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The Purpose of Intervention

CHANGING BELIEFS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE

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This book began in a conversation with Peter Katzenstein. He asked me to write a chapter about military intervention for his project on norms and national security. The UN-orchestrated military interventions in places like Somalia and Bosnia, which were proliferating in the 1990s, looked qualitatively new then and raised important questions for international relations (IR) scholars. Katzenstein was right about military intervention. It was changing and the 1990s were new in important respects. Figuring out what was new, though, and what was not, as well as why things had changed, has taken more than a chapter. Military intervention turns out to pose more anomalies for international relations theory than I had imagined. Intervention policies lie at the boundary of peace and war in international politics; they also define the outer limits of sovereign control. Restraint in intervention politics is what makes a world of sovereign states possible and separates our world from Hobbesian anarchy. Just as regulating the use of force among individuals is a core analytical problem in domestic politics (and its solution—monopoly on coercion—is the defining feature of the state), so, too, does regulating the use of force among states define the characteristics of international society in important ways. Figuring out how states construct rules about using force has been at the heart of this project and, in many ways, is at the heart of IR theory. Investigating this problem has thus taught me much more than I ever imagined when I embarked on my chapter for Katzenstein's volume.

This book would not have been completed without help from a large number of friends and colleagues. Participants in the Culture of National Security project provided invaluable help in the early days as I struggled through initial formulations of the basic theoretical questions.
surrounding military intervention. Jeff Checkel, Steve Walt, and an anonymous reviewer for Cornell University Press all read the entire manuscript and offered invaluable detailed comments. Michael Barnett read most, if not all, of the chapters, often in their earliest and ugliest forms. He has my heartfelt thanks for his suggestions, encouragement, and, most of all, perspective. More people than I can recall have read and commented on early versions of individual chapters. Among these, with apologies to those omitted, are Mlada Bukovansky, Bud Duvall, Michel Girard, Jim Goldgeier, Rick Herrmann, Peter Katzenstein, Beth Kier, Steve Krasner, Joe Lepgold, Charles Lipson, Jennifer Mitzen, Richard Price, James Lee Ray, Herman Schwartz, Henry Shue, Jay Smith, Nina Tannenwald, Alex Wendt, and participants at the many university seminars at which chapters were presented. Special thanks to Mike Brown who waded through an early version of chapter 4 and offered perceptive suggestions about alternative interpretations and pointed out factual errors. Any mistakes that remain are there despite his valiant efforts. Darel Paul and Andreas Katsouris both provided essential research assistance and helpful comments. Roger Haydon's good humor and patience with the long journey of this manuscript make him a saint among editors.

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As always, my deepest debt is to my family.

Martha Finnemore

Washington, D.C.
The Purpose of Force

In any society, regulating the use of force among members is a foundational and defining task. How force is used among members of a society, by whom, and to what purpose reveal a great deal about the nature of authority in the group and the ends that its members value. Force need not be eliminated as a prerequisite for social life—quite the contrary. Many, probably most, societies throughout history that we have come to respect as exemplars of civilization engaged in exceptionally violent practices. Rome comes to mind as one such instance. Many societies, our own included, celebrate certain types of violence, rewarding martial success or skill at arms. Violence or the potential for violence is a fact of human existence. Societies, to cohere and function, must come to some understanding of the role force can or should play in the society members' collective life. That role may be large or small, but it is not random. Force is channeled and disciplined by the notions that members of a society share about when force is legitimate and what kinds of goals it can achieve.

Like any society, international society has shared notions that shape the use of force. One is that large-scale force is the prerogative of states. We live in a world of states that, in turn, are defined by their supposed monopoly on the use of force in their territory. Violence by non-state actors is branded as illegitimate, and its perpetrators are hunted down by states, often acting collectively in the name of "the international community." The use of force between states is also shaped by the notions people have

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about rights and duties of states toward one another. Violations of those shared understandings constitute causes for military action that states collectively understand and recognize. Similarly there are rules about how military force may be used by one state against another—which weapons may be used, who may use violence and who may be its target, how intermediaries are to be treated and communication maintained.²

In this book I examine one particular use of force, military intervention, as a window onto the changing character of international society—the purpose to which its members will use force, the ends they value. In a society that has no central government or law enforcement, those with the means to do so enforce understandings of right and permissible conduct. In international society, intervention and ultimately war are the most visible and perhaps most consequential ways of enforcing standards of conduct, but they are also the most costly. Unlike some war situations, intervenors usually have a choice about whether to use force, and those choices are revealing. States debate long and hard, both within themselves and among themselves, about whether to intervene, who should intervene, and what social values, exactly, are being secured by uses of force.

At a behavioral level, it is these enforcement actions that establish the basic rules of the system about what action is permitted and where the boundaries of sovereign control lie. At the cognitive and normative levels, it is the debates surrounding interventions that establish the authority and legitimacy of those rules. Rules backed only by force, without any legitimacy or normative authority, are difficult to sustain and tend not to last long.

Patterns of military intervention have changed over the history of the states system. States used to intervene militarily in other states for reasons and in ways that they no longer do. States now intervene for reasons and in ways that were unimaginable one hundred or two hundred years ago. This book investigates these changes and the processes that have brought them about. Dominant arguments in security studies would expect these changes to be the result of material factors such as alterations in the balance of power or in the offense-defense balance. However, I argue that many of these changed patterns of military intervention are not the result of new weapons technologies or altered power capabilities in the system, nor have the number or scale of interventions changed markedly. Strong states continue to intervene in weaker states on a massive scale when it suits them. What has changed is when it will suit them—not the fact of intervention but its form and meaning. What have changed are state understandings about the purposes to which they can and should use force.

That understandings about force would vary among states and across time is hardly surprising. States, after all, are a varied lot. We have good theoretical reasons to expect differently constituted and differently situated states to use military force differently. Democratic states might intervene in a different pattern than militaristic authoritarian ones; industrialized states might intervene differently than developing states; states more integrated into the global economy might have interests prompting different patterns of intervention than more autarkic or insulated states. What is interesting about the patterns of intervention investigated here is that the changes in these patterns are global. Certain kinds of intervention states used to engage in have simply disappeared. Others have been created or changed in a systematic fashion. In all cases, states as a group have rejected intervention for some purpose or have altered their understandings about how or why intervention is done, with the result that the behavior of states has changed across the system. My goal in this book is, first, to document that these changes have occurred and, second, to try to understand how and why they happened.

I examine three cases of systemic change in intervention behavior. In one I investigate intervention to collect debts. States used to be able to intervene legitimately to collect debts owed to their nationals by other states. The practice stopped in the early twentieth century. Why? I examine an array of possible answers having to do with rising U.S. power and changed economic structures but find little positive evidence for these explanations. I argue that a variation in the professional composition of decision-making bodies was central to this change. Specifically the rise of international law as a profession, and the increased presence of lawyers at international conferences and treaty negotiations, meant that legal solutions to conflict, such as arbitration, came to be perceived by states as both morally superior and more useful than military solutions, such as intervention. In another case I examine humanitarian military intervention and show that, although states have been intervening for this purpose for at least two centuries, whom they protect and how they intervene to do so have both changed. States now entertain claims from non-white, non-Christian people who previously would not have registered on their consciousness, and, when they intervene, they will do so now only multilaterally with authorization from an international organization. Since multilateralism is often not burden sharing in a meaningful material sense, and since these international organizations often have poor track records as military commands, the move to multilateralism requires some

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realpolitik notions that strong states will intervene in weak ones when it serves their geostategic and economic interests. The cases investigated here were chosen, in part, because they are not easily explained by this formulation. States do, at times, use force for other reasons, as the humanitarian intervention cases show. The more common problem with the traditional formulation is that interests are simply indeterminate. In almost any case of intervention, one could impute a very reasonable set of interests that would explain intervention and another equally plausible set that would explain nonintervention. In fact, in most cases these opposing conceptions of national interests actually were articulated and strongly pushed on decision makers by groups on different sides of the debate over whether to intervene. What is interesting, then, is not the claim that intervention serves interests; of greater note are the contentions about what state interests are and which interests intervention serves. By examining broad patterns of intervention behavior across the system and the kinds of debates states have had about intervention, one can begin to understand both the coordinated shifts in perceptions of interests among states and how it is that states understand the utility of intervention as a tool of policy.

For constructivists and legal scholars, the book goes on to examine how, exactly, changes in these interests and understandings have been accomplished. Over time, states construct rules among themselves about when intervention is legitimate or necessary. These rules are not divorced from power or interests. To the contrary, rules about intervention are strongly not entirely shaped by the actions of powerful states that actually have the capacity to intervene. The issue explored here is how one set of rules perceived by the powerful to be "in their interest" is replaced by a different set of equally self-interested rules. Historical context and contingency play a role here, but so does purposive agency. In all three cases, I examine processes of what I have elsewhere termed "strategic social construction," whereby actors consciously set out to change the perceptions and values of others.1 Elihu Root, Luis Drago, William Gladstone, Robert Castlereagh, and Clemens Metternich all consciously set out to change the rules about intervention and the way their contemporaries understood legitimate uses of force. Sometimes they succeeded, at other times they failed, but the tools and techniques they used to accomplish this task of persuasion are foundational to any understanding of the changing normative fabric of world politics. Exploring these techniques of persuasion and how or why they work leads me to connections with both psychol-

ogy and diplomacy in ways that I hope will be of interest to international relations scholars generally.

Finally, for those interested in normative theory and ethics, the book examines some of the contradictions in intervention norms and their implications for policy. Because military intervention, by its nature, involves violation of a foundational principle of international law (sovereignty) and of a central ethical component of international community (self-determination), it almost always prompts extended normative discussions, both within and among states, about what is right and good in international life. As the cases here reveal, most interventions are embedded in some kind of normative conflict that creates difficult choices for participants. The sanctity of contract must be weighed against state sovereignty (chapter 2). Normative imperatives for humanitarian action to protect lives of innocents must be weighed against values we hold for self-determination and duty to protect one’s own citizens in uniform (chapter 3). Pursuit of self-determination, which we all profess to value so much, may impinge on the peace and security of others in the international community when force and revolution are the chosen ways to achieve it (chapter 4). The normative conflicts involved in each intervention are, of course, different, but the pattern of choices we make about those conflicts is not random. Over time, some normative claims become less powerful or have disappeared entirely. Glory acquired by success at arms is no longer a prominent goal of powerful states nor a justification for military intervention that is accepted by other states or mass publics. Other claims appear to be increasingly powerful, notably claims about human rights, which now challenge assertions about sovereignty and self-determination that were the trump cards of international normative discourse thirty years ago. These shifts by no means reduce normative conflict or intervention, but they do relocate conflict in ways that alter the purpose and character of military force over time.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of intervention—what it is and why it is interesting theoretically. This is not a pro forma review, since, in many ways, the concept’s theoretical importance comes precisely from ambiguities about its definition. Intervention lies at the boundary of peace and war. It also defines the outer limits of sovereign control. It is this liminal character of the concept that makes it a useful vantage point from which to inquire about the role and purpose of force in international society, and the next section elaborates this point. The second section presents the agenda for the book’s empirical investigation. There are a variety of well-established and fairly obvious explanations for why intervention patterns change that I test in each chapter. The most prominent involve changes both in the distribution of material power and in military technology that make application of force possible where it was not possible previously. There are fewer available explanations for how patterns of intervention behavior might change. Explanations that locate causes (answers to the “why question”) in changing technology or distributions of material power rarely provide detailed explanations of how, exactly, decision makers change their notions or learn about these new material realities in ways that influence intervention. Similarly explanations that locate causes in changing rules, law, or norms about intervention rarely specify detailed mechanisms whereby decision makers become persuaded by new claims or follow new rules in considering intervention. In each case I cull what I can from previous research to develop expectations about where these mechanisms might be found and rely on induction from the cases to help elaborate several processes later in the book. The third section presents a brief overview of these findings and some of the themes that run through the cases. I became interested in this problem precisely because the discipline did not have good hypotheses about the changing purpose of force that I could test. Thus a major part of this project is the generation of new hypotheses and sketching of the changing “normative landscape” on which new rules of intervention are negotiated. I find three major trends running through all three cases, and argue that these constitute basic features of the dynamic normative structure in which interstate force is embedded.

**INTRODUCTION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND WAR**

Intervention is an interesting lens through which to examine the purpose of force among states, because it establishes boundary conditions for two central institutions of international life, sovereignty and war. In the most fundamental way, intervention policies define sovereignty and the state. The necessary condition for sovereignty among states is nonintervention. If states are states only because they have control over force within their territory and other states recognize that control, then military intervention is an explicit challenge to sovereignty. If states freely intervened militarily in one another’s affairs whenever some gain could be had, we would live in a very different world. Power asymmetries continue to be enormous in the international system, and the vast majority of the world’s 190-odd sovereign states could not mount any meaningful defense should one of the Great Powers decide to intervene. It is precisely because states show restraint that we
live in a world of sovereign states at all. In this sense, nonintervention is the practice that constitutes the state and sovereignty as foundational institutions of contemporary politics. Intervention, conversely, sets their limits.

At the same time, intervention policies lie at the boundary of peace and war in international politics. Deploying military force against another state is obviously not peacable activity, yet states take great pains to distinguish these actions from war. States understand intervention as being different from, and usually less than, war, but just what those differences are can be difficult to discern from facts on the ground. Often intervention involves occupation of the target country and installing an entirely new government by force, actions that hardy seem limited or restrained in their political aims. That a formal declaration of war was not made seems a trivial distinction, yet we take the distinction very seriously. No one talks about recent U.S. wars with Somalia or Grenada. Americans would bristle (or laugh) at the notion that these actions were war, yet most would be hard pressed to explain why, exactly, they were something else. Conversely there was much talk about a “war” on terrorism, yet there was no declaration of war on Afghanistan despite the forcible overthrow of that government. Contemporary reluctance to declare war, even in the face of such clear attacks, is a change from past patterns.

Distinguishing between these interdependent concepts requires decision makers who act on them (and us as analysts) to draw lines in a large continuum of gray shades. At what point, for example, does the policy of one state so compromise the sovereignty of another that it constitutes intervention? States use their power and influence all the time to try to shape the actions of other states in a great variety of ways. That is what foreign policy is all about. States use leverage in trade, regulate investment and capital flows, make alliances, and even deploy troops regularly to induce or coerce other states to behave in ways they desire. Many of these economic measures, in particular, can seriously compromise the autonomy and control of target states, especially weak ones, yet we do not think of these dealings as “intervention.” To call all foreign policy

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and interstate interaction “intervention” would make the category analytically meaningless, and no decision maker has ever understood it that way. “Intervention” is the term used for compromises of sovereignty by other states that are exceptional in some way, yet lines that differentiate and constitute these exceptions are not always clear and have varied over time.

Distinguishing between intervention and war poses similar problems. We tend to think of interventions as smaller in scale and having more limited objectives than wars; however, when the objectives are to replace whole governments, it is hard to see what is limited about the objectives except that they do not include territorial conquest and absorption. That territorial conquest is rarely a result of modern war only weakens the distinction between war and intervention. Germany and Japan were not annexed by anyone after World War II, but no one thinks of our dealings with those nations as “interventions” simply because the Allies failed to absorb them. Thus objectives alone seem a weak source of distinction between intervention and war, and if scale is the only distinction between the two, such that one has wars with strong states but intervenes in weaker ones, then it is difficult to see why anyone would even bother with the term “intervention.”

One way an analyst might grapple with these ambiguities would be to come up with a reasonable definition, apply it to the universe of potential interventions, and then ask questions about that class of events coded as “intervention”—with what do they correlate, and how do they vary in time, space, duration, and frequency? This is a common scholarly approach, consistent with standard deductive social science methods. Indeed I began this project with precisely this aim and sifted through the large literature on intervention in search of a reasonable definition. Much of this literature dates back to the 1960s, and the definitions used are some variant on the following: military intervention is the deployment of military personnel across recognized boundaries for the purpose of determining the political authority structure in the target state. These sources agree, following James Rosenau, that the central objective of intervention is to change the “political authority structure” of the target state, to distinguish it for more pedestrian foreign policy, and they emphasize the need for military personnel to cross borders, presumably for the same reason. This definition made some sense for the study of cold war inter-

4. There may be excellent self-interested reasons for this restraint. The costs of governing foreign peoples have certainly risen over the past century with the rise of nationalism and self-determination norms. Conversely the benefits of empire have probably fallen with the breakdown of preferential trading arrangements and the opening of markets. Not, though, that it is normative changes that underlie and create these changing costs and benefits. Self-determination norms fuel resistance movements, and expansion of free trade norms undercut old methods of colonial extraction.


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My object of study in this volume is not specific interventions but changes in the overall pattern of intervention. A “case,” therefore, is not an intervention but a change in the pattern of global intervention behavior. To maximize the ability to generalize the findings, I chose changes from a wide variety of political issues. One case deals with issues of geopolitics and security—intervention to promote and protect order. Another deals with economic interests—intervention to collect debts. A third deals with social or humanitarian issues—humanitarian intervention. To ensure comparability, in each case I placed boundaries on the kinds of events I was willing to include in the category of “intervention” that reflect the question I am investigating. To qualify as an intervention, states had to use the term to describe the activity. Those involved had to understand that they were engaging in something called “intervention,” and had to use the term when writing to and talking with one another at


8. Cynthia Weber adopts a similar stance, albeit with different theoretical equipment and different aims (Simulating Sovereignty, chaps. 1-3).

7. My research assistant, Andreas Katsouris, who was charged with coding these episodes, figured this out more quickly than I did. I owe him thanks for his polite insistence on this point.


4. Rather than looking at an event and asking, Is it intervention? I looked at activities that participants describe as intervention and ask inductively, What is it? How did people understand this practice at different times, and how did its contours change? Varying patterns of intervention behavior are often accomplished precisely by redefining the term in ways that legitimate or require certain kinds of behavior and delegitimate or bar others. The term “humanitarian intervention,” for example, evolved over time, focusing first on military action to rescue one’s own citizens in other states, then expanding to include the protection of citizens of other states in those states by military means, and now is being eclipsed altogether in policy discourse by talk of “responses to complex humanitarian emergencies.” This new term is a conscious attempt to create legitimate space for more kinds of actors in these situations than just militaries (a move militaries have often wel-
the time. Second, military action had to be involved. I am interested in the purpose of force. Intervention by other means, for example, diplomatic or economic, even if states call it intervention, is not central to my inquiry. Third, military forces had to meet with opposition during the episode. I am not interested in the deployment of military in a completely consensus manner to act, say, in helping states recover from natural disasters. In such cases military are being used for their logistical and technical capabilities, not their ability to use force. Coercion is not central to such episodes, and they tell me little about the changing role of force among states. These criteria are met in all the cases I present here. All examine a change in some category of military intervention behavior by states as a group. All involve action that states agreed was intervention at the time. All involve a certain amount of military coercion by the intervenors.

A related set of problems involves coding the purposes of interventions. All interventions are spurred by more than one purpose and are justified on multiple grounds. This makes analysis of why states intervene tricky. For it then becomes difficult, when reviewing different interventions, to answer the standard social science question, “Of what is this an instance?” and also difficult to know which interventions “count” as instances of debt collection, humanitarian intervention, or the protection of order.

I see no reason to be Procrustean and force every intervention into a single classification. One intervention could potentially have more than one purpose; indeed, it usually does. To understand how purposes change, one must be alert to all the various motives pushing the action of states. In the following analysis I classify cases of intervention according to two features: the explanation states give for intervening and what they actually do on the ground. If states claim they are intervening to collect debts and their militaries indeed act to take over customs houses and divert revenues, then I classify that as an intervention to collect debts. If states say they are intervening to save lives and their militaries act accordingly, then I count that as a humanitarian intervention. States may articulate additional goals and their militaries may pursue those as well, but the existence of additional goals does not make the existence of the particular motive and justification under study any less real.

In each case, I identify the nature of the change in intervention behavior and the theoretical puzzles it poses. I then identify an array of possible explanations for the change and associated puzzles. Because each case deals with a different area of politics, the theoretical anomalies vary slightly in each. Next, I trace the processes of historical change in each case, looking for the kinds of evidence required to arbitrate among explanations. This creates somewhat different presentations in the various cases, depending, again, on the nature of the puzzles posed. The debts case, for example, requires a detailed tracing of the personal interactions among individually named participants. The two remaining cases cover much larger historical sweeps and call for other designs. Investigating intervention under various international orders requires something resembling a comparative statics design in which aggregate patterns of intervention are compared across periods and supplemented by process tracing to illuminate mechanisms by which changes occurred. The humanitarian intervention case is also organized largely as comparative静态s, comparing behavior in the nineteenth century to that in the twentieth century in order to reveal change.

Methodologically, these cases follow the form of the “narrative explanatory protocol.” Following that form, each case study has two components, descriptive and configurative. Descriptively, each lays out a chronological sequence of events with attention to how one affects another, but each then goes on to articulate a “coherence structure” for these events by configuring them in particular ways that emphasize aspects important for the inquiry at hand. I have done this through a method that John Ruggie (following Charles Pierce) calls “abduction.” Abduction is neither deduction nor induction but a dialectical combination of the two. In each case I present deductively derived hypotheses that shape the initial design of the inquiry but quickly prove insufficient to explain events. Consequently I supplement the deductive arguments with inductively derived insights, moving back and forth between the two to produce an account that will be “verisimilar and believable to others looking over the same events.”

This method has important virtues when compared to the alternatives. As discussed earlier, there simply are no deductive arguments about the changing purpose of force in the international relations literature that are sufficiently well specified to test with dispositive results. Most require

10. The only exception I made to this rule was in chapter 4 when I looked back at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to provide context for the nineteenth-century use of the term. This move is discussed in that chapter.

11. Also, of course, states may not articulate important goals of intervention. Hidden agendas are common in these actions. My concern in this study is whether they follow through on the goals they do claim.


that sense cause) new intervention behavior by creating new norms of behavior and new reasons for action. Reasons for action are not the same as causes of action as understood by utilitarian theories. New beliefs about who is human do not cause humanitarian intervention to save non-white, non-Christian people in the twentieth century in any law-like way. Certainly more such people were killed than saved in that century. But new beliefs about who is human provide reasons to intervene and make intervention possible in ways it was not previously. By creating new social realities—new norms about interventions, new desirata of publics and decision makers—new beliefs create new policy choices, even policy imperatives for intervenors. Thus understanding beliefs about the legitimate purposes of intervention is not “mere description,” since beliefs about legitimate intervention constitute certain behavioral possibilities and, in that sense, cause them. Analysis of this type is less directed toward answering the question “why” than the question “how,” or, more specifically, “how possible.”

Throughout each case I attend to both intervention behavior and discourse about it. Although force may be the immediate means of changing the target’s behavior, the coercion itself provides little insight into the intervenor’s social purpose (since many military interventions go awry or have unintended consequences), nor does it tell us much about the legitimacy and acceptance of that purpose in the broader international community. To understand purpose, I examine justification. Every intervention leaves a long trail of justification in its wake, and justification is analytically important in this project because it speaks directly to, and therefore reveals something about, normative context and shared social purpose. When states justify their interventions, they draw on and articulate shared values and expectations that other decision makers and other publics in other states hold. Justification is literally an attempt to connect one’s actions with standards of justice or, perhaps more generally, with standards of appropriate and acceptable behavior. Thus, through an examination of justifications, we can begin to piece together what those internationally held standards are and how they change over time. In each case I examine not simply who intervened where but why they said they intervened, how they justified their actions, and how other states and publics reacted. The cases thus analyze debates over legitimacy claims and use changing justifications, in combination with altered military behavior on the ground, as evidence about changed social purpose.


17. Wendt, "Constitution and Causation in International Relations"; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Fearon and Wendt, "Rationalism vs. Constructivism."
The cases analyzed here share certain characteristics that suggest both substantive generalizations about the way we use force in the world and some conceptual confusion about the way we think about force. Conceptually, the cases suggest that we, as analysts, need to rethink the relationship between utility and legitimacy in political analysis. The vast majority of political science arguments about state behavior are utilitarian or functional in basic form. States or other political actors do what they do, including using force, because it is useful or fulfills some function. Arguments of this kind are often opposed to normative or idealist arguments in which actors do what they do because such actions are viewed as legitimate, right, or good. Much of the recent theoretical debate in international relations has been aimed at arbitrating between these two types of arguments. This opposition between utility and legitimacy as motivations for action is often visible in the hypotheses explored in chapters 2 to 4, each examining a different case of intervention. For example, extant arguments about humanitarian intervention posit that humanitarian intervention is “really” driven by some underlying geostrategic interest as opposed to being motivated by altruistic humanitarian sympathies. Similarly, debt collection by force is said to end because it is no longer useful for recovering funds rather than because it is viewed as illegitimate and uncivilized. The structure and content of contemporary international relations theory leads it to produce hypotheses about these issues in which utility competes with legitimacy or ideational commitments for explanatory power. However, a consistent feature of the intervention debates in all three case illustrations is that perceptions of utility are tightly bound up in perceptions of legitimacy. Separating the two or treating them as competing explanations is not only difficult but probably misguided, since it misses the potentially more interesting question of how the two are intertwined and interdependent. This insight would not have been uncovered by a purely deductive, hypothesis-testing exercise, since extant hypotheses do not allow for this possibility. Only by moving from deduction to induction does this become apparent.

The utility of force is a function of its legitimacy. Of course, one’s belief or disbelief in the efficacy of a bullet has little to do with the effects the bullet has in one’s body. If one’s goal is simply to kill, then legitimacy and utility may be divorced. But simple killing is rarely the chief goal of political leaders who use force. Force is usually a means to some other end of social life, and attempts to use force alone for social control or social influ-

18. My own work fits this pattern as much as anyone’s.
revenues in order to pay creditors of the many weak, insolvent states that exist today is not obviously more difficult materially now than it was in the nineteenth century, probably less so. Yet such an operation would be extremely costly and, if proposed, would be rejected out of hand. The nature of these "costs" highlights this problem, for they are political, legitimacy-related costs. Such an intervention would threaten the broad normative structure that many states value. Allies and others would be outraged, and diplomacy in other spheres would be hampered, making it difficult to achieve other goals. For a policy to "work" and be useful politically, it must not only achieve its goal; it must achieve a goal that relevant parties accept and do so in a manner they accept. For intervention to "work" and be useful politically, it must achieve a goal that states and domestic publics accept and do so in a manner they view as legitimate.

In addition to this large conceptual issue, several empirical themes emerge from these disparate cases and form basic contours of the normative landscape on which intervention rules have been negotiated. One is that some people have more influence than others over the evolution of international rules and norms. Decision makers in strong states with the capacity for extensive military intervention have a much greater impact on changes in these rules than other people do, and, throughout the several centuries examined here, those states are overwhelmingly Western ones that become increasingly liberal, democratic, and capitalist over time. Global understandings about force and intervention reflect this, but the cases also illustrate the large amount of indeterminacy and contradiction embedded in these strong state values. Even within a Western states system, one can construct different kinds of orders that structure the relationship between strong and weak in different ways. Weak states had little say in the operation of the Concert of Europe, which was explicitly a Great Powers club. Its structure provided no outlet for small state views or means for small states to have influence. Over the next couple of centuries, however, "voice" opportunities for weak states grew as the structure of the system changed. The Second Hague Peace Conference, discussed in chapter 2, was the first forum that aimed at universal state representation. Admittedly voice is a limited kind of power, but weak states would certainly prefer having a seat at the table than not. A more consequential example is the way that Great Powers have understood their "interests" in political control of these peripheral geographic areas. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, powerful states understood their interests to be served best by creating empires and exercising direct political control over Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By the late twentieth century, strong states understood their interests to be best served by devolving political control to people who live in these areas and creating a world of independent sovereign states. These are two very distinct kinds of international systems, both set up and run according to the rules of the same strong Western states. What has changed is the way those states perceive their interests.

Another clear trend that emerges from the cases discussed here is the steady erosion of force's normative value in international politics. In the seventeenth century, war was glorious and honorable. States actively sought it out not only as a means to wealth and power but as an end in itself. Success at arms brought distinction and respect in an era when these were highly valued goals for leaders. By the last three centuries, however, war has become less legitimate and less normatively valued in international forums. Waging wars for the glory of one's country is no longer honored or even respectable in contemporary politics. Force is viewed as legitimate only as a last resort, and only for defensive or humanitarian purposes. The irony is that the diminished normative value has not brought any obvious decrease in the frequency of the use of force. The twentieth century was certainly one of the bloodiest on record despite eighty years of international discourse about the evils of war and attempts to curb or even outlaw war in various ways.

One might be tempted to conclude from this that normative context is irrelevant, since not liking force does not seem to decrease its use. However, that argument obscures the very real shifts in the goals people fight for, the ways they use force, and the perceived imperatives those changes create for military action. When war was a normative good, both in itself and for what it brought, all states could legitimately use it to pursue all kinds of goals in foreign policy, including (and perhaps especially) self-aggrandizing ones. However, when war became a necessary evil and a last resort, it became increasingly circumscribed by legal and multilateral frameworks, and became illegitimate as a means of pursuing many goals, especially self-aggrandizing ones. This does not necessarily decrease its use, since these legalities often require multilateral force in response to actions that previously would have gone unchecked. As chapter 3 indicates, for example, states now must entertain far more claims for humanitarian protection (now from non-white, non-Christians)
than they did previously. Although not all these claims are answered, as the Rwandans understand so well, more are answered now than previously, creating Somalias and Kosovos—large episodes of interstate violence that previously would have remained an internal matter, largely unremarked in international political life. Similarly, multilateral norms mean that more states from far-flung reaches of the world must be involved in these local conflicts (as UN peacekeepers or contributors to nation building, for example) than was previously the case.

Another long-term trend has been the steadily increasing influence of equality norms in many aspects of global political life. This has been true in at least two dimensions. Norms about human equality and human rights have become increasingly powerful in all areas of political life over the past several centuries and have had profound effects, including effects on military intervention. Chapter 3 discusses implications of these changes for humanitarian intervention practices, and chapter 4 connects changes in prevailing regime types, notably the decline of dynasticism and the spread of liberal democracy, with changing notions of order and intervention.

Norms about the formal equality of states—sovereignty equality—have also become more powerful. This has had consequences for multilateral decision making generally but also for intervention rules specifically. As noted above, many multilateral forums, notably the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are now structured to give voice to small, weak states that influence agendas and create issues that strong states must deal with. Decisions about multilateral uses of force, however, are hardly dictated by these countries. Strong states still retain control over their militaries. One effect of broad participation in these forums, however, is the empowerment of middle powers in multilateral intervention operations. Multilateralism not only creates the opportunity for states like Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Australia to become involved in military interventions; it also creates a normative premium on action by these states as opposed to the strongest states and gives them significant say in the kinds of rules that evolve concerning multilateral action.

Sovereign equality has influenced intervention rules more specifically in ways illustrated by the debts case. Sovereign equality is a normative and legal notion that has created restraints on military intervention. Materially sovereigns are obviously not equal; their equality is a social construction of juridical standing. When interstate conflicts become

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dealing with these criminals were created in unprecedented numbers and with unprecedented powers in these years. Even in the international order case, notions about order have become increasingly legalized and rationalized. Beginning with the Concert of Europe, international order became bound up with international law such that breaking the rules of order was not simply opportunistic or bad but illegal. This legalization of order became increasingly powerful over the course of the twentieth century as the fabric of international law became much more dense. Not only was our international order a legal one in the latter part of the twentieth century, but international bureaucracies (rational-legal authorities) increasingly become authorizing agents of state action. States very much want international organizations to bless their uses of force, not just in the humanitarian sphere but in others as well. For example, in the 1991 Gulf War, when states rolled back an overt act of territorial acquisitiveness, the United States was very concerned not only that the UN sanction that operation but that its use of force stay within the bounds of the UN mandate. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, one of the first moves the United States made was to secure invocation of Article V from the most militarily powerful international organization, NATO.

In observing that intervention is increasingly shaped by law, I am by no means claiming that the world is a nicer or better place than it was several hundred years ago. There are probably just as many bad guys in the world now as there were in the eighteenth century. Indeed, the twentieth century saw more that its share of murderous and morally repugnant leaders. I am claiming only that we think about political immorality in a different way than we did three hundred years ago and behave toward it differently as a consequence. We increasingly think of it and debate it as “crime,” and the criminal framework implies certain ways of dealing with these problems. Rhetorically, logically, and ethically such a framework leads to a set of expectations about publicly authorized force, analogous to policing, to stop these actions and rational-legal justice, in the form of trials, to deal with their perpetrators.25 This conquest of Weberian rationality is exactly what world law politics arguments about evolving world culture might predict and is consistent with their arguments about both the expansion of the West and of Western capitalism.24

24. See, for example, George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987); John Boli and George Thomas, eds., Constructing World Culture

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It raises questions for realpolitikers, who would expect opportunism and insecurity to trump the force of law and lead states to ignore these rational-legal authority structures rather than proliferating them. The policy of the United States toward Iraq in 2003 would suggest that realpolitik dynamics are very much alive in the world, but realists would have trouble explaining the fact that the United States spent so many months pursuing UN authorization for its action and made so many side payments to construct a multilateral coalition of allies whose contributions were often of dubious consequence. It also presents some anomalies to liberals, since states adhere to these legal authority structures and participate in the rational-legal discourse about acceptable behavior even when they are not governed by liberal democratic governments.

These three themes—the malleability of strong state interests, the normative devaluation of force over time, and the growing importance of rational-legal authority in governing the use of force—run through all three cases and form the basic features of intervention’s normative terrain. They shape the purposes to which force can be used legitimately in international society and, in the case of the latter two, form strong trends shaping change in those purposes. The cases are full of finer features of this normative landscape that add depth to this overall sketch in the various issues they deal with, but these features form general outlines that might have broad applicability to all kinds of uses of force. But since I have introduced these features from these cases, the best I can do is offer them as hypotheses for future testing. There may be other major features of normative change in the use of force that my cases do not capture; there may also be limits on the applicability of these claims in other arenas of state violence. However, since we have not thought a great deal about what kinds of normative dynamics might be at work in this area, we need to generate some hypotheses. The following cases are offered to that end.