

# Uses of the West

Security and the Politics of Order

Edited by Gunther Hellmann  
and Benjamin Herborth



# Uses of the West

## *Security and the Politics of Order*

---

*Edited by*

**Gunther Hellmann**

*Goethe University, Frankfurt*

and

**Benjamin Herborth**

*University of Groningen*

*This project was realized in association with the Frankfurt Cluster of Excellence “Normative Orders” with the support of the German Science Foundation*



Cambridge University Press  
978-1-107-16849-7 — Uses of 'the West'  
Edited by Gunther Hellmann, Benjamin Herborth  
Frontmatter  
[More Information](#)

## CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom  
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA  
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia  
4843/24, 2nd Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, Delhi - 110002, India  
79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

[www.cambridge.org](http://www.cambridge.org)

Information on this title: [www.cambridge.org/9781107168497](http://www.cambridge.org/9781107168497)

© Cambridge University Press 2017

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2017

*A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library*

ISBN 978-1-107-16849-7 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

## Uses of the West

The notion of 'the West' is commonly used in politics, in the media, and in the academic world. To date, our idea of 'the West' has been largely assumed and effective, but has not been examined in sufficient detail. *Uses of the West* combines a range of original and topical approaches to evaluate what 'the West' does, and how it is being used in everyday political practice. This book examines a range of 'uses of the West', and traces how 'the West' works in a broad array of conceptual and empirical contexts, ranging from the return of geopolitics – via a critical review of the debates surrounding Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis – to the question of the future of the West. Analysis extends further to the repercussions of the war on terror on Western democracy and the processes of delineating the Western from the non-Western, as well as observations on the institutional transformations of Western order.

GUNTHER HELLMANN is Professor of Political Science at the Department of the Social Sciences, Goethe University, Frankfurt.

BENJAMIN HERBOTH is an Assistant Professor of International Relations and International Organization, History and Theory of International Relations, at the University of Groningen.

## Contents

---

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>page</i> vii
<i>List of Tables</i>	viii
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	ix
1 Introduction: Uses of the West BENJAMIN HERBORTH AND GUNTHER HELLMANN	1
 <b>Part I: Theorizing the West</b>	
2 Foreign Policy Identity Crises and Uses of 'the West' STEFANO GUZZINI	13
3 'The West' versus Other Western 'We's': A Discourse Analysis in Reverse OLE WÆVER	37
4 Between Polarisation and Appeasement: Democracy and Its 'Other' HARALD MÜLLER	60
5 After 'the Clash': Uses of 'the West' after the Cold War PATRICK THADDEUS JACKSON	83
 <b>Part II: The West in Use</b>	
6 Aesthetics, Power, and Insecurity: Self-Interrogative Imaging in the West BRENT J. STEELE	111
7 Everyday Exceptions: The Paradox of a Perpetual State of Emergency BENJAMIN HERBORTH	136

vi	Contents	
8	Re-constituting NATO: Foundational Narratives of Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s GABI SCHLAG	156
9	Transatlantic Policies towards China and Russia: Self-Conceptions and Contradictions of a Universalizing West CHRISTIAN WEBER	179
10	Russia Becoming Russia: A Semi-periphery in Splendid Isolation TED HOPF	203
	<b>Part III: Transformations of the Western Institutional Order</b>	
11	Defending 'the West'? The Transformation of National Security in the European Union GUNTHER HELLMANN	231
12	How the 'End of the Cold War' Ended MATTHEW EVANGELISTA	254
13	Conclusion: The Ways of the West and the Road Ahead LENE HANSEN	280
	<i>Index</i>	301

## Notes on Contributors

---

**MATTHEW EVANGELISTA** is President White Professor of History and Political Science in the Department of Government at Cornell University, as well as Director of both the Einaudi Center for International Studies and its Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies.

**STEFANO GUZZINI** is Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Professor of Government at Uppsala University, and Professor of International Relations at Pontificia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio).

**LENE HANSEN** is Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

**GUNTHER HELLMANN** is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences and Principal Investigator in the Center of Excellence 'Formation of Normative Orders', both at Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main.

**BENJAMIN HERBOTH** is Assistant Professor, History and Theory of International Relations, University of Groningen.

**TED HOPF** is the Provost's Chair Professor at the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

**PATRICK THADDEUS JACKSON** is Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean for Curriculum and Learning School of International Service at American University, Washington, DC.

**HARALD MÜLLER** is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences and Principal Investigator in the Center of Excellence 'Formation of Normative Orders', both at Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main. He is also a Member of the Executive Board and Head of the Research Department 'International Security and World Order' at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF).

x Notes on Contributors

**GABI SCHLAG** is Teaching Associate and Research Fellow at Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg.

**BRENT STEELE** is Professor of Political Science and Director of Graduate Studies at the Political Science Department, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.

**OLE WÆVER** is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, founder of the Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST), and Director of the Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts (CRIC).

**CHRISTIAN WEBER** is Research Associate at the Institute of the History, Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine, Ulm University, Germany.

# 1 Introduction

## Uses of the West

---

*Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann*

The notion of 'the West' is ubiquitous in both scholarly and political discourse. Yet, it remains surprisingly undertheorized. As if we always already knew what we are talking about when invoking it, 'the West' seems to operate as a taken-for-granted presumption, making superfluous any further interrogation. Curiously, thus, the West is ubiquitous, undertheorized, and taken-for-granted at the same time, and it is precisely this combination of attributes that seems to render it politically effective. It is also precisely this unique combination of attributes that constitutes the study of the West as an intellectual challenge.<sup>1</sup>

In everyday political language 'the West' is usually understood to refer to a grouping of states and societies in Europe and North America, which share a few characteristics, are tightly connected among each other, and have amassed the overwhelming bulk of military capabilities, economic power, and cultural attraction. Defying geographical common sense, however, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly even Japan are widely considered to be 'Western' outliers in the Pacific. While the idea of 'the West' as well as the array of images, practices, and institutions associated with it did originate in Western Europe, today the imaginary dimension of 'the West' has taken on a life of its own. As Stuart Hall contends, 'the *idea* of "the West", once produced, became productive in its turn. It had real effects: it enabled people to know or speak of certain things in certain ways. It produced knowledge. It became *both* the organizing factor in a system of global power relations *and* the organizing concept or term in a whole way of thinking and speaking' (Hall, 1992, p. 278). Western states and societies define themselves in terms of a shared form of socio-political organization, which sets them apart from a non-Western 'Rest' and warrants a special kind of relation.<sup>2</sup> Hence, 'transatlantic

<sup>1</sup> The editors would like to thank the Research Cluster 'The Formation of Normative Orders' at Goethe University Frankfurt and the Johns Hopkins SAIS Bologna Center for generous support of this volume.

<sup>2</sup> Importantly, the geographical dislocation of the idea of 'the West' opens up the possibility of the entire world becoming 'Western'.

2 Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann

relations' commonly refers to relations among Europe and the US, while, to the complete befuddlement of any studious reader of a world map, relations between, say, South Africa and Brazil are not usually classified as transatlantic.

The terms employed to describe distinctly Western similarities characteristically entail advanced liberal democracies and market-oriented or capitalist economies, and secularized societies. References to their interconnectedness typically point to common historical experiences as well as dense networks of political, economic, and societal exchange.<sup>3</sup> In addition, in a global perspective the 'Western' world is usually viewed as having assumed a dominant position for many centuries – a position which it still occupies to the present. What history books usually consider to be the world's major wars have largely been fought *in* the West and *among* Western states. Here, the concentration of wealth was by far the highest and the political regime of popular sovereignty considered to be most advanced. The longstanding (obviously Western) distinction between 'developed' countries on the one hand and 'developing' countries on the other captured this sense of Western superiority most clearly. In the loose sense in which the remaining states were grouped in this narrative according to the other cardinal points of the compass, 'the South' and 'the East' were relegated to secondary roles at best.<sup>4</sup> In a nutshell, there was little room for doubting who was *dominating* and who was *being dominated*.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact seemed to mark one of those historical junctures with the potential for far-reaching upheavals. In the beginning, Western triumphalists were clearly dominating the debate. Francis Fukuyama famously summarized the alleged 'triumph of the West, of the Western *idea*' in the following way:

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of *Foreign Affairs*' yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in

<sup>3</sup> Initially the pun 'From Plato to NATO' served well primarily for European History courses, as a quick search on the internet shows. By the 1990s it also reached the cover of academically inspired books about the identity of 'the West'; see Gress, 1998.

<sup>4</sup> In recent centuries 'the East' only played a dominant role approximating that of 'the West' when it was understood as the Eastern part of a bipolar 'North' grouped around the Soviet Union. Tellingly, 'the North' has essentially disappeared from the global political compass after the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact – and with it 'the South' has vanished as a playground for the geopolitical maneuvering of Northern powers.

the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world *in the long run*. (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 4)

When one moves closer to the present, the ‘emerging powers’ (most prominently China, India, and Brazil, as well as a resurgent Russia) are all (more or less) rising in ‘the East’ and ‘the South’ – and their rise is often accompanied by diagnoses of crisis at the very heart of the ‘developed’ West. Moreover, the ‘case against the West’ has been made ever more explicitly from the East with charges that it (i.e. ‘the West’ collectively) has become ‘the world’s single biggest liability’ (Mahbubani, 2008). Although neither Fukuyama nor Mahbubani were (or are) representative of a broader discourse at the respective point in time, they certainly expressed an underlying mood – if in an exaggerated way.

Apparently, the concept of ‘the West’ not only entails a distinct ‘set of images’, it also provides us with a way of drawing boundaries, establishing differences, and demarcating political and social spaces. ‘The West’ gains significance only in contradistinction to ‘the Rest’ (Hall, 1992). It seems well-justified and only consequential, then, that most of the attempts to come to terms with the West focus predominantly on Western domination, repression, and silencing of non-Western voices, in short the whole array of hierarchies brought about by the West/Rest distinction. However, the ensuing story, if it merely inverts the hierarchicalization of ‘the West and the Rest’, all too easily reproduces static and fixed images of both the West and the Rest. The problem is most clearly articulated by Edward Said, in a 1994 post-scriptum to his seminal study of *Orientalism*:

Let me begin with the one aspect of the book’s reception that I most regret and find myself trying hardest now (in 1994) to overcome. That is the book’s alleged anti-Westernism, as it has been misleadingly and rather too sonorously called by commentators both hostile and sympathetic. This notion has two parts to it, sometimes argued together, sometimes separately. The first is the claim imputed to me that the phenomenon of Orientalism is a synecdoche, or miniature symbol, of the entire West, and indeed ought to be taken to represent the West as a whole. Since this is so, the argument continues, therefore the entire West is an enemy for the Arab and Islamic or for that matter the Iranian, Chinese, Indian and many other non-European peoples who suffered Western colonialism and prejudice. The second part of the argument ascribed to me is no less far reaching. It is that a predatory West and Orientalism have violated Islam and the Arabs. (Note that the terms “Orientalism” and “West” have been collapsed into each other.) Since that is so, the very existence of Orientalism and Orientalists is seized upon as a pretext for arguing the exact opposite, namely, that Islam is perfect, that it is the only way (*al-hal al-wahid*), and so on and so on. To criticize Orientalism, as I did in my book, is in effect to be a supporter of Islamism or Muslim fundamentalism. (Said, 1995, p. 330f.)

4 *Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann*

Against such 'caricatural permutations', Said (1995, p. 331) insists on the explicitly anti-essentialist thrust of his work.

Nevertheless, *Orientalism* has more often been thought of as a kind of testimonial to subaltern status – the wretched of the earth talking back – than as a multi-cultural critique of power using knowledge to advance itself. Thus as its author I have been seen as playing an assigned role: that of self-representing consciousness of what had formerly been suppressed and distorted in the learned texts of a discourse historically conditioned to be read not by Orientals but by other Westerners. This is an important point, and it adds to the sense of fixed identities battling across a permanent divide that my book quite specifically abjures, but which it paradoxically presupposes and depends on. (Said, 1995, p. 336)

In order to avoid re-essentializations of this kind, this volume explicitly refrains from imposing a shared understanding of the West, or a shared framework of analysis on the individual contributions.<sup>5</sup> We do not ask what the West *is* but what it, the word, *does*, and *how* it is being used in everyday political practice. The 'self/other nexus' is not to be misunderstood as a structuralist formalism where history and politics are relegated to the secondary role of filling in preconstituted positions. On the contrary, it is only in the contested *Uses of the West*, where politics is at play, that the positions of 'the West and the Rest' are constituted.<sup>6</sup> We thus focus deliberately on uses of the West inside the West and by Westerners (or, in the case of Ted Hopf's chapter, potential Westerners), not in order to denigrate the importance of non-Western articulations of the West, but, very much in line with Stuart Hall and Edward Said, in order to shed light on the internal complexity and multifacetedness of references to the West inside the West.

Such a focus on everyday practices of using the West inevitably yields a multitude of different uses. An inquiry into the transformation of Western order thus confronts us with more than the empirical challenge of meaningfully weaving together a coherent account of a complex macro-social process in the light of abundant and heterogeneous pieces of evidence. It also confronts us with the theoretical challenge of how to conceptualize the West in the first place. Traditionally, theories of international politics assume a starting point where conceptual problems of this kind are already rendered unproblematic. From such a perspective, grasping

<sup>5</sup> The chapters by Gabi Schlag, Christian Weber, and the editors are the product of a joint research project 'Secur(itiz)ing the West' funded by the research cluster on the Formation of Normative Orders at Goethe University Frankfurt.

<sup>6</sup> See esp. Iver Neumann's *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation* (1999), and Alastair Bonnett's *Occidentalism: The Uses of the West* (2006), which served as inspiration in choosing the title for this volume; see also Neumann, 1996; Hansen, 2006; the contributions to Hall and Jackson, 2007; Browning and Lehti, 2010; and Katzenstein, 2010.

the intricacies of international conduct seems possible only to the extent that we start from a relatively fixed understanding of who the relevant actors are and what they are up to. Then the ordeal of cooperation under anarchy may begin. The various turns IR theory has taken in recent years have responded to this constellation by attempting to gradually unpack what is taken for granted in the image of states as unified, rational actors pursuing national interests. However, writing against the background of a discipline that still draws a hard and fast line between the domestic and the international, analyses of the contingent, historical, and contentious construction of national interests, state preferences, or identities have, for the most part, still presupposed a fixed unit of analysis – i.e. something like a specific grouping of Western states to which we can attach actor-like qualities. Reflexive analyses of contentious processes of identity formation have gained legitimacy as a distinct type of scholarship within IR precisely because they accepted, in return, a fairly conventional understanding of international order. Constructivist, post-structuralist, and broadly reflectivist scholarship has profoundly (and fruitfully) changed our understanding of what states or international and non-governmental organizations do. Only on rare occasions, however, has it tackled the question of how political spaces, i.e. spaces where political authority is exercised, come into being in the first place.<sup>7</sup>

One of the primary objectives of this volume is to *theorize* the West in a manner that, contrary to the interpretive routines sketched earlier, does not presuppose a fixed understanding of the West as a preconstituted political space, ready-made and waiting for social scientific inquiry. The West, we contend, is one of the elusive phenomena in international politics, which do not have ‘phone numbers’ – to recall one of Henry Kissinger’s complaints about an ineffectual European partner. ‘The West’ indeed is an elusive concept, yet its elusive nature has not seemed to hamper its historical success. On the contrary, it might be precisely the integrative catch-all nature of the idea of the West that has made it attractive in many different ways and contexts.

In seeking to explore a broad range of uses of the West, the volume is organized into three sections. The first section is entitled *Theorizing the West*, but this is not meant to imply that the chapters collected here provided an authoritative framework for what is to follow, let alone that

<sup>7</sup> The burgeoning literature on global governance, which has pointed to the emergence of new forms of regulation beyond the nation-state, runs into a similar problem. Starting from the observation that there is governance beyond the nation-state, it has been taken for granted that post-, trans- or supranational spaces have already emerged. Here, too, the question of how such political spaces are constituted in the first place receives little attention.

6 *Benjamin Herboth and Gunther Hellmann*

there are no distinctly theoretical efforts in the subsequent chapters. On the contrary, the broadly reconstructive approach implicit in focusing on practical uses of 'the West' requires each and every chapter to engage in both conceptual and substantive research at the same time. Similarly, that the second section is entitled *The West in Use* is not meant to imply that these were the only chapters engaging in the reconstruction of specific uses of the West, much as the focus on *Transformations of the Western Institutional Order* is not exclusive to the chapters collected in the third section. Still, the relative emphasis of these respective concerns is distributed unevenly across the chapters, and this is all we mean to highlight by proposing such a categorization.

Specifically, *Stefano Guzzini* addresses the question of how 'the West' operates as a 'geographic imaginary within a context of geopolitical thought'. Theorizing 'the West' here boils down to tracing specific (and contested) articulations of what the West may stand for within different national discursive contexts. *Ole Wæver* moves beyond national spaces by asking whether 'the West' will be 'a powerful category in the future' in contrast to competing (and overlapping) 'other We's'. Posing the question in this fashion suggests a theoretical approach which culminates in a prediction. For Wæver a mixture of polarity analysis and foreign policy outlook of major powers forms the basis for 'predicting future discourses' in which 'the West' (at least as a category) is declining. Whereas 'the West' is either multiply applied in diverse national geopolitical discourses, as in Guzzini's contribution, or seen to be in decline overall from a macro-analytical perspective, as in Wæver's chapter, *Harald Müller* theorizes the West as a universalist ideology which is deployed to justify and perpetuate the powerful global position of states located mainly in the North Atlantic space. In particular Müller castigates the normative impulses feeding liberal interventionism. He pleads for a rehabilitation of state sovereignty and non-intervention in order to reinstate basic rights of self-determination to the non-Western 'rest' of the globe. *Patrick Jackson* shares with Harald Müller an outlook on 'the West' which conceives it primarily in terms of a universalist (and, presumably, fairly coherent) set of ideas. Yet in examining the rise and fall of 'Western civilization' discourses in the context of Samuel Huntington's book on 'The Clash of Civilizations', Jackson shifts the focus back to the discursive level. He shows how 'the West' was linked to the discourse of 'containment' and how it gradually vanished after the mid-1990s, especially after 9/11. Different as they are in their substantive outlook, all three chapters share a particular mode of interrogating the West. Theorizing the West is *not* a quest for absolute foundations, forging a master definition meant to trump all others, but rather an

ongoing inquiry into the performative consequences of its uses in political practice.

*Brent Steele* starts off the second section on *The West in Use* with an analysis of 'self-interrogative imaging', a set of practices that thrives on the difference between an aesthetically idealized US Self and the harrowing experience of being exposed to images thwarting such idealizations. Taking the 2004 Fallujah incident as an example, Steele shows how the idealized image of the US as the 'standard-bearer' of Western values was at the same time actualized and called into question. It is precisely because aesthetic self-images can never be fully stabilized, Steele concludes, that they remain open to critique and counter-power. *Benjamin Herborth* shares Steele's concern for the ramifications of the post-9/11 war on terror on democratic practice. The discursive salience of a 'terrorist threat to the West', he argues, triggers an ongoing securitization spiral gradually submerging what is hailed as the normative core of 'the West' in the name of its defense. In an analysis of the notorious *Torture Memos*, Herborth shows how such a logic of securitization then gradually transforms into a technocratic logic of risk, which works to exempt practices of torture and extraordinary rendition from political accountability.

While Steele and Herborth focus on the dangers of 'de-Westernizing the West' and the ensuing tension between the fragility and tenacity of democratic practice, which typically remains situated at the level of the nation-state, the chapters by Schlag and Weber interrogate dynamics of securitizing and desecuritizing the West at a higher level of aggregation. *Gabi Schlag* focuses on the reconstitution of NATO through the performative enactment of a securitized politics of identity, which can be tracked from the earliest stages of the alliance to the most recent efforts to redefine its operational scope. Casting itself as the primary institutional embodiment of 'the West' and its first line of defense, Schlag argues, NATO has displayed a creative array of practices of self-authorization, which ensured that it would remain safely in business after the end of the Cold War. *Christian Weber* moves beyond the internal institutional organization of the West to an even higher level of aggregation, namely that of great power rivalry. In dealing with China and Russia, the prime candidates for the role of a rivaling great power, Europe and the US are found to project a strong sense of moral superiority. The display of 'Western universalism', however, turns out to be paradoxical even on the inside, for the vibrant public endorsement of shared commitments to universal values, at closer scrutiny, tends to conceal a more complex and multifarious discursive landscape encompassing both securitizing and desecuritizing dynamics. A complex and multifarious ensemble of references to the

8 *Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann*

West lies also at the center of *Ted Hopf's* chapter. Where Weber focuses on Western and, in particular, transatlantic policies towards China and Russia, Hopf delves into Russia's struggles to situate itself vis-à-vis the West to uncover a disjuncture between an elite-centered move towards neoliberal adaptation and a 'strategy of selective disengagement with the West and non-participation in its hegemonic order'. The tension between these alternatives, Hopf shows, plays out not only at the level of alternative common senses, but also in confrontation with Russia's material power base, which remains distinctly semi-peripheral. All five chapters thus start from concrete empirical sites in order to interrogate how the West is being used, and more specifically how it serves in different ways to constitute, shape, and constrain horizons of political possibility.

The two chapters in the final section share a perspective on material and ideational dimensions of 'Westernness' with a focus on transformative dynamics. *Gunther Hellmann* focuses on classical security issues and concentrates his analysis of the transformation of 'the West' on one of its prominent theatres, Europe in general and the European Union in particular. Observing a gradual shift from traditional notions of 'national security' to 'transnational security' in European security discourse, he finds striking differences in references to 'the West' between the EU and the US based on a comparative reading of European and US security doctrines. Instead of defending a classical 'transatlantic West', Europeans are gradually shifting to a redefinition of 'Westernness' in terms of a globally engaging 'Europe'. *Matthew Evangelista* examines the transformation of the 'end of the Cold War'. His interest in explaining 'how the "End of the Cold War" ended' is driven by two curiosities: (a) the rise and fall in Russia of 'the West' as an appealing set of ideas and as a coalition of states which might serve as a partner in a project of de-securitization, and (b) the different ways in which international relations as a discipline tried to come to grips with the 'end of the Cold War'. Evangelista argues that two sets of causes were feeding into each other: first, a preoccupation with domestic concerns in the US and an accompanying lack of empathy for the internal struggles and perceptions of 'Western' alternatives within Russia, and, second Russian disillusionment with 'Western' solutions to domestic as well as international transformation, which in turn stimulated a search for distinctly Russian alternatives.

Both chapters engage most directly with what is commonly associated with 'the West' in everyday political language, namely its manifestation in both formal institutions and broader configurations of global order.

They do so, however, without ascribing the attribute 'Western' and its implicit normative hierarchicalizations to a particular institutional setting in advance, thus opening up the possibility of a problem-based turn in discussions of global order, which benefits from a focus on contested uses of the West in concrete institutional settings.

In the concluding chapter, *Lene Hansen* examines 'what "the West" does' in the individual chapters. In a 'strategic summary reading' she highlights differences at the ontological, epistemological and methodological level and asks what these differences 'tell us about "the West"'. In Hansen's view this diversity of approaches can be reconstructed as an overarching research agenda of 'the West' in terms of an 'ontology in material/discursive action'. Rather than seeing a material-ideational 'front line', she finds that a 'loose analytical framework that theorizes "the West" as made up by institutions, collective "we"-concepts, and values could be said to unite the book's contributions'. Thus, rather than defining the task of 'theorizing' as one which ought to reduce complexity, the chapters as a whole can be read as a plea for building up and rendering intelligible the complexity of the phenomena at hand. This, Hansen concludes, nicely fits the task of 'de-monolithizing "the West"', which, normatively speaking, could be a major task for how the 'inside' of 'the West' might be tackled in future research projects.

It is precisely in the service of such a 'de-monolithization' that we have opted to refrain from imposing a single, overarching theoretical framework on the volume, which would then reduce the task of individual chapters to a mere application of what has been theoretically stipulated in advance. The conceptually and theoretically pluralist structure of the volume thus corresponds directly to an understanding of the West itself as multi-faceted, at times even paradoxical. Individual uses of the West may often appear to operate as moves towards political closure. A strong universalization of all things Western implies a tendency to remove alternatives from sight. In the light of the manifold and often contradictory uses of the West that we find in political discourse, however, such a closure can never be fully successful, and it is precisely due to the impossibility of such a closure that the concept of the West, contrary to the surface implications of its dominant deployments, remains a site of discursive struggle and contestation. This is not the place to go on theorizing. We do hope, however, that lines of arguments such as these may serve as an example of how 'the West', though interesting in and of itself, can be understood as a site through which broader debates on ordering the global can be opened up to inquiry and contestation.

10 Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann

#### REFERENCES

- Bonnett, Alastair (2006) 'Occidentalism: The Uses of the West', paper presented at the NORFACE seminar 'Towards a Post-Western West? The Changing Heritage of "Europe" and the "West"', 2–3 February 2006, Tampere, Finland, available at <http://www.norface.org/files/s1-bonnett.doc>, last accessed July 20, 2015.
- Browning, Christopher and Marko Lehti, eds. (2009) *The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy* (London: Routledge).
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989) 'The End of History', *The National Interest* 16, pp. 3–18.
- Gress, David (1998) *From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents* (New York: The Free Press).
- Hall, Martin and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, eds. (2007) *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of 'Civilizations' in International Relations* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan).
- Hall, Stuart (1992) 'The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power', in Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, eds., *Formations of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 275–320.
- Hansen, Lene (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge).
- Katzenstein, Peter, ed. (2010) *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives* (London: Routledge).
- Mahbubani, Kishore (2008) 'The Case against the West', *Foreign Affairs* 87, 3, pp. 111–124.
- Neumann, Iver B. (1996) 'Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 2, 2, pp. 139–174.  
 (1999) *Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
- Said, Edward (1995) *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Publishers).

## Index

---

- 9/11, 84, 122, 123, 136, 138, 149, 171, 263, 284
- ABM treaty, 102, 266–267  
 accountability, 146  
 aesthetic insecurity, 115–117  
 aesthetics, 111–112  
 Agamben, Giorgio, 150  
 agency, 62, 69, 73, 120, 259  
 al-Qaeda, 124, 137, 143, 173, 263  
 American exceptionalism, 101  
   opposition to, 104  
 Anderson, Benedict, 40, 213  
 Antonio Gramsci, 203  
 archeology (Foucault), 41  
 Arendt, Hannah, 115, 120  
 Aron, Raymond, 23n13  
 articulation, 15, 42, 48, 140, 156, 159, 164, 169, 172  
 asecurty, 141  
 Ashcroft, John, 137  
 Ashley, Richard K., 16n5  
 austerly, 273  
 authorization, 145, 150, 198  
 autocracy, 60, 61, 62–63, 69–70, 140, 162, 184, 197  
 autonomy, 61, 72, 121
- balancing, 88, 92, 99, 203, 264  
 Beck, Ulrich, 71–73, 146  
 Beitz, Charles, 64  
 Bigo, Didier, 142  
 bin Laden, Osama, 52, 125, 137  
 bipolarity, 46, 97, 236, 239  
 Bolton, John, 25  
 Boulez, Pierre, 136–137  
 Bourdieu, Pierre, 16n5  
 Braudel, Fernand, 292  
 Brazil, 3  
 Bull, Hedley, 195  
 Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson, 48  
 Bush, George H. W., 260
- Bush, George W., 25, 45, 46, 60, 73, 84–85, 101–102, 129, 147, 149, 188, 232, 247, 261, 263, 266–267, 268, 273, 283
- Cambridge School (of conceptual history), 40  
 Campbell, David, 94, 294, 297  
 capitalism, 2, 18, 203, 206, 216  
 capitalist world economy, 210  
 Central and Eastern Europe, 167, 168, 268  
 chains of equivalence, 182, 286, 293  
 Chavez, Hugo, 52  
 China, 3, 45, 47, 50, 55, 67, 74, 267  
   and human rights, 190–196  
   rise of, 183–190  
 China Olympics, 48, 49, 52  
 Christendom, 44  
 civic rights, 151  
 civilian power, 232  
 civilization, 25, 28–29, 83, 87–92, 122, 125, 131, 137, 142, 181, 184, 198, 221, 255, 273  
   concept of, 83–104  
   reified concept of, 27  
 clash of civilizations, 14, 60, 104, 128  
 Clausewitz, Carl von, 23  
 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 272  
 Clinton, William J., 130, 264, 265, 298  
 Cold War, 17, 93–97, 160–172, 179, 246  
   end of the, 13, 31, 45, 238, 239, 254–276  
   lessons from the, 49  
 collective defense, 159, 162, 171, 238–239  
 colonialism, 48, 50  
 commonplace, 91, 99  
 commonsense, 203, 205–206, 214–215, 219  
 community, 54, 163, 172, 179, 195  
 conceptual change, 39–41, 43  
 conceptual history, 40, 292  
 confederation, 67

## 302 Index

- Congress of Mantua, 39  
 constructivism, 5, 42, 62, 259, 269  
 containment, 16, 96, 97, 99  
 contingency, 5, 37, 63, 112, 115, 142, 198  
 cooperation, 96, 158, 169, 171, 189, 223, 238  
 COP15, 48, 49  
 core, 204  
 cosmopolitanism, 60–80  
 counter-power, 115–117  
 Cox, Robert, 203–205  
 Crimea, 156, 174, 256, 275  
 crisis management, 171  
 critical constructivism, 158  
 critique, 153, 159  
 CSCE, 254  
 cultures of anarchy, 13
- death penalty, 295  
 decision, 146  
 democracy, 55, 63, 79, 139, 173, 198  
   vs. non-democracy, 60  
 democratic peace theory, 60, 62  
 Denmark, 26  
 de-politicization, 118, 139  
 Dershowitz, Alan, 152  
 de-securitization, 256, 263  
 détente, 17, 159, 236, 240  
 determinism, 19, 21, 157  
 deterrence, 76, 165, 166, 170, 171  
 de-territorialization, 234  
 Dewey, John, 112, 114–115  
 dialogue, 83, 103, 114, 169, 171, 242  
 difference, 3, 83, 91, 182, 196, 280  
 disciplining imagination, 119  
 discourse, 41–43, 157  
 discourse analysis, 37, 41, 87  
 discourse theory, 43  
 discursive structuration, 42  
 disorder, 126–128, 264  
 domestic politics, 42, 270  
 double-bind, 137  
 doxa, 16n5
- Energy Charter, 257  
 Enlightenment, 292  
 essentialism, 184  
 essentialization  
   critique of, 1, 43  
 EU, 25–26, 30–31, 51, 231–249, 274  
   admission of Turkey, 26, 282  
   Eastern enlargement, 169, 268  
   identity discourse, 25  
   weapons embargo against China, 190
- Eurasian Economic Community, 223  
 Europe, 39, 50, 141  
   concepts of, 42  
   emergence of, 39–41  
   provincialization of, 55  
 European Security Strategy, 236  
 exception, 77, 102, 118, 119, 139, 141, 146, 150, 246  
   routinizing the, 148–151  
 exclusion, 31, 64, 65, 182
- Fallujah, 116, 124, 126–131, 285  
 Febvre, Lucien, 292  
 Feinstein Report, 151  
 financial crisis, 46  
 foreign policy, 42, 87  
 foreign policy identity, 15, 24  
 Fortress Europe, 141  
 Foucault, Michel, 40, 41, 44, 112, 113–114, 115–117, 118–119, 146  
 foundational narratives, 159, 173  
 France, 26, 260  
 freedom, 55, 84–85, 103, 161–162, 173, 182  
   and security, 137  
 Fukuyama, Francis, 2–3, 38, 172, 197
- Gadhafi, Moammar, 52  
 Gaidar, Yegor, 203  
 geopolitics, 18, 19–24, 173  
   German tradition of, 19  
   and Italy, 14  
   and organicism, 19  
   return of, 13  
   and Russia, 13–14  
 Georgia, 262, 263, 268, 271  
 Giddens, Anthony, 73  
 glasnost, 167  
 global governance, 60, 63  
 Goldsmith, Jack, 143  
 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 17, 167, 238, 255, 258–259, 261–262, 270, 288  
 Gramsci, Antonio, 204, 206  
 great powers, 38, 45–47, 93, 179–198, 232, 272  
 Guantánamo Bay, 103, 143
- Habermas, Jürgen, 71  
 Hall, Stuart, 1, 3, 4, 137, 181, 182  
 hegemony, 183  
   concepts of, 203–207  
 Held, David, 66–68  
 Helms, Jesse, 25  
 Höffe, Otfried, 66–68  
 Hoffmann, Stanley, 156

## Index

303

- human rights, 49, 54, 60, 74, 79, 190–196  
 Huntington, Samuel, 14, 26–27, 30,  
 83–84, 86, 88, 89–92, 93, 97, 172,  
 197, 283, 292, 293, 294, 298–299
- ICC, 25  
 identity, 16, 27, 51, 157, 182, 203, 232,  
 259, 268–272, 295  
 identity discourses, 24  
 IMF, 195, 223, 273  
 import substitution, 213  
 inclusion/exclusion, 43, 70  
 India, 3  
 individuals  
   rights of, 65  
 inside/outside, 299  
 international law, 79  
 international society, 18, 48, 235  
 international system, 18, 62, 91, 179,  
 260  
 interpellation, 15  
 interpretation, 15, 183  
 intersubjectivity, 15, 119, 158, 256, 259  
 interventionism, 16  
 Iraq, 75  
 isolationism, 16  
 Italy, 14, 26
- Jean, Carlo, 14, 22, 23
- Kant, Immanuel, 13, 61, 63, 69, 77, 152  
 Kennan, George, 96  
 Khatami, Mohammad, 83  
 Koselleck, Reinhart, 40  
 Koskenniemi, Martti, 142, 152, 174  
 Kosovo, 75, 233, 256, 267  
 Kozyrev, Andrei, 254–255  
 Kratochwil, Friedrich, 89, 121, 124n8,  
 131n12, 152, 259
- Laclau, Ernesto, 182, 293  
 Lebow, Richard Ned, 258n4, 261  
 legitimation, 86, 94, 99, 141  
 liberal hegemony, 76  
 liberal universalism, 74  
 liberalism, 2, 63, 71  
 Luhmann, Niklas, 41, 146
- Mackinder, Halford John, 13, 19–22  
 macro-distinctions, 38  
 Malthus, Thomas, 21  
 Marshall Plan, 96  
 Maus, Ingeborg, 61, 63, 77, 198  
 Medvedev, Dmitri, 206, 215–223, 262,  
 272, 275
- mentalism  
   critique of, 41  
 Middle East, 50  
 militant liberalism, 63, 80  
 militarist gaze, 22–24  
 missionary universalism, 76  
 modernization, 174  
 Mouffe, Chantal, 197, 293  
 Muhammad cartoons, 48  
 multilateralism, 263  
 multipolarity, 45, 46, 97
- national interests, 5, 18, 24, 25, 185, 243  
 national security, 141, 232, 236, 244, 245  
 national security state, 232, 236  
 nationalism, 25, 27, 260  
 NATO, 102, 156–174, 238, 248, 254,  
 262–268  
   Eastern expansion, 265  
   strategic concept, 165  
 natural resources, 208  
 neo-conservatism, 45, 60, 65, 73–77,  
 97–104  
 neoliberal hegemony, 213  
 neo-liberalism, 25, 203, 206, 215, 287  
 Netherlands, 26  
 Neumann, Iver B., 4n6, 28, 89, 169, 193  
 New International Economic Order, 48  
 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 129  
 non-liberal others, 64  
 normative power, 232  
 normativity, 72  
 norms, 72, 79, 113, 152, 192, 195–198  
 North Atlantic Treaty, 161  
 North-South relations, 47–50
- Obama, Barack, 46, 60, 76, 85–86,  
 97–104, 143, 256, 272–273, 284  
 occidentalism, 51  
 ontological anxiety, 16, 18, 121  
 ontological insecurity, 15  
 Onuf, Nicholas, 94, 152  
 order, 5, 38, 46, 65, 67, 68, 75, 76, 102,  
 118, 139, 151, 255, 256, 261  
   and securitization/desecuritization, 142  
 Orientalism, 3–4  
 Ostpolitik, 17, 78
- papal policies, 39–41  
 paranoia, 140  
 parliamentary control, 66  
 particularism, 86, 87–92, 283, 291–295  
 Patriot Act, 149  
 peace research, 13, 17, 23n14, 149, 237,  
 245

## 304 Index

- peace-building, 79, 239  
 perestroika, 167, 238  
 performativity, 125, 139, 286, 294  
 periphery, 204  
 Pius II, 39  
 pluralism, 9, 49, 78  
 polarisation, 60, 62–64, 77–78, 80  
 polarity, 38, 45, 62  
     emerging structure of, 46  
 political authority, 5  
 political philosophy, 60  
 political theory, 75  
 populism, 26, 27  
 postcolonialism, 50, 197, 198  
 post-structuralism, 5, 41, 43, 158  
 power, 268–272  
 precaution, 166  
 prediction, 37  
 preemptive self-immunization, 147  
 public international law, 65  
 Putin, Vladimir, 55, 156, 203, 206,  
     215–218, 219, 223, 263, 266–267,  
     274  
  
 rationalization, 118  
 Ratzel, Friedrich, 20  
 Rawls, John, 64, 68–71  
 Reagan, Ronald, 17, 78, 258–259,  
     261  
 recognition, 16, 74, 197  
 regional powers, 45  
 regional security complex theory, 43,  
     44–47, 62  
 Rejali, Darius, 151  
 representation, 15  
 re-securitization, 14, 141, 256  
 Ringmar, Erik, 42, 89  
 risk, 150, 169  
 risk management, 150  
 risk society, 146  
 rogue states, 75  
 Rorty, Richard, 87, 136, 137  
 routinization, 119, 145  
 rule of law, 173  
 Rumsfeld, Donald, 22, 28, 30  
 Russia, 3, 13–14, 55, 254–276  
     and human rights, 190–196  
     and its Soviet past, 221  
     relative isolation of, 212  
  
 Said, Edward, 3–4, 27, 213  
 Schmitt, Carl, 118–120, 150  
 securitization, 19, 23, 62, 174, 188, 234,  
     246  
  
 securitization theory, 47, 137–142  
 security  
     transformation of, 245  
 security communities, 173  
 security dilemma, 62, 76, 269  
 security imaginary, 15–18, 24  
 self-authorization, 174  
 self-interrogative imaging, 121–126  
 semi-periphery, 204, 207–210  
 signification, 43  
 Skinner, Quentin, 40  
 sovereignty, 77, 140, 185  
 Soviet Union, 160, 165, 167, 168, 182,  
     221, 254  
 Spencer, Herbert, 19  
 Spengler, Oswald, 38, 181, 292  
 state of emergency, 150  
 structuralism, 41  
 structures as unstable and incomplete,  
     44  
 subjectivity, 41, 159, 173, 198  
 superpowers, 45  
 symbolic orders, 158  
 symbolic representation, 182  
 systems theory, 41  
  
 technocracy, 146  
 theorizing, 5  
 Tiananmen, 186  
 torture, 103, 142–148, 149–152  
 torture memos, 143–148  
 Toynbee, Arnold, 181  
 transatlantic relations, 2, 13, 28, 30, 84,  
     97, 141, 160–172, 181–183, 231  
 transnational security, 236, 245  
 triumphalism, 2, 76, 172, 276  
 Truman, Harry S., 160  
  
 U.S., 16, 27, 50, 83–104  
     challenges to hegemony, 47  
     foreign policy of the, 45  
     national security strategy, 75, 234  
 Ukraine, 50, 156, 174, 222, 242, 248, 249,  
     256, 263, 269, 271, 272, 273–276  
 UN, 194–195  
 uncertainty, 146, 168  
 unilateralism, 263  
 unipolarity, 45  
 United Nations Security Council, 73  
 universalism, 51, 63, 73–77, 84, 86,  
     87–92, 190–196, 283, 291–295  
 universalization, 55  
  
 vitalism, 117–121

## Index

305

- Wallerstein, Immanuel, 204  
 Waltz, Kenneth, 62, 89, 91  
 war on terror, 101, 131, 148, 151, 173, 198  
 Warsaw Pact, 156, 167  
 Washington consensus, 46, 213  
 Weldes, Jutta, 15, 94, 281  
 Wendt, Alexander, 13, 42, 73, 95  
 West  
   concept of the, 1, 5, 14, 97–104, 128, 151, 161, 183, 190, 196–198, 280  
   contestation of the, 3, 4–9, 14, 26, 27, 142, 158, 196, 206, 269  
   decline of the, 56, 83, 86, 125, 130, 172  
   de-monolithization of the, 9, 299  
   descriptions of the, 2, 30, 180, 196  
   and emerging powers, 3, 48  
   everyday uses of the, 1, 4, 24  
   Fortress West, 14  
   future of the, 57, 132, 231  
   and hegemony, 2, 29  
   presence/absence, 295–297  
   teleologies of the, 39  
 Western civilization, 111, 158, 161, 172, 181  
 Western hegemony, 203, 206, 224  
 Western values, 54–57, 83, 84, 234, 283, 291–295  
 Wiener, Antje, 195  
 World Bank, 46  
 world capitalist economy, 204  
 world system, 204  
 WTO, 46, 204, 224  
 Yeltsin, Boris, 203, 254  
 Yoo, John, 143, 152

The notion of 'the West' is commonly used in politics, the media, and in the academic world. To date, our idea of 'the West' has been largely assumed and effective, but has not been examined in sufficient detail. *Uses of the West* combines a range of original and topical approaches to evaluate what 'the West' does, and how it is being used in everyday political practice. This book examines a range of 'uses of the West', and traces how 'the West' works in a broad array of conceptual and empirical contexts, ranging from the return of geopolitics – via a critical review of the debates surrounding Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilization' thesis – to the question of the future of the West. Analysis extends further to the repercussions of the war on terror on Western democracy, the processes of delineating the Western from the non-Western, as well as observations of the institutional transformations of Western order.

**Gunther Hellmann** is Professor of Political Science at the Department of the Social Sciences, Goethe University, Frankfurt.

**Benjamin Herborth** is an Assistant Professor of International Relations and International Organization at the University of Groningen.

**CAMBRIDGE**  
UNIVERSITY PRESS  
[www.cambridge.org](http://www.cambridge.org)

ISBN 978-1-107-16849-7

