Raimo Tuomela has promoted the account of collective intentionality for decades and has advocated group-based theorizing making use of the I-mode/we-mode distinction. His pioneering work has helped considerably to further recent interest in the field. One of the central aims of his work is to investigate the conceptual resources and the philosophical presuppositions of sociality both from the individual’s and the collective’s point of view (thus from the *shared point of view*).

In Tuomela’s recent account social groups are viewed as functional group agents to which mental states predicates can be attributed by the group members and others. Such group agents are not persons and they do not possess intrinsic (but only extrinsic) intentionality. They basically consist of the group members and their interrelations (and, e.g., in the case of organizations also of necessary material “tools”). Tuomela concentrates in his theory on the full shared we-perspective of the members of groups.
Accordingly, the social domain is constituted by asmembers and non-members of groups, their roles, status functions, and expectations. Group membership presupposes mutual knowledge of membership. The social domain involves both an objective and a subjective ontological aspect. Complex group agents (e.g. corporations and political states) involve some fictitious (e.g. law-based) features in addition to real, objective ones.

In his recent work Tuomela has extended his earlier research to cover a field of sociality including collective intentionality, cooperation, power, social institutions, collective responsibility, and socio-cultural evolution. Philosophical theorizing concerning the aforementioned notions of course is significant not only for the philosophy of sociality, social science, and political and moral philosophy but also for cognitive science.

Tuomela has extended his view in *Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agent*, Oxford University Press: New York 2013 with two analyses: 

*First*, he focuses on collective intentionality and social ontology especially in the case of we-mode groups, thus functional group agents; here a central issue is the distinction between epistemic objectivity and ontological subjectivity of the social domain.

*Second*, the function of authority and hierarchy in communication and cooperation; here the question is the role of elites and authorized leaders in the social domain – the issues of group agents and collective reasoning.

The Symposium aims at analysing in detail the aforementioned issues from different perspectives.
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ProtoSociology - background

ProtoSociology has realized since the 1990s years a project on social philosophy in the contemporary scene. From the project are published:

Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer Eds.
From Individual to Collective Intentionality
New Essays
Oxford University Press, New York 2014

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Gerhard Preyer
Intention and Practical Thought
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On R. Tuomelas account:

G. Preyer, “Kollektive Intentionalität”
http://www.springer.com/springer+vs/soziologie/book/978-3-531-17731-1

On an overview about the accounts of contemporary social philosophy and social ontology:

Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, Gerhard Preyer
“Introduction Collective Intentionality and Collective Rationality: Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five”
in: From Individual to Collective Intentionality New Essays, Edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer