectively in the political process. The distributive duties that arise within a political association are broadly consistent with the politics of social democracy as it was developed in the twentieth century. The content of the distributive demands of equal respect when considering a political association, taken in abstraction from the socioeconomic association with which it coexists, tends in the direction of sufficientarianism.
This argument about justice in political associations has both universalist and contextualist-interpretive elements. The universalist element is the norm of respect for the dignity of persons that is the basis of the egalitarian political requirements. The contextualist-interpretive elements are threefold. The first is the application of the principle of associational justice to the political aspects of an association abstracted from other aspects. The point is that we do not owe duties of political justice to everyone, but only to co-members of associations of the requisite kind. The second contextualist-interpretive element involves lending credence to the claim that political associations are common good associations. The third element is the determination of the objects of justice in a political association. If there is a justificatory presumption of equality, we must determine with respect to what. What are the goods and powers of a political association that justice regulates? In this limited regard, I am employing an approach championed by Michael Walzer, namely that, “Social goods have social meanings, and we find our way to distributive justice through an interpretation of their meanings.”13 Contrary to Walzer, however, I take the interpretive task to be primarily about the goods and powers of justice and the ideal of equality that regulates them, not about the distributive principle, which I argue must be basically egalitarian in nature in order to be consistent with respect for human dignity. The combination of universalist and interpretive elements is also at work in the argument that I make presently about justice in the global economic association.

Although theories of natural property rights in persons and products exist, if we assume that these are not compelling, we may take the global economy as a common good association. Consider how the four conditions of the principle of associational justice apply to the case of the global economy.

First consider strength. I take the strength of an association to be a function of its duration, the extent of its governance by norms, and the degree to which it affects the highest order interests of persons. The association created by the processes of economic globalization is a structural feature of capitalist economic development that has gathered pace recently with technological changes, but that has been observable since at least the early colonial area. It is governed primarily by the norm of competition for market share that requires firms to innovate ceaselessly and to reduce production costs. But norms of governance are also in place through
the regulatory framework established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the municipal exclusionary property regimes that are implicitly recognized in all international commerce.

The globalization of trade, investment, and finance has had profound effects on the highest order interests of persons. Consider six such effects. (1) In some cases, state supported export-lead development strategies have produced significant gains for the social development of countries.\(^\text{14}\) (2) Foreign direct investment (FDI) is very often a requirement of domestic financing as well as financing from third party countries.\(^\text{15}\) (3) Generally, globalization has been associated with an increase in job insecurity around the world.\(^\text{16}\) (4) Globalization has also been associated with a general trend towards increasing inequality within countries.\(^\text{17}\) (5) Some of the poorest and most vulnerable people in the world have become worse-off in comparison to the rich. In the 1990s children in sub-Saharan Africa were 19 times more likely to die than children in the world’s richest countries. By 2003 this figure had grown to 26 times.\(^\text{18}\) (6) With the increased globalization of speculative investing has come the increased danger of a generalized global economic crisis. The effects—sometimes referred to as network effects—of the 2008 home mortgage crisis in the USA extended far beyond domestic borders as did the Asian contagion of the late 90s. Regardless of whether persons are directly engaged with the global economy, their local economy is profoundly affected by international trade, FDI, and the globalization of finance.

Second, consider nonvoluntariness. Although state leaders are formally free either to deepen engagement with the global market or not, the fact that nearly every country in the world is a member of the WTO is evidence that there is no reasonable alternative development path. Moreover, in many cases, democratic institutions are compromised or nonexistent; so, citizens of countries that choose this development path have no choice in the matter.

Third consider the significance of the background rules of the global economic association for the public rules that affect persons’ lives. I already canvassed several considerations relevant to this matter when discussing how the rules of trade and investment affect persons’ lives. So, here I’ll briefly highlight three additional considerations. One concerns the way that private economic competition affects public regimes of reg-
ulation. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) observes that “The pressures of global competition have led countries and employers to adopt more flexible labor policies, and work arrangements with no long-term commitment between employer and employee are on the rise.”

Deregulation of the labor market often constitutes a major transfer of power to employers and away from labor. Second, private competition gives rise to new international regimes of regulation that affect the legal structures of states. For example, WTO rules profoundly affect the domestic policies that countries may pursue. The policies that states may employ in the pursuit of infant industry protection are limited by WTO rules. There is a good deal of evidence both historical and recent that such protection is effective in promoting economic development. Third, the WTO’s TRIPs provisions dramatically curtail the ability of states to encourage the production of life-saving pharmacological therapies, by means for example of Article 28’s patent protection.

Finally, consider the requirement that norms be subject to control. Market competition can be limited, directed, or counterbalanced by deliberate public policy; WTO rules can be amended; and property regimes can be altered. So, there is no doubt that the global economic association satisfies this condition.

The application of the principle of associational justice to the global economic association supports the conclusion that it is a source of duties of justice. Justificatory respect establishes presumptive egalitarianism. An interpretation of the political association of the state yielded the ideal of equal and inclusive citizenship. What ideal is appropriate to the global economic association?

An economic association involves the organization of the division of labor and entitlements to capital assets. It also directs the deployment of labor and capital for the production of goods and services that benefit its members. The economy, taken as a common good association, is a nice example of what Rawls refers to as “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.” Elizabeth Anderson provides a compelling account of the division of labor as a cooperative venture:

Each worker’s capacity to labor depends on a vast array of inputs produced by other people—food, schooling, parenting, and the like. It depends on workers in the recreation and entertainment industries, since enjoyment of
leisure activities helps restore energy and enthusiasm for work. In addition, the productivity of a worker in a specific role depends not only on her own efforts, but on other people performing their roles in the division of labor. Michael Jordan could not make so many baskets if no one kept the basketball court swept clean. Millions of people could not even work if public transportation workers went on strike.22

Within a division of labor persons assume roles in the productive process. Such roles sometimes confer significant benefits, although in capitalist societies the greatest benefits come not from the role that a person plays in the productive process but from the capital assets that she owns under the property rules of the system. More often the benefits conferred by the role one plays in the productive process are meager in comparison to the benefits conferred by ownership. The roles confer powers and privileges; but for many employees they confer mostly the responsibility to do as the boss says. Taking the division of labor as cooperative as Anderson does is not inconsistent with taking it to possess compulsion and exploitation.

Economic systems distribute goods and services with profound ramifications for the income, wealth, opportunities, and capabilities of persons participating as economic agents. These ramifications significantly influence the life prospects of persons. Equal respect for persons in the context of an economic association requires that a principle permitting significant inequalities in the life prospects of persons be justified on the basis of reasons that the persons would find reasonable. Due to the cooperative nature of the division of labor it is reasonable to ask how social and natural advantages should affect the outcome of cooperation. Here again the ideal of democratic equality is compelling. Inequalities on the basis of social or natural advantages are suspect in a common good association generating duties of justice. I am not endorsing the specific principles of justice that comprise democratic equality for Rawls, merely the moral reasoning that supports it. This is the basis for affirming the moral ideal of reciprocity within the cooperative venture of production. And reciprocity between persons cooperating for mutual advantage exists only if the terms of cooperation are fair and reasonable.

Assuming the ideal of reciprocity, it seems unreasonable to claim that individuals are owed as a matter of justice the full return at the market rate for their particular contributions to the productive effort. In light of Anderson’s account of the cooperative nature of the division of labor
Rawls’s reasoning seems compelling: One’s talents, efforts, and skills require the cooperation and contribution of others participating in the productive process. It would be unreasonable to reward a person solely on the basis of her individual talents, effort, and skills when these facilitate her contribution only in cooperation with others who support her in various ways and without whom she would not be successful.23

Democratic equality, which seeks to prevent institutionally conferred privileges derived merely from family background or natural talents, appears to offer an appropriate guide to an account of what equal respect requires within a common good economic association. Once we take stock of the cooperative nature of economic production and the advantages that family wealth and natural talents can confer under some institutional arrangements, we will reject rules that confer advantages merely on the bases of family wealth and natural talents. Working out the institutional consequences of the ideal of reciprocity in an economic association involves the guiding conception of democratic equality with its substantial egalitarian tendency.

I don’t want to argue that the demands of reciprocity in an economic association are satisfied merely by the democratic conception of distributive justice. A cooperative venture for mutual economic advantage should not merely reward persons fairly for their efforts in the productive process. It must also ensure that they are capable of enjoying the benefits of the products produced and of the various roles in the productive process. Enjoying the benefits of the various roles in the division of labor requires basic liberties, among others freedom of contract, movement, and association, including unionization. In order to exercise one’s own judgments about how to evaluate the fruits of the productive process, sufficient education and the freedoms of conscience and thought are required. Finally, the institutions of an economic association do not affect only the economic interests of persons (even as I broadly conceive them). Rather other fundamental moral interests are also affected, such as the general capacity of persons to live lives that are in significant ways chosen. Hence, it is implausibly narrow to limit the requirements of reciprocity in an economic association only to considerations of distributive justice. In sum, the global economy independently generates duties of justice, both distributive and nondistributive, that are delimited by the egalitarian ideal of reciprocity.
4. Cosmopolitanism in a Partially Globalized World

The credibility of the preceding account might be doubted on grounds of the emergent and partial nature of the global economic association. Since states are robust political institutions that also provide governance, or attempt to, over the economic affairs of compatriots, any account of justice that is not statist, but that instead applies to the more amorphous set of institutions that comprise the global economy, may seem comparatively doubtful. Moreover, most of us have come of age in a tradition of political philosophy in which accounts of social justice were developed for application in the state, which these accounts often assumed, for purposes of simplicity, to be a closed social and political unit. The justification of principles of justice is developed on the condition that they will comprehensively cover the background distributive institutions. In a partially globalized world, the global institutions, which I have argued provide the sufficient conditions for duties of egalitarian distributive justice, do not comprehensively and singularly affect life prospects of persons. Not every aspect of a person’s condition, not due her choice, is plausibly the result of the global economic association rather than the influence of state economic policies and the local cultural practices.

One way to appreciate the challenge is to consider an account that shares the basic commitment to membership dependence but, in part due to the emergent character of global institutions, rejects cosmopolitanism. John Rawls argues that neither global inequality nor global poverty is per se unjust. In contrast to egalitarian global distributive duties, he defends a principle of assistance to what he terms burdened societies. These are societies lacking in sufficient “political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be well ordered.” Well-ordered societies include liberal and decent hierarchical societies. The latter possess institutional structures that respect (at least) a minimal set of human rights and include institutions that (at least) incorporate consultation procedures among social groups. So, the goal of assistance to burdened societies is not the eradication of poverty as such, but to reduce it sufficiently so that it is not a hindrance to a society becoming liberal or decent. Rawls offers the following three guidelines for assisting burdened societies: First, a society need not be wealthy to be well ordered. Second, the causes of wealth and poverty lie
in the political culture and the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support public institutions and political virtues. And third, assistance should aim to promote the self-determination of the political and economic affairs of a liberal or decent society. The first and the third guideline reject the view that inequality reduction or even poverty mitigation per se should be a goal of international redistribution. Some relief from poverty might be required in order to achieve the goal of fostering a self-determining liberal or decent society. In that case, poverty mitigation is contingently important. The second guideline underscores this view by locating the sources of poverty entirely within the state rather than the functioning of international institutions and the action of external agents.

Rawls supports this position by considering two hypothetical examples. In each example the differential development paths of two imagined liberal or decent societies are compared. In the first example one society pursues development and savings while the other prefers a more leisurely life. In the second example, one society decides to curb its rate of population growth, but the other one, due to freely held religious values, does not. From these examples he concludes that, “Given that both societies are liberal or decent, and their peoples are free and responsible, and able to make their own decisions, the duty of assistance does not require taxes from the first, now wealthier society....”

One kind of response to Rawls, available to cosmopolitans who reject membership dependence, is to argue that justice requires remedying inequalities even in the absence of significant associational ties. According to this view, Rawls’s claim about the sources of poverty is beside the point. The issue is rather the existence of poverty, and perhaps inequality, not its institutional sources. This response is not compatible with the account that I have defended here. And it is, I think, implausible in any case to suppose that duties of justice are not at all dependent on associational membership.

The argument that I offer for the existence of a global economic association entails that there are significant global causal connections that are factors in global poverty. But it is a mistake to think that the response to Rawls can be made simply on empirical grounds by rejecting his second guideline as failing to appreciate the role of international institutions in harming the poor. For arguments about whether features of the
international system harm the poor have an inescapably normative aspect. No one has made this argument more forcefully than Thomas Pogge. But, as Pogge himself has argued, there is no sensible way of identifying harm to the global poor except by means of employing a normative baseline. 29

One bit of evidence that might be thought to highlight the partial nature of globalization concerns the continued importance of states in affecting the distribution of opportunities for income. It is not merely that there are hundreds of millions of very poor people in the world. Additionally, a significant factor in global poverty is one’s country of birth. Branko Milanovic’s studies of global income distribution confirm the strong influence of country of birth on a person’s opportunity for income. Eighty percent of the variability in a person’s global income percentile rank can be explained by her country of birth and her parents’ income, two factors over which she has no control. And, ninety percent of her global income position can be explained by her income in her country, given the country’s mean income and income distribution. 30 The importance of country of birth in the distribution of opportunities for income does not, however, confirm Rawls’s point that responsibility for poverty lies with state policies and local cultures. Even if we suppose that these are factors, in light of the argument that there is a global economic association there is also the morally important consideration of whether the global economic association permits associational privilege on the basis of external factors. There is an analogy here to equality of opportunity as it is discussed in the context of domestic justice. Family resources and practices are significant factors in the production of unequal opportunities among compatriots. It does not necessarily follow that these inequalities are of no concern to justice in the state. If, as I assume, the global economic association is a common good association, one’s country of birth or residence should not provide the basis for entitlement to a privileged set of opportunities. Just as the moral importance of the family need not evacuate the mitigation of social inequalities due to family background from accounts of domestic justice, so the moral importance of the state need not do so with inequalities generated by state policy and local culture.

Clearly my differences with Rawls run far deeper than this brief discussion suggests. I have discussed these at length elsewhere. 31 My point here is not one about Rawls in particular, but rather about how a cosmopolitan account of duties of justice that is membership dependent can
take into account inequalities that are due to nonglobal sources. There is good reason to believe that such inequalities are not necessarily outside of the concern of justice. Rawls's example of the two different societies with their different policies to the contrary notwithstanding, inequalities that are generated by state practices become concerns of global justice if they are sources of privileges in the global economic association.

The existence of partial globalization might however affect the plausibility of certain principles of justice. For example, significant inequalities of opportunity for income can be mitigated by state policy alone, by liberalizing immigration policy or by modest reforms to the international system including a global commitment to instruction in English as a foreign language. In contrast, the difference principle seems to assume a context of institutional competence to comprehensively affect the well-being of the least advantaged. Partial globalization calls such competence into account and therefore the propriety of judging the package of existing institutions by that standard. However, to the extent that global institutional competence increases, the rejection of the difference principle on this ground weakens. It might be appropriate then to take it as an ideal of reciprocity rather than a principle of distributive justice in a partially globalized world.

5. Conclusion

Taking duties of justice as associative duties provides the basis for a theoretical reconciliation of duties to compatriots and cosmopolitan duties to noncompatriots. The reconciliation that I have defended has several parts. Equal respect for all persons establishes an egalitarian justificatory presumption; duties of justice are associative, both the state and the global economy are associations of the requisite sort for generating duties of justice; the duties of justice in both the state and the global economy are presumptively egalitarian; but to the state and the global economy distinct egalitarian ideals apply, equal and inclusive citizenship and reciprocity respectively, each of which have distributive and nondistributive features. Moreover, the emergent nature of the global economic association is not a reason to suppose that inequalities originating in state policy or local cultural practices are necessarily beyond the concerns of justice. None of this is to argue that there will not be conflicts in duties of justice between compatriots and noncompatriots, or that no additional arguments need be considered when such conflicts arise. To the extent that the arguments
presented here are compelling, however, we have a framework for understanding the philosophical grounds for duties of both kinds and the basis for appreciating the moral stakes in such conflicts.

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Notes


2. Some of what I have to say here results from gathering together and developing a few lines of argument from Darrel Moellendorf Global Inequality Matters (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) that pertain to cosmopolitan and compatriot duties.


5. “According to the first conception, which is usually called cosmopolitanism, the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, and the institutions to which standards of justice can be applied, are instruments for the fulfillment of that duty. Such instruments are in fact only selectively available: We may be able to live on just terms only with those others who are fellow members of sufficiently robust and well-ordered sovereign states. But the moral basis for the requirements of justice that should govern those states is universal in scope: it is a concern for the fairness of the terms on which we share the world with anyone.” (Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” op. cit., 119)


8. There are alternative interpretations of what is democratic about the democratic conception. I take my account to be consistent with Joshua Cohen’s, who argues that the democratic conception of equality results from the extension of our firmer moral convictions about political democracy to socioeconomic justice. See his “Democratic Equality,” Ethics 99 (July 1989): 727–51. Norman Daniels asserts that “The modifier ‘democratic’ points to the connection between the Second and the First Principles and their joint role in meeting our needs as citizens.” See his “Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism,” in Samuel Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 35–55.
I take my account to be consistent with Daniel’s first conjunct, but not the second. I think that we can appreciate the democratic nature of the distributive principles taken in isolation once we appreciate that they are based upon a concern that social institutions not permit inequality on the basis of social and natural fortune, which concern is similarly expressed in democratic citizenship.


12. This certainly is not a novel claim. See Norman Daniels, “Equal Liberty and the Unequal Worth of Liberty,” in Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls A Theory of Justice, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 253–81. Daniels, however, takes the demands equalizing the worth of liberties as requiring a significantly more egalitarian socioeconomic distribution than I understand the demands of equal and inclusive citizenship to require.


14. See the thorough discussion of such strategies in Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, (London: Anthem Press, 2002).


19. Ibid., 37. See also Standing, Global Labour Flexibility, op. cit., pt. II.


24. At the beginning of A Theory of Justice Rawls famously assumes “that a society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons . . . .” See Rawls, Theory, op. cit., 4.
25. Rawls states that, “The principles of justice apply to the basic structure and regulate how its major institutions are combined into one scheme.” Rawls, Theory, op. cit., 242.


27. Ibid., 106–12.

28. Ibid., 118.


32. According to a recent World Bank report, an increase in immigration from developing to high-income countries that would increase the labor force of the latter by 3 percent from 2002–2025 would generate large increases in global welfare. When adjusted for prices the increase in aggregate global income would be $356 billion or 0.6 percent. Moreover, the aggregate gains of this policy would go disproportionately to developing countries, where incomes would increase by 1.8 percent, compared to 0.4 percent in high-income countries. But for the new immigrants to high-income countries, the cost-of-living adjusted income gains would increase on average by nearly 200 percent due to differences in wages between the countries of origin and destination. Income gains in developing countries would result from decreased labor market competition and increased remittances. See The World Bank World, Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration 2006 (New York: The World Bank, 2006).