Sexual Citizenship and Migration in a Transnational Perspective

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Bio Note:
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Abstract:
This working paper\(^1\) is based on a lecture given at the Summer School “Multiple Inequalities in the Age of Transnationalization”, June 23-27 2014 at Goethe University Frankfurt. In it, I explore the linkages between sexuality and migration and aim to show that instead of deeming them a narrow subfield of migration studies, thinking through these linkages has much wider implications for different fields, including post- and decolonial queer studies, the study of race and sexuality, the study of citizenship and state projects of inclusion/exclusion, and for work that attempts to ce-center the predominant knowledge production focused on the Global North.

Working paper, comments welcome: please mail them to kosnick@em.uni-frankfurt.de

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My task today is to talk about the manyfold ways in which sexuality is linked to migration, and what I would like to achieve by the end of my talk is for you to consider work that deals with sexuality not as a very specialized subfield of migration studies, but as something that does and should concern us in a much wider sense, with the potential to affect the ways in which we think about migration but also about ‘race’, citizenship and state projects of inclusion/exclusion. This is a big undertaking, and I will primarily try giving you an overview of different approaches rather than talk about my own research specifically.

To lay the foundation for that, it is necessary to think a bit more deeply about what we are looking at when we study migration processes. While some of us might be interested in mobilities of different kinds (Lenz 2010, Sheller and Urry 2006, Urry 2007), usually by migration we mean border-crossing forms of human mobility, so we are in fact not just talking about mobility but also about the regulatory powers of modern states – states that have created borders in order to control their ‘own’ but also ‘other’ populations. Historically speaking, the administrative barriers to such migration were in many parts of the world quite minimal well into the 19th century, so this is a relatively recent phenomenon.

If you are interested in the emergence of borders as they developed in the context of a modern nation-state system, it is instructive to look at the work of William Walters. He describes the border as a privileged institutional site where governing authorities can acquire biopolitical knowledge about populations, stating that “the border actually contributes to the production of population as a knowable, governable entity” (Walters 2002:573). The border is a locale where the population is actively produced, it does not simply act on a population as something that is fully given, but it needs to be seen, to draw on Foucault, as an instrument of biopower. Modern states are very much concerned with the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, its health etc. (Foucault 1978). So regulating access, exit and the composition of a population on a sovereign territory means that the border is a strategic site where biopower is exercised. It also serves as one, but by no means the only site where state practices of inclusion and exclusion become manifest, as modern states are continuously concerned with the questions of homogeneity and difference, creating internal ‘others’ which have to be kept at bay (Goldberg 2002).
“The biopoliticization of the border is signaled by the political concerns, events, and means by which the border will become a privileged instrument in the systematic regulation of national and transnational populations – their movement, health, and security.” (Walters 2002: 571)

And the entity that performs this regulation is the in fact quite mysterious conglomerate we know as ‘the state’. Those of us interested in transnational migration know quite well that transnationalization does not equal the demise of the nation-state. We do need to overcome the concept of the nation-state as a taken-for-granted container of populations and also as a container of our thinking and research, as Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) decried with the concept of methodological nationalism, but it would be a big fallacy to ignore the continued relevance of state power and the contemporary state system, especially when you deal with migration policy. Both state power and the global system of states are undergoing changes, but they are by no means becoming irrelevant. So when we try to think about sexuality and sexual citizenship in a transnational perspective, we first have to take ‘the state’ seriously. This is by no means an easy undertaking, as precisely what a state is – its power, its apparatus and its projects – varies historically and geopolitically, with modern states often better understood as a relation of forces rather than a sovereign, territorial site of power.  

So if I speak of the state in the following in the singular, I do not mean for it to be understood as a unified actor or entity, but rather as a site for the crystallization of social power relations that is key to modern forms of both sexuality and migration. And it is of course just as important to understand how contemporary states are differentially implicated in a global state system and particular dynamics of globalization (Trouillot 2001).

Sexuality, I’m by no means the first to argue (see below), is a crucial concern of modern states. And not just of modern nation-states, but also of modern colonial empires. So when I talk about transnational perspectives in the course of my lecture, I will sometimes refer to colonial and postcolonial entanglements and constellations, and sometimes also to dimensions of globalization, both of which transcend the more narrow definitions of transnationalism as you find them for example with Ludger Pries and others (Pries 2008, 2010; see Mau and Steffek 2013). I am quite aware of the need to distinguish between those different concepts, but in order to explain in what ways sexuality is relevant to the study of migration, it is necessary to go beyond the concepts.

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of the transnational and transnationalization as they currently tend to be deployed in the field of migration studies.

So what do I mean when I talk about sexuality in relation to migration?

Let me take a guess what comes to your mind.

It is quite likely that you will think of queer migrations, the mobility of LGBT people across national borders (Manalansan 2006), and the increasing acceptance of sexual identity as grounds for asylum in several Western countries (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011, Marouf 2008). It is just as likely that you will think of migrant sex work and the trafficking debates that have been very prominent over the past decade, with many NGOs and the United Nations scandalizing the trafficking of women and children in particular for purposes of forced prostitution and sexual abuse, and also of sex tourism (Andrijasevic 2010, Puar 2002, Alexander 2001, Brennan 2004, Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003, Kempadoo 1999). Maybe your imagination extends to marriage migration and mail-order brides, who are to service their new husbands abroad in sexual ways among others (Constable 2003, Constable 2009).

But my hunch is that this is where it very likely ends. At least, that wouldn’t be surprising. In fact, apart from those special domains that I’ve just listed, sexuality is pretty much a non-issue in the wider field of migration studies. As many of us know, it is difficult enough, still at this point today, to explain the relevance of gender to many mainstream migration researchers. And sadly, as Martin Manalansan and others have demonstrated, there is even much work on gender and migration that ignores the relevance of sexuality to its own concerns, while implicitly retaining a heteronormative focus (Cantú 2009, Donato et al. 2006, Luibhéid 2008a, Mahler and Pessar 2006, Manalansan 2006).

So let me try to widen this imagination and challenge at least some you a bit to develop a wider understanding of how sexuality might be connected to migration. In order to do that, we need to think about sexuality beyond issues of sexual practices – having sex –

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3 I deliberately speak of LGBT here instead of using the term queer or the more comprehensive LGBTQI*, short for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and ‘questioning’, in what can only be a provisional and situated attempt at describing non-normative (though possibly homonormative, see Duggan 2012) sexual and gender identities, for the former have greater currency among activists in different locations of the world, and are most often at issue in the academic literature on sexuality, diaspora and migration. In no way do I thereby intend to suggest that sexual identities are timeless, universal essences.
and also beyond sexual identities. It is good and necessary to think about sexual identities, but since in heteronormative terms most people don’t think of themselves as having a sexual identity at all, sexual identities often get reduced to minoritized, non-normative sexualities. And this is obviously problematic. But just as important, when we think about sexuality, we also have to consider moral norms, taken-for-granted naturalizations and laws that regulate sexual behaviour and identifications, and we need to, maybe most surprisingly, also think about forms of kinship, love and care responsibilities.

For a great text on changing concepts of sexuality in the context of the United States, (re-)read not just Foucault but also Gayle Rubin’s text “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality” (Rubin 1984), where she argues that we need to understand sexuality as a historical and socio-political phenomenon, not as something that is natural, located in the psyche or the body. That is a precondition for linking sexuality to migration, to the state, and to globalization.

Sexuality is about more than who I have sex with or how, or if / who I want to have sex with and desire, about more than sexual identity and schemes of sexual classification, it is also about affect, intimacy and the social ties that matter in my life. So it is one thing for states not to legally punish same-sex sexual activities or particular kinds of sexual activity, and another for states to acknowledge and somehow support specific ties, emotions and affiliations between people of the same sex and their dependents, such as most prominently right now in some countries of the Global North through legal decisions and policies around same-sex marriage, civil partnerships or adoption rights for same-sex couples. The latter also have to do with how states think about families as building blocks of society. There are all kinds of benefits but also obligations for

4 The North American model has undergone important historical transformations. Siobhan Somerville has shown how questions of race were crucially entangled with thinking about and regulating sexuality in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Somerville 2000). In the second half of the 20th century, homosexual identities in the U.S. have been shaped in what can be called a process of sexual ethnogenesis: white gays and lesbians in particular have been encouraged to think of themselves as groups along the lines of multicultural ethnicity, as a social community rather than as produced by biopolitical state power that has created them as a species, or as people simply engaging in same-sex behaviour but having nothing else in common (Jagose 1996). This was partly a result of political struggles in the second half of the 20th century in the US, the civil rights movement, and the ways in which oppressed minorities have achieved recognition there. That requires a fixed identity, and a separatism of sorts where you come to see sexual identity as the central feature defining your social belonging and categorization so you can interact with and get recognition from dominant institutions. Gayle Rubin speaks in this context of a “…relocation of homoeroticism into quasi-ethnic, nucleated, sexually constituted communities”, and, as she put it, “sexualities keep marching out of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (of Mental Disorders) and on to the pages of social history.” (Rubin 1984: 287).
individual state subjects and resident aliens as part of families: such as tax breaks for married couples, inheritance laws, often immigration options in the context of family reunification, rights and obligations to care for each other. So we also need to think about sexuality in terms of its links to kinship, families, care and reproductive labour.

All too often, the existence of families and their meaning within a heteronormative framework is taken for granted (Weston 1991). We have seen in Helma Lutz’s work and in her lecture what the results of that can be (Lutz 2014). So when in Eastern Europe the notion of the heterosexual nuclear family is promoted as an apparently natural context in which children have to be mothered and raised, all kinds of assumptions are made regarding the gendered unit of healthy socialization and upbringing. With aunts, grandparents and the like who then take care of so-called Euro-Orphans while their mothers and fathers work abroad being considered strangers rather than family.

And if you look at migration for purposes of family unification, you will see that many contemporary states have historically increasingly narrowed down their definition of the family to the heterosexual nuclear reproductive family, and have even enlisted the help of genetic testing to determine cases of ‘true and false’ kinship. Our colleague Thomas Lemke here at Goethe University Frankfurt works on this use of genetics as a biopolitical tool (Lemke 2004). I have written elsewhere,

“…heterosexual partnerships and ‘biological’ parenthood still provide the primary models for thinking about migrant families, genealogies and networks of care that span across different localities. Notions of ‘family unification’, for example, usually take for granted that either direct biological kinship or heterosexual marriage unions provide the legitimate grounds for mobility. It is striking to note how mainstream migration research on remittances, generational change or diasporic formation relies upon heteronormative assumptions when establishing what kinds of socio-genetic affiliations and affective ties are thought to matter. Yet, researching migration and diaspora in implicitly heteronormative terms run the risk of unwittingly underwriting gendered and sexualized assumptions about, for example, women as ‘natural nurturers’ who make sacrifices for biological kin (Manalansan 2006: 239), and underestimating the role of other forms of social and affective attachment. It thus becomes difficult to consider the importance and role of differential sexual desires and non-normative family formations as well as other social bonds in migration processes.” (Kosnick 2010: 127)

There are countries where the birth of a child isn’t registered, or where it is difficult to get official documents proving marriage. And maybe more importantly, this definition of the family who is allowed to immigrate on the grounds of compassion does not only exclude homosexual couples and their children, and more generally siblings, aunts and
uncles or other people that some might see as belonging to their inner family circle, but also polygamous unions and socio-cultural forms of family that include people where no kinship deemed biological can be determined (Heinemann and Lemke 2013). And of course, in many cases those who are seen to be economically unfit to sponsor loved ones to join them in the country of immigration. So by setting particular definitions of the family as the norm and codifying them into law, states exert tremendous power over the formation and well-being of people who consider themselves to be family.

Eithne Luibhéid has shown how normative heterosexuality intersects with other hierarchies of race, gender and class to produce subalternized groups and forms of family (Luibhéid 2008b: 296). And this is not just happening at the border, of course. There is a broad literature on the redefinition and functioning of the nuclear family in the context of modern Western nation-states. I just remind you here of the important book “Woman-Nation-State” (1989) that was edited by Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias twenty-six years ago that showed the important links between gender orders and nationalism, and before them George Mosse’s book on Nationalism and Sexuality (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989, Mosse 1985). Mosse was very explicit in saying that sexuality should not be equated with gender but needed to be treated as an analytically distinct category in its own right.

This was famously done by Foucault. In his first volume of the *History of Sexuality*, he described the growing historical concern of some Western European modern states with sex, and the proliferation of discourses around sex in the 18th century (Foucault 1987). This had to do with the emergence of ‘population’ as an economic and political problem that had to be monitored and actively shaped in terms of birth rates, fertility, health and so on. Sexuality was at the heart of this problem, Foucault argued:

“Of course, it had long been asserted that a country had to be populated if it hoped to be rich and powerful; but this was the first time that a society had affirmed, in a constant way, that its future and its fortunes were tied not only to the number and the uprightness of its citizens, to their marriage rules and family organization, but to the manner in which each individual made use of his [sic!] sex.” (ibid.: 26)

Foucault shows in his book that modern states are concerned with regulating their populations and exerting influence on the body politic – in terms of disease control,

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5 For a more recent undertaking to understand the relationship between nationalisms and sexualities in the plural, see Parker et al. 1992.
eugenics, reproduction, procreation – and thereby defining what kinds of subjects are wanted or seen as a threat. States worry about what elements in a population procreate, in class terms, in racial terms etc., and also about sex without procreation.

Coming back to the concept of state borders, then, we can see what possibilities they offer for population management. Disease control – think of the many states which have travel and residence restrictions for HIV infected foreigners. Eugenics – think of the implicitly and at times explicitly racist politics of states when denying entry to particular racialized groups, or curtailing the ways in which they can sponsor family members. Reproduction and procreation – think of the public discourses and policies around the ‘unfettered’ childbearing of particular undesired immigrant groups. This was exemplified in the German context by the infamous book of Thilo Sarrazin “Deutschland schafft sich ab”, where amongst promoting antisemitic and antiziganist stereotypes, he worries about the birthrates of Muslims and welfare recipients, and about the alleged ‘poverty migration’, so-called ‘Armutsmigration’ from the new EU member states of Romania and Bulgaria.

As Eithne Luibheid has argued in her work,

“…unwelcome migrants are often characterized as engaging in “unrestrained” childbearing, which is seen to reflect their deviation from or imperfect mastery over mainstream heterosexual norms, resulting in the birth of “undesirable” children. Or they are portrayed as the bearers of aberrant sexual practices, questionable sexual morals, and sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS, that threaten to “contaminate” the citizenry.” (Luibheid 2008a: 174)

What this points to is that sexuality is not just a focus of concern in migration management – it is central also in regulating and maintaining racial divisions and hierarchies, or ethnic and caste distinctions (Luibheid and Cantú 2005). Who can have sex, relations of intimacy and possibly children with whom? What happens with children from so-called interracial unions that possibly mess up the allegedly clear lines of race that are drawn in and by particular states and empires? This was a question particularly important in colonial contexts, but also in racist states like apartheid South Africa or the U.S. during times of official racial segregation (Somerville 2000). In Germany, the issue arose historically with particular pertinence in the case of the

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‘Rheinlandbastarde’, a racist term used to label the children of predominantly Black men and white women during the First World War up to the end of National Socialism (El-Tayeb 1999).

What we can learn from Foucault is a better understanding of biopolitics as a form of modern state power, and a better understanding of the central role of sexuality in forms of governing. What we cannot learn from him is how these modern state practices were developed and brought to bear on both colonizing and colonized population groups in the context of modern colonial empires. He also does not consider how sexuality becomes instrumental in regulating racial lines of division, class lines, and gender orders. In order to understand this, we better turn to scholars such as Ann Stoler, who has investigated in her work the politics of race and sexual morality in 20th century colonial cultures. In her book *Race and the Education of Desire* (1985), she has taken issue with Foucault and has shown how necessary it is to explode his tunnel vision of Western nation-state development, and not so much to transnationalize as to decolonize his account of sexuality as well. Control over sexuality in all its dimensions was crucial for the racist politics of empire and colonial rule.

Stoler shows how, in the contexts of 20th century colonial rule, migration for Europeans to the colonies was highly regulated along the lines of gender, class, marital status, and age. A central concern of colonial regimes was to maintain sharp divisions between colonizer and colonized, and to maintain the hierarchy between the two social groups. Note here that when we consider sexuality in relation to race, gender and class in this way, we do not simply posit it as one dimension of inequalities among others. This is also not about intersectionality in the sense of an articulation of different axes of inequality and difference (Crenshaw 1989, Erel et al. 2011, Lutz et al. 2011). It is about a different kind of intersectionality in which regulating sexuality is a pragmatic tool of governing that is intended to produce particular racial, gendered and economic effects. Let me give you an example from Stoler’s work. Stoler suggests that “…the very categories of ‘colonizer’ and ‘colonized’ were secured through forms of sexual control which defined the domestic arrangements of Europeans and the cultural investments by which they identified themselves” (Stoler 1989: 635). She describes concubinage as the dominant domestic arrangement preferred by colonial powers in the early 20th century. Concubinage meant cohabitation outside of marriage between European men and colonized women, and beyond sexual access claims to colonized women’s labour power.
and legal rights to their children. European women were in many colonial contexts barred from emigrating for certain, often long periods of time. She states,

“What is important here is that by controlling the availability of European women and the sorts of sexual access condoned, state and corporate authorities controlled the very social geography of the colonies, fixing the conditions under which European populations and privileges could be re-produced.” (ibid.: 638)

But concubinage worked only as long as the supremacy of the European colonizers was relatively uncontested. In times of unrest, the sexual lines of racial division had to be redrawn, and concubinage was abandoned as the preferred model, instead opting for prostitution or bringing in European women as wives who could protect white bourgeois respectability. So then the migration of particular kinds of European women was encouraged, while at the same time, colonized men were repositioned as sexual aggressors from whom white women had to be protected.

“Allusions to political and sexual subversion of the colonial system went hand in hand. Concern over protection of white women intensified during real and perceived crises of control – provoked by threats to the internal cohesion of the European communities or by infringements on their borders. While the chronologies differ, we can identify a patterned sequence [emphasis in the original] of events in which Papuan, Algerian, and South African men heightened their demands for civil rights and refused the constraints imposed upon their education, movements, or dress (Inglis 1975: 811; Sivan 1983: 178). Rape charges were thus based on perceived transgressions of political and social space.” (ibid.: 641).

Sexuality was thus not just a metaphorical arena in which racist hierarchies were constructed and legitimated, it was a field of regulation and deliberate intervention in the politics of colonial rule. So this was, as Stoler has argued, not just about the iconography of colonial rule but about its pragmatics, about concrete ways of managing colonial populations on both sides of the divide.

So, to sum up, if Foucault had widened his lens beyond the container-model of the nation-state and considered the politics of empire, he would have been able to understand a lot more about governing through sexuality, and he might have been able to see the legacy that these colonial histories have left not just for contemporary postcolonies, but also for the former colonial centres of empire (Donovan 2010, El-Tayeb 2003, Eng 2010, Kyungwon Hong and Ferguson 2011, Pérez 2004, Somerville 2000). And we can see that the former restrictions for Europeans on migrating from the European centres of power to the colonies, often related to regulating sexuality, need to be placed in the context of racial, gender and class politics that aimed to stabilize colonial rule. Ann Stoler was herself not concerned with the migration aspect of this, but
her analysis can still provide important insights into how migration control was and still is linked to the regulation of sexuality in different state projects across vast geographical distances. And this is crucial to understand also when we consider contemporary dynamics of globalization.

**Globalization**

Why address late capitalism and globalization if we are interested in the topic of sexual citizenship and migration? The Stoler example helps us see that it makes no sense to focus on nation states and migration politics in isolation, and treat them as single case studies as if there were no interrelations between them, or simply those of push and pull, as older paradigms in migration studies have put it. We need to be aware of the larger contexts in which migration takes place, in particular the legacy of colonialism, the forces of late capitalism and globalization, and how these affect both the claiming of sexual identities and states’ involvement in producing and regulating sexual identities, practices and affiliations.

Migration as the movement of people across state borders is only one dimension of contemporary globalization processes, which entail the flows of trade, of finances, of knowledge and communication, but also outsourcing of production, the grim reach of structural adjustment programmes or growing climate concerns, such as smog reaching North America from China or regions of the world becoming uninhabitable due to flooding or pollution. Similarly, armed conflicts linked to powerful third-party interests and military interventions in different parts of the world are contributing to growing numbers of refugees seeking safety elsewhere. So we do not understand why and how people cross borders if we do not take into account other, seemingly unrelated cross-border flows and dynamics. And, quite clearly, we do not understand how migration and sexual citizenship can be articulated together if we have no idea of what happens in terms of sexualities in different parts of the world, how identities, practices, communities and sexual politics are different but also changing in and responding to contexts of globalization.

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8 I understand globalization as a process that has started well before the 20th century, in terms of flows and connections pertaining to people, capital, goods and information across vast distances, notwithstanding the important new qualities of interconnectivity, capital flows and time-space compression since the second half of the 20th century (Harvey 1989, Trouillot 2001, Tsing 2000).
Unfortunately, it still needs to be pointed out across different academic disciplines that there is no single, universal model of sexual identities, and no universal model of how people form and think about families, intimate relations and so on. Across different academic disciplines but also contexts of queer activism and international human rights regimes, we are forced to recognize that particular hegemonic models of gender relations, of kinship and family (Collier and Yanagisako 1987, Schneider 1984, Strathern 1992), let alone of ‘gay’ and ‘straight’ sexual identities which are closely tied to historical and geopolitical developments in North America and certain parts of Europe tend to serve as the naturalized or normative foil against which ‘other’ models, practices and identities are interpreted, measured and regulated (Alexander and Mohanty 2013, Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan 2002, Mohanty 2003, Mohanty and Russo 1991, Parker et al. 1992, Warner 1993). This has also become evident in relation to academic but also activist debates on transnational homosexual formations, queer globalizations, ‘global queering’ and queer diasporas which emerged in the latter half of the 1990s.

In the field of queer studies, Dennis Altman coined the term global queering to speak about the globalization of ‘gay’ identities, simultaneously critiquing the ‘Atlantic’ focus of much queer theory (Altman 1996, 1997). His views on global queering provided further spark to an ongoing debate regarding the ‘import’ or transformation of Euro-American forms of sexual identity and subjectivity in other parts of the world. While Altman himself identified as the focus of interest “…the ways in which the new gay groups of Asia, South America, and Africa will adapt ideas of universal discourse and Western identity politics to create something new and unpredictable.” (Altman 1997: 433), others have understood the flows of influence as much less unidirectional, pointing to the impact of different immigrant groups and diasporas on the sexual identities and practices in the Global North (Povinelli and Chauncey 1999, Manalansan 2003), and insisting on the efficacy of ‘local’ particularities. As Katie King has put it:

“..no localism or particularism is not caught up in the dynamic interactions between globals and locals, be they geographically or across time. This does not, however, assume that all trajectories are toward the dominations of U.S./Euro cultural, political, economic formations…” (King 2002:41)

The influence of the latter certainly needs to be acknowledged. There is evidence of particularly the North American model of gay identity and politics having become an important source of meaning for mainly gay but also some lesbian-identified activism in
many parts of the world, and for the work of some international LGBT activism with its connections to human rights initiatives and supranational institutions. Think also of the Gay Pride Parades that celebrated the Stonewall riots in New York, and are nowadays organized in many cities on all continents, though mostly in cities situated in the Global North. While contested (Hanhardt 2013), such models are also exported through different forms of cross-border mobility as in tourism, but by no means indicate mere unilinear adaptation of sexual identities (Binnie 2004, Johnston 2007, King 2002, Puar 2002, 2007).

Much evidence points in a different direction, toward the need to understand (or risk ignoring) multiple queer modernities, and that same-sex attractions and non-normative gender identities can be lived and articulated in many different ways that do not conform to a singular hegemonic model (Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan 2002, Drucker 1996; Jackson 2009; Manalansan 2006; Patton and Sánchez-Eppler 2000). This is not to say that we face a happy multiplicity, or to claim that certain hegemonic models are not backed up by powerful national and supranational institutions, but to insist on a close examination of the power relations between and within different models, and the strategic uses of their deployment. This also includes attention to the emergence of global sexual politics that collude with Western neocolonial logics in using sexual tolerance as a measure for judging ‘civilizational progress’ in the Global South (Dhawan 2013; Puar 2007, 2011, 2013; Sabsay 2013).

We need to examine in and beyond the field of queer studies on how particular models of identity emerge in different places, and how those models might travel and transform around the globe, particularly in relation to histories of colonization, (neo-)imperialism and late capitalism (Binnie 2004, Ekine and Abbas 2013, Halperin 1996, Haritaworn, et al. 2008, Drucker 1996, Povinelli and Chauncey 1999, Wieringa and Sívori 2013). In order to better account for the asymmetries of globalization, some critical Third-World/Global South feminists have opted to instead employ the term transnational (Grewal and Kaplan 1994). As Grewal and Kaplan state:

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9 Vanessa Thompson has reminded me that this points to continuities and shifting interlinkages between sexual politics and the colonial ‘civilising mission’ which among others Gloria Wekker has discussed in The Politics of Passion (2006).

10 The use of the term Third World is highly contested, but has been reclaimed and used by some transnational feminists as a critical concept (Mohanty 2003, Mohanty/Russo/Torres 1991).
Since ignoring transnational formations has left studies of sexualities without the tools to address questions of globalization, race, political economy, immigration, migration, and geopolitics, it is important to bring questions of transnationalism into conversation with the feminist study of sexuality.” (Grewal and Kaplan 2001: 666)

I think it cannot be overemphasized how important it is to contextualize sexual identities historically and geopolitically, and to try and understand why non-normative sexual activism might opt for a particular model and strategy in particular contexts, while simultaneously being targeted and shaped by forms of governance and institutions that recognize and encourage particular forms of subjectivity. While activists can never completely escape the power of state projects antagonistic to their goals, histories of activism show their potential to disrupt, subvert and sometimes transform these projects. Such contextualizations have up to now predominately focused on sexual histories of Europe and North America, leaving an urgent need to study the borderlands (Anzaldúa 1987) and develop a ‘decolonial imaginary’ (Pérez 2004) that is sensitive to the entanglements of colonial and postcolonial racism, sexuality, and economy.

Take, for example, the transnational debate on homophobia in African countries. Lgbt activists across Africa have united against Western sanctions to punish countries such as Uganda and Malawi for their legal persecution of homosexuality. In a document entitled African statement to the British Government on Aid Conditionality, in 2011 more than 50 organizations and individuals demanded that Western countries do not cut development funds as a form of retribution, because it would hurt the wider communities into which lgbt people were integrated themselves, and disregard the agency of African civil and social rights movements, of which they are a part (N.N. 2013). It would also draw a wedge between lgbt activists and their allies fighting for different, but related rights causes, such as women’s rights, rights to clean water and so on. Have a look at a book that came out 2013, the Queer African Reader, if you are interested in these understandings of sexual identity and politics (Ekine and Abbas 2013).

So, globalization also pertains to the continued influence of particular states over how sexuality, politics of reproduction and the family are configured in other parts of the world. If countries like the US or Great Britain make financial aid to so-called developing countries dependent on the treatment of sexual minorities, or on promoting sexual abstinence before marriage (under the Bush administration), or an anti-abortion
agenda, that is in some ways a continuation of colonial interference, as some African governments have noted.

In fact, we should ask about the factors that have brought about the increasing moralization of politics in sub-Saharan African countries that has put the scandalization of homosexuality so high on the agenda in several of them. There might be no single answer, but it is likely that the influence of evangelical Christian movements, mostly based in the U.S. and working transnationally, has something to do with it (Kaoma 2012). So while homophobic government officials often point to homosexuality as a Western imported vice, as something non-African, it seems necessary to turn this argument around and show how homophobic thinking has been imported and still is through colonial penal codes and today so-called development aid policy and Christian missionary movements, but also Islamization. And then, importantly, there is the question of the impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) enforced by the World Bank and the IMF that have greatly reduced the scope of sovereign political decision-making in many African countries. SAPs are seen as a major cause of poverty in Africa and other world regions today, with significant consequences for gender relations (Shah 2013, Sparr 1994). It is poor women working in informal and subsistence economies who carry a disproportionate burden of economic restructuring, thus also transforming gendered relations of power which always have an impact upon sexualities as well (Naples and Desai 2004). It should also be considered that there might be a link between political elites shifting the terrain of public debate to moral agendas and their inability and/or unwillingness to tackle problems of material inequality, exploitation and poverty. So if we tie this into the debate on global sexualities, we have to be aware of the complexity of transnational, local and regional factors that intersect to produce particular conflicts and constellations of sexual identity politics. And it is not easy, particularly from the position of Global Northern academia and/or activism, to even become aware of the variety of understandings related to sexual identities and practices in the Global South. This is not least because the groups that are most easily heard internationally tend to be the ones that are most strongly influenced by those transnational organizations in which the Global North dominates with its understandings of human/sexual rights and freedom of choice.

Many Western countries now recognize homosexuality as a valid basis for asylum claims, which in principle is a great thing. But when it comes to refugee politics, we
will not understand how refugees really make sense of their sexuality because they are forced to present a particular narrative of persecution as gay or lesbian. If you apply for asylum in the U.S. or in Germany because you are persecuted in your country of origin for having engaged in same-sex activities, you will have to identify yourself as gay or lesbian even if these are terms that you would not want to apply to yourself (Berg and Millbank 2009). You have to present yourself as seeking to move from backward repression to the country of ‘freedom’. These narratives in turn contribute to contemporary Western understandings of sexuality that divide the world into a sexually enlightened, liberal West and a repressive rest of the world, amplified by the War on Terror and the increasingly dominant narrative of a ‘civilizational’ dichotomy between Islam and the West.

So studies of sexuality crucially rely on developing an understanding of the transnational dynamics at work in shaping sexual identities and politics. At the beginning, I have argued that migration studies need to take sexuality seriously in order to understand the regulatory interests of states, to understand the use of sexual politics across geopolitical divides, and to confront its own heteronormative bias. Now, I want to similarly argue that studies of sexuality need to take on board the insights of studies on transnational migration, post- and de-colonial theory and Third-World/transnational feminism in order to be able to address questions of globalization, racialization, gender orders and political economy. I take this point from Grewal and Kaplan, who argue that nation-states, “economic formations, consumer cultures, and forms of governmentality all work together to produce and uphold subjectivities and communities.” (Grewal / Kaplan 2001: 670). We cannot risk reproducing the story of a clash of civilisations in which an ostensibly liberal, sexually open West is pitted against backward traditions and religions in other parts of the world. I have written elsewhere:

“… relegating issues of sexuality to the realm of the personal and local prevents any examination of how struggles around sexualities contribute to place-making practices and mobilities at different scales and across different localities, a crucial issue for migrants whose capacities for place-making are often shaped and constrained by histories of racialisation, deprivation and forced migrations. It shuts the door on once pionieering yet nowadays almost forgotten considerations of how kinship and sexuality might be central to the production of social and economic relationships …, and on how different sex/gender regimes impact upon or might be impacted by migration.” (Kosnick 2010: 128)
Citizenship

Let me finally come to the issue of citizenship about which I haven’t yet said anything explicitly, but which has been implicitly addressed at different junctures above.

Crossing the border is one thing, having citizenship rights is another. Depending on laws and regulations, migrants can live their entire lives as foreign nationals or without papers in another country, without ever being able to ‘naturalize’ or acquire citizenship in its formal sense. So migration studies also look at what happens within countries of immigration, in terms of the politics of incorporation and integration. How and under what conditions can immigrants become full members of the polity, ‘full citizens’, instead of just being subjects in the sense of being subjected to the laws and regulations of the country they live in? This question has been prominently reframed in migration studies by Yasemin Soysal, who suggested that in many Western countries, rights that once belonged exclusively to citizens have been extended to immigrants with foreign passports, thus complicating the nature and basis of citizenship and suggesting a model of postnational membership for immigrants in these respective nation-states (Soysal 1994). Following Marshall’s famous definition of citizenship as sets of legal/civil, political and social rights (Marshall 1950), it can be said that especially in Western Europe after the second world war, resident aliens have been able to differentially partake in all three: sometimes voting in local elections, having access to welfare benefits, practicing their faith, to name but a few rights pertaining to these domains. These rights, however, have by no means simply been granted but remain areas of political contestation – as is true for the rights and obligations associated with citizenship more generally, not just with regard to immigrants or temporary foreign residents. ‘More generally’ refers not just to the abstract notion of citizenship, but also to a global situation in which citizenship has to be contextualized in wider, colonial and neo-colonial relations of power and domination. As David Taylor once put it in his critique of liberal models of citizenship:

“Citizenship (in Western Europe) becomes not only a process of a struggle for rights and entitlements in Western European nation states but also a struggle to reject claims of entitlement by those intitally residing outside the core, and subsequently, of migrant and immigrant labour. The ‘liberal’ history of citizenship, then, must be viewed in the context of a set of inclusionary and exclusionary practices, aimed at consolidating a particular set of social relations and of rights and entitlements.” (Taylor 1989: 20)
With regard to the limits of citizenship within nation-states, Thomas H. Marshall himself pointed out the differential class dimensions of citizenship, and since the 1990s, there has been an increasing focus on its gendered nature (Lister 1997), on its articulations with racism (Torres et al. 1999), and eventually also on sexuality (Alexander 1994, Evans 1993, see Richardson 1998 and 2000 for an overview). The bulk of this literature still focuses on sexuality as it pertains to gay and lesbian sexual identities, mostly ignoring the plight of other queer ‘misfits’ along the lines of gender and sexuality. Diane Richardson (1998) and others have shown how lesbians and gay men in different countries and historical periods have been excluded from rights in all domains of citizenship, be it legal (formal marriages, legal protection from discrimination etc.), political (problems standing for political office, advocacy being seen as an electoral liability), or social (same-sex relationships not benefiting from pension rights, inheritance rights, tax perks, adoption). Expanding Marshall’s understanding of citizenship, this scholarship has also drawn attention to the importance of social membership in terms of symbolic belonging.

Symbolic belonging in contemporary nation-states has mainly to do with whether or not a person is recognized as belonging to a national community, whether this person is treated by the majority society as one of them or as a stranger or outsider. In contemporary German society, for example, everyday racism (Essed 1991) manifests itself in widespread practices of symbolic exclusion. So, for example, if someone is categorized as a Person of Color in the context of German society, it is likely that white people will often confront this person with the question of where you are from, often without explicitly intending to be racist. Identifying and naming these forms of racism is particularly difficult in a national context in which racism is almost exclusively associated with the history of National Socialism and fascism, and falsely deemed nonexistent or irrelevant in the present German context (El-Tayeb 2003). What they do with this question is of course to symbolically exclude a PoC from belonging to the German nation – this person must be from somewhere else, because the national community is firmly imagined as white. It also tends to be imagined as firmly and naturally heterosexual. Being categorized as sexually deviant, or deviant in terms of your gender identification, in many national contexts around the world will put you outside of this symbolic national community. Be it that you are taken to represent a foreign influence, or that you are seen to be somehow morally degraded or an aberration of nature that will
exclude you from the morally wholesome and ‘natural’ community of fellow nationals. Or maybe you are tolerated in terms of what you do sexually and with whom, but you might not get recognition for the families and supportive networks that you have chosen and are trying to build, because they do not fit the heteronormative mould of how families should look like as the building blocks of a national society.

This line of arguing is productive insofar as it alerts us to exclusionary citizenship as it is associated with different ‘axes of oppression’, but it also runs the danger of re-inscribing the problematic of equating the latter with different social constituencies or ‘communities’, as discussed above. Drawing analogies between different axes of inequality and oppression can contribute to the erasure of the complex articulations between them, and reinforces an understanding through which inequalities are tied to mutually exclusive social groups that mobilize exclusively on their respective behalf. This is not simply an academic question, but one that goes to the heart of contemporary political contestations around ‘race’, sexuality, gender and national belonging in different geopolitical locations.

I have already mentioned what Rubin has called the process of sexual ethnogenesis in relation to the emergence of a dominant model of gay and lesbian sexual identity in North America in the second half of the 20th century. The drawback of such a model is that gay and lesbian concerns are thereby cut off from the concerns of other communities, or what is presented as the concern of other communities. And, what is more, you have to be able to afford foregrounding your sexual identity in this way, which often rests on the privilege of whiteness, among others. Ethnogenesis leads to a mosaic of diversity, with different minority communities appearing to exist side by side and potentially competing for the resources and the attention of the state. There is little room for understanding that one might identify simultaneously as Black and as a Woman, as an immigrant from Turkey and as gay, transgender or queer, and for understanding the articulation of different forms of privilege and oppression (Erel et al. 2011, Kosnick forthcoming 2015). The language of community completely obfuscates how categories of classification are brought into being, and how they intersect. That was a main point of intersectionality theory and research, as many of you will know. And it has devastating consequences for political struggles around citizenship, sexual or

11 See footnote above.
otherwise, because it sets the terms for who can speak on whose behalf. It also sets the
terms for a kind of confrontational politics in which the concerns of one group are pitted
against another, thereby erasing the concerns of those facing multiple, articulated
oppressions (Combahee River Collective 1977). Nicolas Rose has more recently
connected the ‘birth of community’ with neoliberal strategies of governance, creating “a
new and agonistic territory for the organization of political and ethical conflicts” (Rose

To fully explore the terrain of citizenship in relation to sexuality and racism goes
beyond the scope of this lecture/working paper, but if we take seriously the point made
at our summer school that multiple inequalities have to be understood through the lens
of transnationalization, then this is a task that migration scholars can and should
actively contribute to. To do so, I hope I have shown that it is helpful to engage with
work that goes beyond the confines of addressing sexuality in migration studies more
narrowly, and connect it to post- and decolonial queer studies, the study of race and
sexuality, the study of citizenship and state projects of inclusion/exclusion, and to work
that de-centers the predominant knowledge production focused on the Global North.

I will leave you with a set of questions – questions that have been addressed in the
context of my talk and that you might find fruitful to ask in the context of your own
respective projects:

- Sexual identifications and classifications – what are the labels, and who
  produces them why, how do they affect migration processes?
- Sexual relationships and practices – how are people connected to each other?
  This does not just entail sexual encounters and romantic or intimate
  relationships, but also the constellations in which people build overlapping ties
  and form families, communities, alliances and/or networks.
- Sexual governance – how is sexuality implicated in different forms of rule, in
  particular modern state practices and their management of population control,
  also at borders?
- Sexuality and morality - how are moral arguments used, particularly in the
  context of nation-building, to include and exclude parts of the population
  in/from a national community?
Sexuality and intersectionality – how does sexuality relate to other hierarchical schemes of classification and social locations that differently empower/disempower groups of people, within and across national borders?

Sexuality and transnationality – how do cultural understandings and the management of sexuality vary between different nation-states and regions in the world? What are the dynamics that set sexualities in motion locally, nation-wide, globally and transnationally? What do they have to do with the globalizing reach of late capitalist modernity?
Literature


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