

BEYOND WELTPOLITIK, SELF-CONTAINMENT AND CIVILIAN
POWER:
UNITED GERMANY´S NORMALIZING AMBITIONS

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1. Introduction: Visions, Ambitions, and Order

For many the mere thought of associating Germany with “visions”, “ambitions” and “order” is a nightmare, and even more so when this is done in the context of world politics (or even “Weltpolitik”). Since much of history has shown that German visions and ambitions about the creation of any type of *order* - world order in particular - have, more often than not, spelled trouble or even disaster, this is a difficult terrain for any author. Accordingly I have defined my task here in a rather restricted sense. In what follows I will concentrate on German debates about the role of the country in international affairs since unification in 1990. Moreover, given that much of the trouble and disaster which German visions and ambitions have caused historically had to do with the exercise of power in general and the use of force in particular, I will focus on these issues. Such a focus, it seems to me, is also well chosen because since unification many German visions have been circulating, which seemed to suggest that a new and German model of international civility was finally making its way into the world at large which was still dominated by “traditional” great powers.

In this paper I will argue that, almost from the start, this well-intentioned self-image was an ill-conceived founding myth of united Germany which neither corresponded to the realities on the ground nor to the ambitions of the Germans themselves. The “new” Germany which entered the world stage in 1990 was the old FRG in many ways. In its own self-image the old “Bonn Republic” (as the Federal Republic before unification is referred to nowadays) had become a “civilian” power because it had learned from its own history and the world's history more broadly. I argue, however, that it had been the power which it was because, more than anything else, the allies wanted it to be that way. The nascent “Berlin Republic” similarly remains a power shaped by circumstance and choice, ie. a

power shaped by the environment in which it is located, by the aspirations of its leadership and people, and by the demands of other states.

If the German self-image of an avant-garde-type civilian power would have been accurate in 1990, the Germany of March 1999 fighting a war alongside its NATO allies almost exclusively on (at least questionable) human rights grounds probably would have to be ranked as a failure. If, however, the Germany of 1990 was no more (and no less) a power shaped by circumstance and choice than *any* of its partners in NATO and the EU, today's Germany is equally no less (and no more) a "normal" (or "abnormal") country thus shaped. In other words, by most standards of "civility", today's Germany is no more (and no less) "civilian" than any of its allies. Therefore, if the transformation process which German foreign policy has experienced during the last nine years - a process which, as I will try to show, was remarkable indeed - is aptly regarded as a "normalization" process, it is a process of "normalization" which *any* country experiences at *any* time.

In addressing the question of Germany's global visions and ambitions I had to figure out some way of relating visions and ambitions. "Vision" normally relates to the question of what world we want to live in, ie. a desirable future state of the world. "Ambition" normally relates to the question of how we can get there, ie. what we can and should do in order to realize this desirable future state of the world. In trying to relate these two concepts empirically I have decided to examine not only academic or political visions but also what beliefs the political elites and the public more broadly held with regard to the future. The rationale behind this methodological strategy was that before visions could be translated into active policy, they had to be grounded in the broader beliefs of decision-makers and the people on whom they depend (the voters). As a result, I have focused on three things: (1) explicit visions and ambitions outlined in political speeches and academic books; (2) two prominent foreign policy decisions in 1990/91 and 1999 which should enable us to check the nexus between vision and ambition (here:

concrete political steps towards a desired future); and (3) extensive data from public opinion polls among foreign policy elites and the German public more broadly.

In arguing that Germany has gone through a process of “normalization” I will proceed as follows. To begin with I will first recount Germany's role during the Gulf War (Section 2). This crucial episode, coinciding with German unification in 1990, reveals that the country was caught largely unprepared for what was to come in January and February 1991. Still, even at that time decision-makers were seriously (if only briefly) considering sending German troops alongside the anti-Saddam coalition. The reasons for considering such a decision, *and* for finally deciding against it, had nothing to do with *either* “Weltpolitik” in the tradition of the Kaiserreich or the Third Reich *or* with a presumed mistrust among Germans themselves that their country had to somehow “contain” itself, *or* with a more fundamental transformation of the country towards a new type of “civilian power”. Rather, in addition to securing safe ratification of the “Two-plus-Four” treaty (which was only completed in March of 1991) it was a specific West German foreign policy tradition, the tradition of exercising “restraint”, which prevailed over some of the more ambitious designs by the American allies in particular.

The Gulf War experience, setting off a new world order where similar regional conflicts and civil wars were starting to proliferate, had a sobering and lasting effect on German minds. Far from sharing some of the more visionary “internationalist” designs of a segment of German intellectuals and academics, the German public slowly but steadily adjusted to the new realities of an increasingly conflictual world. An even more accelerated speed of adjustment was noticeable among the foreign policy elites more broadly (Section 3). As a result, nine years after the Gulf War, Germany's “normalization” process has carried the country in a direction which few observers had expected in 1990. In security matters - be it regionally or globally - the “new” Germany still envisioned itself as reluctant a

power as the old one. Yet given that the environment of its alliance has changed dramatically during these years, Germany has more continued to develop into the “normal” ally its partners had hoped for (Section 4). Irrespective of whether *this* process of “normalization” is applauded or criticized, it is something with which Germany as well as its allies have to live. In security matters Germany is having a harder time living with it than its allies. In European matters (defined more narrowly in the context of the European Union) it is vice versa (Section 5). As Germany's *European* visions fade, Germany's EU partners will increasingly be faced with “normal” German ambitions - ambitions much more similar to their own. I doubt that they will like it. In the end, therefore, a shade of nightmare might reappear at a very distant horizon - but, as yet, it is only a shade.

2. A defining moment: German Unification, the Gulf War and “Ultima Irratio”

1990 through 1992 were the formative years of Germany's “new” foreign policy. At the time of unification (ie. between September and December 1990) the political rhetoric about Germany's global visions and ambitions was filled with sentences redeploying certain key terms in varying contexts. What was least surprising for the experienced observers of German foreign policy was that these visions were primarily couched in terms of “Europe” and “responsibility”. Hans-Dietrich Genscher's interpretation of the preamble of the Basic Law - according to which a united Germany would “aspire to serve peace around the world as a member with equal rights in a united Europe” - probably best expressed how Germans wanted to see themselves and be seen by others. Although his more far-reaching claims about the “identity” of Germany's national and European interests (which Genscher had

so forcefully expressed just the day before the wall came down a year earlier¹) were no longer apparent, his judgement that a unified Germany carried significantly more “European” and “global responsibility” was widely shared. Against the dual background of both “the greater weight of united Germany” in international politics and “the question of the peoples of Europe, how we will use this increased weight”, the conduct of a “policy of the good example” (“Politik des guten Beispiels”) or, alternatively, a “policy of responsibility” (“Verantwortungspolitik”) sounded good to German ears, especially when contrasted with notions of “power politics” (“Machtpolitik”) associated with German foreign policy prior to the Federal Republic.² As to the specific areas of Germany's “greater responsibility” (or “special responsibility”) Genscher listed seven points: (1) the “unique link between Germany and France”; (2) developments in Central and Eastern Europe, especially with regard to a “European policy of stability in which military factors will play an ever decreasing role”; (3) the relationship with the Soviet Union and (4) Poland; (5) the “deepening and institutionalization of the CSCE process”, especially with regard to the fact that “a new relationship between the members of the two military alliances (NATO and Warsaw Pact, G.H.) opens the way for new co-operative structures in Europe”; (6) a “strengthening of the transatlantic relationship” based on a new relationship between the European Community and North America; and (7) a “new world order” based on the hope of building “a new culture of international co-existence”.³

¹Cf. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 11. Legislaturperiode, 173. Sitzung (8. November 1989), pp. 13050D and 13051D (subsequently cited as DBT 11/173, 8.11.1989).

² Erklärung der Bundesregierung zum Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland durch den Bundesminister des Auswärtigen, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, am 20. September 1990, DBT 11/226, p. 17803D and 17804C.

³Ibid., pp. 17805A-17807A. See also Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, vor der 45. Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen am 26.9.1990, in:

However, a closer reading of both public debates about this new German role as well as concrete foreign policy decisions reveals that both Genscher and his coalition partners as well as the opposition parties had more concrete (and sharply differing) ideas as to where Germany ought to be heading. In hindsight one could even argue that these debates clearly foreshadowed the changes that were to come in subsequent years. Against the background of the "Two-plus-Four" talks (which were only completed in mid-September), the 1990/91 Gulf War marked the most disturbing international event from a German perspective because it forced Germany, even before unification had formally been completed (on 3 October 1990), to spell out in very concrete detail how it would define its role in such a conflict.

As to the contrast between rhetoric and action two phases can be distinguished: (1) the final phase of "Two-plus-Four" leading up to unification (during this phase the conflict in the Gulf steadily escalated, culminating in the 8 November announcement by President Bush that the US-led coalition would prepare for an offensive military option); (2) mid-November 1990 through February 1991 (during this period German hostages held in Iraq were released and the first

Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994, herausgegeben aus Anlaß des 125. Jubiläums des Auswärtigen Amtes durch das Auswärtige Amt, Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1995, p. 708. The fact that Genscher's rhetoric did not fully convince foreign observers neither surprised nor deterred Genscher in sticking to it. David Marsh, for instance, then a British journalist covering Germany, later said that Genscher was the quintessential master in spelling out a "seraphic vision of a Germany diligently exercising its new found responsibilities in pursuit of universal brotherhood" (Germany and Europe: The Crisis of Unity, London: Mandarin 1995, p. 167). Gary Geipel, an American expert on Germany, similarly judged that "to take the German elite at its word is to drown in the latest conventional wisdom" (see The Nature and Limits of German Power, in: Gary Geipel (Ed.), Germany in a New Era, Indianapolis: Hudson Institute 1993, p. 19).

all-German elections took place - in early December - with the new Bundestag meeting for its first sessions from mid-January 1991).

2.1. Visions of Civilian "Weltpolitik" and the Blessings of Constitutional Constraints

It was only three weeks after the Caucasus summit in July 1990 (where Chancellor Kohl and Soviet President Gorbachev settled the outstanding issues relating to unification) that German decision makers were faced with new foreign policy realities. Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait in early August occurred at a time when the foreign policy establishment was preoccupied with wrapping up the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations. Yet behind the scenes decision makers at the highest level were deliberating an unprecedented move: to send the Bundeswehr to the Gulf in support of the anti-Saddam coalition.

Shortly after the Iraqi invasion the American administration had informally approached the military attaché at the German embassy in Washington about whether Germany would be ready to send troops to the Gulf.⁴ Within a week Defense Ministry circles in Bonn were hinting publicly that a deployment of the German Navy would indeed be conceivable and that it could even start within seven to ten days. Among the main reasons for this major departure from previous practice was the fact that these unnamed sources pointed to the "new situation" which had emerged due to the "new thinking on security" and the participation of

⁴See Michael J. Inacker, *Unter Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit. Die Deutschen in der Golfallianz*, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1991, p. 84. Based on background interviews Inacker reports that the official request was made in a letter from US Secretary of Defense Cheney to Defense Minister Stoltenberg dated 20 August 1990. For a more detailed analysis of German decision making regarding the Gulf War see Gunther Hellmann, *Absorbing Shocks and Mounting Checks. Germany and Alliance Burden Sharing in the Gulf War*, in: Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, Danny Unger (Eds.), *Friends in Need. Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War*, New York: St. Martin's Press 1997, pp. 165-194.

the Soviet Union in the anti-Saddam coalition.⁵ Moreover, Hans Stercken (a CDU member and chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee) argued that "we should not in advance count ourselves out of involvement (...) if through readiness we can avert the danger of escalation."⁶ Chancellor Kohl himself hinted that Germany would be willing to send troops, if a multilateralist cover could be provided thereby making it difficult for Germany to shun its obligations.⁷ However, a broad coalition of politicians - including members of Kohl's party⁸ - opposed any such thought, arguing that the German constitution prohibited any deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO territory. Although constitutional experts differed on whether this was indeed the proper interpretation of the Basic Law, there had been a long-established *political* consensus among all the major parties to interpret the constitution restrictively.⁹ Foreign Minister Genscher in particular rejected any

⁵ See Streit um Bundeswehreinsatz am Golf. Hardhöhe schließt Präsenz außerhalb des NATO-Gebiets nicht aus, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 August 1990, p. 2; see also DPA report from Bonn, 9 August 1990, FBIS-WEU-90-154, 9 August 1990, p. 3.

⁶See DPA report from Hannover, 8 August 1990, FBIS-WEU-90-154, 9 August 1990, p. 3.

⁷According to Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, Kohl had informed the Italian Government in mid-August that Germany might consider sending troops not only to the Mediterranean, but also to the Persian Gulf if the WEU at its meeting on 21 August decided to send ships to the Gulf; see Deutsche Minensuchboote in den Golf?, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 August 1990, p. 2.

⁸See Streit um Bundeswehreinsatz am Golf, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 August 1990, p. 2.

⁹See the debate between Dieter Blumenwitz, Die Politik kann frei entscheiden, and Hans-Peter Schneider, Der Verteidigungsauftrag ist eng auszulegen, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 August 1990, p. 8. As Harald Müller put it, before 1990 there existed "an unequivocal interpretation of ambiguous legal language" (German Foreign Policy after Unification, in: Paul Stares (Ed.), The New Germany and the New Europe, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 1992, p. 139). See also Inacker, Unter Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit, pp. 28-30. Inacker reports that in May 1982 the Federal Government under Chancellor Schmidt asked for a constitutional opinion from the Justice Ministry as to whether or not the Bundeswehr could participate "out of area". This was

deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO territory adding - in a pointed counter to Chancellor Kohl - that it would even be impossible for German troops to participate in a UN peacekeeping mission unless the Basic Law was changed.¹⁰

These conflicting views were reconciled in two meetings on 20 August. First the Chancellor met with the Foreign and Defense Minister in the morning, agreeing not to send any troops to the Persian Gulf and to stick to the traditional interpretation of the Basic Law.¹¹ Then Genscher and Stoltenberg appeared before

apparently done against the background of the Iran-Iraq war and the possibility of Western intervention in case of an escalation of the conflict. The legal opinion turned out to advise against the use of the Bundeswehr "out of area", evading, however, the sensitive issue whether the Bundeswehr could participate within the framework of the UN.

¹⁰See Keine Mehrheit für Marine-Einsatz im Golf, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 August 1990, p. 1 and Genscher gegen Einsatz deutscher Kriegsschiffe im Persischen Golf, in: Der Tagesspiegel, 16 August 1990, p. 1. Referring to the still ongoing negotiations in the "Two-plus-Four" context, the Chancellor argued that "one cannot claim international solidarity for oneself and then refuse when others ask for international solidarity from us. This is my very clear position." Asked whether he could imagine the use of the Bundeswehr in the Gulf conflict within the framework of a UN contingent, he said: "If it comes to a clear vote by the United Nations I can imagine a number of possibilities." See DPA report from Bonn, 16 August 1990, in: FBIS-WEU-90-160, 17 August 1990, p. 10; for background see also Karl Feldmeyer and Günter Bannas, Streit in der Bonner Koalition über Bundeswehreinsatz am Golf, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 August 1990, p. 2; Günter Bannas, Bonn sucht nach einer Einigung im Streit um Golfeinsatz, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 August 1990, p. 4 and Bundeswehr unter UN-Kommando?, in: Die Welt, 18/19 August 1990, p. 1.

¹¹In his memoirs Genscher pointed out that "the status of the 'Two-plus-Four' talks called for restraint", a reference to his judgement that it would sharply contradict the provisions of the treaty (and send disturbing signals to Moscow) if Germany sent troops to the Gulf at this point in time (see Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, Berlin: Siedler Verlag 1995, p. 902). The draft treaty which had already been agreed to in its core aspects, committed Germany to conduct its foreign policy in such a way "that only peace will emanate from German soil" ("daß von deutschem Boden nur Frieden ausgehen wird"); see Article 2 of the "Two-plus-Four"-Treaty,

a joint meeting of the Bundestag Foreign and Defense Committees explaining the position of the Federal Government. Whereas Stoltenberg supported the decision reached he also stated his reservations vis-à-vis the current interpretation of the Basic Law.¹² In the evening Kohl finally met with the leaders of the major parties. In these talks the leaders of the governing coalition parties CDU, CSU and FDP and the opposition party SPD expressed their support for the decision reached between Kohl, Genscher and Stoltenberg earlier. They also agreed to work to amend the constitution to allow future military participation in UN actions. However, they left unsettled whether they would pursue such a change before or after the elections scheduled for December.¹³

Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland, 12 September 1990, in: Bulletin. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, No.109, 14 September 1990, pp. 1153-1156. For background on the importance of this aspect from the Soviet point of view see the memoirs of Eduard Schevardnadse, *Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit*, Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag 1991, pp. 233-267, especially p. 248. Chancellor Kohl probably accepted this reasoning in spite of his conviction that Germany was morally obliged to help the US. In a telephone conversation on 6 September with President Bush the Chancellor said that given the solidarity which Germany had always received from the US in the past, he personally felt particularly troubled ("... daß es ihn persönlich sehr belastete") that the Germans could not do more at this point in time. See Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einigung*, Berlin: Siedler Verlag 1991, p. 358.

¹²See Karl Feldmeyer, *Die Bundesmarine wird sich nicht an Aktionen im Golf beteiligen*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 August 1990, p. 4. Genscher for his part said shortly afterwards that he did not share the views of those whom he characterized as being "keen to participate under any circumstances in an international conflict." See *Unsere Bundeswehr ist für Einsätze unter der UN-Charta gut geeignet. Interview mit Hans-Dietrich Genscher*, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25/26 August 1990, p. 7.

¹³See Feldmeyer, *Die Bundesmarine wird sich nicht an Aktionen im Golf beteiligen* and Udo Bergdoll, *Kein Einsatz der Bundeswehr am Golf*, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 August 1990, p. 1. As it turned out it took four more years (and a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in July

The outcome of this precedent-setting episode had some of the typical earmarks of a bureaucratic and political compromise. Genscher, the Foreign Ministry and the FDP on the one hand were strictly opposing any direct military involvement. Rather than participating militarily they wanted to limit Germany's role to political support and direct financial assistance to those Middle East countries most affected by the embargo.¹⁴ Stoltenberg, the Defense Ministry and large parts of the CDU and CSU, on the other, were prepared to go much further in terms of direct military support.¹⁵ However, in the end they did not push very hard and broader political considerations prevailed. Given the FRG's history, it would indeed have been unprecedented if the Kohl government had decided to send German troops abroad without securing the broadest possible consensus, ie. including (at least) the SPD opposition. One of Chancellor Kohl's closest advisers, the Minister in the Chancellor's Office Rudolf Seiters, was probably also speaking for Helmut Kohl when he said in an interview shortly before the 20 August

1994) to settle these differences. According to the court's decision the Basic Law allowed for Bundeswehr out-of-area participation in the context of international organizations irrespective of whether these were based on the principle of collective security or collective defense. See Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts über die Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen internationale Einsätze der Bundeswehr, in: Europa Archiv Vol. 49, No. 15 (1994), p. D. 428pp.

¹⁴For a detailed discussion of Germany's overall financial, military-technical, and logistical contributions to the anti-Saddam coalition see Hellmann, *Germany and Alliance Burden Sharing*, pp. 167-172. All in all this amounted to some DM 18 billion (or almost one third of Germany's annual defense budget).

¹⁵Inacker reports that military planners in the Defense Ministry had developed a scenario for deploying one division of the Bundeswehr to the Persian Gulf in the fall of 1990 (Inacker, *Unter Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit*, p.115).

agreement that the deployment of Bundeswehr troops to the Persian Gulf should not become a subject of partisan controversy.¹⁶

Controversy, however, continued and even intensified after President Bush's 8 November announcement that the US-led coalition would prepare for an offensive military option.¹⁷ This was especially visible in the rhetoric of the Greens and the SPD. Throughout the preceding months, both parties had charged that the governing coalition was once again aiming at a new great power role for Germany. Given the fact that the first all-German elections at the national level in early December had already been set by August, members of the Bundestag opposition (the SPD and the Greens) were increasingly demanding that Germany's "new role as a world power" should take center stage in the upcoming election campaign.¹⁸ The "internationalist" policies advocated by the Greens here marked the strongest contrast to the governing coalition.¹⁹ Interestingly enough, deputies of the Greens, such as Antje Vollmer, appeared to take it for granted (and welcome it) that Germany would henceforth again be conducting "Weltpolitik" since, as she

¹⁶Seiters made this point in an interview which was published two days before the August 20 meeting between the party leaders, see CSU: FDP muß ihre Haltung ändern, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20 August 1990, p. 2. Asked in an opinion poll in August 1990 whether they would support or oppose a change of the Basic Law in order to enable the Bundeswehr to participate in out-of-area operations, 53 percent of Germans objected with 32 percent in support and 15 percent undecided; see Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Renate Köcher (Eds.), *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984-1992*, München: K.G. Saur 1993, p. 1085.

¹⁷See Excerpts from President Bush's news conference at the White House on 8 November 1990, in: Micah L. Sifrah, Christopher Cerf (Eds.), *The Gulf War Reader. History, Documents, Opinions*, New York: Times Books 1991, pp. 228-229.

¹⁸See Antje Vollmer, *DBT* 11/220, 9 August 1990, p. 1740D. Vollmer was a leading deputy of the Green Party.

pointed out, "the European world, in spite of all scepticism and resentment, (...) no longer fears this new role of the Germans".²⁰ In outlining the presumed reasons for Europe's confidence vis-à-vis the Germans, Vollmer pointed to two major factors: According to her, Europe no longer feared the Germans because, among others, her own generation (the so-called "1968 generation") had "thoroughly civilized and humanized" German society which before had been characterized by crude anti-communism, self-aggrandizement ("Wir-sind-wieder-wer-Gegröle") and narrow-mindedness ("spießig und muffig").²¹ This legacy, in her view, carried a clear message for a "civilian" international future for the Germans: A new Germany once again conducting "Weltpolitik" had "the opportunity, never again to shed the experience of the dictatorship of the left and the right from its historical baggage. Given that baggage, one has to proceed more slowly."²² The party programme of the Greens (which was formulated on the basis of difficult compromises and long sessions²³) spelt out in detail what this civilian future implied. Since the "climate of peace" was "favorable", Germany's new slow-moving Weltpolitik amounted to

¹⁹The only party rivalling with the Greens for true "demilitarization" rhetoric was the Party of Democratic Socialism, the former SED, see PDS-Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 1990, Berlin: PDS 1990, pp. 49-53.

²⁰"Bei Ihren weltpolitischen Ausflügen erleben Sie, Herr Bundeskanzler (...), daß wir Deutschen jetzt tatsächlich - das ist das Neue - Weltpolitik machen dürfen und daß offenbar die Welt nichts dagegen hat." DBT, 11/220, 9 August 1990, p. 17402A.

²¹Ibid., p. 17402A-D.

²²Ibid., p. 17402D.

²³See Ludger Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik - ein schwieriges Verhältnis*, Münster: Verlag Westfälisches Dampfboot 1998, pp. 383-390. Volmer, who currently serves as deputy ("Staatssekretär") under Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in the coalition government between SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, is generally counted as a member of the more "left"-leaning faction within the party. His detailed history of the debates on foreign policy among the Greens was published shortly before he assumed his official position.

pursuing a strategy of “unilateral disarmament” in conjunction with a policy of “demilitarization” which would - “actively, not meekly” - aim at the creation of a “new order of peace” through “bloc subversion” on the one hand and “bloc-transcending co-operation” on the other. The ultimate goal was to create “a world without military blocs and a society without weapons and armies”.²⁴ The activist “internationalist” impulse of this policy was balanced by an emphasis on “a policy of self-restraint” complemented by “an opening of the FRG vis-à-vis international control mechanisms as well as effective binding of the FRG in multilateral contexts which assure additional international control and restrictions of German power”.²⁵ The internationalist agenda propagated by the Greens thus combined “Weltpolitik”- activism and self-containment of German power.

Although the SPD was more circumspect in choosing its language, the overall thrust of its vision pointed in a similar direction. At the time when Antje Vollmer was calling for a substantive definition of “world power” in terms of “civility” in August, she had directly addressed herself to the SPD candidate for the chancellorship, the Prime Minister of Saarland, Oskar Lafontaine. In Vollmer's view, Lafontaine's preoccupation with internal unification issues appeared to “evade the new international tasks of a German world power.”²⁶ A few weeks later Lafontaine responded by saying that “the term world power” would be inappropriate. Instead, he suggested that Germany should display “a lot of

²⁴Die Grünen, Das Programm zur 1. gesamtdeutschen Bundestagswahl, Bonn: Die Grünen 1990, pp. 18, 20-21.

²⁵ DIE GRÜNEN, Das Programm, pp. 20-21. For background to the decision-making process leading up to these formulations (especially with regard to the differences between a more radical faction among the Greens which were calling for an end to Germany's NATO membership - “Wir müssen raus aus der NATO” - and a more moderate faction led by “Joschka Fischer and his faithful followers” which was advocating a “fundamental change of course towards a Pro-NATO position”) see Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, pp. 386-389.

²⁶DBT, 11/220, 9 August 1990, p. 17402D.

restraint". Similar to the Greens, Lafontaine also saw "new opportunities" regarding Germany's international role which "should be used to take over leadership roles" ("Vorreiterrollen") in the fields of disarmament and controls over arms exports rather than "talking us with utmost speed into a change of the constitution in order to send German troops to the Gulf".²⁷ Such remarks became even more pointed after President Bush's announcement in early November. After former Chancellor Willy Brandt had secured the release of hostages held in Baghdad, he implored the Kohl government to stick to diplomatic means and economic sanctions "in order to reach, in every conceivable way, a political solution." Germany "must not lag behind anybody in its efforts for peace", Brandt said, because war, in his view, was "the ultima irratio of politics".²⁸

²⁷DBT, 11/226, 20 September 1990, pp. 17809C-17810C. In the same session, Gerald Häfner, a deputy of the Greens supported this position, saying that those "who, after German unity, cannot think of anything better than German units, play with fire", *ibid.*, p. 17825C. The SPD's election programme for the period 1990-1994 which was approved by a party congress in late September 1990 outlines the following additional foreign policy objectives: "drastic disarmament" including a 50 percent reduction in the strength of Bundeswehr as well as - "in the medium term" - of the defense budget more broadly; a ban on weapons exports; the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from German soil; and the redistribution of "at least DM 1 billion" from the defense budget to the development aid budget. The programme also stated that the SPD "opposes the deployment and additional military tasks of NATO and the WEU outside the jurisdiction of the alliance"; see SPD Regierungsprogramm 1990-1994, Bonn: SPD 1990, pp. 21-22.

²⁸DBT, 11/235, 15 November 1990, pp. 18842B and 18843C.

2.2. "And I fear that this is only the beginning of a new development...": The Politics of Avoiding War and Evading Alliance Commitments

Although these debates provided first hints as to the difficulties among foreign policy elites to spell out visions and ambitions for united Germany in dealing with the unexpected realities of war it would be misleading to take this sample of views as evidence that the crisis in the Gulf attracted much attention in its early phase. Rather, as the Bonn correspondent of the Washington Post reported in early November, with the election campaign moving into final gear the situation in the Persian Gulf went "virtually unmentioned."²⁹ Yet, with the elections decided and the "ultima irratio" approaching quickly in early January, the debate heated up and the international community saw the German elites engaged in a frantic effort to somehow arrest what Genscher had called the "war automatism". Genscher's reaction on 10 January 1991 to the upcoming visit of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to Baghdad ("In such a critical situation one must give diplomacy the chance to preserve peace"³⁰) probably best summarized the mood in Bonn and beyond: it was simply unimaginable for Germans (including the highest political leadership) that the crisis in the Gulf could escalate further. The issue was not framed in terms of "effectiveness" of force versus sanctions. Rather, the dominating issue was whether there would be war or more diplomacy - and faced with that choice the Germans certainly preferred the latter.³¹ It should not have

²⁹Marc Fisher, In Bonn and Tokyo, Gulf Crisis Is Better Left Unmentioned, in: International Herald Tribune, 5 November 1990, pp. 1 and 4.

³⁰Genscher Interview with Hessen Radio, cited in DPA report from Frankfurt, 10 January 1991, in: FBIS-WEU-91-007, 10 January 1991, pp. 14-15.

³¹In a telephone survey conducted just before the expiry of the deadline on 17 January 1991 79 percent of Germans were in favor of continued diplomatic efforts and more than 80 percent "preferred a political solution" to the crisis if a war would "cost the lives of 1,000 US soldiers" (see 79 Prozent der Bundesbürger für weitere Verhandlungen, in: Der Tagesspiegel, 16 January

come as such a surprise, therefore, that Germany was paralysed after the beginning of the air war. "We are very decisively against surrendering to a mechanism of war. We are in favour of sanctions" and: "Rather 1,000 days of negotiations than one day of war" -- these statements by Joschka Fischer and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul probably best expressed what most Germans felt.³²

1991, p. 7). According to another survey 25 percent favored an advance by the allied troops; see DPA report from Frankfurt, 10 January 1991, in: FBIS-WEU-91-008, 11 January 1991, p. 11.

³²See *Kaum ist die Einheit da, schickt man deutsche Soldaten zur Front*. Interview mit Joschka Fischer, in: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 9 January 1991, p. 6. It is a "grave matter", Fischer criticized, that "we have to live through a mechanism of war preparations which almost reminds me of Sarajevo and the ultimatum which was issued then." Rather than engaging in "geopolitics with military means" - as the Kohl government presumably did - Fischer advocated a policy of sanctions. Given the "solidarity of the international community of states" he thought that sanctions provided for a "clear alternative", "an opportunity to restore international order and the respect of sovereignty and human rights through peaceful means". (At the time of the interview Fischer was head of the parliamentary group of the Greens in the state parliament of Hessen. It is important to recall that in 1990 "Sarajevo" was still a metaphor for the accidental break-out of war as in 1914 and not yet a metaphor for a beleaguered city shelled at will from the surrounding hills, as in the mid-1990s.) Although the German public was as hesitant as Fischer to escalate the war, a large majority of Germans (81 percent) thought that the use of force against Saddam Hussein was "correct" after the air war had begun in mid-January. Still, three quarters of those questioned rejected any direct military involvement by Germany (with only 20 percent in favour); see ADN report from Tübingen, 22 January 1991, in: FBIS-WEU-91-014, 22 January 1991, p. 22. The public, however, did not share Fischer's optimism regarding the use of sanctions. Only one in three thought that sanctions were of any use (see DPA report from Frankfurt, 10 January 1991, in: FBIS-WEU-91-008, 11 January 1991, p. 11). For Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul's statement see DPA report from Hamburg, 12 January 1991, quoted in: FBIS-WEU-91-009, 14 January 1991, pp. 25-26 (Wieczorek-Zeul, who is currently serving as minister for international development, then was SPD Deputy in the Bundestag and Deputy Chairman of the Social Democrats).

Given that Germany was at the sidelines with regard to the preparations for a military offensive, the debate about war versus diplomacy was less consequential than the more immediate issue of how Germany would respond to requests for alliance support. For more than four decades Germany had profited from the security guarantees offered by its allies. As it became ever more likely that the war in the Gulf would escalate, Germany for the first time ever was faced with the eventuality that its own support would be called for. In contrast to the decision not to send troops to the Gulf because of constitutional constraints vis-à-vis “out of area” operations, Turkey's request for alliance support in case of an Iraqi attack could not be refused as easily.

On 20 December 1990 the Turkish government filed a request for assistance from its NATO allies. As a result NATO's Defence Planning Committee decided in early January to send the Allied Mobile Force's air component to bases in south-eastern Turkey. Given the fact that a NATO ally was calling for help, and since this rapid reaction unit was highly integrated and included some 200 Bundeswehr soldiers and 18 German fighter jets (alongside similar Belgian and Italian contingents), the German government would have had a very hard time to justify not participating. On the first day of the new year the German government decided to send the Bundeswehr to Turkey in order to “deter aggression”, as the government spokesman said.³³ However, the opposition parties, as well as some senior representatives of the governing coalition, were arguing that an Iraqi attack on Turkey would not automatically lead to German assistance to Turkey under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty because, as some critics argued, allied air strikes from Turkish soil under the mandate of the UN Security Council would in effect amount to offensive, not defensive operations. If Iraq were to retaliate, as one might expect, this could not be taken to trigger assistance obligations under Article

³³See DPA report from Bonn, 2 January 1991, in: FBIS-WEU-91-002, 3 January 1991, p. 12. For background to the decision see Inacker, *Unter Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit*, pp. 108-109.

5 of the Washington Treaty.³⁴ Joschka Fischer, among others, criticized that the deployment of German troops “to the front” marked a “qualitative change” in post-World War II history. For the first time German soldiers were called to “war service” (“Kriegsdienst”) rather than mere “military service” (“Militärdienst”). “And I fear that this is only the beginning of a new development. For the first time we have to deal with geopolitics with military means by our government rather than the defense of one's own country. To this we, as Greens, say very clearly ‘No’”. Asked whether it wouldn't be demanding too much from Chancellor Kohl if he were to stand “head-on” against the Americans and the British, Fischer said: “Kohl is Chancellor and significant as such: He has democratic legitimacy”.³⁵

The official government statement was also ambiguous as to how to define eventualities. In announcing the decision to deploy the Bundeswehr, the spokesman of the Federal Government had left open whether the Bundeswehr units would automatically assist Turkey if the Iraqi air force were to launch air strikes on Turkey in response to allied air strikes from Turkish soil. He merely said that the Bundeswehr would only fight “in the event of a clear aggression against the alliance partner Turkey”.³⁶

To sum up: The political rhetoric and the actions taken during the course of the final phase of German unification and the escalation of the Gulf War clearly

³⁴For a sample of statements along these lines from representatives of the opposition as well as the governing coalition parties see Claus Gennrich, Bonn will durch Entsendung von Alpha-Jets den Irak abschrecken, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 January 1991, p. 2; ADN report from Bonn, 4 January 1991, in: FBIS-WEU-91-003, 4 January 1991, p. 5; Keine Mehrheit für Bundeswehr-Einsatz, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 January 1991, p. 2.

³⁵See Kaum ist die Einheit da, schickt man deutsche Soldaten zur Front. Interview mit Joschka Fischer, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 January 1991, p. 6.

³⁶See DPA report from Bonn, 2 January 1991, in: FBIS-WEU-91-002, 3 January 1991, p.12 and Günter Bannas, “Bundeswehrflugzeuge in die Türkei?”, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 January 1991, p.2.

show that uniting (and united) Germany was largely unprepared for these new developments. The overwhelming majority of Germans certainly didn't like what they were seeing: its own political leadership seriously (if only briefly) considering a break with past practices by sending the Bundeswehr to the Gulf in the context of the UN-authorized and US-led anti-Saddam coalition; an ally which had stood at Germany's side for four decades during the height of the Cold War now asking for reciprocal support in case of an attack; a dictator refusing to consider any "diplomatic solution"; an American president at peace with himself while ordering the use of force; and, finally and most awkwardly, Iraqi chemical warheads produced with German know-how in the hands of "a Hitler" determined to terrorize the Jewish state.

German legacies of "Machtpolitik" and "Weltpolitik", self-images of the FRG as a "civilian power" and "trading state", moral obligations of "Auschwitz never again" in general and support for the state of Israel in particular - all these factors which dominated public debates about Germany's new international role in subsequent years here were fused in an intricate web of "multilemmas". The Hitler-Saddam analogy in particular struck a sensitive nerve.³⁷ If there was any analogy which ought to have mobilized "the German fighting spirit"³⁸ it should have been a reminder of Hitler's legacy - and indeed it did. Like few other debates before or after, this one captured the minds of German intellectuals³⁹ - and in many

³⁷See William Safire, *The Hitler Analogy*, in: *New York Times*, 24 August 1990, reprinted in: Sifry/Cerf, *The Gulf War Reader*, pp. 210-212; see also *Vergleich Hitler-Hussein gerügt. Vor allem Juden in USA sind empört über Präsident Bush*, in: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 5 November 1990, p. 2.

³⁸Jim Hoagland, *German Wobbling Puts the Trans-Atlantic Partnership at Risk*, in: *International Herald Tribune*, 30 January 1991, p. 6.

³⁹See *Ein amerikanischer Jude und eine deutsche Friedensrede. Ein Briefwechsel unter den linken Freunden Andrei Markovits und Jürgen Hoffmann, aus dem eine Grundsatzdebatte wurde*, in: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 16 February 1991, p. 6.

ways it foreshadowed subsequent debates about the use of the Bundeswehr in the Balkans. To the astonishment of many observers, however, the dividing line was not between left and right but rather among left intellectuals.⁴⁰ Although prominent writers and academics rejected the Saddam-Hitler analogy as an “apples and oranges” comparison,⁴¹ a surprising number of well known left-leaning intellectuals vehemently spoke out “in favour of this war”.⁴² Yet with the war ending rather quickly and with “internal unification” just about to start, the first months of the first democratically legitimized all-German parliament since 1932 certainly did not seem like a propitious time for spelling out visions beyond the very general acknowledgement to shoulder “greater responsibility”. Still, as the subsequent years showed, Germany's Gulf war experience had a lasting effect in that it initiated the “normalizing” nation to the sobering realities of a new world order which contrasted sharply with Hans-Dietrich Genscher's hopes for “a new culture of international co-existence” and which also seemed to run counter to the expectations raised by the rhetoric of a “policy of the good example”.

⁴⁰See Gunter Hofmann, Wenn die Linke normal sein will. Nicht der Pazifismus, sondern das Bekenntnis zum Krieg fällt auf, in: Die Zeit, No. 8, 15 February 1991, p. 5 and Klaus Hartung, Ein zweites München für Saddam Hussein?, in: tageszeitung, 19 January 1991, reprinted in: Golf-Journal zum Wüstenkrieg, Frankfurt: Tageszeitungsverlagsgesellschaft “die taz” 1991, pp. 60-61.

⁴¹So the German author Günter Grass in an interview with the newspaper tageszeitung, 16 February 1991, reprinted in: Golf-Journal zum Wüstenkrieg, p. 68. See also Jürgen Habermas, Wider die Logik des Krieges, in: Die Zeit, No. 8, 15 February 1991, p. 40.

⁴²See especially Wolf Biermann, Kriegshetze, Friedenshetze, in: Die Zeit, No. 6, 1 February 1991, p. 51 and Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Hitlers Wiedergänger, in: Der Spiegel, No. 6, 4 February 1991, pp. 26-28.

3. Redefining “Ultima (Ir-) Ratio” in the 1990s: Foreign Policy Adjustments between Realpolitik and Idealpolitik

On 24 March 1999, just eight years after the Gulf War had ended, the first German government formed exclusively by parties which self-consciously describe themselves as “left” in an “internationalist” tradition, ordered German soldiers to wage war with its NATO allies against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. For the first time since the end of World War II German soldiers were sent on combat missions - and the tragic irony was that this precedent-setting decision brought them back to where their fathers had fought the last great war: to the Balkans. Yet the contrast to both Germany's abstention during the Gulf War in 1991 and Hitler's aggression during World War II could not have been starker. Whereas back then German soldiers were the outcasts (for either waging a brutal war of aggression or for standing aside while others fought against a dictatorial regime), they now were joining their partners in a war as a “normal ally”.⁴³ Given that NATO's air raids were clearly outside the jurisdiction of the alliance and given, moreover, that a UN mandate could not be furnished, the sole basis of legitimacy was provided by reference to human rights.⁴⁴ Nothing better symbolized how much Germany had

⁴³Cf. Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder anlässlich der 35. Münchener Tagung für Sicherheitspolitik am 6. Februar 1999 in München, in: Bulletin. Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung No. 8, (22 February 1999), p. 91.

⁴⁴Experts of international law even questioned that one could speak of “legitimacy” in this case because the UN Charter’s two exceptions to the use of force ((a) individual and collective self-defense and (b) authorization by the UN Security Council under chapter 7 of the UN Charter) obviously didn’t apply. Asked whether NATO’s air raids therefore marked a “Fall of man in terms of international law” (“völkerrechtlicher Sünderfall”), Bruno Simma, an internationally renowned expert of the UN Charter, assented adding, however, that “NATO has done everything to keep the transgression within the limits of venial sin”; see “Die Nato-Bomben sind eine

changed since unification and the debates at the time of the Gulf War. Many of the actors who previously had vehemently opposed an escalation of the war (even though the UN Charter had provided a rather solid legal justification in comparison to the Kosovo operation of March 1999) now not only supported NATO's attack but also the participation of the Bundeswehr.

What had happened between January 1991 and March 1999 to account for this dramatic turn-around, and what does this tell us about Germany's redefinition of its "self", its global ambitions, and its visions of world order today? In the following section I will argue that the seeds of change were visible as early as 1991. The image of Germany as a "big Switzerland" which was widely circulated in 1991 was misleading from the very start as regards the receptiveness of the German public in general and the foreign policy elites in particular of the socializing pressures of Germany's international as well as domestic environment. Still, it would be similarly misleading to assume that Germany's new "self" could either be adequately captured by the dichotomy "Weltpolitik" or "self-containment" or by an alternative "civilian" symbiosis of "Weltpolitik" and "self-containment", as Antje Vollmer and the Greens suggested in 1990. Rather, what best describes Germany's new role in international relations today is, so to say, a translation of "normalization" into German by spelling out the multiple meanings of the term in the political and historical context of the country.

Measured against an imaginary standard of a "typical" mid-size democracy within the so-called "OECD world", Germany, in spite of its "abnormal history" (Richard von Weizsäcker), is ever more becoming more than a mere "normal" country.⁴⁵ If it is still useful to distinguish empirically between powers that do and

läßliche Sünde". Interview mit Brunno Simma zur völkerrechtlichen Beurteilung der Luftangriffe, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25 March 1999, p. 5.

⁴⁵"Normality" and "normalization" are sensitive but frequently used terms in German political discourse, especially as far as post-unification foreign policy is concerned; for illustrations and

powers that don't belong to a class of "major" or "great" powers - and nothing in the way that the so-called "contact group" handled the Kosovo war speaks against this distinction - Germany has again joined ranks with the other great powers politically and militarily. The Bundeswehr was sent into combat by its political leadership after a process of intense consultation in order to do with the other allied armies what great powers always felt compelled to do: to (re-)establish international order according to their own design. In contrast to 1990 when Germany was allowed to (and wanted to) go "civilian", it now felt - for moral reasons domestically and political reasons internationally - that it had to dress up militarily as all of its allies did. In short, Germany finally looked no more and no less "civilian" than any of them, a power conducting as good or bad a "policy of the good example" as any of them.

3.1. Civilian Internationalism and Swiss Myths

The seeds of this change were sown in late 1990 and early 1991 when unification and the Gulf War marked the conception of the yet to be conceived "Berlin

references see Gunther Hellmann, *Nationale Normalität als Zukunft? Zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik*, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, Vol. 44, No. 7 (July 1999), pp. 837-847. If one listens to political debates in other countries, in contrast, one gets the impression that there couldn't be anything more *abnormal* than not qualifying one's own country as "normal". For an impressive spectrum of leading politicians describing their countries as having become "normal" by the mid-1990s (at the latest) see *The same as you and me*, in: *The Economist*, 29 October 1994, p. 20 (the countries cited are Japan, China, Russia, Italy, Spain, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Israel; Germany is not listed and Canada's prime minister Jean Chrétien is quoted as the only political leader abhorring "normalism": "Canada is not a normal country (...). It is an extraordinary country"). Given that my primary objectives are analytical (rather than political) I will try to be as specific as possible when I speak of Germany as a "normal" or "normalizing" country.

Republic". In surveying public opinion in the immediate aftermath of unification as to how the Germans wanted their country to position itself in the world, one poll received particular attention. Asked what country they perceived to be a model for Germany to emulate, 40 percent of Germans put Switzerland at the top of their list clearly out-distancing the runners-up.⁴⁶ The image of a country in pursuit of welfare and happiness in an idyllic environment and very much detached from the troubles of the world around - this image, reminiscent of the stereotypical German garden, well-groomed and stuffed with garden gnomes ("Gartenzwerge"), apparently seemed quite appealing to Germans.⁴⁷

⁴⁶See Deutschland 2000. Der Staat, den wir uns wünschen, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (Magazin), No. 1 (4 January 1991), pp. 8-15, here pp. 8-9. Only 2 percent of Germans in East and West named the United States and a mere 10 percent mentioned Japan. Switzerland was followed by Sweden with 29 percent. A similar poll conducted in August 1991 found 55 percent of West-Germans and 57 percent of East-Germans similarly favouring Switzerland followed by Sweden (41 percent of West-Germans and 50 percent of East-Germans), the US (36/22), England (24/17), France (22/22) and Japan (10/15) with the rest of the countries lagging far behind; see Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann und Renate Köcher (Eds.), *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984-1992*, München: K. G. Saur 1993, p.955. See also Christoph Bertram, Der Riese, der ein Zwerg sein möchte, in: *Die Zeit*, No. 18 (26 April 1991), pp. 12-13.

⁴⁷The "dwarf" or "gnome" image used to be a recurring theme in the foreign policy discourse of the early 1990, although the connotations were most often even less favorable than in the case of the "Gartenzwerg". Former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel who was well-known for not shying away from undiplomatically strong language said in 1992 that Germany sometimes looked like an "impotent dwarf", quoted by Arthur Heinrich, "Freiheit für die Außenpolitik". *Ausflüge in die Berliner Republik*, in: Katrin Fuchs, Peter von Oertzen, and Ludger Volmer (Eds.), *Zieht die Linke in den Krieg? Beiträge zur Debatte um Kampfeinsätze aus rot-grüner Sicht*, Köln: spw-Verlag 1993, p. 20. See also Ingo Peters, Vom "Scheinzwerg" zum "Scheinriesen" - deutsche Außenpolitik in der Analyse, in: *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (December 1997), pp. 361-388.

Although academic analyses were both more differentiating and less idyllic, and, moreover, dismissive as to the “neutrality” which the Swiss example suggested, the underlying “civilian” thrust of the image was generally supported. In a widely cited article which appeared in the prominent pages of “Foreign Affairs” about the time the poll was conducted, Hanns Maull argued that Germany and Japan represented “prototypes of a promising future” for international affairs, i.e. prototypes of “a new type of international power” which he called “civilian power” and which he thought the US had to emulate as well in order to live up to the challenges of an increasingly interdependent world marked by “intense conflicts over the distribution of its (interdependence's, G.H.) costs and benefits” and confronted with “such new challenges as political instability and crises in Eastern Europe or the Third World, terrorism, drugs or environmental dangers” where “military force is likely to be largely irrelevant”.⁴⁸ According to Maull, becoming a “civilian power” implied three things: “(a) the acceptance of the necessity of co-operation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; (b) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and (c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.”⁴⁹

⁴⁸Hanns W. Maull, Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 91-106, here pp. 92, 93, 102, 103.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 92-93; as to the specific illustration of this concept in the German context see also Maull, *Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik*, in: *Europa Archiv*, Vol. 47 (25 May 1992), pp. 269-278; *Großmacht Deutschland? Anmerkungen und Thesen*, in: Karl Kaiser, Hanns W. Maull (Eds.), *Die Zukunft der europäischen Integration: Folgerungen für die deutsche Politik*, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag 1993, pp. 53-72; and *Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik? Das neue Deutschland in der internationalen Politik. Ein Gespräch mit Hanns W. Maull*, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, Vol. 38, No. 8 (August 1993), pp. 934-948. In developing his “paradigm” of a “civilian power”,

The general thrust of these visions was shared by a distinct segment among German academics and the foreign policy elites which one might call "internationalist" - experts who now either make up or are closely related to the current German government.⁵⁰ In its more ambitious (or idealist) version this view held that Germany's new international responsibility could be concentrated on "the values of peace-maintenance, safeguarding of nature, human rights, and the elimination of poverty", thereby aiming at "a national policy in the international interest".⁵¹ None of this was meant to imply that the nation state would simply disappear or that a "world state" ("Weltstaat") could (or should) be created. Yet, the "world of states" ("Staatenwelt"), according to this view, was gone for good and nation states would henceforth "only be sovereign with regard to their competence

Mauß specifically referred to the similarities with the ideal-type of a "trading state" which was developed by Richard Rosecrance (see his *The Rise of the Trading State*, New York: Basic Books 1986; as to Rosecrance's application of his concept to Europe after 1990 see his *Trading States in the New Europe*, in Helga Haftendorn, Christian Tuschhoff (Eds.), *America and Europe in an Era of Change*, Boulder: Westview Press 1993, pp. 127-145). However, in contrast to Rosecrance's "primarily economic orientation" Mauß wanted to stress the normative "civilian" aspect of his paradigm; see Mauß, *Germany and Japan*, p. 93, fn. 2.

⁵⁰This paragraph draws on arguments developed in a different context; see Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany*, in: *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-39, here pp. 12-16. In contrast to the internationalists I distinguished four additional schools of thought in post-unification foreign policy discourse until the mid-1990s: the pragmatic multilateralists, the Europeanists, the Euro-sceptics and the normalization nationalists.

⁵¹See Ludger Volmer, Thomas Fues, *Schlußfolgerungen für eine neue Außenwirtschaftspolitik Deutschlands*, in: Katrin Fuchs, Peter von Oertzen, and Ludger Volmer (Eds.), *Zieht die Linke in den Krieg? Beiträge zur Debatte um Kampfeinsätze aus rot-grüner Sicht*, Köln: spw-Verlag 1993, pp. 71-82, here p. 71; see also Dieter Senghaas, *Was sind der Deutschen Interessen?*, in: Siegfried Unseld (Ed.), *Politik ohne Projekt? Nachdenken über Deutschland*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1993, pp. 463-491, here p. 491.

for chaos; with regard to their competence for solutions, they will depend on transnational and supranational structures in the future".⁵² The implications for Germany's global ambitions were clear: Germany had to beware that it is "an inter- and transnationally co-operating democracy and market economy which is integrated in Europe and obliged to act 'collegially' rather than 'directorially'."⁵³ Sharing greater "responsibility" and taking over "leadership roles" did not mean, however, playing the role of a global policeman or fire-fighter in a "territorial" or "great power world". Rather, in self-consciously choosing a strategy of self-restraint and in "refusing to project power or apply the (traditional) instruments of power, be they military, economic, or ideological" the aim was to take over the lead as a promoter of preventive conflict management and, if need be, of a "benevolent hegemon" in the sense of supporting the strengthening of civil, joint ("solidarisch"), and ecologically sustainable structures".⁵⁴ To be sure, none of this was meant to imply that the use of force was excluded under any circumstances. There would, of course, still be situations in which force as ultima ratio might be unavoidable. However, even in these cases "the crucial question will be, whether

⁵²Joschka Fischer, *Risiko Deutschland: Krise und Zukunft der deutschen Politik*. Köln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch 1994, p. 232. See also Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Vergesellschaftete Außenpolitik*, in: *Merkur*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 1-14 and Jürgen Habermas, *Vergangenheit als Zukunft*. Zürich: pendo-Verlag 1991, p. 105-110.

⁵³See Volker Rittberger, *Nach der Vereinigung: Deutschlands Stellung in der Welt*, in: *Leviathan*, Vol. 20 (June 1992), pp. 207-229, here p. 215.

⁵⁴These last two quotes are from Albert Statz, *Das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung muß einhergehen mit der Pflicht zur Selbstbeschränkung: Zur politischen Strategie einer grün-alternativen Außenpolitik*, in: Fuchs/v. Oertzen/Volmer, *Zieht die Linke in den Krieg?*, pp. 184, 193; for additional arguments in favor of playing "civilian" leadership roles see also Maull, *Großmacht Deutschland?*, p. 69 and Klaus Dieter Wolf, *Eine neue Rolle Deutschlands? Optionen deutscher Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung*, in: *Der Bürger im Staat*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 59-63, here pp. 62-63.

we succeed in developing effective and legitimate forms of multilateral sanctions (“Zwangmaßnahmen”) or whether the recourse to force follows traditional nation-state thinking”.⁵⁵

At first glance these visions initially also seemed to resonate among the German public more broadly. Even in the aftermath of the Gulf War a majority of Germans thought that Germany should not change the Basic Law in order to enable the Bundeswehr to participate in UN operations such as the Gulf War (see Tables 1 and 2, Noelle, in Appendix). Secondly, Germans in general seemed to be sympathetic vis-à-vis the internationalist impulse of their political leadership as far as “civilian” or “humanitarian” tasks were concerned, but very hesitant as to military missions. When asked, for instance, what they considered to be the most important tasks of German foreign policy, strong majorities in 1991 were in favor of global improvements of environmental conditions (75 percent of West Germans and 77 percent of East Germans thought that this was “very important”), the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons (77/75) and global arms control (65/66). In contrast, among the least important tasks Germans ranked the defense of an ally (19/22), the preservation of a military balance with the Soviet Union (15/17), and the defense of “weak” states vis-à-vis external aggression (27/33; see Table 3). Similarly, whereas almost 60 percent in both East and West in 1991

⁵⁵Mauil, *Großmacht Deutschland*, p. 71. For different views among internationalists on the conditions under which force could still be necessary see Dieter S. Lutz, *Deutschland und die kollektive Sicherheit: Politische, rechtliche und programmatische Aspekte*, Opladen: Leske und Budrich 1993, pp. 90-94, 125-128; Achim Schmillen, *Außenpolitik in einer globalen Risikogemeinschaft*, Bonn: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1993 (mimeo), pp. 36-44 (Schmillen today serves as head of office of Foreign Minister Fischer); Ernst-Otto Czempel, *Gewalt in der Gesellschaftswelt: Die Rolle des Militärischen in der Außenpolitik der neuen Bundesrepublik*, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* Vol. 39, No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 36-43, here p. 39; and Joschka Fischer, *Wir müssen für den militärischen Schutz der UN-Zonen sein*, in: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 20 August 1995, p. 10.

supported the position that Germany ought to “take over more responsibility in world politics” (rather than exercise restraint “due to Germany's political history and earlier ‘Machtpolitik’”; see Table 4), 36 percent of West Germans (and 37 percent of East Germans) “in this context” opposed the view that Germany ought to play an increasing role “in the solution of international conflicts” (only 32 percent (24) were in favor; see Table 5). Moreover, when asked more specifically, in “what framework” Germany could participate in the solution of international conflicts, the view that Germany ought to participate in “humanitarian measures” (86 percent of West Germans, 92 percent of East Germans) clearly out-distanced the position that Germany ought to send the Bundeswehr “in the context of UN-blue-helmet operations, ie. without a military mission” (60/48 percent); only a tiny proportion spoke out in support of the position that the Bundeswehr ought to participate in “military UN-missions such as the Gulf War” (26/14; see Table 6). Also, when asked whether they wanted to see defense expenditures reduced, increased or kept at about the same level, almost two thirds of West Germans (and 84 percent of East Germans) were in favor of spending cuts in March 1991, while only 2 percent of West Germans (and 1 percent of East Germans) supported an increase in spending (see Table 7). Finally, more than two thirds of Germans in East and West supported “drastic cuts” in the strength of the Bundeswehr in September 1991 (see Table 8).

In spite of the fact that these responses seemed to support the widely shared view that Germans were content with playing an activist, yet largely “civilian” global role, other data from about the same time indicated that Germans did not differ significantly from other nations as to how they defined their role in international politics. First of all, when questioned as to their views regarding the overall positioning of Germany in international affairs, a majority of Germans supported positions which could more easily be described as “isolationist” rather than “internationalist”, a position which sounded Swiss indeed. For instance, 51

percent of Germans in East and West in 1992 supported the view that as a result of Germany's EC membership "too much gets lost of what is characteristic about Germany". Even more significantly, the same poll found that 59 percent of Germans thought that Germany should "not care about world politics" but concentrate instead on the problems within Germany itself; also, a surprising 60 percent of Germans thought that their country would be "strong enough to care for itself" (see Table 9). Second, even in 1990 (ie. when hopes were still high that a "peace dividend" could be gained as a result of a "new world order") more than 80 percent of Germans held the view that it would be normal for a sovereign nation to have its own army (see Table 10). In equal numbers Germans supported the view that their country had to have a "well functioning army simply because of its political location between East and West", a position which even received increasing support after 1990, when the political slogan about united Germany being "encircled by friends" was widely circulating (see Table 11).⁵⁶ Also, whereas

⁵⁶This support was obviously welcomed by the military leadership of the Bundeswehr; see the remarks by Klaus Naumann, Standortbestimmung. Ansprache des Generalinspektors auf der Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr am 5. Oktober 1993 in Mainz, in: Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 1993, p. 31. According to Naumann the Bundeswehr represented "a constitutive element of the state even without a concrete threat". The majority of Germans assented. Another survey from 1993 found that almost 70 percent of Germans considered it "normal" for a sovereign country to have its own army (including an astonishing 68 percent of the electorate of the Greens). Moreover, some 50 percent favored having a "strong military" even in the absence of a military threat to Germany (see Christian Holst, Einstellungen zur Bundeswehr in der Bevölkerung in Ost- und Westdeutschland in drei Umfragen 1992 und 1993 (DFG Forschungsbericht Nr. 7), Bamberg: Bamberger Politikwissenschaftliche Beiträge 1995, Tables 1, 2). For some German observers propagating "the principle of 'conflict prevention before conflict resolution'" ("Konfliktvermeidung vor Konfliktbekämpfung") this was nothing but an illustration of the "wretched Wilhelminian spirit" resurfacing within the army of united Germany (see Reinhard Mutz, Militärmacht Deutschland? Die Bundeswehr auf der Suche nach ihrer Zukunft, in: Friedhelm Solms, Reinhard Mutz, Gert Krell (Eds.), Friedensgutachten 1994,

a majority of Germans thought that there was indeed room for “certain cuts” in defense spending, an increasing number after 1990 supported the position that defense spending should equal that of other nations “in the East and in the West” (see Table 12). Third, even in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War Germans were not as hesitant about the use of force in international affairs as some of the surveys referred to above seemed to indicate. When asked in February 1991 whether Kuwait should have been left in the hands of Saddam Hussein or whether “it was right to fight this war” 56 percent of West Germans (but only 36 percent of East Germans) thought that the war was justified (15 percent of West Germans and 22 percent of East Germans thought that Kuwait should have been abandoned, 29 (42) percent were undecided; see Table 13). One year later almost 50 percent of Germans in the West supported the position that Germany should “after all participate in UN peace keeping operations” since Germans could no longer “shun its responsibility” while others were risking their lives (see Table 14). Also, and even more significantly, when the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia escalated during 1991 and 1992, Germans were becoming ever more determined not to stand aside. In August 1992, 50 percent of West Germans (and 40 percent of East Germans) were in favor of sending the Bundeswehr to the Balkans “in the framework of UN peacekeeping troops.” An additional 12 percent of West Germans (and 8 percent of East Germans) even supported the deployment of German troops as part of a peace-enforcing operation (see Table 15).

What conclusion can be drawn from this data about the overall outlook of the German public in the immediate aftermath of German unification and the Gulf War? The image of Germany as a big Switzerland shying away from what most of Germany's partners considered to be its increased “responsibility” in European and global affairs was misleading from the very start. To be sure, whenever

p. 225; the former quote is from Till Bastian, *Frieden schaffen mit deutschen Waffen. Krieg als Mittel der Politik? Plädoyer für ein ziviles Deutschland*, Köln, PapyRossa Verlag 1993, p. 83).

Germans were offered the choice between non-military and military instruments in pursuit of international objectives, they certainly preferred the former. Support for global environmental protection and emergency help in humanitarian catastrophes were definitely more appealing than sending troops. It is questionable, however, whether the broader public in other “Western” states would have reacted very differently. What is surprising, therefore, is not so much that in the immediate aftermath of unification a certain hesitation was noticeable with regard to the use of force, but rather that, even then, substantial numbers of Germans were speaking out in favor of such “traditional” (or “non-civilian”) instruments as armies and the use of force. Thus, the seeds for a process of “re-socialization” into international politics along the lines of other middle-sized or great powers within the West (and in contrast to the expectations of the ideal-type of a “civilian power”) were visible from the very start.

None of this is to say that Germans were intent on reviving the dubious traditions of “Machtpolitik” or “Weltpolitik” of the German Reich as some observers speculated at that time.⁵⁷ Rather they were responding positively (if, at least initially, still hesitantly) to what they perceived to be justified demands by their allies to help in bringing about “stability” in Europe and the world according to Western designs. Given the multilateral and integrationist tradition of the old Federal Republic and its foreign policy impulse of “avoiding international

⁵⁷For arguments along these lines drawing, in particular, on “the German character” see Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers 1993, p. 791; Leopold Bellak, *Why I fear the Germans*, in: *New York Times*, 25 April 1990, p. A29; Dominic Lawson, *Saying the Unsayable about the Germans*. Interview with Nicholas Ridley, in: *The Spectator*, 14 July 1990, pp. 8-10. For good overviews of the historical analysis of the “Weltpolitik”-tradition during Bismarck’s time as well as the Third Reich see Klaus Hildebrand, *Deutsche Außenpolitik 1871-1918* (*Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte*, Band 2), München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1994(2) and Marie-Luise Recker, *Die Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches* (*Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte*, Band 8), München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1990.

loneliness"⁵⁸, the new situation and the demands from friends and allies called for far-reaching changes in Germany's outlook and engagement in international affairs. The German public did realize these demands as early as 1990/91 - and it was ready to respond positively (and increasingly so) as subsequent years showed (I will discuss this in more detail below).

3.2. Pragmatic Multilateralism in Elite Perceptions

This acute sense of what Germany's allies expected after unification was even more noticeable among foreign policy elites. Moreover, as a detailed survey from 1991/92 shows, the views prevailing among these elites as to how Germany should respond were fully in line with these expectations. In 1991 and early 1992 Dietmar Schössler, Reiner Albert and Frank Kostelnick conducted a survey among more than 400 policy makers, Bundeswehr officers, think tank researchers and academics as to their views about European and global security.⁵⁹ I will draw extensively on this survey here for three reasons. First, to my knowledge this is the

⁵⁸Christoph Bertram, *Germany's New International Loneliness*, in: Arnulf Baring (Ed.), *Germany's New Position in Europe: Problems and Perspectives*, Oxford and Providence, R.I.: Berg Publishers 1994, p. 91.

⁵⁹Dietmar Schössler, Reiner Albert and Frank Kostelnick, *Eurosipla '90: Grundfragen des Europäischen Sicherheitssystems in den 90er Jahren*, Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung 1992 (mimeo). Of those invited to participate in the survey 423 responded. Among the respondents those with a military background (almost 200) were clearly in the majority. However, there were also large numbers of policy makers or party representatives (87, including the Party of Democratic Socialism, the former SED), researchers and academics (67), and members of transnational organizations such as the "Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft" (33), and experts on foreign policy working for the industry and the trade unions (26).

most extensive survey among security specialists ever conducted in the 1990s; since we know from extensive research that the political elites have much more leeway in shaping the views of the public more broadly (and in setting the agenda in foreign and security policy) than in domestic politics, the views of these elites are particularly important if one is searching for indicators of foreign policy change. Second, the detailed results of this survey have not been published in full although one other analytical publication by the authors relies on these data.⁶⁰ Third, the data collected clearly underline the argument developed here that even in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War the intellectual climate in Germany was neither one of a renaissance of "Machtpolitik" (as critics from the left charged) nor one of "Machtvergessenheit" (as critics from the right did). The views expressed were far from envisioning a future of peace and stability. Rather, if one examines these views in detail it is astounding how far removed they were compared to both the political slogans from an "internationalist" left ("make peace without weapons") and the critique of an alleged "Angst vor der Macht"⁶¹ from "Realist" critics. German experts were fully aware that Germany's allies expected the country to participate across "the whole spectrum" of political and military tasks (see Table 16). They were also willing to respond positively. Against the background of these results it is far less surprising how quickly Germany's policies have changed during the past nine years with regard to peace-keeping or even peace-enforcing missions in multilateral contexts.

First, the vision among the elites about the future in Europe and beyond was anything but rosy. Overwhelming majorities among the experts questioned held the

⁶⁰See Dietmar Schössler, Reiner Albert, Frank Kostelnik, *Deutschland, die NATO und Europa. Die sicherheitspolitische Lage im Spiegel von Elite-Gruppen-Meinungen. 1. Forschungsbericht zum EURO SIPLA-Projekt*, Münster: Lit Verlag 1993.

⁶¹See Gregor Schöllgen, *Angst vor der Macht. Die Deutschen und ihre Außenpolitik*, Berlin: Ullstein 1993.

view (1) that a revival of national identities would lead to more international instability (90 percent); (2) that war will remain an instrument of politics in the hands of aggressors (97 percent); and (3) that the use of force would have to remain an instrument to fight aggressors if all other means had failed (96 percent; see Table 17). Second, although they were not wholly pessimistic as to the hopes for creating a new and "satisfactory order" in Europe, two thirds of the experts thought that even if such an order could be created, it would "constantly be endangered by crises" (see Table 18). The elites did sympathize with the broader public's preference for "civilian" policies in that a clear majority (60 percent) spoke out in favor of using the military in "police" functions if possible (see Table 19). However, more than three quarters thought that in spite of nuclear weapons the use of military power would still be necessary for the realization of political objectives under certain conditions (see Table 20). When asked as to where they thought that military power would play an increasing role, the experts ranked Asia and Africa at the top (45 and 42 percent respectively) and Europe and the Soviet Union at the bottom (14/10) of their list (48 percent thought that the role of military power would stay about the same in Europe, 36 percent held that view with regard to the Soviet Union; and 36 percent thought that the role of military power would decrease in Europe (49 percent thought so with regard to the Soviet Union; see Table 21). In other words, the experts thought that Europe, including the Soviet Union, would become a much safer place militarily in comparison to both the time before 1989 and in comparison to other regions. Third, in spite of the fact that the experts thought that force would henceforth play a decreasing role in Europe and the Soviet Union more than 98 percent supported the view that "the Europeans" should take over "more responsibility for peace", and among those more than 80 percent thought that NATO should provide the main framework to do so (see Table 22). Asked more specifically how this increased responsibility should be realized, more than 80 percent supported the view that all means "including military power"

should be applied (only 16 percent wanted these instruments to be limited to “diplomatic and economic means” (see Table 23). Fourth, whereas a large number of foreign policy experts was sympathetic to ideas about strengthening all-inclusive European security institutions such as the CSCE, they remained sceptical as to whether political stability could be provided solely or even primarily on this basis. In 1991/92 almost 53 percent supported the view that “existing structures such as the OSCE” should be extended in order to form an “effective all-European” security framework (only 27 percent thought that the “transatlantic structures should be extended to Eastern Europe”; see Table 24). However, when asked specifically as to which view best described their own assessment of the CSCE almost two thirds among foreign policy experts thought that “due to structural deficiencies” the CSCE would not be able to provide for a “stable order of peace on its own” (see Table 25). Moreover, a similarly large proportion (65 percent) subscribed to the view that NATO should play “an important role” even within a “bloc-transcending order of peace” since it is “in fact the only functioning security institution” (see Table 26). Also, when the experts were asked to describe NATO's role against the background of a “new world order of peace”, more than three quarters supported the position that NATO structures should either “take conflicts out of area into consideration” (52 percent) or even “primarily reshape its structures” with respect to this new world order (25 percent; see Table 27). Fifth, foreign policy experts were almost unanimous in their assessment that German unification “raised the question of extended international responsibility for Germany” (95 percent supported this position, see Table 28). Moreover, almost 50 percent thought that Germany's “extended responsibility” had to be defined “primarily in global terms” (44 percent thought that a regional focus on Europe should receive priority, see Table 29). When asked more specifically as to how Germany should re-orient its security policy almost 80 percent subscribed to the position that Germany should help in strengthening a European pillar within

NATO, whereas only 29 percent thought that Germany should do “everything to build an all-European security system in order to supersede military alliances” (here multiple responses were possible; 63 percent even supported a view which seemed to imply that NATO should be the sole institutional context for realizing Germany's security interests; 7 percent thought that Germany should aim at a “Europeanization” of Germany's security policy “as an alternative to NATO” and only 2 percent were in favor of leaving NATO; see Table 30). Finally, the experts were confronted with the question whether they thought that the Bundeswehr's traditional “Atlantic spirit” or “NATO-mindedness” would change as a result of unification and the developments in Eastern Europe. Almost half of the respondents thought that the Bundeswehr would develop a “European identity” in the course of European integration, and another 33 percent thought that nothing would change in that regard. Only 16 percent expected the Bundeswehr to develop a new identity of its own and emphasize “national interests” (see Table 31).

In sum, the foreign policy elites were even more determined than the German public more broadly to quickly and pragmatically adjust to a new world order which (in their view) revealed many characteristics of the old one.⁶² In brief, although the world that German security experts saw in 1991 was one which was highly interdependent, it was at the same time made up of a sea of increasing (rather than decreasing) instability with only a few islands of stability formed by alliances such as NATO and supplemented by inclusive (rather than exclusive) security institutions such as the CSCE. According to this majority view, order - in the sense of predictable, stable, and peaceful relations among states in general and the major powers in particular - was an equally valuable and scarce resource. Therefore, the threat and use of force was considered to be both necessary and

⁶²For a more detailed discussion of this position which I have called “pragmatic multilateralism” in another context see my *Goodbye Bismarck?*, fn. , pp. 5-8 (that discussion also includes references to prominent representatives of this school of thought).

legitimate as an ultima ratio to (re)establish order given the conflict-ridden nature of international politics and the repeated occurrence of war. Moreover, the major powers (united Germany now being included) had both a special interest and a special obligation to see that order was kept (or re-established). As a result, Germany had to come to terms with the fact that its more visible role in international politics had to be "commensurate with its political and economic weight as well as the expectations of its allies".⁶³ If it was "normal" for a great power to be "responsible" for (re)creating international order - even if only in a "co-leadership" role⁶⁴ - and if this, at times, also necessitated the use of force, then it was also part of the "normalization" of German foreign policy to shed whatever restrictions existed to participating fully in these activities (see also Table 32).⁶⁵

None of this implied that there was a need for a wholesale reinvention of German foreign policy. Quite the contrary, many prominent foreign policy experts argued that there was much to learn from the successes of the first 40 years of the Federal Republic. Since "Einbindungspolitik" - as the old FRG's diplomatic strategy of multilateralism and integration had come to be known within Germany - had turned out to be "a more cost-efficient variant to a strategy based on narrowly

⁶³Franz-Josef Meiers, Germany: The Reluctant Power, in: *Survival* Vol. 37 (Autumn 1995), pp. 82-103, here p. 96.

⁶⁴Helga Haftendorn, Gulliver in der Mitte Europas: Internationale Verflechtung und nationale Handlungsmöglichkeiten, in: Karl Kaiser, Hanns W. Maull (Eds.), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Band 1: Grundlagen*, München: Oldenbourg 1994, pp. 129-152, here p. 150.

⁶⁵For prominent examples of German foreign policy experts supporting this view see Vol. 1 of the 4-volume-project by the "Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik" on Germany's "new" foreign policy (Kaiser/Maull, ftn.), especially Karl Kaiser, *Das vereinigte Deutschland in der internationalen Politik.*, pp. 1-14, esp. pp. 9-10; Michael Stürmer, *Deutsche Interessen*, pp. 39-61, esp. pp.44-51; and Uwe Nerlich, *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Konzeptionelle Grundlagen für multilaterale Rahmenbedingungen*, pp. 153-174, esp. pp. 157-163.

defined national interests",⁶⁶ and since Germany was perceived not to be in a position to deal with any of the major problems in its immediate environment or even globally on its own,⁶⁷ sticking with multilateralism and integration seemed to be the only reasonable strategy for the "new" Germany as well. If Germany was to be in a position to choose freely among international institutions, there was a clear preference for (global or regional) "omnilateral"⁶⁸ security institutions such as the United Nations and the CSCE (OSCE). However, given that the majority of the experts were rather sceptical as to whether a desirably more peaceful new order could be built by relying solely on these institutions, other more exclusive (or merely "multilateral") clubs - such as those made up by the Western democracies, like the EU and NATO - were deemed equally or even more significant. The fact that they carried less legitimacy in terms of international law was balanced by the judgement that they would be more effective.

4. The "New" Germany: Still a Reluctant Power, but Increasingly a Normal Ally and a Self-Confident Nation

The views from foreign policy elites and the German public in general (for the first two years after unification) which I have summarized here thus reveal a clear trend to live up to the expectations of the allies, that Germany should take over more international responsibility. The fact that "responsibility" here was defined to a significant extent in terms of security in general and the use of military means in

⁶⁶Haftendorn, *Gulliver in der Mitte Europas*, fn. , p. 140.

⁶⁷According to Michael Stürmer (*Deutsche Interessen*, fn. , p. 61) "for Germany, the ability to act ("Handlungsfähigkeit") is, first and foremost, synonymous with its ability to be a reliable Western ally ("westliche Bündnisfähigkeit")."

⁶⁸Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Conclusion, in: Bull/Watson (Eds.), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984, p. 434.

particular was seen by most of Germany's allies as a sign of "geopolitical maturation".⁶⁹ Within Germany, however, critics interpreted these changes as a degeneration (or perversion of the term "responsibility") because Germany now seemed to (once again) "militarize" (rather than "demilitarize") its foreign policy.⁷⁰ Thus, as usual, the perceptions of change among security experts were converging, whereas the assessment of these changes was increasingly diverging. While representatives of the community of "security experts" welcomed that Germany was finally becoming "once again a 'normal country'" taking over "normal responsibility" as "our Western allies had already requested during the Gulf War"⁷¹, representatives of the community of "peace researchers" saw a "new" Germany characterized by "arrogance and a craving for recognition" ("Übermut und Geltungsdrang") instead of the "sense of proportion, sensitivity and restraint" ("Augenmaß, Fingerspitzengefühl, Zurückhaltung") characteristic of the "old" FRG.⁷²

⁶⁹Ron Asmus, *Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Relations* (Rand Notes N-3522-AF), Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation 1992, p. 41.

⁷⁰For a critique of definitions of "normality" and "responsibility" in military terms see Mutz, *Militärmacht Deutschland?*, fn. , esp. 220-228. According to Mutz, "responsibility" had degenerated to "nothing but an appeal to get rid of scruples vis-à-vis the use of military power" (p.225). For a recent statement in favor of "demilitarization and civilianization" of German foreign policy see the section "Entmilitarisierung und Zivilisierung - die Schlüssel der Friedenspolitik" in the election programme of Bündnis90/Die Grünen for the 1998 federal elections (Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Programm zur Bundestagswahl 1998, beschlossen von der 10. Ordentlichen Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz in Magdeburg, Bonn: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen März 1998).

⁷¹Rupert Scholz, *Deutschland auf dem Weg zur internationalen Normalität*, in: *Der Mittler-Brief*, No. 1/1994, p. 5 (quoted according to Mutz, *Militärmacht Deutschland?*, fn., p. 220). In the late 1980s Scholz, a member of the CDU, had been serving a German Defense Minister.

⁷²Mutz, *Militärmacht Deutschland?*, fn., p. 228.

Whatever the judgements, the perceptions of change were right on the mark. Whether it was hailed that Germany was “again” becoming as “normal” as its Western allies or whether it was castigated for “again” becoming as “abnormal” as other great powers (“normality” here being defined as corresponding to a stringent normative standard⁷³), the experts seemed to agree as to the direction of this “(ab)normalization” process. In the eyes of the normalization-sympathizers, Germany was “coming of age”; becoming more “self-confident” (and assertive)⁷⁴; feeling less inhibited (“befangen”) by its pre-World War II legacy⁷⁵; able “to live up to” the “legitimate expectations” of its allies; and ready to “make a contribution” in order to “preserve peace”. In the eyes of the abnormalization-critics, in contrast, Germany was again “militarizing” its foreign policy; returning

⁷³See *ibid.*, p. 221.

⁷⁴The most direct and authoritative statement recently made along these lines was by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in his first major address to the Bundestag. Schröder said: “We are proud of this country, its landscape and culture, the creativeness and will to achieve of its people. We are proud of the older generation that rebuilt the country after the war and gave it its place in a Europe at peace. We are proud of the people in the eastern part of Germany who threw off the communist yoke and brought down the Wall. *That is the self-confidence of a nation that has come of age, that feels neither superior nor inferior to anyone*” (“Weil wir Deutschlands Kraft vertrauen ...”, Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 10.11.1998, in: Bulletin, No. 74 (11.11.1998), p. 910, emphasis added; quoted in the translation of *The Economist*, *The Berlin Republic. A Survey of Germany*, 6 February 1999, p. 21) In my judgement the distinct connotations of the German term “Selbstbewußtsein” (which Schröder used) is not adequately transported by “self-confidence” alone; rather it seems to me that the meaning of the term is best conveyed as a mixture of self-confidence *and* assertiveness.

⁷⁵Cf. Patrick Bahners, *Total Normal. Vorsicht Falle: Die unbefangene Nation*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 November 1998, p. 43; Werner A. Perger, *Wir Unbefangenen*, in: *Die Zeit*, No. 47 (12 November 1998), p. 7; *Total normal?* in: *Der Spiegel*, No. 49 (30 November 1998), p. 40-48.

to a "security policy of re-confrontation"⁷⁶; determined once again to conduct "Großmachtpolitik" and - in the form of a Wilhelminian Berlin Republic of the left - retreating to a dubious past with "the fatal smack of false continuities".⁷⁷

The trends in public opinion during the past nine years support the perceptions of change which underlie the hopes (or fears) expressed by the experts, as the (ab)normalization trends which were visible already in 1991/92 have mostly accelerated: Pride in being a citizen of a large and influential country has increased steadily (see Table 33). The same holds (at an even more accelerated speed) for taking over "more responsibility" (see Table 34). At the same time opposition against sending the Bundeswehr in support of UN peacekeeping mission steadily dropped (see Table 35) as pessimism increased that wars in general can be prevented (see Table 36). Following the same logic ever more Germans believed that it is important to have an army (see Table 37) and to keep NATO intact as a

⁷⁶Mutz, *Militärmacht Deutschland?*, fn. , p. 227.

⁷⁷Jürgen Habermas, 1989 im Schatten von 1945. Zur Normalität einer künftigen Berliner Republik, in: Habermas, *Die Normalität einer Berliner Republik*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1995, pp. 167-188, here p. 187. In a review of Richard Rorty's book "Achieving Our Country" (which was published in German under the title "Stolz auf unser Land"), Habermas indirectly criticized not only the "snappy nationalist brag" of Chancellor Schröder but also the fact that after the 1998 election victory of the SPD and the Greens "normality" had now been seized by a "nationalist left", see Jürgen Habermas, *Rortys patriotischer Traktat. Aber vor Analogien wird gewarnt*, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27/28 February 1999. It is important, however, to note the crucial differences between Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer in terms of their emphasis on "normality" and national "uninhibitedness" ("Unbefangenheit") on the one hand (Schröder) and "Europeanness" and "constitutional patriotism" ("Verfassungspatriotismus") on the other (Fischer); for perceptive observations about these differences see *Es gibt doch Alternativen. Interview mit Jürgen Habermas*, in: *Die Zeit*, No. 42 (8 October 1998), pp. 12-15 and Bernard-Henri Lévy, *Ein paar Versuche, in Deutschland spazieren zu gehen*, Part I and II, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 Februar 1999, p. 50 and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 February 1999, p. 46.

functioning alliance (see Table 38). Still, there were no signs of “Weltpolitik” self-aggrandizement. To be sure, when asked whether they wanted their country to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, a majority of Germans said yes. However, since 1990 this majority has been slowly decreasing (see Table 39).⁷⁸

Thus, while Germany still displays many signs of a “reluctant power”⁷⁹ it has ever more become a “normal ally”.⁸⁰ The contrast between the Gulf War in 1990 on the one hand and NATO's strikes against Serbia in the summer of 1995 and again in March 1999 on the other is particularly instructive here. When asked in March 1991 whether Germans would support the participation of the Bundeswehr in UN operations similar to the Gulf War only one third were in favor (see Table 2). In 1995, however, more than 50 percent of the German public welcomed NATO strikes (support among the elites in East and West was almost unanimous, see Table 40). Similar numbers thought that it was “right” for Germany to participate actively in these strikes (see Table 41). Support was even stronger after the escalation of the war in Kosovo in March 1999. 64 percent of West Germans (but only 38 percent of East Germans) were in favor of air strikes against Serbian troops in late March (in spite of the fact that a UN mandate could not be furnished) and still higher numbers of West Germans supported the participation of German Tornados in these strikes (here again East Germans were much more reluctant, with only 30 percent in favor, see Table 42). Another poll from late March 1999 found that 52 percent of Germans were in support of German participation even if

⁷⁸This is even more surprising in view of the fact that Germany's material and, to some extent, ideational commitment to the UN has increased during the 1990s. For a detailed analysis see Manfred Knapp, *Enhancing Global Commitment? The Policies of Germany and Japan towards the United Nations* (Studien zur Internationalen Politik Nr. 1), Hamburg: Universität der Bundeswehr 1999, esp. table 1 (p. 10) listing Germany's (steadily *increasing*) assessed contributions to the regular UN budget throughout the decade.

⁷⁹Meiers, *Germany: The Reluctant Power*, fn. .

“German soldiers would be killed in combat”; still more surprisingly, 46 percent of Germans thought it “apt” for the United States “to intervene militarily in conflicts which do not directly affect their national security”. Also, whereas a clear majority of Germans (58 percent) thought that Germany's participation in NATO's airstrikes “corresponds to the current role of united Germany in world politics”, only one fifth thought that this would strengthen Germany's self-confidence (see Table 43).

Whether in shifting its views the public was merely following the agenda set by the political elites during the preceding nine years or whether, in ever more enlarging the scope of Germany's international military engagements, the political leadership was anticipating these shifts in public mood and acting accordingly is not of interest here. The main point simply is that Germany has changed as dramatically between the fall of 1990 and the spring of 1999 as its environment has changed. The Gulf War was a new type of international conflict for any country involved. In terms of being “prepared” for it, however, Germany certainly was lagging farther behind than most. Of course, the adjustment process took time (with the normalization-sympathizers bemoaning the slowness of pace and the abnormalization-critics castigating both the speed and the direction of the process). Still, in all likelihood, few observers would question the conclusion that Germany has come a very long way in a rather short period of time. This conclusion is especially noteworthy in view of the fact that many of the same people who were among the most outspoken critics of both the American conduct during the Gulf War and the Kohl government's cautious, even timid signals of support vis-à-vis the anti-Saddam coalition are now among those who are either vehemently defending NATO's military operation and the Bundeswehr's participation in it or keeping quiet. This is even more striking if one takes into account the similarities and the differences between the Gulf War and the Kosovo War. In 1990 the German left overwhelmingly spoke out against a war which the UN had “authorized”, a war,

⁸⁰See Gerhard Schröder's statement, fn. .

moreover, which certainly was “legitimate” by any standard of international law given that a member state of the UN was threatened with extinction. In 1999, the first government in German history solely formed by parties which define themselves as “left” could not have been more of a reliable (“normal”) ally in carrying out NATO's first full-fledged military campaign in its history. For the first time since the end of World War II a German cabinet sent German troops into war, and for the first time ever a social democratic defense minister had to give the order. Moreover, this government of the left did so not only without being able to refer to a UN mandate but having to justify, in addition, that the military operations of the alliance (which many a Green once wanted to abolish) were directed against a sovereign state which (justifiably or not) was rejecting an intervention in its “internal affairs” based on human rights grounds.⁸¹

Most of those German representatives now being (truly) “responsible” for these decisions would probably hesitate to interpret their behavior as a case of “learning”. The same probably holds for many International Relations specialists who in the past two decades have developed an extensive research agenda on “learning” in international affairs and foreign policy.⁸² Yet this is precisely what I would argue: During the past nine years Germany in general and the German left in

⁸¹If one were to leave aside the legal aspect that Kuwait was a recognized entity in terms of international law while Kosovo is not, it probably could be argued that the *violations of human rights* which Saddam Hussein’s troops committed against the Kuwaitis were only marginally less severe than the ones committed by the troops of Slobodan Milosevic against the Kosovo Albanians. Yet in 1990 the German left was rather unmoved by the plight of the Kuwaiti people, seeing instead predominantly a war where “blood” had to be spilled for “oil”.

⁸²For an overview see Jack S. Levy, *Learning and Foreign Policy. Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield*, in: *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 279-312; for extensive theoretical treatment as well as detailed illustrations of this research program see George W. Breslauer, Philip E. Tetlock (Eds.), *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder: Westview Press 1991.

particular has “learned” some very hard lessons about international politics. The point here, though, is not that some idealists have (finally) come around to understand that international politics is driven by certain “eternal laws” of power and national interest, as the realists suggest. Rather, the point is that any type of (political) action has to be conducted in an environment which (more often than not) confronts decision-makers with “problematic situations”. These problematic situations call for solutions that have to rely both on experience and innovation.⁸³

A large part of the “problematic” aspect of Germany's new environment consisted in the fact that the desired “all-European order of peace”

⁸³The epistemological position and the theory of action underlying these propositions draw heavily on the tradition of American pragmatism and such classical writers as William James, John Dewey (who has coined the concept of “problematic situations”) and George Herbert Mead, but also extending to the present work of authors such as Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam and (in part) Jürgen Habermas. I develop these propositions in more detail in a larger project on German foreign policy currently under way. For introductory overviews of the tradition of pragmatism see Louis Menand, *An Introduction to Pragmatism*, in: Menand (Ed.) *Pragmatism. A Reader*, New York: Vintage Books 1997, pp. xi-xxxiv; Nicholas Rescher, *Pragmatism*, in: Ted Honderich (Ed.), *Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995, pp. 710-713; Richard J. Bernstein, *American Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives*, in: Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. (Ed.), *Rorty and Pragmatism. The Philosopher Responds to His Critics*, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press 1995, pp. 54-67; and Hans Joas, *Pragmatismus und Gesellschaftstheorie*, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1992, esp. pp. 7-65. For more recent prominent contributions see Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989; Rorty, *Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998; Hilary Putnam, *Pragmatism. An Open Question*, Oxford: Blackwell 1995; and Jürgen Habermas, *Rortys pragmatische Wende*, in: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Vol. 44, No. 5 (1996), pp. 715-741. Two authors who have spelled out the consequences of this position for sociology (and the theory of action in particular) and the academic discipline of history are Hans Joas, *Die Kreativität des Handelns*, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1992 and Geoffrey Hawthorn,

("gesamteuropäische Friedensordnung") has not materialized beyond those regions containing countries that will (sooner or later) be included in the exclusive clubs of the EU and NATO. Seen from a German perspective, today's Europe is in significant ways much less "all-European" and certainly less "peaceful" than the old Cold War order was.⁸⁴ At the same time Germany's "problem" has been worsened (or at least been "reshaped") in that after 1990 its partners started pushing ever harder for a German "contribution" to ordering Europe. As a result it has become ever more difficult for Germany to stand aside.

In foreign policy (as in any other field of human action) being "responsible" always meant being "responsive" - responsive to what other significant actors demand, responsive to what your own (material and ideational) interests suggest, and responsive to the demands and limits set by your voters. The responses called for by German decision makers today are different than ten years ago. During the old days of the "Bonn Republic" Germany was asked to do mainly two things: (1) be a responsible ally in that it did not rock the boat of an alliance steering the (only seemingly) quiet waters of a semi-stable and bipolar European security order by pushing ahead too far with its own "all-German" agenda; (2) be a responsible "motor" (in "co-leadership" with France) of European integration in the Western half of Europe. The fact that the Bonn Republic was largely living up to these expectations helped significantly in bringing down the old order, thereby enabling the Germans in East and West to realize their "all-German" ambition of "self-

Plausible Worlds. Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.

⁸⁴For an early expression of pessimism as to a European order of peace see John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War, in: *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-55. Mearsheimer's analysis is still very much contested. However, even though his scenario has not (yet?) materialized as he expected, the European order of security looks much less promising at the end of the decade than at the beginning.

determination" in concert with their allies and former opponents. As a result, Germany has been not only one of the big winners of the radical transformations in Europe at the turn of the decade from the 1980s to the 1990s. It subsequently has also realized many of its ambitious goals of reshaping (at least) its immediate environment according to its own design by opening up NATO and the EU to its Eastern neighbours. The price for these desired changes has been German reciprocation in shouldering a larger part of the costs of the institutional transformations of both NATO and the EU. In this sense the "new" Germany is as "(ab)normal" as the old FRG: (1) It has excelled in adapting the old strategy of "attritional multilateralism"⁸⁵ in order to reshape its environment according to its own goals. Yet as before 1990, Germany has experienced that the allies are no less apt at "attritional diplomacy". As a result Germany has been forced to live up to the demands of the allies on which it depends (as ever) politically and economically. (2) The new Germany is as (ab)normal as the old one also in another respect. The legacy of "Machtpolitik", which had crucially shaped Germany's strategy of "Einbindungspolitik" during 40 years of post-World War II West German foreign policy, taught mainly three lessons, best summarized under the heading of "restraint"; never go it alone, never be out in front, and always keep German soldiers as invisible (in their being "German") as possible. The dual legacies of both "Machtpolitik" and "Einbindungspolitik" are still being felt today. With very few exceptions,⁸⁶ Germans are still moving only in crowds, mostly behind some ally out front and almost always with German uniforms disappearing in a sea

⁸⁵This term was coined by Timothy Garton Ash, *Germany's Choice*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4 (July/August 1994), p. 71. Garton Ash defined attritional multilateralism as "the patient, discreet pursuit of national goals through multilateral institutions and negotiations".

⁸⁶For a detailed analysis for one of the most often cited exceptions after unification see Beverly Crawford, *Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia*, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 48 (1996).

of NATO olive. Given that NATO olive now is more often shown at trouble spots in the Balkans (rather than at the intra-German border) German uniform colors are appearing there too. But up to this point it is not "Weltpolitik" self-aggrandizement but precisely the dual legacy of both "Machtpolitik" and "Einbindungspolitik" that explain why German uniforms are reappearing. In other words, from what we can tell thus far, it is not "arrogance and a craving for recognition" which drives the German government to send the Bundeswehr along with its NATO allies; rather, it is precisely for normative reasons (reasons which, of course, are disputable and disputed) and the effects of the socializing pressure of its environment that Germany's military normality has changed.⁸⁷

5. Conclusion: Revising Germany

During the last nine years Germany has learned some hard lessons about international politics. It was hard for Germans to learn these lessons because few really wanted to learn them. At the same time it was easy because it would have been difficult (based on the old Federal Republic's foreign policy tradition) not to learn them. These lessons learned are neither captured by the dichotomy "Weltpolitik" or "self-containment" nor are they captured by an alternative "civilian" symbiosis of "Weltpolitik" and "self-containment", as the Greens suggested in 1990. Rather what probably best describes Germany's new role in international relations today is a translation of "normalization" into the specific

⁸⁷The German public and, presumably, the political elites as well have a clear sense of what is "special" about Germany's history. Throughout the 1990s increasing majorities testified to the country's historical "specialness" (see table 44a). The Holocaust and the many wars initiated by Germany stand out as being "special", the division of the country and German unification in 1990 are ranked next in line (with more emphasis in East Germany placed on the latter, see table 44b). At least as far as the (dominating) West Germans are concerned, the lesson to be drawn

political and historical German context by spelling out the multiple meanings of the term itself.

In aspiring to be regarded as “normal” in some respects and very “special” in others any country has to make its own choices. Some of these choices are rather abstract. They relate to the long-term aspirations of a country, its visions. Most, however, are very concrete, involving core values, material interests, and historical experience in specific problematic situations. The “visionary thing” (George Bush) feeds into these concrete choices as well. It is not, as Helmut Schmidt, the quintessential pragmatic “doer” (“Macher”) among Germany's post-war chancellors, once said, that if you are having visions you should consult your doctor. Rather, as his successor has shown, the visionaries sometimes are the true realists.⁸⁸ Western Europe's integration would not have proceeded as far as it did (for good or ill) , had Kohl not been obsessed with his vision of creating an ever more closely integrated union. Without Kohl, Europe would, most likely, still be a “Euro-free” zone dominated by the Deutschmark. It is significantly, but not exclusively, in this regard that German visions and ambitions have reshaped both the county itself and the continent during the past nine years.

However, in order not to idealize these recent developments in German foreign policy I will also mention one important downside of this normalization process beyond “Weltpolitik”, “self-containment” and “civilian power”. As Germany has learned some hard lessons about international politics during the past nine years, Germany's allies soon may also have to learn some hard lessons

from that special history are equally clear: Germans have a “moral obligation” to fight dictators (see tables 45 and 46).


⁸⁸This has been a standard line in Kohl ´s speeches during the past few years. His legacy in these terms (including a reference to “the visionaries” being “the true realists”) is summarized in his first (and possibly last) speech in the Bundestag after his resignation; a condensed version of this speech was reprinted in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 July 1999, p. 8.

themselves. In Germany's policy towards European integration (as in no other area) Germany's domestic discourse about "national" interests has markedly shifted during the past decade (and particularly during the past three or four years) from a position of supranationalism and "inhibitedness" ("Befangenheit") based on both Germany's post-war enthusiasm for European integration and its pre-World War II legacy of "Machtpolitik", to a more self-centered, assertive and more "national" position (see figure 1).⁸⁹ Some of the early repercussions of this "normalization" shift have already been felt around Europe during the end game of the negotiations of the Amsterdam treaty. In all likelihood this trend of (ab)normalization will also accelerate. In 1994 Hans-Peter Schwarz predicted that Germany's European policy was bound to become "more selfish, more calculated and cost-conscious, less flexible and primarily fixed on a rather narrowly defined national interest".⁹⁰ Similarly, one of the state secretaries of both Foreign Minister

⁸⁹I discuss this in more detail in *Deutschlands Kraft und Europas Vertrauen oder: Die Selbstbewußten, die Befangenen und die Betroffenen der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik*, in: Ulrich Albrecht (Hrsg.), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik* (forthcoming).

⁹⁰Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne*, Berlin: Siedler 1994, p. 92.

Figure 1: The Spectrum of Foreign Policy Discourse in Germany in the 1950s, 1980s and 1990s



Kinkel and Fischer said in 1997 that Germany's European policy had, almost by necessity, become "more British".⁹¹

None of this means that Germany is about to go "wild" again. Many of the "taming" effects of German integration in Western institutions will probably persist.⁹² But other images may be somewhat misleading: the image of Germany as not living up to its presumed leadership responsibilities in Europe due to a powerful grip of collective memory⁹³ and the image of Germany as imploding under the burdens of "anti-imperial overstretch".⁹⁴ In significant respects the metaphor of Germany becoming "more British" adequately captures recent developments in Germany's European policy. When Schröder said in the early days of his chancellorship that Germany "is contributing more than half" of the money which "Europe squanders" ("verbraten")⁹⁵ he was, in stark contrast to his predecessor, expressing a new type of German resentment vis-à-vis the project of European integration increasingly felt among the German public more broadly. Surveys clearly underline this trend: Throughout the 1990s Germans saw ever fewer

⁹¹See Peter Hort, *Die deutsche Europa-Politik wird "britischer"*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 November 1997. It was State Secretary Friedrich von Ploetz offering this judgement.

⁹²Cf. Peter J. Katzenstein (Ed.), *Tamed Power. Germany in Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1997.

⁹³Cf. Andrei S. Markovits, Simon Reich, *The German Predicament. Memory and Power in the New Europe*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1997.

⁹⁴Cf. Daniel S. Hamilton, *Beyond Bonn. America and the Berlin Republic*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1994, p. 17.

⁹⁵Gerhard Schröder quoted according to Eckart Lohse, *Ministerpräsidenten wollen Steuerreform zustimmen*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 December 1998, p. 1. The same message also appeared during the 1999 election campaign to the European Parliament. One large campaign poster carrying Chancellor Schröder's picture sent the following message to German voters: "We do not expect gifts from Europe. But the same should also hold vice versa" ("Wir erwarten von Europa keine Geschenke. Aber umgekehrt sollte es genauso sein").

benefits and ever more costs associated with European integration (see Table 47); at the same time opinion turned around as to whether Germany should play a leadership role in order to pursue its interests (see Table 48); finally, and most interestingly, a recent poll found that more than 80 percent of Germans welcomed that "Schröder was presenting himself more self-confidently and assertively in Europe" than his predecessor (see Table 49). Even Foreign Minister Fischer seems to imply that Germany has to stand up for its interests. While he denies that the Kosovo experience will tempt Germany to "speak up" in international institutions, he expressed his "wish" that Germany will "speak more effectively" there - obviously implying that even Helmut Kohl's heir apparent in terms of Germany's Euro-enthusiasm is hoping to maximize German influence in Europe.⁹⁶

Thus, while Germany is becoming a more normal ally globally (which most of its partners welcome), it is at the same time also becoming a more normal - ie. more self-centered and assertive - big player regionally in European affairs (which most others will probably increasingly resent). Whether Europe (and Germany itself) will be better off as a result of both (ab)normalization processes remains to be seen.

⁹⁶"Nicht lauter, aber wirksamer sprechen". Interview with Joschka Fischer, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 10 July 1999, p. 8. For an interesting research project on German foreign policy since unification examining, among others, a realist-inspired influence maximization hypothesis see Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger, Wolfgang Wagner, Macht und Machtpolitik. Neorealistic Außenpolitiktheorie und Prognosen für die deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung (Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, Nr. 30), Tübingen 1998.