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Imperialism
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Glossary
Imperialism In its economic usage the most basic sense of this term is the export of capital from one country to another. In its political usage it refers to the military conquest or subordination of one country by another.
Labor theory of value The theory of classical economics that the exchange value of a commodity is measured in terms of the value of the labor or labor power consumed in producing it, including labor power consumed either directly as the labor power of the worker or indirectly as the labor power that makes up the value of the technological means of production. The theory has been largely rejected in the twentieth century except by some Marxists.
Overaccumulation The condition of an economy in which capital cannot be profitably invested (or not as profitably as in a foreign economy) because there is too much of it for the economy to put to use. Underconsumption is generally thought to amount to the same thing, merely looked at differently.
Prima facie evil An act that is wrong or a state of affairs that is bad, the wrongness or badness of which may under certain circumstances be outweighed by a resulting greater good. Prima facie evil is usually contrasted with all-things-considered evil.
Rate of profit Based upon the labor theory of value, it is the ratio (fraction) of surplus value to total value invested (including labor and technology). Many Marxists argue that there is a tendency for the rate of profit to decline as an economy becomes more industrialized; as investment in technology increases, the denominator of the fraction increases and the rate of profit declines. Capitalists are thought to pursue high rates of profits.
Surplus value According to classical Marxist theory this is the difference between the value of the labor power of the worker and the value of what he or she creates in a day’s work. It corresponds to the measure of profits of the capitalist and the exploitation of the worker.
Underconsumption The condition of an economy in which demand is insufficiently high to attract for reinvestment of all the profits it generates.

Introduction
Economic imperialism is minimally defined as the export of capital from one country to another. Difficulties in arriving at a more substantive general definition than this are considerable because the very meaning of the term is in great measure dependent upon the particular theoretical framework in which it is employed. All of the frameworks at least look at the causes and consequences of the export of capital, although they differ in what they view these to be. Because of these differences in purported causes and consequences, a more substantive general definition seems impossible. Furthermore, while theorists of imperialism usually wish to show that political imperialism serves economic imperialism, accounts of the former also vary. This has implications for a moral account of imperialism. A general account of the morality of imperialism of necessity will be insensitive to some of the particularities (causes and consequences) of the chief empirical theories.

Reviewing the Empirical Theories
A general distinction can be drawn in the explanatory goals of pre- and post-World War II empirical theories of imperialism. Pre-World War II theories sought to explain the increasing competition for control of foreign lands by the major capitalist powers. Post-World War II theories often sought rather to explain the failures in development of the economies of underdeveloped countries.

Both pre- and post-World War II theories generally attempt to establish a causal connection between the economics and politics of imperialism. Pre-World War
II theories hold that capitalist competition causes war. Post-World War II theories are often used to support the claim that the major capitalist powers, in particular the United States, have an interest in preventing, or turning back by military means, democratic change and socialist revolutions in the underdeveloped countries.

Pre-World War II Theories

The principal theorists of imperialism of this time period are Luxemburg, Hobson, Hilferding, Bukharin, Lenin, and Kautsky. All of them hold that the export of capital is the main cause of the increasing competition of the major capitalist states. Furthermore, with the exception of Hobson they are all Marxists and hold that imperialism, as the export of capital, is a necessary feature of capitalism. And of these Marxists, with the exception of Kautsky, they all see competition erupting into warfare as the necessary consequence of imperialism. For most of the theorists of imperialism of this period then the exposition of imperialism constitutes an important element in the critique of capitalism; capitalism is to be condemned, in part, because of the evil of warfare to which it gives rise.

Generally, these theorists believe that the immediate cause of economic imperialism is overaccumulation. This is subject to empirical verification. If the overaccumulation thesis is true one would expect to see either a decrease in domestic capital investment at roughly the same time as an increase in foreign investment or an overall increase in investment with the increase going abroad.

With the exception of Luxemburg, all of these theorists see the development of monopoly enterprises in previously more competitive economies as causing overaccumulation. This suggests that Luxemburg’s theory is consistent with a different set of facts than the others. If the export of capital preceded the development of monopolies, then Luxemburg’s account may be correct but the others would appear to be threatened.

Luxemburg draws attention to what she sees as a chronic problem of underconsumption in capitalist economies that sends business in search of noncapitalist markets for sales. The problem is explained in terms of what Marx referred to as the realization of surplus value. Surplus value is only realized upon sale of the commodity. This is the basis of the capitalist’s profits.

On Luxemburg’s account it is structurally impossible for all of the surplus value of a capitalist economy to be realized within that economy. The explanation for this seems to be grounded in the following two claims regarding capitalist competition: Competition requires that the capacity for production constantly expand; but the capacity for consumption cannot keep up with production, as workers are not sufficiently remunerated and capitalists are interested in plowing profits back into production, not consumption, in order to keep up with the competition.

Hobson is the first pre-World War II theorist to assert the causal connection between imperialism and the rise of monopoly influence in capitalist economies. Fierce competition followed by monopoly consolidation gives rise to tremendous profits for a few that cannot be profitably invested in the domestic market. Overaccumulation of capital or underconsumption of goods then motivates the capitalist to look for foreign sources of investment. The main sectional interests involved in the search for foreign investments are the large capital investors and speculators.

Hobson is also the first of this group to contend that economic protectionism serves imperialism. The best way to defend the gains of imperial conquest against economic competitors is through protectionism. Sufficient protection however requires the use of military force. Military force also ensures that foreign debtors are forthcoming with payments. So, economic imperialism is the cause of the politics of imperialism. Unlike the Marxists who succeeded him, Hobson thinks that the economics and politics of imperialism can be excised from the capitalist economy by reforming its functioning, largely through redistributive policies that boost internal demand thereby giving incentive to capital to invest domestically.

Hilferding lays the basis for the subsequent anticapitalist theories of Lenin and Bukharin, all three of which link the development of imperialism to the rise of finance capital. This is the name that Hilferding gives to capital loaned by banks to be set to use for industrial purposes. Such loans produce an intimate connection between two previously more distinct businesses, banking and industry. Hilferding, unlike Hobson, sees the banks playing an active role in causing monopoly. The demand for bank loans, a demand initially caused by competition, results in the concentration of capital into large monopolies or trusts because the banks’ interest in minimizing losses motivates them to discourage competition among industrial firms.

Protective tariffs and monopoly prices allow for increased prices and higher returns on domestic investments. But the increased prices also reduce demand. This underconsumption provides an incentive to search for foreign markets. Import tariffs in other countries motivate the transfer of production to those countries as a means of payment avoidance. This capital exportation leads to three policy objectives: (1) to establish the largest possible economic territory; (2) to close this territory to foreign competition by a wall of protective tariffs; and (3) to reserve the territory for the national monopolies. The militaries of various states play important roles both in opening up new areas and in protecting them. Hilferding thinks that the only way to halt imperialism and to
provide for peace is by the expropriation and nationalization of the largest firms of finance capital.

Bukharin advances at least two explanations of the overaccumulation, and thus the export, of capital. One is based upon the view that the rate of profit declines in the more industrially advanced countries. The declining rate of profit produces an overaccumulation of capital. The second explanation invokes the growth of finance capital in advanced capitalist economies. Competition results in large concentrations of capital in the hands of the winners. The investment of ever-larger sums of capital tends to reduce competition and leads to the development of industrial monopolies dependent on financial capital. Monopoly profits create an overaccumulation of capital. Thus, monopoly coverage of the domestic market produces international competition among country-based monopolies.

Bukharin argues that tariffs play a new role under conditions of interstate monopoly competition. They allow domestic firms to raise prices giving them the ability to sell below costs (or dump) in international markets. In other words tariffs at home give capital abroad penetrating powers. Although a globally unified monopoly, existing peacefully, is a theoretical possibility, it is a practical impossibility because the fierce competition between country-based monopolies will periodically erupt into war. Bukharin holds that because imperialist wars serve only the interests of the capitalist class, the most effective means of opposing them is through international working-class solidarity.

Lenin’s account of imperialism is much less an explanation of the causes and effects of the export of capital than a description encapsulated in his list: (1) the concentration of capital has produced monopolies that play an important role in the life of economies; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital has formed oligarchic finance capital; (3) the export of capital has replaced the export of commodities; and (4) the formation of international monopolies has resulted in the territorial division of the world amongst the largest capitalist powers.

Lenin, like Bukharin, is keen to establish that a peaceful imperialism through a globally unified monopoly alliance is impossible. Finance capital must seek territorial areas to control in order to maximize profits. This leads to competition among states for areas of control and resistance among those who fall under foreign domination. The result is periodic warfare.

Kautsky is the only Marxist of this period to contend that the export of capital peacefully coordinated by the major imperialist powers is not only a theoretical possibility but a practical one as well. The political threat of opposition to war from the working classes of these countries and the need to suppress colonial opposition would motivate peaceful cooperation. Kautsky calls this new stage of imperialism ‘ultra-imperialism.’ Although Kautsky’s theory came under sharp attack from Lenin and Bukharin, it was no endorsement of ultra-imperialism but rather a warning of the kinds of dangers that might be posed by a new, more stable form of imperialism. Currently the world seems to be better characterized by Kautsky’s ultra-imperialism than the intra-imperialist warfare of the other Marxists of this pre-World War II period.

**Post-World War II Theories**

The main post-World War II theorists of imperialism are Baran, Frank, Wallerstein, Amin, and Emmanuel. Their principal concern is to explain the unequal levels of development around the world, resulting in what they call ‘underdevelopment.’ With the exception of Emmanuel, the cause of underdevelopment is the capital invested in the less-developed countries and repatriated to the developed countries. Emmanuel locates the cause in unequal trade relations with the developed countries. These, of course, are not incompatible theses. The theories of imperialism of this period are generally intended to be part of a Marxist critique of the capitalist system. Brenner and Warren are Marxist critics of these accounts.

The underdevelopment theorists attempt to explain causally the relationship between the development of the advanced developed countries and the underdevelopment of others. Obviously, this method relies on the claim that there are underdeveloped countries, a claim that Warren disputes. The causal explanation cannot start with an empirical observation of correlation between development and underdevelopment and move to a causal explanation. For unless ‘underdevelopment’ means complete absence of development, which would render it useless, it cannot be considered merely an observable brute fact. Empirical evidence that some countries are less developed than others does not reveal that they are underdeveloped. This requires showing either that their lack of development is a structural feature of relations between more- and less-developed countries or that it is the result of unfair relations between these countries. Identifying underdevelopment requires significant empirical or moral theory.

There seem to be two possible ways of identifying underdevelopment. Perhaps ‘underdeveloped’ means not as developed as would be absent the causal relations of underdevelopment. In this case, the theories would have to give a counterfactual account of why certain countries would have been more developed in the absence of certain relations with others. Failing such an account, there is the possibility that the less-developed countries would be even less developed without the relations in question. But such speculation may be open to doubt. Alternatively, ‘underdevelopment’ may mean development constrained by terms of relations that are unfair. On this
interpretation, it must be explained why the inequalities among countries are unfair because the mere existence of inequality is not evidence of unfairness. In this case the truth of underdevelopment theory is not merely an empirical matter.

Baran’s explanation of the mechanics of imperialism is not particularly new. As with the pre-World War II monopoly theorists, monopoly coverage yields an over-accumulation of capital or an underconsumption of goods that gives an incentive to invest capital abroad. But his account of the effects of this export is new. For the consequence of capital export to less-developed countries is the transfer of surplus capital (profits) from the less-developed countries back to the more-developed, resulting in the distortion and retardation of the development of the less-developed countries. Baran’s thesis sets the stage for the underdevelopment theorists who would follow him.

Frank argues that the development of underdevelopment is to be traced to three contradictions or tensions in global capitalism. The first is the expropriation/appropriation of the surplus. External monopolies appropriate the surplus of a country and expropriate it to their home countries. The second is polarization of global capitalism between the metropolitan center and the periphery satellites. It is the metropolitan center that benefits from the appropriation of the surplus of the periphery satellites. The third is the continuity and ubiquity of the structural essentials of the development of underdevelopment throughout the course of the expansion of capitalism in all places.

The chain of appropriation and expropriation of surplus capital extends through many intermediary links, from the peasant in the underdeveloped periphery to the financial house in the metropolis. The latter’s expropriation is the ultimate cause of the former’s poverty. These expropriative relations have been going on since capitalism first began to develop and extend, via exploration, beyond its national borders. According to Frank, the way out of underdevelopment for the satellite countries must involve breaking the economic relations with the metropolitan center, but doing this requires a socialist revolution.

Following upon Frank’s image of the chain of expropriation that extends from within the borders of a country to beyond, Wallerstein argues that capitalism must be analyzed as a world-system because globally there is a single division of labor within the relations of market transfer. He contends that there are three main components of the capitalist world-system, the core, the semiperiphery, and the periphery. The first and third correspond to Frank’s metropolis and satellites.

These three components play different roles in the capitalist world market. The periphery is characterized as primarily an exporter of low-wage products, the semiperiphery as having a higher-wage sector that produces part of what is consumed on its internal market, but that is dependent for the other part, and the core as a substantial exporter of high-wage products and the major customer for these products. Wallerstein explains the underdevelopment of the periphery in much the same way as Frank does. The development of capitalism in the core has required since its inception that it receive the redistribution of the surplus from the periphery and semiperiphery. Wallerstein maintains that only a socialist world-system can overcome the relations of subordination of the capitalist world-system.

According to Amin the cause of capital moving to foreign markets is the tendency of the rate of profit to decline in the center (core) countries. This export of capital produces distorted economies in the periphery. Amin seeks to explain these distortions as the result of the primitive accumulation of capital. This is the name that Marxists give to the brutal origins of the capitalism in which noncapitalist communal arrangements were destroyed, leaving people without options other than becoming wage laborers. According to Amin, these kinds of events characterize the ongoing relationship between the center and periphery.

The result of these relations is that the economies of the periphery develop only to serve those of the center. Amin calls this the disarticulation of periphery economies. Disarticulation is not quite the equivalent of underdevelopment; rather, it means that the national economies of peripheral states lack internal coherence. Most of the exchanges are not between economic agents internal to the economy but between internal and external agents, with the effect that the surplus flows to the center. But it is hard to see what the problem with this is unless it results in evils like underdevelopment. Amin contends that the way to overcome these subordinate relations is for periphery countries to delink from relations with the center. The aim of delinking is to establish what Amin refers to as ‘autocentric’ economies in the periphery oriented around developing institutions that service local needs, rather than external profit.

Both Wallerstein and Amin augment their accounts of imperialism by asserting that trade relations between the center (or core) and periphery are exploitative. Emmanuel first developed this theory of unequal exchange. He argues that free trade can be unequal if the price of wages in the two trading countries is unequal.

Emmanuel assumed that if capital were mobile and labor were not, then the rate of profit around the world would converge while the costs of labor would not. Emmanuel must assume the mobility of capital is sufficient to achieve a unitary rate of profit, but not so great as to have all capital flow to low-wage, low-cost sites of production. If the rates of profit are to remain the same,
then the price of commodities in high-wage countries must be higher than in low-wage countries because of higher production costs. Thus, low-wage countries must pay more for their imports than do high-wage countries, and exchange is unequal.

Emmanuel sees two ways in which unequal exchange might be ameliorated. Either those countries suffering from it must diversify their economy, sending up the prices of their former main exports and sending down the prices of their former imports, or institutions of international redistribution must be implemented in order to compensate the low-wage countries for their loss of income to the high-wage countries.

Although it has been widely held in this time period that imperialism just is the relationship between the developed and the less-developed world such that the development of the former necessarily is financed by the underdevelopment of the latter, views critical of this have been offered by those also working within a Marxist framework.

Brenner’s criticism of underdevelopment theory takes up matters of the theory of capitalist development. He takes issue with the general claim that the capitalist development of the core can be financed only by surplus transfers from the periphery. Brenner’s argument involves a distinction between absolute and relative surplus. Feudal economies attempt to increase productivity by requiring the serfs to work longer for the lords. This is an increase in absolute surplus. An increase in relative surplus occurs when workers produce more in the same amount of time.

Brenner argues that capitalist development historically is a function of an increase in relative surplus. Capitalists get more to invest through innovation, which increases labor productivity. Because workers in a capitalist economy are free to sell their labor power, they must be motivated by market incentives and disincentives (pay increases/the threat of sacking) to use innovations to increase productivity. The key to capitalist development historically has been to dispossess some group of people in order to create a class willing to sell its labor power. Thus, the dynamism of capitalist development has less to do with transferring surplus form the periphery to the core and more to do with creating a class of workers who respond to market incentives and disincentives.

Warren’s argument contains a certain irony insofar as it can be characterized as a Marxist defense of imperialism. Warren would likely contend that whatever irony one sees in this has far more to do with the mistakes of Marxism in the twentieth century than with any inconsistencies in his work. For he, quite like Marx, argues that capitalism is historically progressive. He contends further that imperialism is generally progressive because it just is the spread of capitalism.

According to Warren, capitalism is progressive on cultural, economic, and political grounds. It encourages individual development; it increases productivity; and it encourages parliamentary democracy. These are empirical claims, and Warren contends that the record of development verifies them. If the claims are true, whether they amount to evidence for the progressive nature of capitalism is a moral matter. Warren seems to think quite reasonably that these are valuable items in and of themselves, but what is more that Marxists ought to find them especially attractive because they both comprise the ethical foundation of socialism and are necessary preconditions for it.

A Model of Imperialism

In order to assess the morality of imperialism in a way that is not dependent on one or another controversial empirical theory, a more general model of imperialism must be employed. Such a model, by definition, will be insensitive to many purported features of imperialism captured by the various empirical theories. But the loss of sensitivity is offset by the gain of generality.

Roemer has a model that is useful because its empirical commitments are less extensive than any of the theories I have summarized. He analyzes imperialism as a particular kind of exploitation, the exploitation of one state by another. This is based on his model of exploitation among individuals. A worker is exploited when her wages embody less labor than she expends, while a capitalist is an exploiter when his profits embody more labor than he expends. In other words, what the worker receives requires less socially necessary labor to produce (given current levels of technology) than she expends, and what the capitalist receives requires more.

Roemer argues that this unequal outcome may result even under consensual market relations. If the capitalist has more resources at the beginning of the transactions he may either employ the worker or lend to her on terms that are more advantageous to him than working and more advantageous to her than working without those resources (money or productive technology). Because unequal outcomes are not necessarily unfair ones, this is a technical, normal definition of exploitation. Whether or not a particular exploitative relationship is fair depends upon the justice of the preexisting distribution between the two parties.

Roemer sees the morality of exploitation, then, as dependent on the morality of the prior distribution of resources. The reason why exploitation under capitalism is immoral is because the property relations that permit private differential ownership cannot be justified. He makes this argument by considering how a justification
might be attempted, for example, on the necessity to reward people for risk-taking or entrepreneurial behavior. This fails to justify private differential ownership of capital because it is not obvious that such activity merits reward, and even if it does, it is doubtful that private differential ownership of capital is necessary to provide the reward. Roemer does not consider, but might have, a more egalitarian defense of capitalist property relations, namely, that they are justified if and only if they are to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged. But if he is right about the failure of the previous possible justification, it is also doubtful that this one would pass the test.

Similar reasoning can be applied to the relations between states. Imperialist states are those that export capital and import labor. States that are exploited by imperialism are those that import capital and export labor. The former end up with income that is greater than the labor expended by their citizens, the latter with less; the former are analogous to the employer, the latter to the worker. Whether or not a particular imperialist relationship is unjust depends not on the features of the economic relationship itself (assuming it to be consensual) but upon the justice of the international distribution of resources that precedes it.

This model takes states as the agents and victims of imperialism. Strictly speaking ‘states’ is best understood as shorthand for individuals grouped geopolitically who thereby partially share, although differentially along class lines, the benefits and burdens of certain economic transactions and policies. For although actual states may in certain ways be agents of imperialism through policies encouraging the export of capital and protecting it after export, theorists of imperialism are usually not concerned about the impact of inequality on the life and health of the state, but on individuals.

**Imperialism and International Distributive Justice**

Beitz argues that the international distribution of wealth should conform to what Rawls refers to as the difference principle. The difference principle states that inequalities among individuals must be such that they are to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged. Only inequalities that conform to such a principle can be considered fair or just.

The justification of the difference principle involves utilizing a thought experiment that Rawls calls the original position. We are asked to imagine parties to a convention who are asked to decide from among competing principles on the ones that they wish to govern their social interaction. The parties, as representatives of others, are assumed to be motivated only by the pursuit of the advantage of those whom they represent.

However, in deciding on the principles they are subject to a number of constraints. The most important one for our purposes is that they are behind the veil of ignorance; they do not know the social position or natural endowments of those whom they represent. They know only that everyone is presumed to want certain basic goods, among which are liberty and wealth. Assuming the above motivation and constraint, Rawls contends that the parties would choose the difference principle as one of the principles to regulate social interaction because the difference principle gives assurance that everyone will benefit from any distribution of wealth.

The original position is intended to model our convictions about impartiality and fairness. For given its setup, any principle that calls on us to treat people differently on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, creed, and physical and mental abilities would not be chosen. The difference principle appears to be simply the economic expression of equal respect. All people can agree that they are treated equally by institutions governed by the difference principle because, measured against a benchmark of strict equality in wealth, they have all benefited, and remaining inequalities exist only because the system is designed to make everyone better off than under strict equality.

Rawls does not think that the application of the original position to matters of international justice yields a commitment to international egalitarianism. His position has come under criticism by many political philosophers, including Beitz and Pogge. Beitz argues that the original position is useful for thinking about international as well as domestic fairness and impartiality. And contrary to Rawls, Beitz argues that if the original position is thought to consist of parties representing all the peoples of the world, then they would choose an international difference principle. If this is right, it seems most unlikely that presently existing inequalities between the rich and the poor of the world could be thought to be just.

Part of what is required in order to yield the conclusion that Beitz advocates is an empirical claim about the nature of international society. It must be the case that there exists significant international economic interaction in the form of trade and trade treaties. Without significant interaction among people the question of the justice of their relations does not arise. Agreement on this empirical claim is something all theorists of imperialism appear to share. Indeed, nearly all of them offer substantial evidence to support the claim.

If this procedure is used to think about the economic relations among states, some of which are thought to be agents of imperialism and others victims, then it is of no great moral significance what the particular causal mechanisms of the inequalities are. Rather, the imperialism is unjust, if the inequalities that result from it are due to preexisting economic relations
that do not conform to the difference principle. On the reasonable assumption that present-day international inequalities are unjust, so then is present-day imperialism.

Although this account is neutral to the causal accounts of international inequality, it seems to correspond roughly with the intuitions of underdevelopment theory, that unequal outcomes from the relations between more- and less-developed countries are unfair. Nonetheless, the account does not necessarily gainsay Warren’s contention that capitalism still has a progressive role to play in developing the less-developed economics. The international redistribution required to achieve justice may not address property relations within states.

This model does not capture all current concerns about imperialism. For example, critics of globalization often point to several constraints placed on the economies of states, particularly those with developing economies. One constraint is the need for capital investment that is required, if the economy is to grow. Another is the general, and apparently democracy-constraining, trend of attaching neoliberal macroeconomic conditions to international loans. A third constraint is the progressive reduction of trade barriers that allows capital greater mobility. The second and third serve to punish by disinvestment states pursuing courses of egalitarian development, which punishment retards development. International institutions of redistribution in conformity with the difference principle would, however, provide some relief from the first constraint and, therefore, the second and third.

Imperialism and War

I have argued elsewhere that a necessary condition for the justice of war is that it may reasonably be believed to effect the liberation of an oppressed people, or that it may be against a force that if victorious would oppress a people. The terms ‘liberation’ and ‘oppression’ may have the connotation of all or nothing, not subject to degrees of improvement. Because of this, the above criterion should be modified as follows: A necessary condition for the justice of war is that it is reasonable to believe that its outcome will result in morally relevant improvements in the social circumstances of the affected parties, the citizens and residents of the countries fighting. Accounts of what constitutes morally relevant improvements may differ, but I would suggest that standards of human and civil rights, democratic governance, and socioeconomic equality be employed.

This modified criterion focuses on what is often called just cause. Of course there are also other important constraints on the moral permissibility of waging a war, but they need not occupy us here. This criterion of just cause seems reasonable because it is consistent with our ideas that because warfare is a prima facie evil some significant social good should be expected to result from it. But wars that are fought to safeguard the export of capital would seem quite often to fail to meet this condition because they would be fought, at least under unjust background conditions, to preserve unjust relations of inequality and exploitation. The justice of the U.S. Gulf War against Iraq might be challenged in this way.

The connection between unjust economic imperialism and an unjust war is, however, empirical and contingent, not conceptual. It is possible to imagine wars that do nothing to challenge unjust imperialism but nonetheless improve the social circumstances of those affected by them, for example, wars that result in arrangements that are no worse from the perspective of distributive justice and improve on the possibilities for respect for human rights and the establishment of democracy. The U.S. intervention in Haiti might be an example of such a war.

The long history of unjust wars conforming to the interests of unjust imperialism raises the question of whether the intervention in Haiti, if it was just, is an exception to the historical rule or the beginning of a new trend. There are reasons to believe that private ownership over vast productive resources, such as exists under capitalism, increases the likelihood of unjust wars. Roemer suggests that we look at imperialist wars as public bids to which capitalism is especially susceptible. Wars are evils that the citizenry suffers but under capitalism are often fought to gain or to preserve access to resources from which mainly private parties profit.

See also: Business Ethics, Overview; Development Ethics; Economic Globalization and Ethico-Political Rights; Marxism and Ethics.

Further Reading


Biographical Sketch

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